Gt oton Fire Department. Summary of the Boat House Road Fb e Water Supply Issues. Date of Incident: May 10, 2013

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1 Gt oton Fire Department Summary of the Boat House Road Fb e Water Supply Issues Date of Incident: May 10, 2013 SUM:MARY On May 10, 2013 the Groton Fire Department responded to a structure ftre where there were significant water supply issues. At 12:01 hours the Groton Fire Depatiment was dispatched to a reported structure fire at 99 Boat House Lane. At 12:09 Engine 1, A2 and the Chief (I C) arrived on scene and found heavy brown smoke coming from the eaves and the roof of the structure. Engine 1 laid a line in from a hydrant in the area of 27 Boat House Road. Engine 7 arrived on scene at 12:12 with a single firefighter, a lieutenant. Engine 7 completed the lay from Engine 1 and returned to the hydrant on Boat House to establish a water supply. After performing a 360- degree size-up, the crew from Engine 1 shut off propane tanks close to the A side of the building. At 12:16 they entered the structure through a door on the B side with a 1 %"hose line. A Water Department employee (Water 2) arrived at the hydrant prior to Engine 7, dressed the hydrant with the Hydrassist left by Engine 1 and at 12:24 charged the supply line to Engine 1 as instructed to do so by the IC. The IC ordered Engine 7 to pump the hydrant. At 12:39 the IC ordered an evacuation of the building due to unsafe conditions and interior operations ceased. The lieutenant from Engine 7 and Water 2 connected Engine 7 to the Hydrassist and began relay pumping the Boat House Road hydrant at 12:41. At 12:43 Engine 1 lost their water supply. There continued to be water supply issues to the scene until 13:53. During this time, Engine 1 did receive water for a total of approximately 15 minutes. At 15: 11 the IC reported that the fire was extinguished and crews were performing overhaul. Key contributing factors identified in this review included that there was limited water flow from the Boat House Road hydrant (approximately 500 GPM), untrained personnel assisted with the relay pump operation, inexperience of personnel on the hydrassist valve and relay pump operations, and inconsistent labeling of the hydrassist valves in the department. This review recommends the following to minimize the risk of similar occurrences: review the adequacy of the water available in the Lost Lake area for fire suppression, including the hydrant system, d1y hydrants and draft sites consider training Water Department personnel to operate the hydrassist valve ensure that firefighters are sufficiently trained in operating the hydrassist valve and relay pump operations 1

2 ensure that all department hydrassist valves are labeled in a consistent manner consider the adequacy of fire department staffing INTRODUCTION On May 10, 2013 there were significant water supply issues at a house fire at 99 Boat House Road. On May 13, 2013 the Town Manager requested a review of the incident. The Fire Chief held a preliminary meeting with Captains James Emslie and Susan Daly and requested that they petform the review. They conducted interviews with officers, firefighters and town employees who were at the incident scene from May to May 20th. The Captains reviewed training records, the Hydrassist valve used at the incident, and dispatch audio transcripts. FIRE DEPARTMENT The Groton Fire Department is a combination department staffed with 5 full-time and 35 call members. There are four stations serving a population of over 10,000 residents in a geographic area of approximately 3 3 square miles. The department responded to 1, 118 calls in 2012 including 359 fire calls and 759 EMS calls. TRAINING/EXPERIENCE The Lieutenant from Engine 7 has 5 years of call firefighting experience and was promoted to Lieutenant on January 1, His training includes the Groton recruit class, EMT-B training, Massachusetts Fire Academy Call/Volunteer Firefighter training program including Fire Fighter IIII Cettification, Massachusetts Fire Academy courses in Aerial Ladders and Pumps and Hydraulics, and numerous department trainings. APPARATUS, PERSONNEL AND ON SCENE ARRIVAL TIMES 1201hours Dispatched to a structure fire at 99 Boat House Road 1209 hours Ambulance 2 (A2)- two firefighters (assigned to suppression) Fire Chief(Fl)- Incident Commander (IC) Engine 1 (Eng. I) -lieutenant and captain (assigned to suppression) 1212 hours Engine 7 (Eng. 7) -lieutenant (assigned to water supply) Water 2 - Water Department employee 1222 hours Engine 5 (Eng. 5) - captain and firefighter (assigned to suppression) 2

