JAMES F. GLEASON, P.E. CHAIRMAN QUALIFICATION COMMITTEE

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1 JAMES F. GLEASON, P.E. CHAIRMAN QUALIFICATION COMMITTEE Presented ese ted at NPEC C Ju July y 27, 7,

2 NPEC Most Nuclear Power Countries Use IEEE NPEC Standards Administrative Qualification Operations, Maintenance, Aging, Testing & Reliability Auxiliary Power Human Factors & Control Facilities Safety Related Systems

3 Equipment Qualification Electrical and Mechanical Safety Systems Seismic Radiation Design Basis Accidents

4 EQ and Present Issues Thirty years ago the accident at Three Mile Island focused attention on nuclear safety and EQ efforts increased dramatically. The accidents at the Fukushima plants will also accelerate implementation of third generation nuclear technology and EQ services Initial Safety System Performance Initial Safety System Performance Safety Systems worked Safety Systems Shut off Safety Systems worked Safety Systems Shut off Operators mislead by instrumentation Tsunami destroyed AC Power Two phase flow in valves Inaccurate instruments t Sf Safe until battery power exhausted Inability to timely restore AC Power EQ EQ became Law in USA New Qualifications EQ Research IAEA EQ Mandatory? EQ New EQ Tests Make existing plants safer Make existing plants safer New Procedures Beyond Design Basis New Procedures Beyond Design Basis Design of third generation commenced Advanced third generation technology 4

5 min Off Site AC Diesel AC Class 1E Batteries Core Cooling Fuel Pool Cooling Earthquake Tsunami End of Battery Life

6 *IN Ft St. Vrain Complete loss of AC power (Offsite and EDGs) cause high winds and snow *IN Grand Gulf Complete loss of AC power (Offsite and EDGs) cause high winds and rain *IN Sweden Forsmark Complete loss of all AC (Offsite and EDGs) and ½ of DC power cause human error and design error 6

7 EQ Standard IEEE 323 Add Environments and Qualification Methods for Other natural phenomenon hazards: extreme wind, flood, tsunami, hurricane, and tornado Initial Fukushima Enhancements IEEE and IEC Drafting

8 China Commitment to IEEE Standards EU Evaluations Stress Tests Considering DBA + Severe Accident Qualification

9 Hr Off Site AC Diesel AC Class 1E Batteries Passive Designs meet 72 hours w/o AC Power Core Cooling Fuel Pool Cooling Earthquake Long Duration Battery Modules Tsunami

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11 1. Establishing a logical, systematic, and coherent regulatory framework for adequate protection that appropriately balances defense in depth and risk considerations. Risk process does not recognize that qualified equipment is less likely to fail than unqualified equipment IEEE 323 has been working on a failure rate factor for qualified equipment for risk applications 2. Reevaluate and upgrade as necessary the design basis seismic and flooding protection of structures, systems, and components for each operating reactor. Seismic qualification of fire protection systems and of equipment to provide flood prevention is already practiced example fuel facilities such as MOX

12 Strengthen station blackout mitigation capability at all operating and new reactors for design basis and beyond design basis design basis external events. SC 2 developing Severe Accident Qualification Process IEEE 323 draft under review adds severe accidents as environments and qualification process IEEE 535 Coping time for Stationary Batteries 24 and 72 hours Utilize IEEE 344 Seismic Fragility Method to establish utilmate Seismic Capability and Margin

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