Spill History. Trans Mountain s Spill History

Transcription

1 Spill History Trans Mountain is committed to transparency involving any and all spills that have occurred along its lines, or on partner vessels carrying Trans Mountain- transported product. Information about reported spills is available to the public. While no spill is acceptable, when one does happen, Trans Mountain notifies the National Energy Board (NEB) the independent federal regulator of pipelines in Canada since As a regulated company, Kinder Morgan is responsible for reporting spills greater than 1.5m 3 or any spill to a water body regardless of volume. Over the years, the NEB has revised the spill reporting criteria for pipeline companies. Trans Mountain has followed all NEB regulations in terms of reporting pipeline leaks and malfunctions, according to the rules and thresholds listed below. Time Period NEB Spill Reporting Criteria Current Release of low vapour pressure (LVP) hydrocarbons greater than 1.5m 3 ; Release of gas or high vapour pressure (HVP) hydrocarbons; and Release resulting in significant adverse effect. Release of oil greater than 1.5m 3 ; Release of gas or high vapour (HVP) hydocarbons; and Release resulting in the discharge of toxic substances in land or into a body of water Any leak, break, fire or explosion in, or failure or malfunction of pipeline. It is important to note that the NEB s definition for a pipeline spill is not limited to the products transported in the pipeline. A spill or release is defined a discharge, spray, spill, leak, seep, pour, emit, dump and exhaust. That means if water is released from a pipeline or facility, that incident is also reported to the NEB. Trans Mountain s Spill History Since 1961, Trans Mountain has reported approximately 82 spills to the NEB. Click here for a table of spills reported by the company. Some of the incidents were below the reportable threshold. 69.5% of Trans Mountain s past spills have occurred at pump stations or terminals. All of our pump stations and terminals are equipped with monitoring and spill containment systems to provide early detection and lessen impacts and ensure spilled volumes are contained on site. These facilities are rigorously maintained and inspected to meet NEB standards. The remaining 30.5% of Trans Mountain s spills have occurred along the pipeline, with 21 incidents related to releases of crude oil from the pipeline. Of these spills, only 13 exceeded the reporting threshold of 1.5 m3 with just four of those 13 occurring in the

2 last 30 years. In all of these circumstances, Trans Mountain deployed its emergency response and spill management procedures. Since 1956, vessels from our Westridge Marine Terminal have been transporting petroleum products safely through Port Metro Vancouver without a single spill from a tanker. Find out more about pipeline incident reporting in Canada. Find out more about regulations regarding spill cleanup in Canada. Updated June 30,

3 Updated: June 30, 2014 Releases Reported by Trans Mountain June 2014 Trans Mountain has a comprehensive safety and preventative maintenance program that includes the protection of stream and river crossings. These spill prevention systems are fully documented and can be audited by the National Energy Board (NEB), the federal regulator of pipelines in Canada that cross inter- provincial boundaries. Trans Mountain acknowledges that spills do happen. While no spill is acceptable, the key is to ensure that robust response measures are in place to deal with incidents. Trans Mountain staff, combined with trained responders and contractors, provide for 24/7 response management along the 1,150- kilometre pipeline. Trans Mountain is required to report spills greater than 1.5 cubic metres (approximately 9.5 barrels) or any spill to a water body regardless of volume, to the NEB. The reporting rules have changed over the years. Trans Mountain has always followed the NEB spill- reporting regulations. Since 1961, Trans Mountain has reported 81 spills on its pipeline system to the NEB, some of which are below the reportable threshold. It is important to note that 69 per cent of all spills have occurred at Trans Mountain pump stations or terminals. These facilities have monitoring and spill containment systems that are rigorously maintained and meet NEB standards. Since 1956, vessels from our Westridge Marine Terminal have been transporting petroleum products safely through Port Metro Vancouver without a single spill from a tanker. Following each spill, Trans Mountain conducts a thorough incident investigation that contributes to improved spill prevention and management initiatives. Below is a summary of spills reported to the NEB by Trans Mountain between 1961 and June Line Pipe Pump Station Terminal /Tank Farm Barrels (6.29 barrels per cubic metre) IncidentNo Detected ReportingCompany Location Substance Cubic Metres Aug- 61 Company Limited 1 MP Mainline Crude Oil Unknown Unknown Aug- 62 Company Limited 1 MP Mainline Crude Oil Feb- 63 Company Limited 1 loop line MP Crude Oil Unknown Unknown May- 65 Company Limited 1 MP Crude Oil Jul- 65 Company Limited 1 Mile 237.4, Jasper Water N/A N/A