3 1224 hours Ayer Engine 2- captain, lieutenant and firefighter (assigned to suppression) 1226 hours Westford Engine 1 -four firefighters (assigned to suppression) 1235 hours Pepperell Engine 6- four firefighters (assigned to suppression) 1241 hours Ambulance 1 (AI) - 2 EMTs (assigned to firefighter rehab) 1246 hours Dunstable Engine 6-3 firefighters (assigned to water supply) Dunstable Chief(Dunstable Car 1) (assigned to water supply) Littleton Engine 4-Deputy Chief, 2 firefighters (assigned to water supply) 1415 hours Townsend Engine 1-2 firefighters (assigned to suppression) 1511 hours Fire Marshal investigators Fire extinguished, crews performing overhaul BUILDING INFORMATION The fire structure was a 3 stmy, single family home of approximately 1,260 square feet per the town assessor's database. The home was built in 1930 and extensive renovations including a sizeable addition were completed in The home was traditional wood frame and was built into the side of a hill overlooking a lake on the C-side. The second floor was at street level. There were two propane tanks at the A-side of the building. There are no plans of the renovated building on file with the Town. The home is located at the end of a hilly, narrow street. Review Attacltment A for a photo of the structure after the fire. HYDRANT INFORMATION There is a fire hydrant located in the area of27 Boat House Road which is approximately 1,700 feet from the fire structure. The hydrant was flow tested by the Groton Water Department on Monday, May 13, The results of the flow test are as follows: 6" water main with a static pressure of 125 PSI~ flowed 530 GPM at approximately 20 PSI Review Attachment B for a photo of the Boat House Road ltytlrant 3

4 There is another hydrant located on Lost Lake Drive at the comer of Boat House Road which is approximately 2,200 feet from the fire structure. The hydrant was flow tested by the Groton Water Department on Monday, May 13, The results of the flow test are as follows: 12" water main with a static pressure of 100 PSI; flowed 1,455 GPM at approximately 75 PSI Review Attachment C for a photo for the Lost Lake Drive hydrant WEATHER The weather on May 10, 2013 was sunny and clear with a temperature of approximately 85 degrees Fahrenheit. INVESTIGATION On May 10, 2013 the Groton Fire Depattment responded to a structure fire where there were significant water supply issues. At 12:01 hours, the Groton Fire Department was dispatched to a reported structure fire at 99 Boat House Lane. At 12:09 hours the first crew arrived on scene including A2 with 2 firefighters, F 1, and Eng. 1 with a captain and a lieutenant. The crew from A2 performed a scene size up along with a 360-degree size-up. They reported a 3 story wood frame home with heavy brown smoke coming from the roof and the eaves and two propane tanks on the C-side of the building. F1 established Incident Command and requested mutual aid (Ayer Fire) to the scene. Eng.1 left their hydrassist at the hydrant near 27 Boathouse Road and laid a line to the scene. The line was approximately 200 feet short of the scene. One of the firefighters from A2 was assigned to be the pump operator of Eng. 1. The remaining crew members from A2 and Eng. 1 (firefighter, lieutenant and captain) shut off the propane tanks (actually located at the A-side of the building), stretched a 1 % " hose line to the B-side of the building, down to the first floor (below street grade). At 12: 16 hours they made entry into the home through a door. At 12:12 hours Eng. 7 arrived on scene with a lieutenant and was instructed to complete the lay from Engine 1 and then return to the hydrant to establish a water supply. Water 2 arrived on scene and dressed the hydrant with the hydrassist from Eng. 1 and a 2 W' gate on the side port from his truck. He was not familiar with how to operate a hydrassist. At 12:17 Water 2 was instructed by the IC to charge the line. Water 2 sent the water slowly. The IC also requested additional mutual aid companies to respond to the scene and for station coverage. At 12:21 Eng. 7 arrived at the hydrant. The IC repeatedly asked for the water quicker with Eng. 7 reporting it was on its way. At 12:24 hours Engine 1 received water from the hydrant. The IC asked Eng. 7 to pump the hydrant. At approximately 12:31 hours Eng. 1 crew exited the building due to a low air alarm fl"om one of the members. Ayer Eng. 2 crew cut a vent hole in the roof of the stmcture. At 12:37 hours Ayer Eng. 2 crew along with a captain from Eng. 5 and Westford Eng. 1 crew entered the structure 4

