Planning for North Korea after Kim Jong-un

Transcription

1 Jane's Intelligence Review [Content preview Subscribe to IHS Jane s Intelligence Review for full article] Planning for North Korea after Kim Jong-un The health of Kim Jong-un could have a profound impact on North Korea's political stability given that no succession plan is in place. Neil Ashdown assesses three scenarios under which the nation would manage the transition of power from its supreme leader. North Korean supreme leader Kim Jong-un did not appear in public from 3 September to 13 October. His absence notably coincided with a session of the Supreme People's Assembly (SPA), prompting international speculation about his health and whereabouts. North Korean state media, probably in response to this speculation, announced on 26 September that Kim was experiencing "discomfort", and pictures were finally released on 13 October that showed him either seated or walking with a cane. The announcement that Kim Jong-un was in ill health is all the more significant given that North Korean state media never officially acknowledged the illness of former leader Kim Jong-il ( ), despite a visible deterioration in his health in This apparent openness about health issues is contrary to decades of careful image control under the rule of founding leader Kim Il-sung ( ) and Kim Jong-il. A defining feature of the North Korean political system is the extent to which power and legitimacy are centralised within the Kim family, from Kim Il-sung (who was made the "Eternal Premier of the Republic" in 1998), through his son Kim Jong-il, to his grandson, Kim Jong-un. Rather than weakening over time, this trend has strengthened because of the transition to Kim Jong-un. The current leader rarely appeared in public before 2010 and was in his late twenties when he came to power in December 2011 (his date of birth is uncertain). Risk in December 2014 In order to assess the likely risk profiles of future leadership scenarios for North Korea, it is first necessary to examine the country's current stability. This can be done by examining five stability factors: political, social, economic, military/security, and external. Political stability North Korea's political stability ratings declined because of the transition to Kim Jong-un in 2011, underscoring uncertainty around the extent and longevity of the young leader's hold on power. Three years after the death of his father, there are indications that the situation may be stabilising. Indeed, barring any dramatic developments, it is likely that the political stability rating will improve in the medium to long term, with the initial period of entrenchment around Kim Jong-un passed. Article 1 Page 1 of 14

2 One of the least likely scenarios in the event of Kim's hypothetical incapacitation would be for a genuine family succession to take place. Kim Jong-un is without a credible heir, and his siblings are either men who have already been passed over for succession or women who are likely to face considerable difficulties enforcing their authority. Kim Jong-il's oldest son, by a different mother to Kim Jong-un's, is Kim Jong-nam. As the first son, he was long considered the strongest contender for succession. However, in 2001 Kim Jong-nam was detained at Narita airport in Japan after attempting to enter the country on a forged Dominican Republic passport, a public embarrassment for his father. He is now believed to live in Macau. Kim Sul-song, the next oldest sibling, has a low profile within North Korea and, as a woman, was never considered a likely candidate for the succession. Kim Jong-il's second son, Kim Jong-chul, has also been passed over for the succession. The transfer of power to Kim Jong-un's younger sister, Kim Yo-jong, would preserve the logic of the succession, but a young woman is unlikely to be publicly acceptable as a leader in North Korean society. Kim family's line of succession. (IHS) In addition to these presentational issues, it is unlikely that any of Kim Jong-un's siblings have the kind of political networks or high-level supporters that Kim Jong-il created for Kim Jong-un before the last transition. Kim Jong-il's succession was engineered over three decades, 14 years of which were firmly in the public eye. Social stability Social and economic stability are closely related in North Korea, where food production remains consistently below the country's consumption requirements. The majority of the population is dependent Article 1 Page 2 of 14

3 on informal markets as well as the Public Distribution System (PDS) for subsistence, and any disruption to these systems is likely to significantly increase the risk of social unrest. Based on figures from the World Food Programme (WFP) and the United Nations Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO) for 2013/14, the deficit is equivalent to 6.3% of total consumption requirements. For 2012/13, the figure was approximately 9.8% of total consumption requirements. As such, if food imports were to be cut off suddenly - for example, in the event of a leadership succession prompting internal instability - there would probably be a shortage in a country where the majority of the population, particularly in the north and east, lack food security. Economic stability In general, the continued poor performance of North Korea's economy remains a leading indicator for its other stability ratings, with a significant decline in this area likely to presage similar declines in political and social stability ratings. IHS forecasts low, but steady, GDP growth in North Korea, rising from 1.1% in 2014 to 1.2% a year between 2015 and 2017, and then rising again to 1.3% in This translates into a steady rise in per capita GDP from USD1,236 to USD1,479 between 2014 and Although this figure does not broadly represent the experience of the vast majority of North Koreans, the fact that it is increasing rather than decreasing avoids the scenario of competition over a decreasing pool of resources among the country's privileged elite. Similarly, projections of increased foreign direct investment, rising from USD1.8 billion in 2014 to USD2.4 billion in 2018, alongside a steady rise in foreign-exchange earnings (from USD4.2 billion to USD6.1 billion over the same period), suggest that - on current projections - North Korea is not heading towards an economic or fiscal crisis. Article 1 Page 3 of 14