4 Updated: June 30, 2014 Line Pipe Pump Station Terminal /Tank Farm Barrels (6.29 barrels per cubic metre) IncidentNo Detected ReportingCompany Location Substance Cubic Metres Oct- 65 Company Limited 1 Mile 237 Water N/A N/A Oct- 65 Company Limited 1 Mile 241 water NULL NULL Apr- 66 Company Limited 1 Mile 239 Crude Oil May- 68 Company Limited 1 Mile 529, Kamloops B.C N/A N/A N/A Mile 581.3, Downstream from Apr- 71 Company Limited 1 Brodie Valve Crude Oil Jun- 73 Company Limited 1 MP 205, Alberta Crude Oil Jun- 77 Company Limited 1 MP 39.7 Mainline Crude Oil Jun- 78 Company Limited 1 Tank # 51 Oil Jan- 80 Company Limited 1 Edmonton Terminal Crude Oil Aug- 81 Company Limited 1 Tank Line Crude Oil Apr- 82 Company Limited 1 Westridge Loading Line Crude Oil Oct- 82 Company Limited 1 TMPL Burnaby Terminal Crude Oil Mar- 83 Company Limited 1 TMPL Edmonton Terminal Condensate May- 83 Company Limited 1 TMPL Burnaby Tank Farm # 82l Crude Oil Nov- 83 Company Limited 1 TMPL Edson Station Crude Oil

5 Updated: June 30, 2014 Line Pipe Pump Station Terminal /Tank Farm Barrels (6.29 barrels per cubic metre) IncidentNo Detected ReportingCompany Location Substance Cubic Metres Mar- 84 Company Limited 1 Line Valve Crude oil N/A N/A Jun- 84 Company Limited 1 Station Boundary Crude oil Jul- 84 Company Limited 1 Main Line Valve KP Crude Oil <0.001 < Jul- 84 Company Limited 1 Station Yard Crude Oil Oct- 84 Company Limited 1 TMPL Edmonton Pump Station Crude Oil - Sweet Jan- 85 Company Limited 1 TMPL Edmonton Tank Farm Crude Oil Apr- 85 Company Limited 1 TMPL Edmonton Terminal Crude Oil Jun- 85 Company Limited 1 TMPL Jasper Pump Station Crude Oil Unknown Unknown Aug- 85 Company Limited 1 TMPL Kamloops, B.C. Terminal Crude Oil Jan- 86 Company Limited 1 TMPL Edmonton Terminal Crude Oil Mar- 86 Company Limited 1 TMPL Kamloops, B.C. Terminal Crude Oil Oct- 86 Company Limited 1 TMPL Edmonton Terminal Crude Oil Oct- 86 Company Limited 1 TMPL Edmonton Terminal Crude Oil Oct- 86 Company Limited 1 TMPL Edmonton Terminal Crude Oil Nov- 86 Company Limited 1 TMPL Edmonton Terminal Crude Oil

