a report from the trenches by Georg Fons-Stankiewicz 2nd Edition Safety Days Conference - Fribourg Switzerland 10&11- October 2017

Transcription

1 BORDERLESS SAFETY IN THE BORDERLESS RAILWAY NETWORK - A METHOD OR A MIRACLE? a report from the trenches by Georg Fons-Stankiewicz 2nd Edition Safety Days Conference - Fribourg Switzerland 10&11- October 2017

2 THE SAFETY (RECALLED SAFETY DAY 2016) Safety is the ability of a system in combination with its defined application to attenuate the likelihood and/or consequences of a hazardous event to an acceptable level Conclusion: There is no universal safety. The safety strongly depends on the system and its application. The easiest way to ensure safety is to: operate standardised systems within unified application conditions and under unified rules and regulations. P 2

3 YES, WE CAN BUILD SAFE TRAINS (RECALLED SAFETY DAY 2016) Standards and regulations sufficient to manage safety up to SIL4 Consistent processes to determine and manage risks Practical Toolbox of proven methods Safety evidence based on traceability and transparency Mature independent assessment and approval process Whole Life Cycle covered BUT CAN WE OPERATE THEM SAFELY EVERYWHERE? P 3

4 THE EUROPEAN RAIL NETWORK P 4

5 ITS ELECTRIFICATION SYSTEMS P 5

6 NATIONAL TRAIN CONTROL SYSTEMS EBICAB 900 ATC ATB TBL, Crocodile SHP P 6

7 NATIONAL SAFETY AUTHORITIES (NSAS) P 7

8 ..OPERATORS AND INFRASTRUCTURE MANAGEMENT Country Infrastructure Manager National Operator Austria ÖBB Infrastruktur ÖBB Belgium Infrabel SNCB/NMBS Bulgaria NKŽI BDŽ Croatia HŽ Infrastruktura HŽ PP Czech Republic SŽDC ČD Denmark Banedanmark DSB Estonia EVR Infra Elron Finland Ratahallintokeskus VR France RFF SNCF Germany DB Netze DB Bahn Great Britain Network Rail National Rail Northern Ireland NIR Greece OSE Hungary VPE MÁV Republic of Ireland IÉ Italy RFI Trenitalia Latvia LDz PV Lithuania LG Luxembourg ACF CFL Macedonia MŽI MŽ Transport Montenegro ŽICG ŽCG Netherlands ProRail NS Norway Jernbaneverket NSB Poland PKP Polskie Linie Kolejowe PKP Portugal REFER CP Romania CFR Serbia ŽS Slovakia ŽSR ŽSSK Slovenia SŽ Spain ADIF RENFE Sweden Trafikverket SJ Switzerland SBB Infrastruktur SBB/CFF/FSS P 8

9 ONCE UPON A TIME The Tower of Babel by Pieter Bruegel the Elder P 9

10 THE EASY PAST OF THE EUROPEAN RAILWAY With only exceptional and precisely defined cross-border traffic Independent regulations each country Independently acting legal institutions and authorities had to react on the opening of the European railway market expecting Common understanding and Way of Working Unified legal, operational and technical regulations Cross Acceptance Unified homologation process P 10

11 INTEROPERABILITY THE EARLY APPROACH Council Directive 96/48/EC on the interoperability of the trans-european high-speed rail system Directive 2001/16/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on the interoperability of the trans-european conventional rail system First standardised legal approach Aim to achieve the interoperability of the European high-speed train network *) by standardizing design, construction, placing in service operation Maintenance yet very general/rudimentary *) Infrastructure, rolling stock, fixed installations and ILS P 11

12 INTEROPERABILITY THE EARLY APPROACH Directive 96/48/EC Directive 2001/16/EC essential requirements: Safety Reliability and availability Technical compatibility Health Environmental protection Environment general Maintenance and Operation Energy Control, command and signaling Rolling stock P 12