5 through the B-side. Heavy fire was observed coming from the vent hole and the gable end on the D-side of the building and at 12:39 the IC ordered an evacuation of the building due to unsafe conditions. The evacuation tones were sent out on all working radio frequencies and the pump operator from Eng. 1 sounded the evacuation tone signal with his air horn. At 12:40 hours the IC asked for an accountability check and at 12:42 hours all crew members were accounted for. At 12:41 hours Eng. 7 began to relay pump the hydrant. (Note: The handle of the hydrassist was placed in the "closed" position rather than the "relay pump" position.) At 12:43 hours Eng.1 lost their water supply. The IC requested Dunstable Eng. 6 and Littleton Eng. 4 to tag the hydrant on Lost Lake Drive. At 12:45 hours Eng. 1 reported that they were out of water. The lieutenant from Eng. 7 and Water 2 attempted to trouble shoot the problem at the Boat House Road hydrant. At 12:48 hours Eng.1 was fed water for approximately 2 minutes. (Note: This may have been due to head pressure as a result of the elevation changes in the road from the hydrant to the scene. The hydrassist was still in the "closed" position.) At 12:49 hours Dunstable Eng. 6 and Littleton Eng. 4 anive at the Lost Lake Drive hydrant. Dunstable Eng. 6 dressed the hydrant and set up to pump the hydrant. Littleton Eng. 4 laid a line from the Lost Lake hydrant to Eng. 7. At 1258 hours Dunstable Eng.6 reports that they are sending water to Eng. 7. (Note: The water was still flowing through Eng. 7 and the Boat House Road hydrant with the hydrassist in the "closed" position. Witnesses report a large amount of water was coming out of the top of Eng. 7. Several crews reporting to the scene of the fire also note that there was a leak in the supply line coming from the Boat House Road hydrant to the scene. A couple of times, Eng. I reported receiving water at the scene in intermittent short bursts. Again this may have been due to head pressure from the elevation changes.) The Chief from Dunstable reported to the Boat House Road hydrant to assist the lieutenant. At 13:04 hours the Dunstable Chief reported there was a problem with Eng.7 and it needed to be swapped out. At 13:06 hours the IC ordered the Dunstable Chief to shut down the hydrant so Eng. 5 could be put in line to supply their tank water to Eng. 1. At that time, Littleton Engine 4 was connected however, there was a miscommunication with the lieutenant from Eng. 7 and Eng. 7 was also still connected. (Note: The lieutenant from Eng. 7 may have turned the handle from the hydrassist from the "closed" position to the "hydrant" position. This would enable the limited water available from the Boat House hydrant to flow to the fire.) At 13:10 hours Eng. 5 supplied Eng. 1 with their tank water (1200 gallons) which lasted 2 minutes. At 13: 14 hours the Dunstable Chief reported to command that they were ready to flow water from the hydrant. At 13 :20 hours Eng. 5 received water from the hydrant and supplies Eng.l. (Note: Eng.5 was receiving approximately 500 GPM per the flowmeter on Eng. 5. It appears that the water is still flowing through the Boat House Road hydrant.) At 13:22 hours the Dunstable Chief informs the IC that he can supply him with more water if he can shut down for 2 minutes. At 13 :24 hours the hydrants are shut down to take Eng. 7 and the Boat House Road hydrant out of line. At 13:30 Eng.5 and Eng.1 receive water at the scene but have to shut down due to a water hammer. (Note: At this time it appears that water is flowing from the Lost Lake 5

