REPORT ON STATISTICAL INDICATORS OF PUBLIC TRANSPORT PERFORMANCE IN AFRICA

Transcription

1 Union Internationale des Transports Publics International Association of Public Transport Union Africaine des Transports Publics African Association of Public Transport REPORT ON STATISTICAL INDICATORS OF PUBLIC TRANSPORT PERFORMANCE IN AFRICA DATE: April 2010 Version 1.3 Final version

2 Table of Contents INTRODUCTION...3 METHODOLOGY...4 GLOBAL STATISTICAL INDICATORS RESEARCH GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS DEFINITION OF THE GLOBAL STATISTICAL INDICATORS USED DATA COLLECTED GLOBAL STATISTICAL INDICATORS RESEARCH FINDINGS...24 SPECIFIC STUDY CASES...33 ABIDJAN (COTE D IVOIRE)...33 ACCRA (GHANA)...48 ADDIS ABABA (ETHIOPIA)...55 DAKAR (SENEGAL)...67 DOUALA (CAMEROUN)...79 JOHANNESBURG (SOUTH AFRICA)...86 LAGOS (NIGERIA) NAIROBI (KENYA) RECOMMENDATIONS THE INVOLVEMENT OF PUBLIC AUTHORITIES IN THE MANAGEMENT OF PUBLIC TRANSPORT ACTIVITY INVESTMENT IN TRANSPORT INFRASTRUCTURES INVESTMENT IN QUALITY ROLLING STOCK, NOTABLY IN NEW VEHICLES, TO CUT COSTS AND IMPROVE OPERATIONS ESTABLISHMENT OF TRANSPORT ORGANISING AUTHORITIES FORMALISATION OF THE INFORMAL OPERATORS FINANCIAL SUPPORT TO PUBLIC TRANSPORT PUBLIC TRANSPORT PLANNING AND INTEGRATION WITH URBAN PLANNING CONCLUSION

3 INTRODUCTION For the past few decades, African cities have been experiencing huge population increases. This is mainly due to galloping urbanisation and rural exodus. It is estimated that by 2020 some 55% of the African population will be living in urban areas. Such fast growing cities face enormous challenges in terms of infrastructure provision and the need to cope with the increasing demand for transport. This is especially acute as much of the existing road infrastructure in African cities is far from being appropriate for the actual transport demand. In addition, apart from a few remaining companies, almost all publicly owned and managed public transport enterprises in Africa ceased to exist during the 1990s, often as a consequence of structural adjustment policies required to comply with aid programmes associated with international agencies. Therefore, the public transport sector has suffered more than 15 years of neglect and this, combined with escalating urban populations, has resulted in chaotic, unsustainable, time and money wasting transport systems in most African cities. Today throughout Africa, public transport is dominated by the operations of the disorganised informal sector (by this we mean market based, unregulated, lowcapacity service offers). The dominance of these services hampers economic development and reduces the quality of life for citizens as the large number of vehicles required to meet demand causes congestion and parking issues and, in the main, citizens suffer with high levels of local associated pollution and low levels of security and safety. Political decision makers urgently need support to make the right decisions. Precise and relevant statistics are required to give a clear overall view of the issues at stake and to monitor the benefits of implementing efficient public transport systems, which in general are almost inexistent today. This study highlights the advantages of developing organised public transport compared to the other transport modes. The specific purpose of this study is to provide facts, figures and indicators to support public transport advocacy in Africa. This has been done via two approaches: an analysis of global performance of organised public transport services in the cities studied on the one hand, and on the other, the study looks into the benefits of specific mobility reforms implemented in each of these cities. 3

4 METHODOLOGY This study is the fruit of widespread data collection implemented with the help of local contributors (organising authorities, operators, and consultancy firms). A first analysis helped refine the information, followed by a second comparative one which has tried to evaluate the correlations between the general level of public transport in the cities studied and various statistical indicators. The objective is to build a set of arguments supported by these facts and indicators in favour of public transport in Africa. The study was carried out on a sample of ten cities chosen with the double objective of balancing the sample geographically in the four regions of sub Saharan Africa and also ensuring balance in terms of the type of situations experienced. The cities studied are: Western Africa: Abidjan (Côte d Ivoire) Accra (Ghana) Dakar (Senegal) Lagos (Nigeria) Central Africa: Douala (Cameroon) Eastern Africa: Addis Ababa (Ethiopia) Dar es Salaam (Tanzania) Nairobi (Kenya) Southern Africa: Johannesburg (South Africa) Windhoek (Namibia) 4

5 GLOBAL STATISTICAL INDICATORS RESEARCH 1. GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS Departing from the results of the existing Mobility in Cities Database (MCD), which contains data mainly covering the world outside Africa, a set of global indicators was conceived in order to assess the performance of passenger transport in the cities concerned. The reference year used for this study is 2008, with data taken from annual statistics for this year. Where necessary, data from periodic surveys (censuses, mobility studies, etc.) were extrapolated to 2008 (extension of past trends measured using the latest complete studies available; use of partial studies conducted since the last full study; use of annual statistics addressing related indicators, etc.). When insufficient information was available to make a reliable estimation, the indicator was marked as not available. The reference area for each city is defined as the metropolitan area of each city. In the case of public transport services operated beyond the boundaries of the metropolitan area (typically regional bus or minibus lines), the following rules were applied: services between city centre and outside the metropolitan area with no or few stops within the metropolitan area were not taken into account; services where the majority of the service was within the metropolitan area were counted in their entirety; where neither of these applied, services shared between the two zones were treated on a case by case basis using adjustment methods. Demand indicators excluded passengers that enter the network in stations situated outside the metropolitan area. Categorisation of the different transport modes The modes of transport were classified in main categories as follows: - Walking and cycling (non motorised transport) - Private car - Collective transport (see below) - Private taxis - Motorcycle Classification of the various collective transport modes studied For the purpose of our study, the following collective transport modes were differentiated: - city bus - minibus - shared taxi - private taxi 5

6 - motorcycle taxi The following general considerations were made: Bus This term refers to large urban or city buses with more than 50 seats. For certain cases, midibuses (buses with a seating capacity between 35 and 50 seats) were included, especially where they were integrated in a formalisation process which is monitored by an organising authority, as is the case in Dakar. In all cities studied, large buses included in this category are owned by organised transport companies. We therefore took the option for our particular sample to simplify the categorisation, by making the assumption that organised public transport would be represented by this category. Minibuses This category comprises motorised collective transport means, which can carry from 5 to 35 seated passengers. In most cases, the minibus category relates to the privately run, informal transport sector (referred to later in this report). Private taxis Private taxis are commercial transport vehicles licensed to carry up to 4 persons excluding the driver, who travel privately to a destination of their own choice. Taking account of the operating mode of private taxis and their occupancy rate, which is very often comparable to the private car, and given their marginal number in the cities studied, they were not considered as collective transport, but they were assimilated as private cars. In fact, several cities among those studied have no private taxi operations at all. Shared taxis The shared taxis category considered here refers to all vehicles with a seating capacity of 5 people travelling together, not necessarily with each other or to the same destination. Minibuses, known as shared taxis in some locations, were not included in this category. Besides, taking account of the disparities in the terminology and in the level of acceptance of these shared taxis by the local public authorities of the cities, all kinds of shared taxis were included in this category regardless of their official or unofficial recognition or whether they are licensed or not. Motorcycle taxis Motorcycle taxis are motorised two wheel vehicles used as a collective transport means. This concerned just two cities in our sample although this mode is increasingly used in sub Saharan Africa. However, in all cases, they are always considered as an informal transport means that is tolerated by the public power in the absence of a sufficient alternative offer of safer transport. 6

7 The table below shows a summary of the various motorised transport (private car and collective transport) found in the cities: Modes ABIDJAN ACCRA ADDIS ABABA DAKAR DAR ES SALAAM Private cars Formal large bus company Minibus Private taxis Shared taxis Motorcycle taxis Modes DOUALA JOHANNESB URG LAGOS NAIROBI WINDHOEK Private cars Formal large bus company Minibus Private taxis Shared taxis Motorcycle taxis Notions of formal and informal collective transport The formal or informal characteristics of public transport in Africa primarily relate to both the regulatory and operating mode of the transport means and its internal management system. In general, collective passenger transport with poor or no control of its operations by an overall regulatory authority, usually characterised by an unplanned and ad hoc service offer, little or no respect of routes, no published or fixed fare structure, is called informal public transport. Formal public transport refers to much of the rest and, in the majority of cases, is characterised by the provision of scheduled transport services, offered by a legal company that has to adhere to an authority s regulations, and, most of the time, under a formal contract. In spite of the abovementioned obstacles, the categorisation of transport services as formal and informal or organised and disorganised is unavoidable in the framework 7

8 of this study in order to distinguish between these two different groups that in any case display singularities. For that reason, even if local collective transport may have a legal identity by paying various taxes, it might be included in the informal group as a result of its operational management. Under these definitions, the informal category includes the minibus and shared taxi groups, since they are predominantly informal in Africa at the moment, in spite of a few successes in their formalisation and professionalisation in some cities. Furthermore, to make the comparison between formal and informal transport as set out hereinafter in this report, only the minibus category was used for the informal sector and the formal one was represented by the large buses. This is explained by the fact that the other (informal) transport categories were sometimes insufficiently assessed because of the lack of reliable information on them (for instance, both cities where motorcycle taxis operate, namely Douala and Lagos, have no actual statistics on their activity). 8

9 2. DEFINITION OF THE GLOBAL STATISTICAL INDICATORS USED GENERAL DATA Definition of the metropolitan area The metropolitan area is either defined by its actual name (if it is an administrative entity taken in its entirety) or by the list of administrative entities it comprises (list of municipalities, for instance). Population The population refers to the total resident population in the metropolitan area in Urban population density (unit: inhab/km 2 ) The urban population density is the ratio between the population (as defined above) and the urbanised surface area of the metropolitan area. The urbanised surface area refers to the built up land surface, that is, residential, office, commercial and industrial areas (including warehouses and waste storage areas), public utilities, hospitals, schools, cultural centres, parks, gardens, sports fields, transport infrastructures (roads and motorways, railway tracks, airports), and derelict areas. On the other hand, the urbanised surface does not include sea, lakes, rivers and waterways, farmland, woods, meadows and other natural zones (flood plains, rocky points, etc.) and large recreational zones. GDP per capita (unit: EUR/inhab) The Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per inhabitant is the ratio between the GDP of the metropolitan area and its population. The GDP of the metropolitan area refers to the production approach, at the price of factors (that is, excluding taxes and including subsidies). The unit is EURO/ per inhabitant. Percentage of transport budget (unit: %) Percentage of the total expenses of the household spent on transport to meet regular mobility requirements within the metropolitan area. ROAD TRANSPORT INFRASTRUCTURE Total length of road network (unit: km) The computation of the length of road in the metropolitan area takes into account all roads open to public traffic (paved or non paved) located within the metropolitan area, with the exception of routes and paths through forests and across farmland. Residential routes are included, with the exception of those whose use is restricted to property owners. Dual carriageways and motorways are counted as ordinary roads (not twice). The length of the motorway network within the area is included. 9

10 Length of paved roads (unit: km) The same definition as above but limited to the paved road within the metropolitan area. Percentage of paved roads (unit: %) This is the percentage of paved roads out of the total length of road network within the metropolitan area. Density of road within the area (Length of road per urban hectare) (unit: km) The length of road per urban hectare is the ratio between the length of road (linear) in the metropolitan area (as previously defined) and the urbanised surface area of the metropolitan area. Length of road per thousand inhabitants (unit: m) The length of road per thousand inhabitants is the ratio between the length of road in the metropolitan area (as previously defined) and the population of the metropolitan area (as previously defined). TRAFFIC DATA Total number of vehicles (unit: veh) This is the total number of passenger vehicles (taxis, cars and motorcycles) within the metropolitan area privately owned or used in public transport. Only active vehicles are counted (not scrap vehicles, even ones that are still registered). Number of vehicles per mode (unit: veh) This is the total number of motorised vehicles for each mode which are effectively in activity and used for transporting people. Private passenger vehicles per thousand inhabitants This indicator is the ratio between, on the one hand, the sum of the number of passenger cars in the metropolitan area (as defined above) and the number of private motorcycles in the metropolitan area (as defined above), and on the other hand, the population of the metropolitan area (as defined above). Motorcycles per thousand inhabitants The number of motorcycles in the metropolitan area includes all motorised twowheel vehicles belonging to households, administrations or companies resident or established in the metropolitan area. 10

11 Capacity offered per vehicle (unit: place) This indicator is the average number of places (seats and standing persons) per unit of each mode of transportation. Average occupancy rate per vehicle (unit: passenger) The average occupancy rate is an annual average occupancy estimated for the vehicle defined above over the metropolitan area s entire road network. Average annual mileage per vehicle (unit: km) For private cars, this indicator is the average annual distance travelled by a vehicle within the limits of the metropolitan area (excluding the distance travelled outside the metropolitan area). For public transport means, it is the total annual distance covered by the one vehicle as defined above in commercial operation (also called live mileage), that is, excluding deadhead runs from and to depots (also called dead mileage). Average daily mileage per large bus (unit: km) Average number of kilometres covered by each organised bus per day. Average daily mileage per minibus informal transport (unit: km) Average number of kilometres covered by each minibus per day. Annual total number of passengers per unit per mode (unit: passenger) This indicator refers to the total number of passengers annually carried by each vehicle of each transport mode. Daily unit trips per collective transport mode (unit: trips) This is the average number of daily trips carried out by each transport mode. MODAL SHARE The total number of daily trips is characterised as follows: trips made by persons over five years of age who reside in the metropolitan area, trips with at least one extremity (origin and/or destination) inside the metropolitan area, all reasons for travel and all transport modes, motorised or otherwise: trips on foot are included, trips on an annual average day: the indicator being sought is equal to the number of annual trips divided by 365 (which is distinct from trips on an average working day), a trip made using several modes is counted as one trip and assigned to a primary mode in accordance with the following conventions: assignment to public transport, whatever the feeder mode (including motor vehicles/cars as part of a Park and Ride scheme), 11

12 assignment to a motorised mode, whatever the length of distances on foot or using non motorised modes at either end of the journey. Modal share of private car (unit: %) This is the percentage of the total number of person trips which are made daily by private car. Modal share of bicycle & walking (unit: %) This is the percentage of the total people trips which are made daily by bicycle & walking. Modal share of motorcycle (unit: %) This is the percentage of the total people trips which are made daily by motorcycle. Modal share of public transport (bus) (unit: %) This is the percentage of the total trips which are made daily by formal public transport (large bus). Modal share of private taxis (unit: %) This is the percentage of the total number of trips which are made daily by private taxis. Modal share of informal public transport (minibus, collective taxis) (unit: %) This is the percentage of the number of total trips which are made daily by informal public transport means (minibus, collective taxis, motorcycle taxis ). INVESTMENTS Annual investment in public transport (unit: EUR) This indicates the average amount annually invested in public transport. The expenditure taken into account refers to investment by public transport networks operated within the confines of the reference area, all modes combined. Investment is understood to mean all improvements or new infrastructures, new systems and any purchase of rolling stock or waterborne craft. More specifically, investment may involve: construction of new infrastructures [new lines, reserved routes (e.g. exclusive rights of way), stations, stops, bus shelters, workshops, depots, maintenance and storage facilities, administrative buildings of public transport companies, etc.], implementation of equipment and new systems for existing lines and networks, rolling stock purchases, certain maintenance expenditure whenever this is not incorporated within operating expenditure. This might be the case with certain heavy expenditure involving modernisation or renovation. All types of expenditure are taken into account, including expenditure on expropriation and financial costs linked to borrowing contracted by investors. All 12