6 Updated: June 30, 2014 Line Pipe Pump Station Terminal /Tank Farm Barrels (6.29 barrels per cubic metre) IncidentNo Detected ReportingCompany Location Substance Cubic Metres Km Pembina River Mar- 87 Company Limited 1 Crossing west of Edmonton AB Crude Oil Aug- 87 Company Limited 1 TMPL Burnaby Terminal Crude Oil Apr- 88 Company Limited 1 TMPL Edmonton Terminal Crude Oil N/A N/A May- 88 Company Limited 1 TMPL - Chiliwack KP 1017 Crude Oil N/A N/A Jul- 88 Company Limited 1 TMPL - Edmonton Pump Station Crude Oil Jul- 88 Company Limited 1 TMPL - Black Pool Station Crude Oil - Sweet Sep- 88 Company Limited 1 TMPL - Edmonton Pump Station Crude Oil Aug- 88 Company Limited 1 TMPL - Edmonton Pump Station Crude Oil Oct- 88 Company Limited 1 TMPL Burnaby Tank Crude Oil Feb- 89 Company Limited 1 TMPL - Burnaby Terminal Crude Oil Apr- 89 Company Limited 1 TMPL - Edmonton Tank Farm Crude Oil Unknown Unknown Apr- 89 Company Limited 1 TMPL - Edmonton Terminal Crude Oil Mar- 90 Company Limited 1 TMPL - Westridge Terminal Crude Oil - Sweet Jun- 90 Company Limited 1 TMPL - Edmonton Terminal Crude Oil Jun- 90 Company Limited 1 TMPL - Kamloops Tank Farm Crude Oil - Sweet

7 Updated: June 30, 2014 Line Pipe Pump Station Terminal /Tank Farm Barrels (6.29 barrels per cubic metre) IncidentNo Detected ReportingCompany Location Substance Cubic Metres Sep- 90 Company Limited 1 TMPL Kamloops to Burnaby Line Crude Oil - Sweet Jun- 91 Company Limited 1 TMPL Kamloops to Burnaby Line Crude Oil - Sweet Jul- 91 Company Limited 1 TMPL - Kamloops Tank Farm Crude Oil - Sweet Jul- 91 Company Limited 1 TMPL - Edmonton Terminal Jet Fuel Dec- 91 Company Limited 1 TMPL - Edmonton Tank Farm Crude Oil - Sweet May- 92 Company Limited 1 Jasper Alberta Pump Station Jet Fuel TMPL - McMurphy Pump Dec- 92 Company Limited 1 Station Crude Oil - Sweet Jan- 93 Company Limited 1 TMPL - Kamloops Tank Farm Crude Oil - Sweet Jun- 93 Company Limited 1 TMPL - Edmonton Terminal Crude Oil - Sweet Feb- 94 Company Limited 1 Tank Farm Diesel fuel Aug- 94 Company Limited 1 TMPL - Sumas Station Diesel fuel Sep- 95 Company Limited 1 Pump Station, Pump Unit #3 Crude Oil Apr- 96 Company Limited 1 TMPL - Burnaby Terminal Contaminated Water Jan Mar- 98 Approx 80% Methyl tert- Company Limited 1 TMPL - Sumas Station butyl ether & 20% Diesel Fuel Company Limited 1 TMPL - Westridge Terminal Crude Oil - Sweet