13 INTEROPERABILITY THE REFINEMENT.. furthermore For complex systems the directives 96/48/EC and 2001/16/EC mandated the elaboration of detailed technical specifications Technical Specifications for Interoperability (TSIs) were born Standards are recommendations, TSI are law The conformity to TSIs must be proven and permanently maintained during the whole life cycle P 13

14 BUILDING THE TOWER Directive 96/48/EC Interoperability Directive 2001/16/EC Interoperability Directive 2004/50/EC Interoperability Directive 2004/49/EC Railway Safety Directive Directive 2007/32/EC Interoperability (Ammendments) Directive 2008/57/EC Interoperability Directive 2008/110/EC Railway Safety (Ammendments) * only the most considerable presented for transparency P 14

15 BUILDING THE TOWER Directive 2011/18/EU Directive Interoperability 2009/131/EC(Ammendments) Interoperability (Ammendments) Regulation 352/2009 Common Safety Method Directive 2014/38/EU Directive Interoperability 2013/9/EU (Ammendments) Interoperability (Ammendments) Regulation 402/2013 Common Safety Method Directive 2014/88/EU Railway Safety (Ammendments) Directive 2014/106/EU Interoperability (Ammendments) Regulation 2015/1136 Ammending CSM RA Directive (EU) 2016/797 on Interoperability Directive (EU) 2016/798 on Railway Safety * only the most considerable presented for transparency P 15

16 TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS FOR INTEROPERABILITY In general, TSIs are engineering specifications Applied parallel to the other specifications (incl. functional safety spec.) Implemented in cooperation with safety (wherever appropriate) Do not replace risk analysis as defined in the EN15126 and CSM RA Do not deliver a specific SIL (except CCS subsets) TSIs provide a recipe on: How to do it properly interoperable (non-safety related TSIs) How to do it properly and (functional) safely interoperable (safety related TSIs) TSIs are still in development Mistakes, inconsistencies and ambiguous content possible ERA issues a regular errata of the TSIs Close cooperation with the NoBo in course of the implementation necessary Compliance to TSIs is certified by Notified Bodies (NoBo) P 16

17 TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS FOR INTEROPERABILITY System group System TSI xxx Vehicles Installations Common Operation Relation to (functional) safety? Area of safety relation Locomotives and passenger rolling stock LOC & PAS YES passive-, derailment-, brake-, fire- safety Noise NOI NO Freight Wagons WAG YES derailment-, brake-, fire- safety interface to TSI SRT, Safety Management Infrastructure INF NO System Energy ENE NO interface to TSI SRT Control command and signalling CCS YES Detailed subsets on ETCS, DMI, GSM-R Persons with reduced mobility PRM in principal - NO *) *) focus on passenger safety and passive barriers Safety in railway tunnels SRT YES fire and evacuation, electrical installations, interface to TSI LOC&PAS and WAG Operation and traffic management OPE in principal - NO *) *) refers for details to TSI LOC&PAS, CCS, SRT Telematics applications for freight service TAF NO Telematics applications for passenger service TAP NO P 17

18 NATIONAL REGULATIONS The Starting Holes National Regulations defined and developed in the pre-era era There are many reasons to keep some of them (some of these reasons may however be of a traditional nature ) National Rules may contradict the TSIs, even if for a good reason Solution the NNTRs Directive 2008/57/EC requires definition of Notified National Technical Rules (NNTRs) Layed down binding NNTRs supplement or substitute the TSIs Compliance to the NNTRs is certified by Designated Bodies (DeBo) P 18

19 NNTRS - THE GORDIAN KNOT Usually issued in national languages Difficult to satisfy in cross-border operation due to diversity May become high complexity and quantity Derogations may be requested in cases justified by technical/economical unfeasibility (DeBo) Conversion of all NTTRs in the TSIs is the most desireable goal of the interoperability initiative but this is a long way until then P 19