13 fund providers are concerned, be they public (State, region/province, local district, groupings of public authorities, transport organising authorities, public transport operators, etc.) or private (private operators). Each year s investment expenditure is the sum without duplication of each operator s investment expenditure within the reference area for that year. The expenditure being compiled is that which is effectively being consumed (not programme authorisations). Given the variations that are likely to affect investment, provision was made here for this indicator to be collected year on year over a threeyear period: 2006, 2007 and Annual amount of road investment and maintenance (unit: EUR) This figure indicates the average annual amount invested in the construction of road infrastructures and maintenance. Expenditure taken into account concerns investment, operation and maintenance of the road network defined above. More precisely, it covers: all categories of road open to public traffic (only residential roads whose use is reserved exclusively for property owners are excluded), pavements and public parking areas, toll booths and parking meters, signposts, traffic lights and traffic management and road user information systems. Investment is understood to mean all creations of infrastructures or new systems and all extensions or substantial improvements to infrastructures or existing systems. Maintenance is understood to mean all work to restore and repair the infrastructures and systems listed earlier. Operation is understood to refer mainly to traffic police costs. All types of expenditure are taken into account, including expenditure on expropriation and financial costs linked to borrowing contracted by investors. All fund providers are concerned, be they public (State, region/province, districts, groups of public authorities, etc.) or private. The expenditure being compiled is that which is effectively being consumed for regular service provision (not programme authorisations). Given the variations that are likely to affect investment, provision was made here for this indicator to be collected year on year over a three year period: 2006, 2007 and

14 REVENUES AND COSTS Annual operating cost of a private car (unit: EUR) This is the annual amount invested in the operation and maintenance of one private car. This cost is the full cost (all taxes, insurance etc. included) borne by the motorist. This cost is computed for an average car, which varies depending on the city being studied, and includes: fuel expenditure (based on fuel consumption and fuel price including all taxes), vehicle maintenance expenditure, insurance and vehicle ownership taxes, expenditure on parking and tolls, vehicle depreciation (based on the purchase cost of the average car, divided by 6, 8, 10 or 12 when the average annual distance travelled by private car is respectively > 15,000km, between 10,000 and 15,000km, between 6,000 and 10,000km, or < 6,000km). Average annual fuel consumption cost of a private car (unit: EUR) This indicator refers to the total annual amount allocated to fuel consumption for the operation of one private car. Transport cost for the users of private car (unit: EUR) This is the annual cost of a private car (car operation and maintenance costs) per passenger transported. Annual operating cost of organised public transport (unit: EUR) This is the amount annually invested in the operation and maintenance of the fleet of organised public transport in the city. This expenditure (excluding depreciation) includes: expenditure on staff (including social security contributions and pensions), energy expenditure (for operations, maintenance and facilities), purchases of external goods and services (including subcontracting), maintenance expenditure (save for that included under investment expenditure), miscellaneous costs (e.g. rental), financial costs, taxes and duties. All information from public transport operators is taken from their activities within the boundaries of the metropolitan area. Total operating expenditure is the sum of each operator s operating expenditure calculated without duplication. Average cost of annual fuel consumption of organised public transport (unit: EUR) This is the annual amount allocated to fuel consumption for the operations of the fleet of organised public transport buses. 14

15 Annual revenue of organised public transport (unit: EUR) This is the annual revenue of organised public transport. The farebox of the organised public transport revenue includes: revenue from the sale of tickets, the product of fines paid by fare evaders, reimbursements for concessionary fares paid by public authorities at all levels (State, region, district, etc.) in the case of fare reductions granted to certain passenger categories (children, students, large families, military personnel, jobseekers, pensioners, seniors, etc.). Farebox revenue does not include: contributions paid by other public transport beneficiaries (e.g. the versement transport, i.e. a transport tax, paid by employers in France), subsidies paid by public authorities on all levels (State, regions, districts, etc.) for any reason other than to compensate for social fare reductions, other public transport company revenue (advertising, rental, revenue derived from the supply of services other than scheduled passenger services, etc.). All public transport operators with organised activities within the metropolitan area are taking into account their activities within the boundaries of the metropolitan area. Total revenue is the sum of the revenue from each operator calculated without duplication. Transport cost for the users of organised public transport (unit: EUR) Annual amount allocated to public transport fleet operation and maintenance of the urban buses per passenger transported This indicator is the ratio between public transport farebox revenue excluding reimbursements for concessionary fares and the total number of users transported. Annual operating cost of minibuses (unit: EUR) This is the annual amount invested in the operation and maintenance of the minibuses in operation within the metropolitan area. Average annual fuel consumption cost minibuses (unit: EUR) This the annual amount allocated to fuel consumption for the operations of the fleet of minibuses (informal public transport) Annual revenue minibuses (unit: EUR) Annual revenue of minibuses. Transport cost for the users minibuses (unit: EUR) Annual amount allocated to minibus fleet operation and maintenance of minibus per passenger transported. 15

16 OTHER DATA Annual transport fatalities (unit: deaths) Number of deaths related to road transport. The number of passenger transport fatalities 1 refers to the annual number of people killed as a result of transport accidents that occurred in the metropolitan area. These accidents include: traffic accidents, accidents on public transport networks not counted as traffic accidents. Annual pollutants (unit: kg) This indicator is the sum of the annual local emissions, expressed in kilogrammes, of: CO, Carbon Monoxide, VHC (volatile hydrocarbons or unburnt petrol/diesel), also called particulate matter (PM), NOx, Nitrous Oxide, caused by passenger transport in the metropolitan area (including public transport and private modes). Average speed on the road network (unit: km/h) Average commercial speed of traffic vehicles (all vehicles included) on the road network. This is the average speed of vehicles throughout the year (24 hours a day, 7 days a week) across the entire road network (on all types of roads open to public traffic). Annual transport fatalities/1000 vehicles (unit: deaths) Annual transport fatalities divided by the total number of vehicles (per 1000). Annual pollutants per vehicle (unit: Kg/veh) Annual pollutants divided by the number of polluting vehicles. 1 Following the World Health Organization s recommendations, a fatality is counted if it occurs during a period of 30 days after the accident. 16

17 3. DATA COLLECTED Global information on the cities INDICATORS ABIDJAN ACCRA GDP per capita (euros) Population (inhab.) ADDIS ABABA DAKAR DAR ES SALAAM DOUALA JOHANN ESBURG LAGOS NAIROBI 1,800 1, ,700 1,100 2,300 10,600 2,200 1,600 5,200 4,252,986 3,832,680 2,973,004 2,482,294 3,296,203 2,500,000 3,800,000 17,552,942 4,736, ,000 Area (km 2 ) 1,183 1, , ,645 3,569 4, WIND HOEK Urbanised area (km 2 ) Human density (inhab/km 2 ) Human density with urbanised area (inhab/km2) Total number of cars Car density per km 2 of urbanised area 120 1, ,645 2,831 3, , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,185 26, Car/1,000 hab The number of vehicles per 1,000 inhabitants is relatively low in Africa. The highest figure is for Johannesburg. Data on road network INDICATORS Abidjan Accra Length of road network (kms) Length of paved roads (kms) Addis Ababa Dakar Dar es Salaam Douala Johannes burg Lagos Nairobi 2,042 2, ,140 1,800 10,000 5,180 2,385 1,205 1, ,500 4,818 1,153 Percentage 59% 61% 63% 65% 39% 25% 85% 93% 48% 17

18 Data on private cars Fleet (number of units) of private car Capacity per unit (private car) Average rate of occupancy per unit (private car) Annual kilometres per unit (private car) Annual total number of passengers (private car) Daily unit trips (private car) ABIDJAN ACCRA ADDIS ABABA DAKAR DAR ES SALAAM 164,833 53,806 93, , , ,000 19,200 25,357 7,500 25, ,562,400 58,918, ,566,188 87,406, ,098, Fleet (number of units) of private car Capacity per unit (private car) Average rate of occupancy per unit (private car) Annual kilometres per unit (private car) Annual total number of passengers (private car) Daily unit trips (private car) DOUALA JOHANNESBURG LAGOS NAIROBI WINDHOEK 33, , , ,422 20, ,000 21,900 4,260 8,133 15,863 40,263,156 2,194,601, ,499, ,818, Data on regulated public transport (organised large bus companies) ABIDJAN ACCRA ADDIS ABABA DAKAR DAR ES SALAAM Fleet of PT (large bus) Capacity per unit PT (large bus) Average rate of occupancy per unit PT (large bus) Annual kilometres per unit PT (large bus) Annual total number of passengers PT (large bus) Daily unit trips PT (large bus) ,049 29,952 53,924 45, ,319,474 12,437, ,601, ,864,240 6,400,

19 DOUALA JOHANNESBURG LAGOS NAIROBI WINDHOEK Fleet of PT (large bus) 115 4, Capacity per unit PT (large bus) Average rate of occupancy per unit PT (large bus) Annual kilometres per unit PT (large bus) Annual total number of passengers PT (large bus) Daily unit trips PT (large bus) ,000 27,260 73,920 15,000 15,000 10,065,960 28,561, ,000, ,123, Fleet (number of units) Minibuses Capacity per unit (Minibuses) Average rate of occupancy per unit (Minibuses) Annual kilometres per unit (Minibuses) Annual total number of passengers (Minibuses) Data on other means (mostly unregulated urban transport) a) Minibus ABIDJAN ACCRA ADDIS ABABA DAKAR DAR ES SALAAM 5,370 45,883 8,911 2,551 10, ,400 79,872 57,350 58,006 70, ,940,760 1,458,103, ,887, ,063,850 1,115,631,312 Daily unit trips (Minibuses) Fleet (number of units) Minibuses Capacity per unit (Minibuses) Average rate of occupancy per unit (Minibuses) Annual kilometres per unit (Minibuses) Annual total number of passengers (Minibuses) DOUALA JOHANNESBURG LAGOS NAIROBI WINDHOEK ,600 80,000 22,733 N/A ,000 64,680 72,000 18,000 30,197,340 2,513,817,600 2,140,000,000 1,590,744,661 Daily unit trips (Minibuses)

20 b) Shared sedan taxis Fleet (number of units) shared taxis Capacity per unit (shared taxis) Average rate of occupancy per unit (shared taxis) Annual kilometres per unit (shared taxis) Annual total number of passengers (shared taxis) Daily unit trips (shared taxis) ABIDJAN ACCRA ADDIS ABABA DOUALA DAR ES SALAAM 11,073 22,099 N/A 10,000 3, ,000 46, ,000 50, ,052, ,504, ,500,000 18,593, c) Motorcycle taxis Information on motorcycle taxis is actually very poor and usually quite imprecise. Indeed, in several locations motorcycle taxis are simply illegal transport means, which are even fought against by the public authorities. As a result, these latter do not seek to collect or update any information on motorcycle taxis, although there are signs indicating that their numbers are constantly increasing in sub Saharan Africa. They are found only in three cities within our sample, namely Dar es Salaam, Lagos and Douala. Only the latter has accurate information on their activity (see table below). Their number is estimated at 10,000 units in Lagos and in Dar es Salaam at a maximum of 2,000 units. Fleet (number of units) motorcycle taxis Capacity per unit (motorcycle taxis) Average rate of occupancy per unit (motorcycle taxis) Annual kilometres per unit (motorcycle taxis) Annual total number of passengers (motorcycletaxis) Daily unit trips (motorcycle taxis) DOUALA LAGOS 40,000 10, , ,236,

21 Data on modal share ABIDJAN ACCRA ADDIS ABABA DAKAR DAR ES SALAAM Modal share private car Modal share bicycle & walking Modal share motorcycle Modal share public transport (bus) Modal share private taxis Modal share informal transport(minibus, collective taxis) Transport modal share split DOUALA JOHANNESBURG LAGOS NAIROBI WINDHOEK Modal share private car Modal share bicycle & walking Modal share motorcycle Modal share public transport (bus) Modal share private taxis Modal share informal transport (minibus, collective taxis) Data on cost for private car Annual operating cost of private car Average annual fuel consumption cost of private car ACCRA ADDIS ABABA JOHANNESBURG NAIROBI 145,780, ,746,782 61,985, ,906,040 53,011, ,640, ,650, ,909,867 21

22 Data on cost for regulated public transport (organised large bus companies) ABIDJAN ACCRA ADDIS ABABA DAKAR Annual operating cost PT 94,840,690 5,010,436 9,470,464 33,870,157 Average annual fuel consumption cost PT 11,790,096 1,347,220 3,391,151 6,639,951 Annual revenue PT 94,078,495 2,452,252 6,790,460 25,511,373 Transport cost for the users of PT DOUALA JOHANNESBURG LAGOS NAIROBI Annual operating cost PT N/A 42,438,747 11,135,183 2,985,735 Average annual fuel consumption cost PT 8,526,750 4,752,000 1,963,490 Annual revenue PT 13,074,633 16,079,229 36,719,990 Transport cost for the users of PT Data on costs for minibuses Annual operating cost (Minibuses) Average annual fuel consumption cost (Minibuses) Annual revenue (Minibuses) Transport cost for the users (Minibuses) ABIDJAN ACCRA ADDIS ABABA DAKAR DAR ES SALAAM 167,005, ,200,053 74,165,698 38,251, ,143,201 57,819, ,981,754 32,896,709 11,468, ,139, ,563,155 64,201,505 75,036, Annual operating cost (Minibuses) Average annual fuel consumption cost (Minibuses) Annual revenue (Minibuses) Transport cost for the users (Minibuses) DOUALA JOHANNESBURG LAGOS NAIROBI WINDHOEK 8,568, ,851,543 37,507,497 N/A 395,774,318 1,935,360,000 17,588,866 9,792,683 1,696,538,468 1,469,844, ,758,

23 Other data Average speed on the road network ABIDJAN ACCRA ADDIS ABABA DAKAR DAR ES SALAAM Annual transport fatalities Percentage of household budget spent on transport Average speed on the road network DOUALA JOHANNESBURG LAGOS NAIROBI WINDHOEK N/A Annual transport fatalities Percentage of household budget spent on transport Annual investment in public transport Annual amount in road investment and maintenance ABIDJAN ACCRA ADDIS ABABA DAKAR DAR ES SALAAM 38,109,756 20,220,690 20,308,641 11,973,357 1,562, ,421,429 5,725, ,460,000 4,848,279 Annual investment in public transport Annual amount in road investment and maintenance DOUALA JOHANNESBURG LAGOS NAIROBI WINDHOEK 0 4,949, ,740, ,773,014 37,500,000 45,684,451 5,916,084 41,406,500 39,216,143 23

24 4. GLOBAL STATISTICAL INDICATORS RESEARCH FINDINGS SE Africans either use non motorised transport (walking and cycling) or informal transport for most of their trips. It is well known that pedestrians and cyclists are the most vulnerable and more of them are injured or killed in traffic incidents. Safety is less of a concern to many informal operators and can be compromised in the quest for commercial benefits. TRANSPORT MODAL SHARE OF THE CITIES WINDHOEK NAIROBI LAGOS JOHANNESBURG DOUALA DAR ES SALAAM DAKAR private car bicycle & walking motorcycle public transport (bus) private taxis informal (minibus, collective taxis) ADDIS-ABABA ACCRA ABIDJAN 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% As in much of the rest of the developing world, it is clear that informal collective transport is the main means of motorised transport across the whole of the African continent and accounts for around 35 40% of most urban transport trips. Non motorised transport (walking and cycling) is the second most important group with a modal share of 30 35% (with walking being the most dominant). As a consequence, the modal shares of these two groups are inversely correlated. Changing a walking or bicycle trip to a motorised collective transport trip is a first choice wherever this latter is provided at an affordable cost for the population. Nevertheless, although collective transport is widely used, it remains mostly disorganised, that is to say, informal public transport. 24

25 Graph 1: Modal share informal transport vs Modal share of bicycle and walking Modal share informal transport vs Modal share bycycle & walking 120 R 2 = 0, Accra Modal share informal tranport mode Abidjan Dar Es Salaam Windhoek Johannesburg Lagos Addis-Ababa Nairobi Douala Modal share informal (minibus, collective taxis) Linear (Modal share informal (minibus, collective taxis)) Dakar Modal share of walking and cycling In other words, up to now, people in Africa have mostly used walking and cycling to get around. It might be that other options, such as private cars, are not affordable for the majority of people. However, given the size of the African cities such as the ones in our study sample and their rapid expansion, walking taken alone cannot be considered as a time efficient and sustainable mode, in spite of all its environmental friendly aspects. Walking needs to be complementary to other sustainable mobility means, like public transport. One can thus deduce that if more high quality public transport was available the African population would have a better chance to actively participate in the economic life of their cities and would be able to go about their daily activities with considerable time gains. 25

26 PRIVATE CAR OWNERSHIP GROWTH IS A NATURAL TREND LINKED TO THE ECONOMIC PROSPERITY OF CITIES Graph 2: Modal share of private car vs Country GDP per capita 35 private car modal share vs GDP per capita 30 R 2 = 0,567 Johannesburg Private car modal share (%) Addis-Ababa Nairobi Lagos Abidjan Windhoek Modal share private car Linear (Modal share private car) Dar Es Salaam 5 Accra Dakar Douala GDP pr capita (eur/inhab) Graph 3: Modal share of motorised private mode vs GDP per capita 26