4 Kim Jong-un oversees a drill of combined military units on 24 October The supreme leader made his first public appearance on 14 October after a period of ill health. (PA) In December 2013, when Kim Jong-un removed and then executed Jang Song-taek, his aunt's husband and a vice-chairman of the NDC, the list of charges by the state against him included a number of allegations that were explicitly framed in terms of the country's economic stability. These included claims that Jang was behind abortive economic reforms in 2009 that led to "serious economic chaos", that he had created "a great confusion in financial management system of the state", and that he "instructed his stooges to sell coal and other precious underground resources at random". Military and security stability North Korea's internal security situation remains tightly controlled, with multiple and competing internal intelligence and security agencies, as well as a high degree of surveillance of the population. There is no evidence of the kind of public protests that occur with thousands of protesters in China, nor the limited opposition political demonstrations that take place in Russia. Instead, it is highly likely that a challenge to the internal security of the state will come from within the state apparatus itself. Given its size, the position of pre-eminence it enjoyed under Kim Jong-il's 'military first' policy, and its diverse economic interests, the military remains one of the most likely sources of opposition to Kim Jongun's leadership. One of the allegations against Jang was that he intended to stage a coup to remove Kim Jong-un. Article 1 Page 4 of 14

5 An IHS Jane's source with knowledge of North Korea's internal political and business environment reported in 2013 that the highest levels of the military broadly supported Kim Jong-un's efforts to 'civilianise' the country's economy as part of the economic reform effort, and to transition to a younger generation of officials with more technocratic backgrounds. This would be particularly in sectors where foreign investment is sought or anticipated, albeit with some exceptions - for example, the military retains significant interests in gold mining. External stability There is a continued high likelihood of small-scale military incidents on North Korea's southern land and maritime borders. On 10 October, there was an exchange of fire across the Demilitarised Zone (DMZ), according to South Korean officials. A North Korean unit fired an anti-aircraft heavy machine gun at gasfilled balloons that had been released across the border by South Korean civil society activists. In response, the South Korean military first issued a warning and then fired 40 rounds from a similar weapon. This was the first exchange of weapon fire across the border since October 2010, and before that in No casualties were reported on either side and the South Korean response was largely symbolic. On 10 November 2014, South Korean troops fired warning shots at North Korean soldiers inside the DMZ, according to reports in the South Korean media. The North Korean soldiers retreated without returning fire, and again there were no reports of casualties. The South Korean army fires K9 self-propelled artillery during a military drill in Yeoncheon, South Korea, on 13 November South Korean troops fired warning shots on 10 November after North Korean soldiers approached the border separating the two countries. (PA) Similar incidents are more common around the NLL. In May, for example, North and South Korean naval vessels were involved in an exchange of fire near the NLL. According to the South Korean Ministry of Defence, two artillery shells from a land-based battery struck the sea close to one of its naval vessels, Article 1 Page 5 of 14

6 prompting the South Korean ship to return fire in the direction of a nearby North Korean naval vessel. No damage was caused on either side. Along with its economic stability, the leadership in North Korea considers South Korean and US military deployment in its neighbour as one of the two main threats to its survival. This was apparent in the parallel development policy Kim Jong-un endorsed after coming to power: economic reforms aimed at stabilising the economy alongside the development of North Korea's nuclear weapons programme as a deterrent against the perceived threat of US intervention. Scenario 1: Policy continues under Kim's leadership Notwithstanding reports of his ill health, it is likely that given his age, access to medical treatment, and high levels of personal security, Kim Jong-un will remain healthy enough to exert power for at least another three decades. A range of eventualities could lead to his downfall in that period, but given the longevity of the current political arrangement in North Korea, any analysis that posits its collapse as the most likely scenario in the short term will probably be driven primarily by political exigencies or optimism. Kim Jong-un would remain in power and continue to pursue the policies he prioritised after coming to power in 2011, namely limited economic reforms on a test-case basis across the country and the development of North Korea's nuclear deterrent. The overriding imperative for the North Korean leadership is the security of the current political dispensation. As such, economic reforms would be continued provided that they do not increase the risk of social instability driven by an increasingly comfortable middle or merchant class. Nevertheless, as modern communications technology and the passage of time increase awareness among the North Korean population about conditions outside the country, it is also likely that the risk of social instability would increase the longer the Kim dynasty persists. Scenario 2: Elite manage transition after Kim leaves In this scenario, Kim Jong-un would be permanently rendered unable to rule. This could take place through ill health, an accident, or some form of internal putsch. In this scenario, it is likely that there would be a power struggle within the existing elite. A number of possible outcomes could result, including: a regency with a powerful leader from the existing elite holding power behind a figurehead member of the Kim family; a new leader from outside the Kim family (most likely claiming to carry on the legacy); or a ruling council. Figures such as Hwang Pyong-so and Choe Ryong-hae, two of the three high-level figures who travelled to South Korea on 4 October, are among the most obvious candidates for the first two roles. Article 1 Page 6 of 14