20 TSIS, NNTRS AND THE RACE AGAINST TIME Implementation of complex railway projects takes years Average period of time call-for-bids start of operation is 3,5 years Regulations and directives develop themselves To freeze their status to the starting point means risk of incompliance To fulfill all as they come to force requires a reliable cristal ball Strategic balance betweeen the implementation in advance and requested derogations is key factor Close cooperation with NoBo, DeBo and the NSA is a must Customers and Operators must be involved at early stage. a lot of expectation management activities P 20

21 STRUGGLING WITH TSIS Two Examples from the trenches Source: P 21

22 STRUGGLING WITH TSIS FIRE DETECTION (EXAMPLE) (Undetected) fire in long tunnels is critical hazard TSI SRT? (Ref. EU 1303/2014) are simplest detectors (with no reliability requirements) sufficient? ok, let s check P 22

23 STRUGGLING WITH TSIS FIRE DETECTION (EXAMPLE) (Undetected) fire in long tunnels is critical hazard TSI LOC&PAS? (Ref. EU 1303/2014) same question, are simplest (no-sil) detectors sufficient? P 23

24 STRUGGLING WITH TSIS FIRE DETECTION (EXAMPLE) (Undetected) fire in long tunnels is critical hazard TSI LOC&PAS (continued) no detectors required in passenger/luggage compartments, toilets etc. P 24

25 STRUGGLING WITH TSIS FIRE DETECTION (EXAMPLE) TSI LOC&PAS (continued) Interoperability everywhere?. isn t it a NNTR merged into a TSI? Do we really want it? P 25

26 STRUGGLING WITH TSIS EMERGENCY BRAKE (EXAMPLE) Loss of Emergency Brake likely becomes catastrophic TSI LOC&PAS (Ref. EU 1303/2014). well, an undisputable fact. let s check the maximum allowed brake distance P 26

27 STRUGGLING WITH TSIS EMERGENCY BRAKE (EXAMPLE) Loss of Emergency Brake likely becomes catastrophic TSI LOC&PAS (continued) P 27

28 STRUGGLING WITH TSIS EMERGENCY BRAKE (EXAMPLE) Emergency Brake in the search for the stopping distance TSI LOC&PAS (continued) what about trains designed for speeds < 250 km/h? what is the maximum emergency brake distance in degraded mode? P 28

29 STRUGGLING WITH TSIS EMERGENCY BRAKE (EXAMPLE) Emergency Brake in the search for the stopping distance TSI LOC&PAS (continued) ok, lets check P 29

30 STRUGGLING WITH TSIS EMERGENCY BRAKE (EXAMPLE) Emergency Brake in the search for the stopping distance EN : 2015 (:2005 is revoked) ok, lets look there P 30

31 STRUGGLING WITH TSIS EMERGENCY BRAKE (EXAMPLE) Emergency Brake in the search for the stopping distance EN Ch. 4 EN Ch. 5 and what is the allowed distance? Performance? P 31

32 STRUGGLING WITH TSIS EMERGENCY BRAKE (EXAMPLE) Emergency Brake the safe stopping distance solution at the very end the real solution is to: Haggle between the train manufacturer/infrastructure operator Compile a dedicated risk analysis (train line dependent) Convince the AsBo/NSA Bear the full responsibility for the assumptions and consequences and the TSI looks&feels like a non-binding recommendation P 32

33 A METHOD OR A MIRACLE Considerable legal framework (being) put in place The quantity of national regulations continuously decreasing More and more Cross Acceptance agreements met thus more and more unified Homologation process The interoperability/cross-border safe operation is definitely becoming a sophisticated method and a good practice... but there is still a long and thorny path to go. P 33

34 THAT S IT LET US DISCUSS Copyright Statements: enrespro reserves all rights in this document and in the information contained therein. All pictures used in this presentation are free to use for commercial purposes acc. to the licence or legally purchased. The author of this presentation has however no way to determine the initial source of the pictures if not placed under the terms of the CC licence and therefore refuses any further liability. P 34