27 The trend for car ownership follows a similar pattern to elsewhere in the world and, as incomes and prosperity rises, car ownership increases. Private car ownership tends to increase in line with the wealth of the country or of the population. This trend can only be stemmed with traffic demand policies to direct the natural human preferences for travelling privately towards more sustainable mobility choices such as public transport. THE NUMBER OF PRIVATE CARS GROWS IN LINE WITH ROAD NETWORK EXPANSION Graph 4: Length of paved road vs modal share of private car Lenght of paved road vs number of private cars Modal share private car Linear (Modal share private car) Length of paved roads network Nairobi Lagos Johannesburg R 2 = 0, Abidjan Dar Dakar Es Salaam Addis-Ababa Accra Douala Number of private cars The number of private cars also grows in line with road network growth. Consequently, as more roads are built, more private cars will be acquired to use them. Experience in the developed world shows that no road infrastructures are able to cope with the private car demand in the long term, undermining the outmoded traditional approach to transport planning and infrastructure construction of predict and provide. In Africa, more than elsewhere, the road network suffers from a lack of regular, planned expansion and from a lack of long term maintenance plans. It is therefore even more critical to provide mobility options other than just encouraging the use of the private car. Furthermore, although the private car is still used relatively little due to the low purchasing power of people, paradoxically, traffic congestion is increasing in the African metropolises. This illustrates moreover the limited availability of road infrastructures and especially of 27

28 quality paved roads. It is therefore necessary to seek adapted transport solutions which optimise the use of road infrastructures currently available. Therefore, we can see that encouraging the development of private cars or even failing to address the issue of implementing affordable, cost efficient public transport systems in Africa, clearly means marginalising and hampering the mobility of the vast majority of its people. UNREGULATED INFORMAL PUBLIC TRANSPORT DAMAGES THE TRANSPORT SYSTEM AND IS VERY COSTLY FOR THE COMMUNITY As previously mentioned, collective transport accounts for a large part of daily trips in African cities, but it is dominated by the operations of informal rather than formal collective transport with small vehicles ranging from four to 30 seats maximum, creating many dysfunctions in the transport system. The graph below shows the increasing number of informal low capacity units. The sheer numbers required to meet demand within a particular area tend to affect the proper functioning of the transport system by reducing its fluidity, and thus commercial speed. Graph 5: Density of small capacity units on roads and average speed on the network Density of small capacity transport means on roads vs Average speed on the road network Dakar R 2 = 0,7298 Average speed of the road network Johannesburg Nairobi Dar Es Salaam Lagos Addis-Ababa Accra Average speed on the road network Linear (Average speed on the road network) ,0 5,0 10,0 15,0 20,0 25,0 Density of small capacity transport units on roads The dominance of an informal, unregulated transport offer across a system may also impact other externalities by increasing pollution and threatening road safety. Comparisons between formal and informal transport for some indicators are sometimes difficult to 28

29 establish in the particular case of the African cities. For instance, road accidents caused by informal operations are often not taken up in the official statistics as a large proportion of accidents are settled amicably on site. In this case, the statistics will be significantly lower than the reality. Various studies conducted in west Africa indicate that the costs of dysfunctions in the transport system due to informal operations can amount to a significant part of national and local economic performance. The following table gathers some of these results: EXTERNALITIES GENERATED BY URBAN TRANSPORT CITY ANNUAL COST (millions EUR) PERCENTAGE OF COUNTRY S GDP YEAR Pollution Cotonou % 2003 Pollution Ouagadougou % 1999 Pollution, congestion, road accidents Pollution, congestion, road accidents Dakar % 2000 Abidjan % 2002 Source: Trans Africa from several other studies WELL ORGANISED AND MANAGED PUBLIC TRANSPORT IS MORE EFFICIENT THAN INFORMAL COLLECTIVE TRANSPORT Organised or regulated public transport is more efficient in many aspects such as the numbers of passengers transported, number of vehicles required and energy used when compared to informal collective transport. The following table shows the number of passengers transported by formal public transport operations. PASSENGERS TRANSPORTED ADDIS JOHANN ABIDJAN ACCRA DAKAR DOUALA PER KM ABABA ESBURG LAGOS NAIROBI Passenger/km organised PT Passenger/km informal transport Ratio Passenger per km organised/informal PASSENGERS TRANSPORTED PER VEHICLE ABIDJAN ACCRA ADDIS ABABA DAKAR DOUALA JOHANN ESBURG LAGOS NAIROBI Annual passengers PT/veh 290, , , ,801 87,530 5, , ,423 Annual passengers minibuses/veh 105,948 31,779 56, ,770 54, ,256 29,571 69,975 Ratio annual passengers per veh organised/informal

30 In a certain respect, the indicator of number of passengers transported per km may be taken as a performance indicator of public transport. Through this indicator, the formal public transport sector shows higher efficiency when compared to the informal sector by an average ratio of 5.7 within the cities studied. The highest figures are obtained for Nairobi, Lagos and Accra. Both in Nairobi and Accra, formal public transport is close to interurban operations. In the case of Lagos, the BRT alone is responsible for the significant performance of formal public transport in comparison to the informal sector within an important but restricted area of the city. However, it is important to point out that this indicator does not reflect either the comfort or safety of the passengers transported, especially in the case of informal transport. Even in cases where the number of passengers transported per km is equal both for organised and informal transport, commuters using organised transport often cite a considerable difference in terms of comfort and customer care between the two modes. As far as our study sample is concerned, 4.5 times fewer vehicles are needed if formal transport is used compared with informal to carry the same number of passengers. This was clearly demonstrated in the case of Lagos. Both in terms of passengers per km and passengers per vehicle, the gap between organised and informal transport is considerable. Apart from the exceptional case of Johannesburg, and after assessing the two indicators mentioned above, it would appear that the level of performance of organised public transport in the English speaking countries of our sample is higher than in the Frenchspeaking ones. This might be explained by the different patterns of public transport in each system. A typical characteristic of the English or British public transport pattern and this particularly applies to our sample is that the collective transport vehicles serve the downtown, central business district (CBD) or main economic centre(s) and satellite cities and towns, dropping off and picking up passengers en route. So, even when the service is scheduled, there is still a certain flexibility to be able to wait for the vehicle to be as full as possible before departure. This type of urban public transport is then close to the regional/interurban transport service, benefiting from its higher efficiency compared to mere urban transport services. This results in a higher level of passengers carried per vehicle or per km. The particular case of Johannesburg is also rather relevant regarding the minibus taxi sector, which is currently going through a formalisation process. As such, this industry might be regarded as more of an organised body in terms of registration, vehicle roadworthiness (i.e. safety) and aspects of formalisation and democratisation of associations. Nevertheless, they are not economically organised, with no fare integration, and still charge passengers variable ticket prices. The restructuring is still ongoing at the time of this report. However, before deciding on the fares, the taxi associations consult with local communities. There is a component of regulation, especially on safety and registrations, but also another component of self regulation, whereby associations strictly adhere to the codes of practice 30

31 that they establish for themselves. We would say therefore that this sector is somewhere in between organised and informal as a consequence of the ongoing reform. On the other hand, the high performance of minibus taxi operations in Johannesburg shows that they can usefully complement large bus services and highlights the benefits of organising and regulating the minibus sector. Fuel consumption Not all cities communicated figures on fuel consumption; however the data on passengers transported by both organised and informal transport modes are summarised in the table below. EUR/passenger ABIDJAN ACCRA ADDIS ABABA JOHANN ESBURG LAGOS NAIROBI Fuel consumption per passenger of organised PT Fuel consumption per passenger of informal transport Ratio fuel consumption organised PT/ informal In these cities, with the exception of Johannesburg, organised public transport uses about half the fuel per passenger transported compared to informal transport operations. In Johannesburg, the minibus sector no longer really matches the definition of informal transport, as it is subject to minimum requirements in terms of safety, efficiency and service quality and operates more along the lines of formal public transport. In addition, the patronage of organised public transport with large buses, at present, is not very high. Lagos records the best performance of the sample in terms of energy consumption per passenger transported with regards to formal transport operations versus the informal operations. This is actually an outcome of the BRT system implemented in the city, as it almost totally removes the effect of congestion, as it runs on dedicated lanes. In summary, the difference in fuel consumption between informal and formal public transport ranges from 1/3 to 4/5 respectively in a normal situation when operating in mixed traffic with other vehicles and significant extra savings are made if it operates on dedicated lanes (in a BRT or BRT Lite situation) segregated from the other traffic. The case of Johannesburg might suggest that, when the informal minibus sector attempts to comply with the rules and regulations set to formalise its operations, its efficiency may approach and possibly even surpass the larger bus operations. However, with its historical political heritage which affected the transportation system, Johannesburg is somewhat different from the other African cities. 31

32 .. BUT STRICT MANAGEMENT MUST FOLLOW TO OPTIMISE OPERATIONS Operating costs The results of the review of operating costs make it difficult to draw clear conclusions: ABIDJAN ACCRA ADDIS ABABA DAKAR JOHANNESB URG LAGOS NAIROBI Operating cost/passenger of organised PT Operating cost/passenger of informal PT Ratio From these results it is possible to prove that informal transport spends less on its operation than the formal sector. This situation arises because overhead costs of the informal operators are almost non existent, contrary to the situation faced by the formal operators. The latter often record administrative and fixed costs that are as high as the direct operating costs, if not higher. In this regard, Lagos, Addis Ababa and Nairobi appear to be exceptions. As a matter of fact we also found that the cost for formal transport is times higher than the cost for informal transport, which logically corresponds to the fixed costs. This also means that the direct costs per passenger transported are more or less the same for both kinds of transportation. Nevertheless, Lagos again is noticeable with a very low operating cost for organised transport but a rather high operating cost for informal transport resulting from the chaotic condition of the informal sector and the operation of older vehicles. 32

33 SPECIFIC STUDY CASES ABIDJAN (COTE D IVOIRE) CUTTING DOWN THE TECHNICAL COSTS OF OPERATIONS BY INVESTING IN NEW ROLLING STOCK A. INTRODUCTION SOTRA (Abidjan Bus Transport Company) is the only organised and formal public transport company serving the city of Abidjan (Côte d Ivoire) with a fleet of around 500 large buses dispatched daily. It operates under a concession agreement signed with the State of Côte d'ivoire. Established in 1960, the history of SOTRA is studded with events which have often resulted in a significant reduction of the operating fleet. Since the 1990s, in fact, SOTRA experienced cash flow problems that caused a significant reduction in its services. Its difficulties were mainly linked to the inability of the Ivorian government to meet its financial commitments towards SOTRA, such as the annual fare compensation. This resulted in a drastic reduction in the investment in rolling stock and maintenance actions. This led to the weakening and gradual degradation of the operating fleet, which reached critical levels. Given the strong demand pressure that the old rolling stock at the time was unable to face effectively, in 2005 SOTRA implemented a fleet renewal policy, by first purchasing new TATA branded vehicles from India and later MERCEDES KHODRO vehicles from Iran. To date, 75% of SOTRA s fleet involved in services under the concession agreement consists of new vehicles. While efforts in this area are still being made to ensure the continuity of this programme and ensure a satisfactory level of supply in terms of quantity and quality, it was appropriate at this stage to assess its impact on the transport service of SOTRA in general and on its technical operations in particular. This study therefore aims to highlight the effects of SOTRA s fleet renewal on its technical activities. 33

34 B. URBAN CONTEXT: The Abidjan District Created by Act No of 9 August 2001, the Autonomous District of Abidjan is the third largest agglomeration in sub Saharan Africa after Lagos and Kinshasa. It covers an area of approximately 128,000 hectares and includes 10 municipalities from the former city of Abidjan, and three peripheral districts: Anyama, Bingerville and Songon. The economic capital of Côte d'ivoire, Abidjan is a cosmopolitan city with more than 4,000,000 inhabitants. Composed of peninsulas interspersed with bays and lagoons, Abidjan is an agglomeration with shaped by its geography and mainly characterised by water, which crosses 11 of the 13 districts. SOTRA, in accordance with its public service mission for passenger transport, plays an important role in the social and urban integration of the Abidjan agglomeration, which is experiencing major population growth. To date, SOTRA focuses most of its activities in the 10 districts constituting the core of the city, gathering 93% of the population. Since 2005, the extent of SOTRA activities was enlarged to an 11th district, and studies provide a roadmap to get this coverage extended to the entire Autonomous District. The public transport operators They provide the service of urban public transport and share the market of Abidjan journeys. On the regulatory level, they can be grouped into two categories: providers of an urban public transport service formally contracted with the State of Côte d Ivoire; operators simply operating with a transport permit. Only two structures are formally recognised as having a contract with the State of Côte d Ivoire SOTRA and SOTU, although the latter has never really launched its operations. The other operators are holders of nominative and individual transport permits issued by the organising authority (AGETU). These are individuals or legal entities (corporations, cooperative etc..) which own transport vehicles and usually group themselves into transport professional unions. They are: Gbakas The commonly used name Gbakas refers to services provided by minibuses with a capacity of between 14 and 32 seats and which operate under authorisation from the Ministry of Transport, which designates the route to operate. 34

35 Woro woro Woro woro are local district four seater taxis providing door to door transport services. They have grown considerably since the 1990s. This expansion is firstly due to their competitiveness compared to other modes (affordable price and quick links) and secondly to difficulties experienced by SOTRA, along with the liberalisation of the importation of second hand vehicles. C. DESCRIPTION OF THE REFORM 1) Brief presentation of SOTRA SOTRA, Société des Transports Abidjanais was established on 16 December 1960 following the signing of a memorandum of understanding between the State of Côte D Ivoire and the Renault Saviem group. It is a mixed financial holding company whose capital (3 billion CFA francs) is held by the State of Côte d Ivoire (59.63%), the IRISBUS group (39.80%) and by the Abidjan District (0.57%). The company is under the technical supervision of the Ministry of Transport and the financial supervision of the Ministry of Economy and Finance. Its mission is to operate under the best conditions of comfort, safety and regularity a public service of passenger transport within the urban transport area of Abidjan. 2) History of SOTRA s fleet In 1994, in order to solve problems related to SOTRA s insufficient service provision, a recovery plan implemented a second hand vehicle purchase programme, which resulted in the gradual increase of the fleet, rising from 350 units in 1994 to 662 in However in 1999, it was noted that, although the fleet comprises 583 vehicles in daily operations, this fleet was over 15 years old and was less and less able to meet the daily demand. At that particular time also, the deterioration of traffic conditions was very visible and congestion spread and intensified throughout the city. Besides, the pressure exercised by demand hit unprecedented levels and access to public transport at peak hours became problematic. The fleet, which was in poor condition and heavily used, started to show frequent technical failures: continual breakdowns due to overheating of engines of vehicles stuck in traffic, difficulties for vehicles carrying a load of passengers to get over ramps, even low level ramps. Since 2000, foundations were laid for an operational revival, coupled with a financial restructuring plan to help the company get a sufficient cash flow which might accompany 35

36 and support these efforts. One key component of this recovery plan was the gradual and regular renewal of the fleet with new vehicles. Table 1 : Chronological breakdown of SOTRA fleet allocated to URBAN service TYPE OF VEHICLES NEW VEHICLES SECOND HAND VEHICLES TATA MERC. Khodro 68 % 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 54% 78% S SC PR PR R % 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 46% 22% TOTAL SOTRA s fleet configuration, formerly dominated by second hand vehicles for its urban activity, changed with the emergence of new types of new vehicle and the phasing out of second hand vehicles. Indian buses (Tata) and Iranian ones (Khodro) were introduced from The following diagram shows the evolution of SOTRA s fleet between 1999 and Figure 1 : Graph of SOTRA s fleet evolution SOTRA S EVOLUTION FLEET DU EVOLUTION PARC