8 Updated: June 30, 2014 Line Pipe Pump Station Terminal /Tank Farm Barrels (6.29 barrels per cubic metre) IncidentNo Detected ReportingCompany Location Substance Cubic Metres May- 98 Company Limited 1 TMPL - Mainline Crude Oil - Sweet Jan- 99 Company Limited 1 TMPL - Blue River Scraper Trap Crude Oil - Sweet Apr- 99 Company Limited 1 TMPL - Edmonton Terminal Gasoline Dec- 02 Company Limited 1 TMPL- Sumas Station Crude Oil - Sweet Terasen Pipelines (Trans Jul- 05 Mountain) Inc. 1 TMPL- Sumas Tank Farm Crude Oil - Sweet Terasen Pipelines (Trans Dec- 05 Mountain) Inc. 1 TMPL - Edmonton Terminal Iso- octane Jun- 07 Terasen Pipelines (Trans Mountain) Inc. 1 TMPL - Wahleach Pump Station Crude Oil - Sweet Jul- 07 Trans Mountain Pipeline Inc. 1 TMPL - Westridge Line Crude Oil - Synthetic Jan- 08 Trans Mountain Pipeline Inc. 1 Atco Pipeline Natural Gas - Sweet N/A N/A May- 09 Trans Mountain Pipeline ULC 1 TMPL - Burnaby Terminal Crude Oil - Sweet Mar- 11 Trans Mountain Pipeline ULC 1 TMPL - Kamloops, BC Terminal Waste Oil TMPL - KP Apr- 11 Trans Mountain Pipeline ULC 1 (near Chip Lake, AB) Oil Jan- 12 Trans Mountain Pipeline ULC 1 TMPL - Sumas Tank Farm Crude Oil - Sweet TMPL - Mainline Kingsvale No NEB # 12- Jun- 13 Trans Mountain Pipeline ULC 1 North Crude Oil No NEB # 26- Jun- 13 Trans Mountain Pipeline ULC 1 TMPL - KP 966 Crude Oil 17.8* 112* TMPL - Edmonton Terminal - No NEB # 1- Dec- 13 Trans Mountain Pipeline ULC 1 Tank 31 Crude Oil No NEB # 22- Jan- 14 Trans Mountain Pipeline ULC 1 TMPL Chip Station Crude Oil * May 12, 2014 UPDATE: Based on initial observations and an estimate at the time of the release, KMC initially reported 25 bbls of petroleum being released. A revised interim volume of 112 bbls has been calculated and reported based on clean up in 2013 and oil recovery to date. As clean up efforts at this location will continue in 2014, KMC will continue to do what is necessary to ensure that regulatory criteria for clean up and remediation are being met. Once clean up efforts have been completed, (late fall 2014) the release volume may be further revised, if site data warrants change.

9 Trans Mountain Pipeline operators ignored alarms warning of Abbotsford oil spill: report National Energy Board critical of control centre in Edmonton By Gordon Hamilton, Vancouver Sun November 28, 2012 A National Energy Board report reveals that Trans Mountain Pipeline operators ignored warning alarms for three-and-a-half hours before responding to a gasket failure that resulted in a crude oil spill last January at its Sumas tank farm near Abbotsford. It took six hours after the first warning sounded for Trans Mountain s Sumas operator to arrive on the scene, where a spill was discovered. The crude oil did not escape from a containment area but noxious fumes were released into the atmosphere, affecting nearby residents. The NEB estimates 90,000 litres of crude oil escaped. This latest oil spill report comes at a time when pipeline owner Kinder Morgan is applying to expand the pipeline s capacity from 300,000 barrels a year to 750,000 barrels to feed Asian markets. It has given the company a black eye, said Ben West, of the Wilderness Committee. The report is critical of monitoring staff at Trans Mountain s control centre at Edmonton, stating that the control centre operator failed to set an alarm within the required time limit of 15 minutes after an oil transfer had taken place at the Sumas tank farm the evening of Jan. 23, and then failed to respond to leak warning alarms that sounded every hour until the operator s shift ended. The NEB report finds that the leak was detected later than it should have been, the control centre operator did not follow procedures and there were improper alarm settings in a recently-installed data acquisition system. The board states Trans Mountain Pipeline has identified corrective actions to address the report s findings. The board finds that these actions are appropriate to prevent the occurrence of similar incidents in the future. The report, which was released earlier this month, states that the operator assumed the alarms were being caused by high winds and did not send a field technician to investigate. Further, the operator failed to understand that the volume in the tank was dropping.