7 A ruling council would potentially resemble the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC) that took power in Myanmar in 1988, although it need not be military-led or predominantly military in its composition. Scenario 3: State collapses as Kim relinquishes rule Despite the strong personal incentives for the elite to ensure the continuation of the current dispensation in North Korea, the power struggle that is likely to take place in the event of Kim Jong-un's death or incapacitation could easily deteriorate into a general breakdown of the state. If, for example, Kim Jong-un's disappearance were sudden, and coincided with a foreign visit by potential successors such as Hwang or Choe, their absence from Pyongyang would complicate the transition process, increasing the likelihood of destabilisation. Similarly, if Kim Jong-un were to die suddenly and unexpectedly, for example in an air accident, this would be more likely to critically destabilise the state than a longer illness or an internal putsch, both of which would allow time for succession planning. It is possible that the state could also experience a destabilising shock, leading to its collapse, from an incident other than the death of the current leader. For example, a repeat of the famine that the country experienced in the 1990s, an accidental escalation into outright conflict with South Korea and the US, or a popular uprising that the security forces prove unable to control could all precipitate such a collapse. However, a successful 'people power' uprising remains highly unlikely given the breadth and depth of security measures in place. A complete loss of central legitimacy could create a situation in which North Korea becomes a failed state, with members of the military, the KWP, and others acting effectively as warlords competing for the control of territory and revenue-generating assets. Some parts of the state - particularly the more northerly provinces bordering China - would experience a decline in central control in the event of a difficult transition in Pyongyang. Conclusion The only kind of leadership transition that North Korea has experienced in the past two decades is the least likely type of changeover to be repeated in the event of Kim Jong-un's sudden death. At present, there is no publicly designated heir or even a credible heir apparent within the Kim family. As such, if Kim Jong-un were rendered unable to lead in the next 20 to 30 years, this would present an existential threat to the North Korean political system. The most likely scenario in this case is that a power struggle would take place within the upper echelons of the North Korean leadership. The absence of strong successors within the Kim family would suggest that a transition to either a single powerful leader from outside the Kim family, or to a council with a tenuous balance of power among the elite, would be the most likely scenario at the national level. Article 1 Page 7 of 14

8 In either case, it is possible that a surviving member of the Kim family would be presented as a figurehead. KIM JONG-UN AND THE NORTH KOREAN MEDIA In the past year, North Korean media references to Kim Jong-un have transitioned to almost exclusively focusing on his civilian role. This transition indicates a dilution of Kim Jong-un's military image as the 'dear marshal' in North Korean socialist ideology. Such a change in focus could indicate an increasing dispersal of power at the top of the North Korean regime, probably driven by the current focus on the economy. At the same time, references to other members of the elite have begun to include the honorific 'tongji' (senior comrade), indicating a relative increase in their status. IHS Jane's analysis of Korean-language North Korean media bears out this trend towards an increasing diffusion of power at the top of the North Korean power structure since It shows Kim Jong-un is no longer being referred to primarily by his military titles, with state media instead prioritising his position as head of the KWP. There are no private news outlets in North Korea. The main news outlet is the state-controlled Korea Central News Agency (KCNA) and the newspaper with the highest readership is the Rodong Sinmun (the Workers' Newspaper ), the daily official paper of the KWP's Central Committee. IHS Jane's has carried out a two-year study of a representative sample of North Korean media. The titles and full articles analysed are representative because of the tightly controlled and repetitive nature of North Korean media, and because of the similar content of the articles. The first analysis focused on KCNA and Rodong Sinmun articles describing Kim Jong-un's site visits, during which the supreme leader met local people, talked about 'juche' (self-reliance) ideology, and inspected new buildings such as factories, schools, and apartment blocks. The second analysis evaluated more than 300 KCNA articles, assessing those that mentioned Kim Jong-un or other members of the elite on the 15th day of every month for 26 months between September 2012 and October Finally, the articles were evaluated for references to the elite other than Kim Jong-un. The shift in references to him was evident in textual analysis of articles about his site visits published on 14 October 2013 and 14 October 2014 in Rodong Sinmun, and on 10 August 2013 and 31 August 2014 by the KCNA. In 2013, 47 of 51 references in Rodong Sinmun and 18 of 19 references in the KCNA referred to Kim Jong-un with military titles; almost all 'wonsunim' (marshal). In 2014, approximately half the articles referred to him by other titles: 16 of 30 references in Rodong Sinmun were simply tongji, and seven of 18 references in the KCNA were either tongji or che-il-piseo (first secretary of the KWP). Japan and North Korea's kidnap negotiations stall Article 1 Page 8 of 14

9 Korea moves - South Korea responds to northern provocation Young guns - New generation joins North Korean ruling elite Author Neil Ashdown is the deputy head of the Asia team within IHS Country Risk Analysis and Forecasting Team (CRAFT). Additional research by Senior Asia Analyst Alison Evans. Copyright IHS Global Limited, 2014 Article 1 Page 9 of 14