37 The fleet size essentially fell from 1999 to Over this period, it decreased by over 48% of its initial value. This significant fleet reduction, which took place over seven years, is explained mainly by the high number of vehicles which were scrapped, from a fleet whose average age was excessively high. Since 2006, fleet numbers began to grow, rising from 437 units in 2006 to 800 units in The improvement is a result of the efforts to acquire new vehicles carried out in the framework of financial restructuring and operational revival. Average fleet age Figure 2 : Graph of the evolution of the average fleet age FLEET AGE MOYEN AVERAGE DU PARC AGE With an average age of 16 years from 1998 to 2005, the average age of SOTRA s fleet sharply decreased thanks to the acquisition of new vehicles and now stands at around five years old now. Current SOTRA fleet SOTRA fleet on NEW VEHICLES SECOND HAND VEHICLES TOTAL 01/01/2009 KHODRO TATA S/total R312 PR100 PR180 S/total Available commercial fleet Commercial fleet in operation Fleet immobilised (major parts & others) Fleet available + immobilised

38 D. IMPACT OF THE REFORM 1) Impact on vehicle breakdown rates The indicator of breakdown rates per 10,000 kilometres is equal to the number of breakdowns recorded during the operation of a given fleet over a total operating mileage of 10,000 km. The following table gives us the summary of breakdowns that occurred during the nine first months of 2009 of SOTRA activity along with the related mileage. Table 2: Breakdowns rate for 10,000 km per vehicle type 2009 Khodro Tata R312 PR100 PR180 January Breakdowns Km 453,155 2,246,056 68,130 20, ,105 February Breakdowns Km 437,168 2,022,700 65,206 14, ,530 March Breakdowns Km 476,276 2,115,549 66,970 11, ,883 April Breakdowns Km 462,996 1,958,259 71,522 3, ,100 May Breakdowns Km 452,460 1,896,452 70,567 1, ,762 June Breakdowns Km 357,867 1,860, ,051 1, ,470 July Breakdowns Km 366,657 1,534, ,756 8, ,299 August Breakdowns Km 361,108 1,552, ,757 9, ,788 September Breakdowns Km 357,629 1,520, ,860 8, ,074 Total Breakdowns Km 3,725,316 16,706, ,819 78,574 2,151,011 Breakdown rates at 10,000 km NEW VEHICLES SECOND HAND VEHICLES Average breakdown rates at 10,000 km The second hand vehicles record a breakdown rate of 3.94 breakdowns per 10,000 km, which is significantly higher than the new vehicle rate of In the same operating conditions, therefore, the second hand vehicles break down 2.8 times more than the new vehicles. 38

39 2) Impact on spare part consumption Consumption of spare parts is based on tracking the allocation of spare parts by type of vehicle and an accurate valuation of the spare parts affected. The table below summarises the estimation in CFA francs and in euros of the average monthly consumption of spare parts for each type of vehicle; Table 3: Spare part use per type of vehicle Monthly value of spare parts/ veh (CFA francs) Monthly value of spare parts/ veh (euros) KHODRO TATA R312 PR100 PR180 88,586 99, , , , In annual values per type of vehicles (new and second hand): ANNUAL VALUE OF SPARE PARTS PER VEHICLE TYPE Annual value of spare parts/ veh (CFA francs) Annual value of spare parts/ veh (euros) NEW VEHICLES SECOND HAND VEHICLES 1,181,238 3,222,250 1, ,912 Therefore, a second hand vehicle at SOTRA uses an average of EUR 4,912 annually in spare parts against EUR 1,801 on average per new vehicle, which is 2.7 times higher than for second hand vehicles. Impact on fleet immobilisation The impact on fleet immobilisation will be assessed in two ways: on the one hand, in terms of the number of immobilised vehicles per day and on the other through the average immobilisation time per vehicle. Estimation of the number of vehicles immobilised each day for each type The tables below give, for the first nine months of 2009, the details of the average number of vehicles immobilised per day at 8.00 am for each type of vehicle, according to a differentiation into two main immobilisation causes: immobilisation due to a failure of the most significant parts (engine, gearbox,..) and immobilisation due to other failures. 39

40 Table 4.1: Average number of vehicles immobilised daily per type DAILY AVERAGE NUMBER OF VEHICLES IMMOBILISED FOR TATA EXPRESS Jan 09 Feb 09 Mar 09 Apr 09 May 09 Jun 09 Jul 09 Aug 09 Sept 09 AVERAGE MAJOR PARTS OTHERS TOTAL DAILY AVERAGE NUMBER OF VEHICLES IMMOBILISED FOR TATA URBAIN Jan 09 Feb 09 Mar 09 Apr 09 May 09 Jun 09 Jul 09 Aug 09 Sept 09 AVERAGE MAJOR PARTS OTHERS TOTAL DAILY AVERAGE NUMBER OF VEHICLES IMMOBILISED FOR KHODRO Jan 09 Feb 09 Mar 09 Apr 09 May 09 Jun 09 Jul 09 Aug 09 Sept 09 AVERAGE MAJOR PARTS OTHERS TOTAL DAILY AVERAGE NUMBER OF VEHICLES IMMOBILISED FOR R312 Jan 09 Feb 09 Mar 09 Apr 09 May 09 Jun 09 Jul 09 Aug 09 Sept 09 AVERAGE MAJOR PARTS OTHERS TOTAL DAILY AVERAGE NUMBER OF VEHICLES IMMOBILISED FOR PR180 Jan 09 Feb 09 Mar 09 Apr 09 May 09 Jun 09 Jul 09 Aug 09 Sept 09 AVERAGE MAJOR PARTS OTHERS TOTAL

41 DAILY AVERAGE NUMBER OF VEHICLES IMMOBILISED FOR PR100 Jan 09 Feb 09 Mar 09 Apr 09 May 09 Jun 09 Jul 09 Aug 09 Sept 09 AVERAGE MAJOR PARTS OTHERS TOTAL Below are the results categorised in terms of new vehicles and second hand vehicles: Table 4.2 DAILY AVERAGE NUMBER OF NEW VEHICLES IMMOBILISED Jan 09 Febr 09 Mar 09 Apr 09 May 09 Jun 09 Jul 09 Aug 09 Sept 09 AVERAGE MAJOR PARTS OTHERS TOTAL DAILY AVERAGE NUMBER OF SECOND HAND VEHICLES IMMOBILISED Jan 09 Febr 09 Mar 09 Apr 09 May 09 Jun 09 Jul 09 Aug 09 Sept 09 AVERAGE MAJOR PARTS OTHERS TOTAL To clearly assess the difference, these average numbers of vehicles immobilised daily must be divided by the respective fleet size of new and second hand vehicles to obtain the indicator of immobilisation rate, which is as follows: 41

42 Table 4.3: Immobilisation rate per type of vehicle IMMOBILISATION RATE FOR NEW VEHICLES Jan 09 Feb 09 Mar 09 Apr 09 May 09 Jun 09 Jul 09 Aug 09 Sept 09 AVERAGE MAJOR PARTS 5% 6% 7% 8% 8% 8% 8% 9% 9% 8% OTHERS 13% 13% 14% 18% 17% 15% 14% 13% 12% 14% TOTAL 18% 19% 21% 26% 26% 23% 21% 22% 22% 22% IMMOBILISATION RATE FOR SECOND HAND VEHICLES Jan 09 Feb 09 Mar 09 Apr 09 May 09 Jun 09 Jul 09 Aug 09 Sept 09 AVERAGE MAJOR PARTS 28% 33% 38% 41% 45% 48% 18% 18% 19% 32% OTHERS 12% 10% 12% 24% 14% 12% 6% 5% 6% 11% TOTAL 39% 44% 50% 66% 60% 60% 24% 23% 25% 43% Over the whole fleet, an average of 22% of new vehicles are regularly immobilised for various reasons, whereas for the second hand vehicles, on average 43% of the fleet is regularly immobilised. Note that this rate does not mean that the vehicles are immobilised for the whole day; some of them are repaired and sent back into operation. For the sake of the calculation, the supposition was made that, where repairs were made to major spare parts, such as engines and gearboxes, the vehicles were indeed stopped a whole day. Therefore for the other less important breakdowns, it is appropriate to look at the immobilisation issue under the consideration of immobilisation time. Estimation of the immobilisation time for other breakdowns A computation of data on immobilisation time for diverse maintenance reasons over a fleet of 653 vehicles for the five first months of 2009 enabled us to draw up the following review: 42

43 Total fleet available + immobilised Number of vehicles which needed interventions over the five months Number of interventions made Number of interventions made per vehicle Total intervention time over the five months (Hours, minutes, seconds) Average time for an intervention (Hours, minutes, seconds) Monthly intervention time per vehicle (Hours, minutes, seconds) KHODRO TATA R312 PR100 PR :40: :53:00 735:00:00 107:30: :12:00 1:26:00 1:03:53 3:14:16 2:41:15 1:45:14 1:05:46 2:10:53 6:23:29 4:18:00 5:40:35 Average immobilisation time: Average monthly immobilisation time per vehicle (Hours, minutes, seconds) NEW VEHICLE SECOND HAND VEHICLE 2:02:56 5:41:19 As a consequence, each vehicle in the two categories is annually immobilised as follows: TYPE KHODRO TATA R312 PR100 PR180 Average annual immobilisation time per vehicle 0.55 days 1.09 days 3.2 days 2.15 days 2.84 days SECOND HAND NEW VEHICLES VEHICLES Average annual immobilisation time per category 1.02 days 2.74 days 43

44 An estimation of costs incurred by the immobilisation was made both in term of loss of revenues as a consequence of the vehicle inactivity and in terms of cost of maintenance staff working on repairs. The following chart represents the evolution of the number of passengers compared with the evolution of the average fleet in daily activity from the year 2002 to We will not seek to obtain the equation of a whole graph correlating the level of the fleet to the annual number of passengers transported. But by limiting our investigation to the point at which 350 to 600 vehicles are in activity, we can see that it can be easily assimilated to a straight line whose equation is y = 175,310x + 10E08 with a correlation rate of 75%. Thus, an annual variation of one vehicle would imply a variation of around 175,310 passengers annually upwards or downwards depending on the variation of the fleet itself. With an average ticket price of 200 CFA francs (EUR 0.30) the annual reduction of the fleet by one vehicle entails a loss of EUR 52,593 annually, which equates to an average of EUR per vehicle per day. Thus the annual loss of revenues due to vehicle immobilisation as a result of breakdowns not involving major spare parts is as follows: Annual revenue loss in euros per vehicle due to immobilisation for minor breakdowns NEW VEHICLE SECOND HAND VEHICLE

45 For longer immobilisations, the previous tables provide an average of 42.1 new buses down per day due to repairs to major spare parts and 34 second hand vehicles, out of total respective fleets of 556 and 106 units. The immobilisation due to repairs to major spare parts led therefore to respective losses of 42.1*144.1 euros and 34*144.1 euros. Annually and divided by the fleets, this means: Annual loss of revenue in euros per vehicle immobilised due to major breakdowns NEW VEHICLE SECOND HAND VEHICLE 3, , These figures highlight the fact that one second hand vehicle is immobilised for major repairs for around 1/3 of its operating time, whereas a new vehicle is stopped for around 8% of its operating time. Thus in total (all kinds of vehicle failures included): Annual loss of revenue in euros per vehicle immobilised NEW VEHICLE SECOND HAND VEHICLE 4, , ) Impact on staff maintenance cost From the above estimates, a new vehicle is stopped for various reasons for 28.7 days per year, while a second hand vehicle is immobilised for days per day. The average hourly staff maintenance cost is EUR 2.51 ( CFA francs) for all types of workers working on rolling stock repair (mechanics, electricians, fuel station agents, body workers) for a working day stretching from 4 AM to 10 PM, that is 16 hours per day. The average staff maintenance cost per day is then EUR The immobilisation of vehicles also incurs the following related staff costs: Annual cost of maintenance staff (in euros) NEW VEHICLE SECOND HAND VEHICLE ) Impact on fuel consumption The table below summarises fuel consumption per 100km for each type of vehicle based on actual figures. Here our study is limited to standard buses, as the articulated PR 180 bus has obvious higher fuel consumption due to a higher engine power. 45

46 DESIGNATION KHODRO TATA R 312 PR 100 CONSUMPTION FOR 100 KM (in litres) Ratio = 1.61 AVERAGE NEW VEHICLES SECOND HAND VEHICLES 31 L/ L/100 The annual mileage per vehicle being 60,049 km, the average annual consumption for both new and second hand vehicles per unit is thus: Annual fuel NEW VEHICLE SECOND HAND VEHICLE consumption 31 L/ L/100 Annual fuel consumption per unit NEW VEHICLE SECOND HAND VEHICLE (diesel litres) 18, , Annual fuel consumption cost per unit (euros) 16, , ) Summary of the impact We cannot assess the difference of the two types of vehicles without taking their purchasing price into account: KHODRO TATA R 312 PR 100 PR ,000,000 CFA francs 30000,000 CFA francs 10,500,000 CFA francs 7,500,000 CFA francs 11,000,000 CFA francs (euros) KHODRO TATA R312 PR100 PR180 Purchasing price of one unit 86, , , , , Annual depreciation 12, , , , , Average annual depreciation NEW VEHICLE SECOND HAND VEHICLE 7, ,

47 The following table summarises the various impacts (loss of revenue is presented as a cost to be included in the table): (in euros) NEW VEHICLE SECOND HAND VEHICLE RATIO SEC. HAND VEH/ NEW VEH Annual depreciation 7, , Loss of revenue 4, , Maintenance working staff cost (direct staff) 1, , Fuel consumption 16, , Spare part uses 1, , TOTAL 30, , Over a year, all main costs considered, the new vehicle costs half as much to the company during its operations than the second hand vehicle, in terms of technical costs only. YEAR 0 YEAR 1 YEAR 2 YEAR 3 YEAR 4 YEAR 5 YEAR 6 YEAR 7 NEW VEHICLE TECHNICAL COSTS 30, , , , , , ,972.6 SECOND HAND VEHICLE TECHNICAL COSTS 59, , , , , , ,712.6 SAVINGS 34, , , , , , , ,740.0 CUMULATED SAVINGS 34, , , , , , , ,579.1 The savings refer to the gains made in terms of the lower technical costs and the reduced revenue losses obtained by using a new vehicle compared to a second hand one. From an accounting perspective, the new vehicles are depreciated over 7 years while the secondhand vehicles are depreciated over 3 years. The negative savings of year 0 reflect the average additional cost required to buy a new bus compared to a second hand one. The break even point is already reached during the second year of operation. This simulation shows the advantages of investing in new affordable buses, instead of running an erratic second hand public transport fleet along with high technical costs and revenue losses. QUALITY PUBLIC TRANSPORT PROVIDED WITH NEW VEHICLES BENEFITS THE COMPANY, ITS CUSTOMERS AND THE WIDER COMMUNITY 47

48 ACCRA (GHANA) REDUCING THE FUEL BILL FOR THE COMMUNITY: THE CREATION OF A PUBLIC TRANSPORT COMPANY A. INTRODUCTION One of the least recognised but most important demographic developments occurring in Africa in recent years is the rapid growth in the number of large cities. This trend will have a major impact on the transport sector by placing significant demands upon Governments to respond with urban transport improvements, which are coordinated with other action to improve urban management and are designed to meet the corresponding growth in and concentration of travel demand. Whilst the urban population is increasing rapidly, the growth and size of the motor vehicle fleet is not expected to keep pace. Many African countries have underdeveloped urban public transport services, which are often inadequate and unable to meet current travel demand, much less the forecast growth in passenger traffic associated with urbanisation. Bus transport is the primary mode of public transport in nearly every major city of Africa. Bus transport infrastructure is modest, comprising mostly central terminals, bus shelters or stops, and in a few cases special bus lanes and streets. The motor vehicle fleet in urban areas comprises private cars, buses, trucks, motorcycles and intermediate forms of transport (such as carts and bicycles). Private cars are concentrated in the urban areas, where average incomes are higher. Many commuter vehicles used in urban areas are smaller 8 30 passenger mini buses. Urban public transport services in many large cities are provided by either a number of small owner operated bus companies or by a large parastatal bus operation (owned or controlled wholly or partly by the government). Very few large privatesector bus companies operate in Africa. With increasing use of smaller mini buses, the roads are congested, fuel cost to the country is high, pollution from emissions from the many but old second hand imported mini buses is a growing environmental hazard, whilst deaths from careless driving and pedestrian deaths continue to be commonplace. 48