6 hydrant, through Dunstable Eng.6 and Littleton Eng.4 to Eng.5 at the scene to Eng.J.) A cap is blown off of Eng.1 fi om the water hammer and it needed to be replaced before they can flow water again. At 13:37 hours Eng.1 is able to flow water again. At 13:38 hours the B-side of the building collapsed into the building. At 13:39 hours the D-side of the building collapsed. A captain from Groton, along with Ayer Eng. 2 crew were assigned to swap out the leaking supply line between the Boat House Road hydrant and the scene. At 13:48 hours they request the Lost Lake hydrant be shut down, swap the leaking line and request that the hydrant be charged again. The Lost Lake hydrant is charged and Eng.5 received water at 13:53 hours. There is adequate, sustainable water at the scene and there are no further reported water issues fi om the scene. At 15:11 hours the IC reports that the fire is out and overhaul is being performed. Investigators from the Fire Marshal's officer arrived on scene and began their investigation. SUMMARY OF WATER SUPPLY ISSUES INCLUDING TIMES 12:01 Toned out for a structure fire at 99 Boat House Road 12:09 A2, F1 and Engine 1 arrive on scene 12:16 Crew fi om Engine 1 makes entry into the house 12:24 Engine 1 gets water from Boat House Road hydrant Time: 23 minutes to establish initial water supply 12:41 Relay pump starts Time: 19 minutes flowing approximately 500 GPM fr om Boat House hydrant 12:43 Engine 1loses water (handle ofhydrassist in wrong position) 12:48 Engine 1 gets water for app. 2 minutes 13:58 Dunstable Fire dresses Lost lake hydrant and flows water. Set up appears to be as follows: Lost Lake hydrant -> Dunstable Engine Engine 7 ---?Hydrassist on Boat House Road hydrant ---7 Engine Fire 13:06 Swap out Engine 7 with Littleton Engine 4 but miscommunication and Engine 7 still in line. Set up appears to be as follows: Lost Lake hydrant ---7 Dunstable Engine 6 ---? Littleton Engine Engine 7 ---?Hydrassist on Boat House Road hydrant ---7 Engine Fire Handle on 6

7 Hydrassist may have been turned to be in line fi om hydrant to the fire (6:00 position). 13 :09 Put Engine 5 in line behind Engine 1 to use it's tank water. Set up appears to be as follows: Lost Lake hydrant - Dunstable Engine 6 - Littleton Engine 4 - Engine 7 -Hydrassist on Boat House Road hydrant - Engine 5 - Engine 1 - Fire 13 :20 Engine 5 receives water of approximately 500 GPM per flow meter on Engine 5. Appears to be still flowing through Boat House Road hydrant. Time: 4 minutes flowing approximately 500 GPM through Boat House Road hydrant. 13 :24 Shut down both hydrants to take Engine 7 and Boat House Road hydrant out of line. Set up appears to be as follows: Lost Lake hydrant - - Engine 1 - Fire Dunstable Engine 6 - Littleton Engine 4 - Engine 5 13 :30 Engine 1 gets water but water hammer occurs. A cap blows off of Engine 1 and Engine 1 shuts down. Need to replace the cap before Engine 1 can flow water a gam. 13 :37 (Approximate time) Engine 1 able to flow water again. 13 :48 Shut down water supply to fix tom LDH. 13 :53 Engine 5 gets water. Sustainable water for remainder of fire. ime: 5 minutes without water to fix. torn LDH 15: 11 Command reports the fire is out and overhaul is being performed. 7