10 The night shift CCO (control centre operator) did notice the trend, but considering the initial volume change as relatively small, interpreted the cause as a weather event, not a possible leak, states the report. The spill happened at an undetermined time around midnight Jan. 23 as a result of a gasket failure on the roof of a tank caused by pressure from frozen water in the roof drain system. The temperature was cold and a strong wind was blowing. There had been a transfer of warmer crude oil into the tank earlier in the evening; after the transfer, the control centre operator failed to set the warning alarm. There were two alarm systems, a new system and a legacy system. The new alarm was set at 11:26 p.m., Jan. 23 but the one that the operator was to use for monitoring, the legacy system, was not set until 1:11 a.m., Jan. 24. At 2:39 a.m., Jan. 24 the first alarm from the legacy system was received. The command centre operator decided it was a false alarm. At 3:11 a second alarm was received, from the new system being installed on the pipeline, but the operator again assumed it was a false alarm. At 4:11, a third alarm was received. The centre operator deemed it notable but did not see any change in the tank level so left a note on it for the day shift. A new shift arrived at 5 a.m. The day operator reviewed tank levels but determined the onecubic-metre change was within the accuracy level of the measuring device. At 5:47 the fourth alarm was received and at 5:50, the operator called the Sumas terminal operator to investigate. The terminal operator arrived on the site at 6:50, discovered the leak and closed the roof drain, isolating the source. The control centre received the first odour complaint at 7 a.m. The fact that, similar to Enbridge s 2010 spill on the Kalamazoo River in Michigan, Trans Mountain Pipeline staff ignored warning alarms raises concerns over Trans Mountain s plans to twin its Edmonton-to-Burnaby pipeline, said Jay Ritchlin, director-general of the David Suzuki Foundation. Even with highly advanced systems you will have a spill. This case seems to be a really egregious case of human error. It s tragic. What you have is the release of a chemical that does significant harm to human health and the environment during the peak period when you could actually hope to do something about it, he said. I think people are seeing more and more instances of spills and are seeing difficulty in getting any realistic response. I think it will make people more suspicious that these kinds of things can be run safely.

11 After the spill, Kinder Morgan spokesperson Lexa Hobenshield said the only threat to residents was from nuisance odours. In an Tuesday, she said: We take all incidents at our facilities seriously. Kinder Morgan Canada completed a thorough investigation and learned lessons after oil from a storage tank was released into a fully contained area on KMC s Sumas Terminal property on January 24, As a result of our investigation, we have established new prevention and community notification measures, which we have communicated to the Sumas Mountain community, and will continue to provide updates as needed. Abbotsford resident and pipeline opponent Michael Hale, who discovered the NEB report, said it reinforces his concerns. There seems to be a propensity on the company s part to minimize the seriousness of what was involved, he said. ghamilton@vancouversun.com Copyright (c) The Vancouver Sun Abbotsford+spill+report/ /story.html

12 US regulator fines Kinder Morgan for breaking 27 safety rules By Andrew Nikiforuk Published March 15, :00 pm The U.S. federal Department of Transportation has fined Kinder Morgan nearly a million dollars in civil fines for breaking 27 U.S. pipeline safety rules. The Houston-based firm, the continent's third largest energy company, currently wants to triple the capacity of its Trans Mountain pipeline in a controversial bid to bring more Alberta bitumen to the port of Vancouver for export to China. According to the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA), the violations took place between 2007 and 2009 during the hectic construction of the Rockies Express pipeline. The 42-inch diameter natural gas pipeline now pumps shale and tight gas from heavily drilled western landscapes to eastern consumers in the U.S. Unlike PHMSA, the National Energy Board, Canada's federal pipeline regulator, performs two conflicting roles: it approves new pipelines and regulates existing ones. PHMSA does not approve lines, it only monitors their technical safety and fines companies for breaking the law. As one consequence of its dual mandate the NEB has no system for fining pipeline companies for violating Canadian laws. Since 1959, the agency has only shut down two pipelines. Moreover the NEB, which has been operating since 1959, did not begin posting its safety and environmental actions until the fall of Since 2008, the board says it has issued 24 safety orders against pipelines owned by Enbridge, TransCanada and Kinder Morgan for a variety of infractions. None of the companies were fined and most of the safety orders were not publicly available when issued. In July 2011, for example, the NEB ordered Kinder Morgan to reduce pressure on the 60-yearold Trans Mountain pipeline after a leak appeared on a pipe that failed to operate properly after a pump station expansion in The NEB later ordered Kinder Morgan to check "long seam weld cracking" on all pre-1970s pipe installed on the line by December In 2012 PHMSA fined Enbridge, a Calgary-based firm, a record $3.7 million for a total of 24 violations of pipeline regulations related to largest onshore oil spill in U.S. history in Kalamazoo, Michigan. The spill of diluted bitumen cost nearly $1 billion to clean up and the river remains contaminated.