49 B. CONTEXT : Ghana Government s Transport Policy The main business of any passenger transport company is the management of its traffic operation. With the high growth in the urban population, it is economically unwise for the country to continue to encourage the use of smaller vehicles and taxis exclusively for intra urban transportation. These are generally over aged, expensive to runconsuming much fuel and needing more repairs and are the cause of numerous pedestrian deaths. 1. The table on age distribution of vehicles explains the cost to the nation in fuel and maintenance bills. AGE DISTRIBUTION >15 ACCRA KUMASI TAKORADI TAMALE TEMA The point in the table above is buttressed by a recent report by the Adam Smith Institute (May 2004), on a specific route in Accra (Nima Circle UTC) Zone 2, where fifteen (15) tro tros (minibuses) and fourteen (14) shared taxis were polled. They were all second hand; the tro tros ranged in age from 8 18 with a preponderance being years old; 9 of the 14 taxis were between 3 and 15 years. Owners of all vehicles were unable to say when their vehicles were imported into Ghana. Though the speedometers may not be consistently reliable, the tro tros recorded from 200,520km to 510,599km, whilst the taxis ranged between 101,526km to 641,150km. Tro tros ranged in capacity from 12 to 35 seats, with the majority in the 18 seat bracket. 2. Old and poorly maintained vehicles produce deadly emissions and are environmentally unsuitable. A TV documentary by a Ghanaian journalist on vehicular emissions in the city won the Best TV documentary first prize award on Environmental Reporting organised by URTNA (Union of Radio and Television 49

50 Networks in Africa) in High emission vehicles imply high costs of operation. The new and environmentally friendly MMT DAF buses fitted with Euro 3 lowemission engines were literally a breath of fresh air. 3. Most taxis and private vehicles, which regularly ply the city municipal roads, use gasoline fuel, which is more expensive than the diesel fuel used by buses. In the Adam Smith study cited above, 48 out of 55 tro tro vehicles polled used diesel fuel. The net savings in a year in fuel and maintenance costs approximates to $ 2.5 million, versus the smaller taxi system. Based on the City DAF Bus, we show the following fuel savings: DAF Bus Taxi Mini Bus Load factor 90% 120% 125% Passengers Fuel Consumption km/lt Passenger/km/lt Differential /Savings Against this background, we will review the successes and difficulties encountered by MMT, operating in Accra. C. DESCRIPTION OF THE REFORM: MMT Structure & Objectives Larger buses would make more sense for Ghana given the country s economic development, but since the private sector does not have the money to develop a large intra urban fleet, the state should do this in conjunction with some privatesector entrepreneurs. Whilst the state brings the money, the private sector brings the needed management and working capital. Out of this need, the idea of the Metro Mass Transit Company Limited was born in March One of the pressing needs of the political administration is to provide improved urban mass transit. The reasons are so obvious that it is difficult to see why this had not received equal attention in the past. Mass intra urban transit using larger buses reduces fuel costs to the country enormously, as reduced numbers of smaller vehicles like private saloon cars, minibuses and taxis take to the roads and traffic congestion is reduced. Secondly the importation of private vehicles, especially used cars will fall, and with it savings in foreign exchange will result due to fewer imports of vehicles and spares. 50

51 Roads will be less congested and business can be conducted more speedily, not to mention getting school children to school earlier. So important is this policy of introducing urban mass transit that in both his inaugural and first sessional address, the President expressed the necessity to introduce a mass urban transport system in the large cities and towns to decongest the roads and make urban transport costs more affordable. He said It was a tragic error of policy when Ghana dismantled her system of mass public transportation. As part of (the) government s answer to mitigating the impact of rising petroleum prices on the family budget of the working population (government) will restore the urban bus and other mass transportation systems, which will also help to economise on Ghana s use of imported petroleum. Additionally, the Minister of Finance in his Budget Statement added that, in line with the President s Sessional Address, the Ministry of Transport would formulate programmes that would enable some mass transport services to become a reality. The Minister expressed the hope that prospective foreign investors would be encouraged to team up with Ghanaians to operate mass transport services. To this end, a private German company is to rehabilitate and run the Accra Tema rail line for commuter passenger purposes. It is known that the prices of new large buses are sometimes so high that, if purchased on the open market, it is not possible for transport operators to break even, much less make it worth a private investor s while to obtain a favourable return. The most viable option is for the state to look for and obtain concessionary loans and favourable repayment terms, in order that the desired benefits will be obtained. This study, which backs our application, aims to reduce the cost to the operators of an additional 150 new DAF buses to be supplied to the Government of Ghana for onlending to the Metro Mass Transit Company Limited. The Metro Mass Transit Company Limited was incorporated in March 2003 as a Limited Liability Company under the Companies Code, (1963) Act 179 with the following current shareholders: The Government of Ghana (45%) and six private companies and parastatals (55%). Its principal objectives are: To carry on the business of Mass Transportation in Ghana in all its aspects; and other businesses incidental thereto; To undertake bussing on a contract basis; To undertake school bussing services. 51

52 The Raison d etre Just deploying buses will not bring passengers to MMT. Better traffic management, the goodwill of the Metropolitan Authorities, the commitment of the Motor Traffic and Transport Unit of the Ghana Police, the readiness of the Urban Roads and many other persons or groups of persons will need to share in the President s dream to make it easier for MMT to operate. Things have begun to take shape and steps were taken to rehabilitate the rundown city centre Bus Terminal for use as the main bus terminal in Accra at Opera Square. Better use of the Kinbu terminal facilities has also been considered and place somewhat improved. An MMT Loading Bay will have to be found within the environs of the Kwame Nkrumah Circle a main passenger hub in Accra. There was also a temporary Loading Area near the Old Parliament House. The Government of Ghana has taken steps to support the introduction of the urban mass transit system, which has collapsed over the past twenty to thirty years, and has promoted the establishment of the Metro Mass Transit Company as a private sector driven company. D. IMPACT OF THE REFORM: Impact of the creation of MMT 1. Impact on energy use MMT has a mixed fleet of VDL/DAF, Jonckheere, TATA and Yaxing buses. The last two were acquired largely on price consideration when the Government had, for political reasons, to extend the services of MMT, initially to a total of 11 other locations. The more expensive but fuel efficient and environmentally friendly VDL/DAF buses, acquired under the Dutch Government s ORET facility, were relatively more difficult to obtain. At the very beginning of the process leading up to the formation of MMT ( ), the Government obtained, free of charge, ex Italian ports, from Italian Government sources, old (sometimes over 20 years old) and largely disused Italian IVECO buses, which were both uneconomic to run, environmentally hazardous, totally unreliable and ready for the rubbish heap. The additional fuel usage of the Yaxing and the Iveco over and above the VDL/DAF buses was calculated at EUR per km. However, as could be expected, the Yaxing and the Iveco proved every transporter s nightmare. The Iveco buses have all been scrapped, and most of the Yaxing buses are ready for scrap. We can therefore reasonably say that the VDL and the Jonckheere are the standard for fuel usage. The average fuel consumption of the VDL/DAF bus is 3km/lt. Based on current MMT operations, which use commuter instead of city buses, 52

53 and current figures, we can show the following: DAF Bus Taxi Minibus Load factor 90% 160% 150% Passenger capacity Fuel Consumption km/lt Passenger/km/lt Differential/Savings Fuel consumption for minibuses and taxis is relatively much higher per passenger/km in relation to the VDL/DAF. Though MMT deployed an average of only 107 buses in Accra, for logistical reasons (due to major ongoing road construction on some of the key arterial roads in Accra), the savings are quite significant. 2. Impact on other transport modes The potential of MMT to swamp other modes, particularly the minibus and the shared taxis, is so great that those private operators were the most vocal and sometimes violent when MMT was first introduced. During the year 2008, there was almost a peaceful co existence between MMT and the other modes; because with 107 buses on average every day in a vast city such as Accra, it has not been a real threat to their business. The government is yet to implement the bus lanes marked out between four to five years ago, to give preferential traffic light controlled rights to MMT buses, and also to implement the planned strategy of keeping minibuses outside the CBD. 3. Impact on transport costs Metro Mass Transit was kicked into action largely to break a transport strike by taxis and minibuses, or tro tros as they are locally called in Accra, over the Government s curb on proposed hikes in transport fares. The fares of the MMT operated buses had to be lower than the other modes. Since then it has always been so. The principal appeal of MMT for passengers is derived in a large measure from its relatively lower fares, and in part also from its safety and comfort. The average MMT fare for a single journey is under EUR 0.25; compared to an average minibus fare of a little over EUR This is due in part to the tendency on the part of minibus operators to break their journeys into shorter lengths to maximise their fare takings. On the basis of such a differential, the savings made in respect of MMT passengers is equivalent to approximately EUR 2.5 million for

54 Lower fares had been one of the objectives of the company. MMT fares have traditionally been set at 20% or more lower than comparable same distance minibus fares. 4. Impact on road safety Road safety has been a major concern of the authorities in Ghana. Daily, on the streets of Accra, one sees minibuses and taxis involved in road accidents, occasionally causing fatalities. Most of the fatalities are attributable to poorly maintained (yet old) minibuses and taxis. Of the officially recorded 286 fatalities during the year 2008 on Mega Accra roads, not one is attributable to MMT. 5. Impact on congestion To the extent that an MMT bus carries more passengers per kilometre than a minibus or taxi would, we can assume that if the 107 MMT buses were not on the road, to move the same passengers, an additional 360 minibuses or 807 taxis or a combination of them would further congest the roads. With the right traffic conditions and the adherence to a conducive public transport environment, the impact would be felt more. Government investment in public transport has been spread too thinly on the ground; but in a politically active environment, the government has to keep all other regional capitals happy. Ideally MMT (in Accra) could benefit from over 1,100 buses operating on bus lanes and supported by enabled traffic lights and with approved bus stops and lay bys dedicated to public transport only. Metro Mass Transit operating in Mega Accra would more than make a significant impact. THE CREATION OF A FORMAL PUBLIC TRANSPORT COMPANY SIGNIFICANTLY CONTRIBUTED TO THE IMPROVEMENT OF THE MOBILITY CONDITIONS OF THE PEOPLE OF ACCRA AND BENEFITED THE COMMUNITY AT LARGE 54

55 ADDIS ABABA (ETHIOPIA) EFFICIENCY OF PUBLIC TRANSPORT OVER THE OTHER TRANSPORT MODES A. Introduction Addis Ababa, like most African cities, has been experiencing huge population increases. This is mainly due to the fast growth in urbanisation. The population of Addis Ababa is about three million and is expected to increase by 3% every year. The lifestyle of the city dwellers is changing and people prefer to travel by vehicles to move from place to place within the city. The major facilities and public services, like the market area, the schools, the religious centres, the offices and the like, are concentrated in the city centre and hence, people have to travel to these places every time. This demand has led to the development of transportation firms and Anbessa City Bus Service Enterprise is one of the results of this demand. B. Context: The Present Public Transport Actors in Addis The main actors of public transport services in Addis Ababa are: Anbessa, the state owned city bus company; the privately owned sedan taxis, the minibus taxis and the collective taxis. The details are discussed below. 1. Minibus taxis The common privately owned minibus taxies are the Toyota Jaguar, Haice, the Nissan minibus and the Peugeot or other pick up vehicles, which are converted to taxis and are nicknamed as Wuyeyet in Amharic, meaning discussion as a result of the sitting arrangement. According to the Addis Ababa Transport Authority branch office, the number of minibus taxis is registered as 9,901 and their average daily operational capacity is estimated at 8,911. They are serving about 1,372,294 passenger trips a day. 55

56 The minibus taxies are more than 15 years old and most of them are imported secondhand vehicles. They have no definite routes. They operate on any route they like, but recently, the transport authority has announced plans to conduct a zonal dispatch arrangement programme for the minibuses. The fares the minibuses are charging are regulated. However, during peak hours and in the evenings, they force passengers to pay nearly double the normal fare. 2. The sedan taxis Most of the sedan taxis are Lada (Russian brand) taxis, which operate on a contract basis. They are usually found around the hotels and big supermarkets. Since they charge more money, only high income groups are getting services from these taxis. 3. Midi buses These are the newly operational 495 China made higher midi buses. They have a capacity for carrying 25 passengers. They joined the sector three years ago and they are more or less working in the same manner as the mini buses. In conclusion, Addis Ababa is a political centre, where the Federal Government is located, along with international bodies, such as the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (ECA) and the African Union (AU). It is the economic centre of the country where about 85% of the manufacturing industries and most financial and commercial institutions are situated. About 80% of the national vehicle fleet registered is found here. The city is mainly served by Anbessa, the state owned city bus company, and by the above mentioned privately owned mini buses and collective taxis and private taxi service, with a modal share of 6.94%, 34.23% and 6.28% respectively. Walking accounts for the rest of the share, which is 43.76%, and 8.65% of trips are made by private car. Out of the operational fleets of Anbessa, an average number of 296 units are operating daily, carrying about 310,000 passengers on 93 routes. GBA consultants in Addis Ababa have estimated the following transport modal share during the peak hours: Pedestrians 30% Small & collective taxis (private) 25% City buses (Anbessa) 35% Private vehicles 7% Company provided transport 3% 56

57 C. Description of the reform Anbessa city bus services enterprise, the largest city transportation company in Ethiopia, was established immediately after the Italian invasion in 1943 by collecting vehicles and garage equipments from the invader. At that time its name was Public Transport and, guided by Italians and other foreigners, in December 1954 it was organised into a share company by getting legal entity from the government. In that particular year the enterprise had only 10 buses to serve the people of Addis Ababa on four routes. In 1956 the enterprise bought 20 Mercedes model buses and increased its routes to 14 and the management was also shifted from foreigners to Ethiopians. In 1966 the enterprise transferred its ownership from a share company to public transport services; in 1973 the enterprise bought 50 city buses and strengthened its transportation services. In 1994 under proclamation number 187/94 the company declared paid up capital of EUR 742, (14 Million Ethiopian birr) and got its current name Anbessa City Bus Service Enterprise. Concurrently, the population of Addis Ababa increased tremendously. The market system changed from a command economy to a market economy and the need for a transportation service also become essential. To meet this need, the enterprise bought 466 DAF model city buses from 1996 to Today, the enterprise operates 93 routes with an average daily dispatch of 312 buses. The enterprise has three large depots, four bus terminals located in the centre of the city, 16 check points and 1,400 bus stops throughout the city. To facilitate the transportation service and decrease the downtime of buses, the enterprise has its own garage that provides all types of maintenance services. However, the enterprise is facing serious problems in running its operations. The increasing cost of the operation (especially the cost of fuel and lubricant, spare parts, tyres and inner tubes) has caused the company to operate with financial difficulties. No attempts were made to replace the old buses, except in 1997 when the city council purchased and offered 150 buses to the company. For many years, due to tariff regulations, the company has operated with the lowest fare (an average of EUR 0.061), whereas its costs have reached about (EUR 0.090). The operating costs are increasing dramatically, yet the company is expected to give the service with a minimum fare. There is an attempt by the city government to subsidise the fare per passenger, so that the fare will remain within the reasonable level. The company, however, is insisting that the authorities allocate sufficient funding, which could cover all the operating costs, in order to continue the operation in a reliable manner. 57

58 Today the company is operating with a fleet of 535, out of which 312 buses are in service every day and the remaining 210 buses are waiting for spare parts, to be maintained and become operational. About 60% of the buses have an average age of 8 years and a quick replacement is highly needed. However, the inadequacy of funding support from the government to smooth the operation of city bus transportation has created fear and anxiety in the company. Its management autonomy to be efficient, productive and profitable is threatened by the interference of the authorities. On the one hand, the company is expected to operate in a competitive manner; on the other hand, its fate is highly regulated no matter what the cost of service. The public authority s prime interest is that the inhabitants are getting the transport service with the lowest possible fare. As a result, Anbessa has suffered for over 12 years with no proper fare, no replacement of buses, and the increasing cost of operation. Although competition is accepted, the informal or the private transport sector is trying to exploit the opportunity by raising the fares and shortening the routes, so as to charge more money. This chaotic, unsustainable, time and money wasting transport system of Addis Ababa has impacted economic development and has reduced the quality of life for citizens. Even though the city government has so far tried to subsidise the fare for passengers, the compensations are minimal and inadequate. If the problem continues to exist in this way, the inhabitants with lower income levels, which are about 60% of the city population, will soon face a serious transportation problem. D. Impact Assessments with Major Indicators 1. Impact on Congestion All Anbessa s buses are rigid single deckers of city bus configuration, with a seating arrangement for 30 passengers and standing accommodation for 70, with an average operating speed of 18 km/h. The buses have a length of 12 metres. The space which Anbessa s buses take up on the road corresponds for example to the space taken up by two minibuses and 1.6 midi buses. Meanwhile, the average rate of occupancy per unit corresponds to 7.3 and 2.7 fold of that of the minibuses and midi buses respectively. The cost of wasted fuel due to congestion in relation to the number of passengers on board is lower for the Anbessa city bus and the collective taxis, while for minibuses and private taxis the cost per individual is much higher, especially during peak hours. The Anbessa city bus, because of its 58