8 CONTRIBUTING FACTORS The reviewers identified the following items as key contributing factors in this incident: Limited water flow from the Boat House Road hydrant (approximately 500 GPM) Untrained personnel assisted with the relay pump operation Lack of experience and training of personnel operating the hydrassist valve and relay pump operations Inconsistent labeling of the hydrassist valves in the depattment Limited fire department staffing RECOMMENDATIONS Recommendation # 1: The town should review the adequacy of the water available in the Lost Lake ltrea for fire suppression. Discussion: There are several factors which make it difficult to ensure adequate water available in the Lost Lake area. The area is mostly protected by the hydrant system; however the topography of the Lost Lake area includes significant changes in elevation, which impacts the water flow from a hydrant. There area includes many natrow, hilly roads that dead end off of the main road, Lost Lake Drive. While the hydrants on Lost Lake Drive are supplied by a 12" main, the remaining roads are supplied by smaller mains. This impacts the water flow coming from those hydrants. The Water Department flow tested the Boat House Road hydrant after the fire and found that it was only able to flow 530 GPM at approximately 20 PSI from a 6" water main. There is an abundant amount of lake water in the area. However, access to the lake water is limited by the topography and the ability to get fire trucks close enough to the lake to be able to draft from it. In order to draft from the lake, we need to get an Engine to within 30' of the water, including distance and elevation. There are currently no dry hydrants on the lake. The availability of dry hydrants would increase the ability of the fire department to access water from the lake. The dry hydrants must be placed in locations that are accessible by fire trucks and can have no more than a 30' elevation from the lake. There is a cost associated with purchasing the materials and establishing the dry hydrants of approximately $5,000-10,000. Recommendation #2: The town should consider training the Water Department personnel to operate the hydrassist valve. Discussion: Water Department employees are extremely knowledgeable about the hydrant system in town which is extremely helpful at a fire. The fire department has very limited resources, especially at the beginning of an incident. Additional manpower :fi om trained Water Department personnel may help to ensure an adequate water supply is set up faster. 8

9 Recommendation #3: Th.e fire department should ensure that all pump operators are sufficiently trained to operate a h.ydrassist valve and in relay pump operations. Discussion: The hydrassist valve has three handle positions for different operations. These include the closed position, a position for sending water directly from the hydrant to the fire, and a position for relay pumping which boosts the pressure from the hydrant. This involves connecting to a fire engine and then using the engine's pump to boost the water pressure before sending the water to the fire. In this incident, the relay pump operation was complicated by the hydrassist valve being in the closed position. Personnel on scene did not recognize that the handle was not in the correct position for relay pumping. (Note: The hyllrant was located at the bottom of an incline. As a result, the hose line which led to the fire from th.e h.ydrassist was full of water due to the back pressure. This may have made it more difficult to recognize that tl1e valve was closed.) The department should consider offering additional training opportunities for pump operators including both department trainings and professional trainings that meet standards set by the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA). These trainings will require additional funding. Recommendation #4: The fire department should ensure that every hydrassist valve in the department is labeled the same. Discussion: The fire department currently has 5 hydrassist valves (Note: Attachments D, E and F show a photo of each. The numbers in the pictures signify which engine it is on.) The one used in the fire is the newest and is :fi om Eng. I. It has a silver arrow on the handle which is not present on any of the other valves. The handle positions on the other 4 valves have been labeled 1, 2 and 3. The valves from Eng.2 and 4 also have handwritten labels for the hose connections. To reduce confusion, the hydrassist valves should all be labeled the same. The labeling scheme should include both hose connections and handle positions for the different operations. Recommendation #5: The town needs to consider the adequacy of.fire department staffing. Discussion: Adequate staffing for fire apparatus is generally a minimum of four firefighter which would include a driver/pump operator, an officer and two firefighters. As the size of the crew is reduced, their efficiency also decreases. In this incident, the initial engine assigned to water supply responded with a single firefighter. Additional personnel would have been able to assist with the setup of the operation and with trouble shooting any problems that arose. With many call depattments, minimum staffing of apparatus cannot be guaranteed. However, due to safety issues, the department may want to consider a minimum staffing of at least two firefighters per apparatus. 9

10 Respectfully submitted: Captain James Emslie Date 6/r-/;s Date 10

Routine Emergencies are defined as incidents that do not require the deployment of hoselines. Ex. Fire alarms, smell of smoke, etc..

Routine Emergencies are defined as incidents that do not require the deployment of hoselines. Ex. Fire alarms, smell of smoke, etc.. 15. Riding Assignments 15.1 Assignments 15.1.1 The following assignments have been developed to alleviate duplication of tasks on the fire scene. These assignments are only guides and can be changed on