13 Given the number of ongoing problems on the Rockies Express line, Kinder Morgan must develop a plan to "address the potential for remaining girth weld defects resulting from inadequate radiography or delayed cracking that was not identified during girth weld remediation activities." Improper welding practices and inspections for pipelines were the subject of two part-tyee series last year based on documents and complaints registered with Canadian and U.S. regulators by Evan Vokes, a Calgary-based mechanical engineer. The NEB confirmed the allegations against TransCanada, Vokes' former employer, and ordered "remediation measures." Kinder Morgan wants to boost the capacity of the Trans Mountain pipeline from 300,000 to 890,000 barrels a day with a $5-billion expansion. The upgrade would increase the number of international oil tankers in the port of Vancouver. Local communities, First Nations and environmental organizations have criticized the expansion plans, saying a larger bitumen highway will multiply risks to the environment, community health as well as violate of indigenous rights and sovereignty. After Kinder Morgan experienced a major pipeline leak and an oil tanker spill near Burnaby in 2007 and 2009, citizens have raised questions about the adequacy of company's monitoring and accident response programs. In recent years Kinder Morgan has profited from the "energy sprawl" generated by increased production of lower quality unconventional hydrocarbons such as bitumen and shale gas. As such Kinder Morgan has become a major shipper of condensate, a gasoline-like hydrocarbon, much in demand in Canada's bitumen industry. Bitumen, a junk crude, is so thick and heavy that it will not move through a pipeline without being diluted by higher quality fuels such as condensate. The Eagle Ford Shale, an unconventional gas resource that requires heavy hydraulic fracturing, now yields large volumes of highly valued condensate which Kinder Morgan hopes to ship to Canada via two proposed pipeline networks by But the NEB recently raised serious concerns about the fitness and integrity of one of the proposals, the Cochin Pipeline. It also questioned the adequacy of crack detection methods employed by Kinder Morgan. The more bitumen that Canada exports, the more dependent the country becomes on imported condensate and higher quality hydrocarbons from the U.S. or the Middle East. Currently, a lot of condensate needed to move bitumen comes from shale gas fields where hydraulic fracturing blasts open deep rock with millions of gallons of water, sand and toxic chemicals. The process can contaminate groundwater, cause earthquakes and leak vast amounts of methane.

14 Canada now imports about 300,000 barrels of condensate a day in order to export its bitumen. Expected demand could grow as high as 670,000 barrels a day in the absence of any public policy to upgrade and refine raw bitumen within Canadian borders. PHMSA posted its ruling on Kinder Morgan on its website last November where it went largely unreported in the Canadian press.