59 higher carrying capacity (up to 180 passengers per trip), reduces the cost of wasted fuel per passenger. On other hand, Anbessa city buses carry most of the low income group and working population of the city, especially during peak hours. This makes them one of the best alternative means of urban transport for both ordinary and contract services. 2. Impact on transport costs Public transportation fares are regulated by the government. The transportation service fare that Anbessa is charging is one of the lowest, and this has made it the first and most preferred means of urban transportation for the majority of the metropolitan inhabitants, compared to the other modes of public transport. The following table shows the current fares declared by the Transportation Authority of the Ministry of Transport and Communication (effective 11 October 2009). The authority, as a state body, regulates the transportation tariffs and fares periodically based on global fuel price changes. For Anbessa City Bus Up to 9 km EUR 9 12 km km km km km km km 0.25 For minibuses Up to 2.5 km EUR km km km km

60 For collective taxis up to 8 km 0.07 EUR km km km km km km 0.23 The tables show that Anbessa, as a mass transportation system, presents the lowest transportation fare and is preferred by the majority, especially the lower and medium income group. 4 Impact on road safety Data from the Addis Ababa traffic police office shows that the number of road accidents occurred in the last Ethiopian year (2008/2009) was as follows: 60

61 Types of accidents Total Private car Commercial station wagon & pickup Heavy trucks Private taxi Minib us Anbessa Bus Collective taxi No. of total accidents 7,523 2,010 1, , No. of fatalities No. of injuries, serious No. of injuries, light No. of properties damaged Others 5,845 1,656 1, The figures above indicate that Anbessa city buses are in the best position in terms of road safety. These buses have different travelling features compared to the other modes of transport indicated in the table. Anbessa city buses have a scheduled and regulated time to complete a trip and to start from and arrive at their origin and destination. This guides the operations with a predetermined travelling speed. Anbessa City Bus Service Enterprise also conducts regular training schedules and has introduced an incentive system with regards to road safety and maximum availability to passengers, which has had a positive impact on losses due to traffic accidents. 61

62 5. Impact on air pollution Even though it is not possible for now to present data on the magnitude of air pollutants corresponding to each mode of transport in our metropolis, it is obviously understood that a mass transportation system has a far better impact on air pollution than any other less collective mode of transportation system. This becomes clear when comparing the volume of gas products from the engine s combustion from a bus with a loading capacity of 100 passengers and the volume emitted by 25 automobiles or 9 minibuses (the number required for them to transport 100 passengers in one trip). It is estimated that two million metric tons of fuel are consumed in a year by motor vehicles circulating in the metropolitan area and, from this volume of fuel, 90% corresponds to a complete combustion producing Co 2. This means that the remaining 10%, or 200 million kg, corresponds to products contaminating the environment like CO, NO 2 and SO 2. Air pollution in Addis Ababa is becoming an issue with visible dense smog in the city throughout the day, affecting the respiratory organs of its inhabitants as well as plants. Mass transportation s share of air pollution is less than that of the other modes of transportation proportionally. 62

63 6. Impact on energy use (Fuel) The table below shows the yearly fuel consumption by mode of transport. The fuel consumed per passenger stands at for an Anbessa City bus, for minibuses, for private taxis, for collective taxis and for private cars. Descriptions Unit of measure City Bus Minibus Private Taxi Collective Taxi Private Car Fuel consumption per unit Km/l Yearly covered distance per unit Km 53,924 57,350 39,420 46,042 25,357 Fleet size Each 296 9,901 6, ,972 Yearly total fuel consumption Litre 8,867,502 81,117,478 30,788, ,384, ,856,

64 7. Impact on public transport operation Description Bus (Anbessa) Minibus Private Taxi Collective Taxi Private Car Remark No. of breakdowns per ,000 km Technical maintenance expenses (Euro) 1,053, ,406, ,910, , ,119, Including trip Annual fuel expenditure 3,391, ,896, ,345, ,274, ,640, (Euro) Transport service frequencies (minutes) Commuter travel time (minutes) No. of accidents per 10, km Passengers carried per 101,601, ,887,310 91,903, ,293, ,566,188 Annual transport mode Revenue (Euro) 6,790, ,201,504 34,137, ,512,715 64

65 Spare parts and maintenance expenditures are determined by the age of the fleet and the condition of the roads over which it operates. Given the relatively good road conditions in much of the city and the low average fleet age for collective taxi and private car fleets, it is not surprising that current levels of expenditure are lower. 62% of the fleet of Anbessa buses presents an age of over 10 years of service and the enterprise has introduced a strong replacement policy in order to ensure availability, reliability and cost minimisation. The remaining modes of transport, other than Anbessa, that are shown in the table are owned by individuals, driven sometimes by the owners and more often by hired drivers. It is very difficult to get exact information on the frequency of breakdowns and expenses of technical maintenance, since no organised centre and/or records were made. The study team have made an estimation of the number of breakdowns per 10,000 km, proportionally differentiated in relation to technical maintenance expenses. Computing the specific cost of technical maintenance by the number of individuals transported for each mode gives a result of 0.01 for Anbessa, 0.29 for minibuses, 0.13 for private taxis, for collective taxis and 0.70 for private cars. The figures show that Anbessa s total fuel expenditure is the lowest compared to other modes of transport, which makes a positive contribution to the economy and to environmental protection. Distributing the annual fuel expenditure shown in the table across the number of passengers transported by each mode gives the specific fuel cost per passenger. This is also significantly lower for Anbessa: EUR 0.03 for Anbessa against EUR 0.07 for minibuses, EUR 0.20 for private taxis, EUR 0.05 for collective taxis and EUR 1.83 per passenger by private car. The transport service frequency is lower for Anbessa city buses. This is partly due to an insufficient fleet of buses being available to meet demand and the larger distance covered by each route of city buses. Despite the large number of route variations and large number of buses assigned on main routes in the city, over 70% of the routes have only two to four buses assigned, resulting in the service frequency rate as shown in the table. In the case of the remaining private modes of public transport, services are provided only on selected and heavily populated routes and fleet numbers are larger, which contributes adversely to congestion and pollution matters. Commuters travel time depends on the same factors as service frequency. The mixed traffic system used in Addis Ababa contributes adversely to the operation of the relatively larger (in terms of vehicle length) buses used by Anbessa, which have poor manoeuvrability on the roads due to traffic congestion. This situation has an effect on the number of accidents shown in the table, even though a large number of them resulted only in small property damages; from a total of 7,523 car accidents that occurred in 2001, 141 relate to Anbessa and, out of this 141, 93 are only property damages. Obviously, the mass transport modes have a tremendous advantage over any other modes with respect to the number of passengers carried per mode. Anbessa City Bus, with only

66 operational buses a day, has transported a considerable number of passengers. The market size for passenger transport in Addis Ababa, defined by the total population, the income level they have and the affordability of the fare they charge, favours and requires a mass transportation system. However, Anbessa s service offer is considerably below demand due to a number of reasons. E. Conclusion The existing public transport system in Addis Ababa is critically inadequate to provide services for the existing travel demand. The overall performance of Anbessa is hampered due to many problems, of which the low number and technical fitness of most of the vehicles are critical. Although other modes of transport are providing services for a considerable number of trips per day, the problem of insufficient transportation offer continues to grow in the city. More of the same however would mean increasing traffic congestion, pollution and accidents in the city. There is no doubt regarding the need to expand and improve the public transport system for Addis Ababa. The only mass transportation system needs to be expanded and more mass transportation vehicles, like trolleybuses, need to be introduced. This would improve the direct cost of construction and operation and health costs due to changes in the level of pollution and would introduce time savings. It would bring other positive impacts, as seen in the study. Anbessa could also act as the umbrella organisation to implement and coordinate the process of expansion and introduction of new mass transportation systems. FORMAL PUBLIC TRANSPORT IS THE OPTIMAL COLLECTIVE TRANSPORT MODE ALLOWING THE TRANSPORTATION OF THE GREATEST NUMBER OF PEOPLE AT THE LOWEST COST FOR THE COMMUNITY. BUT IT NEEDS TO BE SUPPORTED IN ORDER TO ASSUME THIS KEY ROLE IN A SUSTAINABLE WAY. 66

67 DAKAR (SENEGAL) INTEGRATING THE INFORMAL SECTOR IN A FORMAL, EFFICIENT AND SUSTAINABLE PUBLIC TRANSPORT SYSTEM A. INTRODUCTION Fleet renewal has been identified as a key issue in most recent projects in urban transport in developing countries, but two approaches are adopted in this regard. The traditional approach, especially where there was a provider of public transport services, was that part of the project budget would be allocated to the acquisition of rolling stock. This has often been done in conjunction with transport regulatory reform or with a restructuring of the existing operator as part of the overall project concept. The most recent approach is to formulate the project to ensure sustainability of the overall system through the implementation of adequate infrastructure, where the private sector takes the full operational responsibilities, including financing and management of the rolling stock. This model of public private partnership has shown a maximisation of the benefit gained from the public investment, and helped avoid mismanagement in the purchase of transport rolling stock that has often characterised the sector. Dakar is in this regard a pioneer in the development of a professionalisation policy in sub Saharan Africa, with the introduction of a programme of fleet renewal of private sector operators vehicles through public funding. It was thus appropriate to carry out a study on the impact of this reform in the framework of the Trans Africa project. Given the structural problems of the former public transport company (SOTRAC), and in parallel the emergence of a dominant informal sector (providing over 70% of public transport), which were also sources of many very costly dysfunctions for the community (4% GNP), the Senegalese state had no other choice but to seek to professionalise the sector with the aim of cleaning it up to make it more efficient and sustainable, especially for the benefits of the poorest. B. BACKGROUND Senegal is a West Africa country with a gross domestic product (GDP) of approximately USD 9.2 billion, and GDP per capita of USD 760. Its national population is approximately 12 million people, more than 3 million being in the region of Dakar, the capital. The population of Dakar grows annually at a rate of about 4.4%, which is significantly higher than the national rate of 2.2%, due to rural migration; and transport demand is growing at the same pace. 67

68 Public transport services in Dakar are provided by a mix of formal sector operations and informal ones. The formal sector operators are, on one hand, the private bus company, Dakar Dem Dik (DDD), which took over the routes of the former public company SOTRAC in 2001, and on the other, the suburban railway company Petit Train Bleu (PTB), complemented by the licensed taxi operators. The importance of the formal sector has declined in recent years, as government restrictions on price levels made it difficult to renew their fleet of vehicles. Most urban transport services are provided by the informal sector, comprising a fleet of 2,500 to 3,000 minibuses (or Cars rapides ), supplemented by illegal taxi operations (Taxis Clando). The reform of urban public transport would provide a lasting solution to the crisis in the sector through a market restructuring and the creation of an integrated network based on a genuinely complementary system between the different operators: namely, a rail network operated by the Petit Train de Banlieue (PTB SA); a structuring network with large buses provided by Dakar Dem Dikk (DDD); and a door to door service supplied by private operators by the means of minibuses. In this context, the passing in 2001 of the Urban Mobility Improvement Program (PAMU), and particularly the implementation of its leasing component, has created favorable conditions for the development of urban public transport. Thus, major construction and rehabilitation of road infrastructure have been made and the proposed renewal of the fleet of Cars Rapides has been partly executed. Already 505 minibuses have been delivered and put into service on routes granted to private operators. C. THE DIFFERENT TRANSPORT ACTORS 1. Public authorities The Ministry of Transport is the authority responsible for the issuing of licenses and vehicle permits authorising operators and vehicles to operate. Rates are set by Presidential Decree after the work of a technical committee headed by the Directorate of Land Transport. Planning and coordination of the sub sector of urban public transport are ensured by the Executive Council of Urban Transport in Dakar (CETUD). 2. Transport operators Dakar Dem Dikk (DDD) The attempt to privatise the company in based on an international tender was not successful, after the withdrawal of the French Senegalese company Dakar Bus. The Government resulting from the political change that occurred in March 2000 in Senegal, established Dakar Dem Dikk in December 2000, with a capital of 1.5 billion CFA francs (USD 2.20 million) in the midst of particularly difficult conditions. The introduction of 509 new buses from 2005 to 2006, through bilateral cooperation with India and Sweden, has allowed Dakar Dem Dikk to revive. However, financial difficulties remain. 68

69 Dakar Dem Dik is a limited company with a major state participation. It runs a public transport network of 17 lines (10 urban lines and 7 commuter lines). The network length is estimated at km. The transport company owns two depots (Ouakam and Thiaroye) and 18 stations across the network. It deploys on the network an average of 294 buses out of a total fleet of 408. The transport service ranges from 5:45 to 21:30. Le Petit Train de Banlieue (PTB) Le Petit Train Bleu (PTB), the commuter train, a Department of the National Railway Company of Senegal (SNCS), gave way to Le Petit Train de Banlieue (PTB), a subsidiary of the SNCS, in June The PTB commuter train is known to be the backbone of public transport. The PTB is a 100% stateowned railway company in charge of providing public transport services by rail in the Dakar region. The PTB has only a very small proportion of the market, although this is expected to increase once the network improvement programme is completed. Photo: Commuter train 69

70 The Cars Rapides minibuses Aside from the new Tata minibuses, all Cars rapides were originally second hand freight vans imported from Europe and converted into passenger transport vehicles in local workshops in Dakar. The exact number of the current operating units in Dakar is unknown, but can be roughly estimated at between 2,500 and 3,000 vehicles. The fleet of Cars Rapides is now very old and generally in a poor condition. They provide services in a dense network, and prices are relatively low but the quality of service is poor and disorganised. The operators can certainly cover their operating costs, but the system does not allow them to financially ensure the renewal of their vehicles. This results in a gradual deficit in the public transport offer. Some studies have shown that the occupancy rate of the vehicles was generally high, with more than one paying passenger per seat for each trip. Prices are indeed negotiated and are actually often below the official rate, although no ticket is issued. However, drivers frequently break the journey with some trips on non official sections, and passengers traveling long distances are often forced to pay twice or for more sections to complete their journey. D. DESCRIPTION OF THE REFORM Photo: Car Rapide The programme of renewal of the informal fleet, which was launched in 1999, is designed to improve a part of the cars rapides fleet, with the acquisition of 505 new minibuses, and to lead the informal operators towards a more professional activity. The government of Senegal has taken out an IDA credit from the World Bank of EUR 21 million, which it lent to the selected operators to fund 75% of the price of new vehicles. The loan interest rate is 8% and it must be repaid by the operators in five years. Initially, it was expected that operators would provide the balance of the purchase price with their own funds, but they were almost all unable or unwilling to do it, so their contribution was borrowed locally from state development banks. Detailed specifications of expected vehicles have been developed and submitted to tenders, with the condition that the vehicles must be assembled in Senegal, and that the guarantee covers 70

71 either the first 200,000 km or five years of activity. The tender was won by Tata with an offer of EUR 34,000 per vehicle, in collaboration with a local company, Senbus, with Unitech, an Indian company, being responsible for vehicle maintenance. For each new vehicle acquired, participating operators legally authorised to operate had to scrap an old vehicle for which they received compensation per unit of 2.46 million CFA francs (USD 5,500) on average. The programme did not directly result in an overall increase in the public transport capacity. Picture: TATA Minibus Picture: Assembly of a TATA minibus 1. Establishment of a regulatory body (CETUD) The Executive Council of Urban Transport in Dakar is a state owned body created by law n of 10 March It is responsible for implementing and monitoring the implementation of the public transport sector policy, defined by the state for the Dakar region. The CETUD is also the Executing Agency for all projects in the framework of the urban transport reform. These projects concern the urban area of Dakar and the cities of Thies and Kaolack. The CETUD acts on behalf of state and local governments and has the following functions: identification of routes, quota of corresponding transport authorisations and their technical application; 71

72 drafting of specifications, terms of reference and tendering and contracting agreements with licensed operators and monitoring the execution of contracts; proposition of tariff policies to relevant authorities; identification of public service constraints and the determination of any related financial compensation; development of criteria to access the occupation of the public transport carrier; development of studies, training, information and promotion sessions on urban public transport in the region of Dakar; coordination between different public transport modes, including decisions on revenue sharing in the case of fare integration; development and support of the implementation of actions and investment plans in order to improve service level of infrastructure, traffic and road safety; improvement of the fleet condition and quality to contribute to the fight against noise and air pollution generated by motorised transport. Its operations are financed by the Development Fund for Urban Transport (FDTU). The state provides an annual sum of EUR 610,000, which local authorities and transport operators are expected to complement. The CETUD also acts as a repository for international assistance to the urban transport sector. It may enter into concession agreements with licensed operators, assign routes and may propose restrictions on a compensation agreement with the operators if the official prices do not cover the cost. The CETUD has a Development Fund for Urban Transport (FDTU), established under the reform and which must be fed by contributions from all actors in the sector, namely, the State of Senegal, local authorities and public or private entities. The regulation of the FDTU organisation is now being applied; local governments and private operators have started to pay their contributions. For the implementation of the PAMU, the CETUD has received funding from international donors especially IDA, French Development Agency (AFD) and the Nordic Development Fund (NDF). The PAMU has been designed around five components: road infrastructure, safety and traffic flow; rehabilitation and development of the suburban railway; financial support to the development of leasing; improving air quality in urban areas; capacity building of institutions. The implementation of this project began in July 2001 in a first phase, which was planned to last four years. 72

73 2. Creating viable entities The participating operators were invited to come together as groups of operators, known as Groupements d intérêt économique (economic interest groups) or GIEs, now numbering 13, whose members are collectively responsible for loan repayments. Only approved operators with licences and validated vehicle registrations have been allowed to group together. The GIE is represented in its business relationships with TATA and CETUD by the Association of Finance Professionals from Dakar Urban Transport (AFTU), which was formed in April Process of grouping operators Objective: To establish viable entities; Commitment made by operators in November 1999 in the context of fleet renewal; Started in 2001 for the commencement of the line of credit from IDA through the formation of 13 GIEs (Economic Interest Groups), gathering 446 operators with a fleet of 1,350 buses; Created in April 2001, the Association for the Association of Finance Professionals from Dakar Urban Transport (AFTU) grouping the 13 GIEs and the bus company Dakar Dem Dikk; A transporters credit union (MEC TRANS) was created in May 2005 and approved in January 2006 by the Ministry of Finance. It has 1,850 members. 3. Concessions of operations Through GIEs, operators were compelled to conclude concession agreements with the CETUD, with which they have specified routes and rates which apply and some important operating practices. In particular, they had to commit to use and respect the official bus stops, to abandon the practice of route sectioning and the use of non official sections (just as the other cars rapides), and issue tickets to all passengers. The concession agreement also stipulates the conditions for price revisions and provides grant payments in case the operators do not succeed in balancing their financial accounts with the fixed tariffs. Moreover, a tacit agreement exists on the frequency of service, which that should be five minutes during peak hours and 10 minutes during off peak, although it is apparent that there are not enough vehicles to provide this level of service. The agreement gives CETUD the right to monitor the provision of service, and requires operators to provide CETUD with their operational and financial data. 73

74 4. Capacity building Urban transport, a changing transport sub sector, is becoming more and more professional. The development of this programme is thus justified, since it will improve the supply of transport to meet the objective of professionalising the sub sector and will help to rationalise transport. In the field of general training, training sessions are mainly held for the drivers and conductors on modules of road safety, economic and safe driving, trade relations, first aid and management of ticketing. Concerning the operators, the training modules are focused on human resources management, operational management of a public transport network, the technical management of a fleet, the commercial management of a public transport SME and the accounting and financial management. For supporting staff, controllers, regulators and line managers, training sessions revolved around the following modules: Ticketing, knowledge and network structuring, regulation techniques, management of the service quality of a transport network. This totals 1,351 participants (195 operators, 590 drivers and 566 conductors) as shown in the table below: Training Operators Drivers Conductors Cost (in CFA francs) ,300, ,750,550 Total Total ,050, Assistance to GIE to operate the concessionary network This is the technical support provided to the GIE and operators to encourage them to properly manage an urban public transport service. The support for a period of six months had started in September Beyond the regulatory tasks, it had this time been extended to include the issues of monitoring and control of the activity, by the provision of supervisors and line managers. This support is designed to make the operators accept the idea that it is necessary to have some supporting staff for operations, as well as the technical, administrative and accounting aspect of lines granted. 6. The organisation of the new network of minibuses The fleet renewal of Cars Rapides is part of the overall reform of the urban transport sector in Dakar. It mainly aims to professionalise an industry dominated by informal operations. Therefore, the circulation of vehicles acquired under the PAMU is, in respect of specific operating standards, accepted by operators and enclosed in the concession agreements and contracts signed between CETUD and GIE. 74

75 Thus, to date, 18 lines were granted to 8 GIE of AFTU, which operate in compliance with agreed standards, including: - respect of a fixed route, - sales of tickets on board, - respect the official stops located on routes, - establishing a regular service, that is to say, the establishment of departures at a predetermined frequency from the terminals (or stations). The routes are provided by the CETUD, and finally adopted after consultation with operators grouped in the GIE. The terminals or stations are defined by the CETUD. Against this backdrop, a major programme of rehabilitation and construction of street furniture (bus shelters) and bus stations for passengers has been achieved through the PAMU to improve waiting conditions for users at different points where supply and demand meet, namely bus terminals, stations and stops en route. E. IMPACT OF THE REFORM The total fleet of the informal sector is 2,558 vehicles (2008 Census Fideco), which breaks down as 55% Cars rapides and some 45% of Ndiaga Ndiaye, giving estimated respective fleets of 1,390 and 1,151 vehicles. 1. Impact on commercial speeds and travel time The professionalisation reform had no direct impact on traffic in terms of lowering the number of vehicles on the roads, in as much as, for every new vehicle, one old informal vehicle was scrapped with an incentive per vehicle. This was then purely a fleet renewal. Moreover, TATA minibuses on the one hand, and Cars rapides and Ndiaga Ndiaye on the other hand, operating in the same traffic, all experience the same overall traffic influences and congestion in particular. The formalisation has introduced the system of formal bus stops that passengers appreciate and has significantly improved travel times for buses as they stop less frequently. Thus, the average commercial speed is higher than that of the informal sector. It ranges between km/h and km/h, while that of informal transport stands at between 5.3 km/h and 9.8 km/h. On average therefore, the commercial speed of TATA is more than double the average speed of informal transport, which is also equivalent to a travel time proportionally less for the same distance traveled. Improved journey times: TATA is also linked to good regulatory practices introduced in the operation, for example, regulators giving the departures at line heads, supervisors who are on the network to ensure respect of routes and stops and monitor the behavior of those lines and warn of congestion points. Naturally, the fleet of TATA minibuses is relatively new compared to the informal ones and their performance is better. All these measures combined explain the significant reduction in travel times. 75

76 2. Impact on passengers The number of passengers per kilometer for TATA minibuses is higher than for other informal vehicles. It stands respectively at 2.87 and 2.59 passengers per km. This seems to be related to the capacity offered by larger TATA vehicles of 43 places, of which 27 are seats and 16 are standing positions, compared to 16 seats in Cars Rapides, which are the most common informal vehicles, although Ndiaga Ndiaye also have a capacity of 42 seats. But the informal sector by definition is not regulated; it operates without fixed schedules, meaning that the system of arbitrarily sectioning trips artificially increases the number of passengers carried for the purpose of a higher profit. 3. Impact on the availability of supply TATA vehicles are generally very efficient, with relatively few mechanical problems. The TATA fleet records an availability of 85 90% currently. Regarding the Cars rapides and Ndiaga Ndiaye, a fleet estimated at 2,558 buses, only an average of 65 70% is on the network per day. This is mainly due to the age of the fleet, obsolete equipment and fragmented vehicle ownership. 4. Impact on operating revenue Improved revenue Conversations with operators reveal that the gross daily revenue per TATA bus is on average EUR 95, against an average of EUR 80 for the former Cars rapides and Ndiaga Ndiaye. 5. Impact on operating revenue Quality of service The quality of service has improved to the satisfaction of the general public. Passengers say AFTU services are significantly better than those offered by the old minibuses. The drivers are more disciplined. Passengers appreciate the positive ticketing system, and believe that, on average, prices are lower than in the former system, because they are no longer subject to the arbitrary practice of trip sectioning. Thus the overall costs to the passenger are lower because the crew extorts no more additional money. 6. Improved legal and regulatory framework Changes in work practices The contractual arrangements between owners (operators) and crew were changed as part of the renewal programme. Previously, drivers and their assistants gathered the revenues and actually determined the amount to be paid to owners. Under the new arrangements, tickets must be issued for all passengers and drivers and conductors who are now employees are required to provide daily receipts and pay the full income to the owner. This has significantly increased the incomes of owners, since crews cannot keep any part whatsoever of revenue. 76

77 The monthly salaries are varied: some earn slightly more than 100,000 CFA francs per month, others a little less than 75,000 CFA francs. Recipients earn between 35,000 CFA francs and 75,000 CFA francs. 7. Monitoring of revenue and operating expenses (TATA minibuses) Assistance to the GIE allowed dashboards to be developed regarding the operation of TATA minibuses. The table below provides information on indicators of certain routes operated by the GIE AFTU in November Line Passengers/minibus /day Income/ vehicle/day Operating expenses Commercial speed Mileage/minibus/day Covering rate Line ,147 42, Line ,250 45, Line ,006 47, Line ,875 49, Line ,602 44, Line ,788 42, Line ,725 41, Line ,725 45, Line ,632 52, Line ,701 55, Line ,026 50, All the new minibuses lines show a positive profit margin. F. CONCLUSION Until the reform, the minibuses ( Cars rapides and Ndiaga Ndiaye ) had licenses allowing them to operate over the whole Dakar urban area. With the reform, the 505 new minibuses are operated on 26 routes, of which 18 serve the suburbs, based on contracts signed by the 9 GIE recipients and CETUD, the organising authority. The 244 operators and their staff (drivers, conductors, controllers and route regulators) benefited from training funded by the project under the supervision of CETUD. This permitted the consolidation of over 1,250 jobs. Users are globally satisfied with the service quality provided by the GIE. 77

78 More transparency in operations with the introduction of ticketing and the enforcement of a specification book, although there is a certain level of flexibility. However, to ensure sustainability, the following is required: The consolidation of the institutional framework, by reinforcing the powers of CETUD, the organising authority, expressed by development partners. The continual renewal of the bus fleet through the revolving fund created in 2008 and exploiting opportunities from bilateral or multilateral cooperation in this direction. The continued capacity building of operators and their staff. Financial sustainability of the sector. THE DEVELOPMENT OF FORMAL PUBLIC TRANSPORT LED TO IMPROVED QUALITY OF CUSTOMER SERVICE, AS WELL AS TO BETTER PROFITABILITY THE FORMALISATION AND PROFESSIONALISATION BROUGHT JOB STABILITY TO THE SECTOR 78

79 DOUALA (CAMEROUN) AN EXAMPLE OF A SUCCESSFUL PUBLIC PRIVATE PARTNERSHIP IN PUBLIC TRANSPORT A. INTRODUCTION Transport infrastructure and especially roads are an essential part of the economic activity of the state and a tool to fight against poverty. Indeed, the opening up of so called spontaneous areas, with the creation of a road network or a public transport service, is essential to improve accessibility to jobs or social services. In addition, the urban road network is also of value to all urban service networks and is particularly crucial for the emergence of an effective public transport service by road in terms of speed and service quality. In Cameroon, due to the economic crisis in the late 1980s, with the drastic reduction of the State s financial capability, road infrastructure particularly went into decay. Confronted with this serious deterioration, soon after 2000 the Government initiated many projects for investment in and rehabilitation of urban roads, particularly in Douala where the situation was very worrying. In the framework of the Trans Africa project, we intend to study the impact of the condition of the road infrastructure on public transport activities and in particular on the operations of the single formal public transport structure in Douala: SOCATUR. B. BACKGROUND 1. THE CITY OF DOUALA Douala is the economic capital of Cameroon with a population estimated at 2.5 million inhabitants, growing at a rate of 5% per year with a motorisation rate of around 40 veh/1,000 inhabitants. This city is a major area of development in Cameroon due to the high level of concentration of economic activities. Douala has indeed the first port in the sub region and an international airport. Douala s road network, which in addition is an entry and exit point for the landlocked countries of the CEMAC zone, is heavily used by freight traffic. But the exceptional growth of Douala in recent years in terms of both population and space did not include a corresponding development of road infrastructure, causing major mobility problems. Instead, Douala s road network is characterised by: the acute deterioration of certain segments of the main paved roads; the absence of secondary (or tertiary) roads to give access to the squatter settlements; the lack of prioritisation in the road network; 79

80 the configuration of the network with several radial roads going to downtown, without any ring to limit concentration and funnel effects. The roads have become very dilapidated, are not organised into a hierarchy and are increasingly subject to traffic congestion. This major deterioration of the infrastructure actually derives from natural facts. Douala has grown on both sides of the river Wouri. The flatness of the land, the lack of natural drains and the rainfall of 4,000 mm per year expose the roads to a high level of degradation. The sandy clay soils which constitute the geomorphology of Douala are unstable; under the effect of gully erosion, pavements deteriorate naturally, with traffic as an additional catalyst. The storm drainage system set along the roads is unable to properly evacuate the precipitations during the rainy season (July October). Thus the majority of main roads are covered with water, provoking congestion and accidents, potholes, cracks and other damage to the roads. 2. THE URBAN COMMUNITY OF DOUALA (CUD) Created by Decree 87/1366 of 25 September 1987, within the territorial limits of the department of Wouri and with headquarters in Bonanjo, CUD is, with Yaoundé, one of two urban communities found in the municipal environment of Cameroon. It is subdivided as required by the law into five urban districts. It is an autonomous entity on both a legal and financial level and is headed by a government representative appointed by the President of the country. The CUD is the competent body in matters of urban planning, roads and transportation planning. The role of the CUD in financing the maintenance of urban roads derives from the 'Contract of Objectives of the City of Douala signed between the government and the CUD in This Contract of Objectives includes a road maintenance programme incorporating a specific account, the Road Maintenance Account (CEV), the objective of which is to secure the funds necessary to implement an annual programme of minimum maintenance of the road network in the city. The CUD has the responsibility for the maintenance of main roads and signage in its area, while the urban districts (CUA) have responsibility for maintenance and cleaning of secondary municipal roads. However, there is no official classification to distinguish between main roads and secondary roads, which means that very often the CUA place the prerogative on CUD as far as rehabilitation and reinforcement are concerned. 3. SOCATUR From 2000, the activities of SOCATUR were launched, which by government convention is delegated to operate an urban passenger transport service in the city of Douala. It was created from the concession in October 2000 of the past lines of the former Sotuc, the State owned public transport bus company. Indeed, the bankruptcy and liquidation of Sotuc in February 1995 paved the way for the liberalisation of public transport operations. SOCATUR was then created on the basis of a new 80

81 approach involving a private operator to operate the network. It has a renewable exclusive agreement for five years on the operations of vehicles with more than 30 seats. The monopoly on operating vehicles with over 30 seats, along with the free provision of the former headquarters of Sotuc, constitute the only public service compensation from the government. SOCATUR s offer is limited and provides a small amount of journeys for Douala inhabitants. SOCATUR trips represent less than 5% of commuting. It has a fleet of 135 buses, of which 115 are operational, with a capacity that SOCATUR management set at 80 seats. It provides coverage of nine radial lines (centre to periphery). The price charged, 150 CFA francs whatever the route, is approved by the government; a part of the ticket price, 25 CFA francs, corresponding to VAT, is repaid to the state. Some buses also collect company workers. On some sections where the competition with informal transport is very high, the company s fare is 100 CFA francs without any compensation. 81