15 Crude, Dirty and Dangerous By DAVID SASSOON Published: August 20, 2012 EVERY day more than one million barrels of oil flow to refineries in the United States from western Canada s oil sands region. Producers hope to quadruple that amount in the next decade, arguing that oil from a friendly neighbor will deliver an extra degree of national security. But this oil is no ordinary crude oil, and it carries with it risks that we re only beginning to understand. Its core ingredient bitumen is not pumped from wells but is strip-mined or boiled loose underground. Industry insiders long considered bitumen to be a garbage crude. But now that the light, sweet oil we covet has become more scarce and its price has skyrocketed, bitumen has become worth the trouble to recover. At room temperature, bitumen has the consistency of peanut butter, thick enough to hold in your hands. To get it through pipelines, liquid chemicals must be added to thin it into what s known as dilbit, short for diluted bitumen. Last month, the National Transportation Safety Board issued a report that was harshly critical of the federal government s regulation and oversight of pipeline safety following a spill of more than one million gallons of dilbit into the Kalamazoo River in Michigan in The accident underscored not only how different dilbit is from conventional oil, but how unprepared we are for the impending flood of imports. After the dilbit gushed into the river, it began separating into its constituent parts. The heavy bitumen sank to the river bottom, leaving a mess that is still being cleaned up. Meanwhile, the chemical additives evaporated, creating a foul smell that lingered for days. People reported headaches, dizziness and nausea. No one could say with certainty what they should do. Federal officials at the scene didn t know until weeks later that the pipeline was carrying dilbit, because federal law doesn t require pipeline operators to reveal that information. The 2010 spill could have been worse if it had reached Lake Michigan, as authorities originally feared it might. Lake Michigan supplies drinking water to more than 12 million people. Fortunately, the damage was restricted to a tributary creek and about 36 miles of the Kalamazoo, used primarily for recreation, not drinking water. This close call hasn t deterred the energy industry from announcing plans to build or repurpose more than 10,000 miles of pipelines to carry dilbit to the United States and global markets. That includes the controversial Canada-to-Texas Keystone XL pipeline, which would pass through the Ogallala aquifer, the nation s largest drinking water aquifer. It supplies drinking water for eight states and about 30 percent of the groundwater used for irrigation. The nation s pipeline network was designed to handle conventional crude oil and is governed by laws and regulations that were written long before the unique risks and hazards associated with

16 dilbit began to emerge. In fact, dilbit is exempt from an excise tax that pays for oil spill cleanups, because the 1980 law that created the tax did not consider bitumen from the tar sands to be crude oil. After the spill, Congress passed new pipeline safety legislation, but it will take years for its modest provisions to have any impact. It does not require pipeline companies to reveal whether their lines are shipping dilbit. And while it does require a study of how dilbit affects pipeline corrosion, the scientists conducting that study met for the first time only last month, and their work is not likely to be completed before new pipelines are built or old ones are repurposed. The N.T.S.B. s investigation of the Michigan spill identified a complete breakdown of safety at Enbridge, the pipeline s operator. But it also revealed that pipeline rules are weakly enforced. One telling fact: Enbridge discovered defects in the area where the pipeline eventually ruptured as early as 2005, and reported them to regulators. Yet the company was able to delay making repairs without breaking any rules. The N.T.S.B. also found that Enbridge s leak detection system did not work as advertised. The company had said that its sensors could spot a leak and shut down in less than 10 minutes. TransCanada, the company that is building the Keystone XL, makes similar claims. Yet it took operators in Enbridge s Canadian control room 17 hours to realize their pipeline had torn open. Sensors triggered 16 alarms but operators continued to pump dilbit into the line, believing the problem was an air bubble, until someone in Michigan saw oil on the ground and called Enbridge s emergency line. The leak-detection problem is industry-wide. Oil spill data maintained by federal regulators show that over the last 10 years, advanced leak detection systems identified only one out of every 20 reported pipeline leaks. Members of the public detected and reported leaks at four times that rate. Now that the industry is aiming to fill almost a quarter of America s domestic oil needs from western Canadian sources, we need a transparent and informed discussion about dilbit s risks and benefits, up-to-date laws and regulations, and improved leak detection. The N.T.S.B. chairwoman likened Enbridge employees to Keystone Kops in their handling of the Michigan dilbit disaster. It is a label that could come to apply to the rest of us if we don t guard against future catastrophe. David Sassoon is the publisher of InsideClimate News, which published the e-book The Dilbit Disaster: Inside the Biggest Oil Spill You ve Never Heard Of. A version of this op-ed appeared in print on August 21, 2012, on page A19 of the New York edition with the headline: Crude, Dirty and Dangerous.