82 4. ROAD NETWORK CONDITION The road network of the city of Douala comprises approximately 1,800 km of roads, of which just over 470 km are paved (26%), including 150 km of main roads. The road density is approximately 0.72 km/1,000 inhab. This low figure places Douala behind the major African cities. For example, Kinshasa has a road density of 0.93 km/1,000 inhabitants, Brazzaville 1.10 km/1,000 inhabitants and Lome 1.7 km/1,000 inhab. Based on previous studies, it appears that the primary structuring road typical of the downtown neighbourhoods is in good overall condition. Unlike the so called secondary roads, which are generally in poor condition (50%). The network of the Douala urban community has an incomplete structuring network of East West orientation, which concentrates the flows toward the city centre, whereas the North/South structuring network, which could allow transit, is almost absent. The city of Douala also suffers from the lack of a recent urban master plan, which would include issues such as the prioritisation of roads, planning of all transport (private, public, freight), traffic and parking management and the management of urban space and of its use, in order to make the mobility of people and goods more efficient. Above is a picture of the old Bonaberi road, one of the most important axes of the city in terms of private car traffic and freight trucks to the west and in terms of public transport demand. C. DESCRIPTION OF THE REFORM POLICY As of Wednesday 22 July 2006 the City Contract, signed between the CUD and the state of Cameroon under funding from the French Development Agency (AFD), replaced the contract of objectives. The City Contract has essentially taken into account the rehabilitation of the road network in the city, over a period originally set from 2006 to

83 Indeed, this new participatory approach aims to bring together national partners and donors to ensure the success of the Framework Programme for Investment (FPI), which amounts to over 160 billion CFA francs for road infrastructure expenses. The main objective of the FPI, for which the completion period has been postponed until 2011, is the rehabilitation of existing roads (and not the construction of new roads) and to improve the access to isolated areas. This initiative should facilitate the redeployment of the transport offer to help better meet needs and improve mobility. In addition to infrastructure projects, the framework programme also provided the opportunity to define, following pressure from donors, a self sufficient and transparent mechanism of municipal funding for the CEV to meet the annual needs for road maintenance. Of 50 km of roads planned to be rehabilitated when the City Contract was signed in 2006, only 22 km are completed. Works affecting the city centre, and therefore concerning a vast majority of daily urban mobility needs, are still ongoing (15 km) or scheduled (14 km). A CUD/SOCATUR partnership agreement was signed in December 2007 following the desire of the Prime Minister to "develop a formal offer of transport: modern, economically viable, socially accessible and environmentally friendly." This partnership, based on CUD s entry into SOCATUR s capital with a share of 33%, was decided with a view to making the renewed company the core around which all current modes of transport in the city of Douala may be developed. This willingness on the part of political leaders illustrates a strong commitment to sustainable urban development by limiting the activity of informal transporters. In practice this partnership should enable the new structure to benefit from banking, financial, fiscal or technical facilities, which are normally available to a public company: - acquisition of SOCATUR headquarters by the CUD to allow for necessary constructions; - various financial measures for the economic survival of SOCATUR, including credit assistance, exemption from customs duty on vehicle imports and VAT on ticket prices, and the partial exemption from fuel taxes. D. IMPACT OF REFORM POLICY A detailed analysis of the impact of road rehabilitation on the SOCATUR operating lines is made difficult by the fact that this measure is still ongoing. However, a few elements allow us to assess its importance. Firstly, we must consider the situation before the measure: it is estimated that over 80% of observed failures of SOCATUR vehicles were directly due to the condition of the roads. Statements of breakdowns are sent daily by maintenance services and have been archived since the creation of SOCATUR in November These are handwritten notes which include for each intervention 83

84 the bus number and the type of failure. There are two classes of failure: network failures, observed during the bus service and requiring an interruption in the operation, and complex failures, dealt with only at the end of the service when the bus returns to the complex, and that therefore did not interrupt its operations. Network failures are the most serious, since they cause deterioration in service quality and require the bus to be towed. Confronted with the difficulties of operating on deteriorated roads, SOCATUR management decided to change some routes from March These changes involve bypassing certain sections to use sections of road in better condition. However, this bypassing, in addition to generating additional operating costs (fuel, everyday wear, etc..) contributes to isolating certain areas of high demand. Frequently, lines have been shortened. These changes will obviously lead to a loss for SOCATUR, forced to abandon some major axes, and will reduce the coverage of the network and therefore the populations served. These routes changes were made with a view to increasing the fleet as scheduled in the company business plan in the framework of the public private partnership between SOCATUR and CUD. They took place mostly during March 2009 before the inauguration of the 65 new buses in May and their effective introduction in early June. 7,0 6,0 5,0 4,0 3,0 2,0 1,0 0,0 January February March Breakdowns evolution (rate per vehicle from January 2008 to July 2009) April May June July August September October November December January February March April May June July breakdowns repaired on the network requesting to return to the maintenance facilities A regular and noteworthy drop in the breakdowns rate of SOCATUR buses was seen from January 2008 to July 2009 (fall of 50%), which is linked to two major facts: the improvement of the road infrastructures and partially the modification of SOCATUR s routes on the one hand and, on the other, the acquisition of new second hand vehicles, both as a result of this public private partnership. 84

85 CONCLUSION In conclusion, the improvement in the operating conditions of SOCATUR from March 2009 is undeniable. This is due to a combination of two factors: the improvement of the road network and the acquisition of new second hand vehicles for SOCATUR s operation, both as a result of the public private partnership between CUD and SOCATUR. It might be too early to assess the impact on the financial side, as this policy is still ongoing. In any case, these developments clearly illustrate the influence of the road network on the operating conditions. In the longer term, the progress and completion of the ongoing road rehabilitation programmes will enable a deeper analysis of the impact of the infrastructure policies. SOCATUR is currently changing as a result of the momentum initiated by the partnership with the CUD from In addition, planned reforms set to streamline and better regulate other competing modes of transport will also be crucial: the attempt to control the traffic of motorcycle taxis, which was first launched in July 2009 and intended to follow the lead of a significant change in bus traffic, has not yet produced the desired effect. THE DEVELOPMENT OF A PUBLIC PRIVATE PARTNERSHIP FOR PUBLIC TRANSPORT ENABLED A SIGNIFICANT IMPROVEMENT IN THE OPERATING CONDITIONS OF THE PUBLIC TRANSPORT COMPANY 85

86 JOHANNESBURG (SOUTH AFRICA) THE IMPROVEMENT OF GOVERNING AND LEGAL FRAMEWORK OF PUBLIC TRANSPORT A. INTRODUCTION In 2008 the population of South Africa was estimated at 48,687,000 people and 13,448,000 households. South African metropolitan cities contributed a third to the population. The City of Johannesburg in particular had a population equivalent to 7% of the country s population. The estimated number of employed people in 2008 stood at 13,369,000 people, crudely implying that the country is economically supported by 27% of the population. In 2008 the number of registered individual tax payers was 8,487,502 people, up from 3,166,795 in 1996, and tax collected amounted to R billion in 2008, up from R 2.4 billion in 1996 (USD 1 R7, and EUR 1 R11 on average 2009 rates). Some of the notable demographic trends in South Africa are as follows, noting that cities often bear the brunt: Increasingly reduced household sizes and rapid increase in the number of households, especially in the urban areas. High rates of deaths associated with HIV/AIDS, especially in the economically active population group as well as in infants, although this has recently stabilised. Increased net migration into the country. The location of South Africa and the City of Johannesburg within the African continent is shown in Figure 2.1. The City of Johannesburg is landlocked and has a surface area of 1,645 km 2, and in 2008 an average density of just over 20 persons per hectare. 86

87 Figure 2.1: South Africa and the City of Johannesburg in a geographical context The Management of Transport in South Africa is a shared responsibility between National, Provincial and Local governments. In particular, the National Department of Transport is responsible for overall policy formulation and monitoring as well as managing national funds. Many other national government departments, such as the Department of Energy, the Department of Trade and Industry and the Department of Labour, formulate policy that also impacts on transport in the country. Apart from managing and implementing transport infrastructure, such as provincial roads, provincial departments of transport also have the responsibility to refine national policy to match provincial circumstances, coordinate transport activities within the province and offer a number of administrative functions, such as transport subsidies and public transport operator licensing. Many of the provincial administrative functions are set to be devolved to local government, especially in the large metropolitan areas. Local government is essentially a transport policy implementation agent, through transport infrastructure and systems projects and programmes. The implementation of transport policy in local government is achieved through Integrated Transport Plans (ITPs) which, among other things, prioritise the implementation of projects and programmes in municipalities (local government). ITPs are subject to annual review, including public participation processes. Legally, no transport project can be implemented unless it has been identified as such in the ITP. ITPs became a transport management and implementation tool following the promulgation of the National Land Transport Transition Act (Act 22 of 2000), which later became the National Land Transport Act (Act 5 of 2009). The Act itself is a product of a national landmark transport reform policy in the form of the 1996 White Paper on National Transport Policy. Among other things, the 87

88 White Paper aimed to transform land transport in South Africa in order to dismantle the inefficient apartheid transport legacy, and for the first time in South Africa, bias transport investments towards public transport. Figure 2.2 summarises the apartheid settlement policy in which the shaded areas represent areas where Black African people were confined to live, divided in terms of ethnic groups (for example Zulu, Xhosa, Ndebele, Pedi, etc.), and with limited infrastructure development and job opportunities. Within the cities, Black people were primarily used for labour purposes and settled relatively far from city centres. In order to transport workers between their places of work and residential areas, subsidised public transport was provided in the form of trains and buses, initially financed largely by employers and subsequently financed completely by government. The footprint of the apartheid spatial planning legacy is still visible and its momentum is reflected in the spatial provisioning of public transport subsidies and growing settlement patterns somewhat still reinforce the apartheid system. In many respects, therefore, the 1996 White Paper on National Transport Policy stands out as the turning point for South African transport. It declared that the vision of transport in the country is to: Provide safe, reliable, effective, efficient, and fully integrated transport operations and infrastructure which will best meet the needs of freight and passenger customers at improving levels of service and cost in a fashion which supports government strategies for economic and social development whilst being environmentally and economically sustainable. Subsequently, this vision guided the implementation of transport policy and the formulation of transport strategies in the country across the three spheres of government. Four key issues are identifiable in the vision statement: Group of service attributes: safety, reliability, effectiveness and efficiency. While safety, reliability and efficiency are self explanatory, effectiveness refers to the transport system achieving set goals, including the application of transport subsidies to meet specific goals. Meeting customer needs. The use of the word customers emphasises a service oriented relationship between end users and authorities. Continuous improvement of service quality and costs, emphasising the need for continuous policy monitoring. Transformation to concurrently support economic, social and environmental objectives, in order to emphasise sustainability. 88

89 Figure 2.2: Settlement restriction for Africans during apartheid South Africa Source: Napier (2008) A number of ambitious targets were set through the White Paper. Notable ones include an average modal split ratio for motorised transport of 80:20 in favour of public transport, and a maximum household expenditure on public transport equivalent to less than 10% of the disposable household income. Furthermore, public transport users were regarded in the White Paper as customers and a customer centric approach for the provision of public transport infrastructure and services was promoted and legislated. While progressive transport policy was put in place, there are shortcomings that still require stern interventions in the country, some of which are: Vested interests: While vested interests are unavoidable in an industry with multiple stakeholder needs such as transport, it is important that such interest should not hinder overall progress. Examples include transformation resistance from labour unions, incumbent public transport operators and state owned public transport operations. Inability to integrate modes of transport: Sustainable examples of modal integration are yet to be demonstrated. Long travel distance and time: Travel time on public transport is significantly higher than on private transport mainly as a result of a combination of two factors: (i) relatively distant spatial separation of interdependent land uses; and (ii) public transport operations that largely take place in mixed traffic. The situation is more severe in the rural areas given their remote location and dispersed settlement patterns. 89

90 Design standards in favour of car use: Road reserve design standards are largely in favour of car use, with little consideration for multimodal user needs. Poor monitoring mechanisms: No systematic transport policy monitoring mechanisms are in place. Public transport is largely regarded as the mode for the poor: Public transport has yet to appeal to potential users across different demographics through improved marketing and service design. Many of the above shortcomings require strengthened leadership and institutions in public transport management achievable through training and development, political will and active civil society that is able to hold leadership accountable. B. CONTEXT The City of Johannesburg is one of the six metropolitan areas in South Africa. Others metropolitan areas are, namely, Cape Town, Nelson Mandela Bay, Ekurhuleni, Tshwane and Ethekwini, and their locations are shown in Figure 3.1. Three of the metropolitan areas, namely Johannesburg, Ekurhuleni and Tshwane, located adjacent to each other, form the main core of the conurbation referred to as the Gauteng Global City Region. It is envisaged that over time this conurbation will develop as a unit and be able to use its joint resources to compete with other megacities in other parts of the world. Figure 3.1: Location of metropolitan areas in South Africa 90

91 In order to understand the current state of the City of Johannesburg and the state of transport, it is essential to appreciate its history. The history of the City of Johannesburg is characterised by: Mergers of different cities and administrations: In its current form, the City of Johannesburg was established in the year Previously, in the period 1995 to 2000, the City comprised the Greater Johannesburg Transitional Metropolitan Council and four Transitional Metropolitan Local Councils. The Local Government Transition Act, negotiated by various political groupings and civil society groups, provided a transition from apartheid local government structures. In 1997 the city was experiencing serious financial problems. The autonomy of the five structures led to individual expenditure that collectively increased city deficit. This was exacerbated by the tariff boycotts in the former lack areas, inertia maintained from years of resisting against the apartheid led government. High rates of immigration: The City of Johannesburg has historically attracted, and continues to attract, large numbers of people from other parts of the country. A phenomenon of circular migration in which households migrate within the city in large numbers is also significant and partly results in the growth of informal settlements. Systematic spatial inequalities: Spatial inequalities in the City of Johannesburg are a direct result of apartheid spatial planning policy. While historically the spatial divisions were in terms of race, they are recently in terms of wealth. The large majority of the Black African population continues to live in townships, which are areas in the urban areas historically confined for their settlement. The emergence of informal settlements, without access to basic services such as running water and electricity, and mainly in the form of shacks, is an emerging challenge and has arisen from the unavailability of affordable housing stock for the poor. State sponsored housing developments for the poor also continue to be poorly located relative to areas of economic opportunity. In situ developments of informal settlements have also had limited success. Multi nodal city: While in the past the City of Johannesburg had a defined centre, it currently comprises multiple spatial nodes that compete with the city centre, for example areas such as Sandton to the north of the city centre. This was as a result of the phenomenon referred to as capital flight in which large businesses moved out of the inner city to establish their businesses elsewhere in the city. The areas that attracted large businesses themselves began to individually compete for increased investment, and individually introduced spatial management practices that were in some instances incompatible, for example parking management and other building control standards, as well as road network development. The shift in non residential land use also induced a strong shift in residential land use in which wealthier households relocated to suburbs that were closer to the newer centres. Efforts to re establish the inner city as the core of the city had limited successes. Nonetheless, the inner city has since attracted a large number of Black African people who currently make up the largest majority. Public transport services did not keep pace with the increasingly multi nodal nature of the city, meaning that public transport had forced trip transfers in the absence of direct routes connecting the nodes. Spatial politics: Within the City of Johannesburg, there is a clear division in terms of political ideology reflected in terms of the municipal election results held in 2006 (the next election is 91

92 to be held in 2011). Figure 3.2, for example depicts wards won by the governing African National Congress (ANC) with a large Black people base, the Democratic Alliance (DA), with a large White people base, and a few wards won by other contesting parties. The majority of the municipal wards in the northern and south western suburbs were won by the DA, and the rest mostly by the ANC. For historical reasons, many of the areas in which the DA won coincide with the routes of the city owned Metrobus services, and the ones won by ANC are mostly without the Metrobus service. Independent IFP Source: Bénit- Gbaffou (2006) Figure 3.2: Results of the 2006 municipal elections in the City of Johannesburg The City of Johannesburg has a relatively extensive road network with an extensive freeway system as shown in Figure 3.3. A notable feature of the road network is a radial pattern of arterial roads converging towards the city centre, as well as a ring road freeway system providing a bypass function to the city centre. A 160 km passenger rail network with 55 stations crosses the inner city in an east west pattern, with numerous stations along its length. Within the city, the rail network provides a passenger transport service mainly to townships located to the south west of the city, as well as to the south. The rail service emanates from the apartheid spatial planning legacy as described in the previous section of the report. The ownership of roads within the City is shared between the City, Province and the National Government. Road ownership in this context implies that both the investments and maintenance functions are the individual responsibility of 92 DA ANC

93 the three spheres of government for the road reserves in their control. The rail network is owned and operated by an agency of the national department of transport. Figure 3.3: City of Johannesburg road and rail networks Besides the passenger rail network described above, the rest of the public transport network is road based, in the form of minibuses, buses, long distance coaches, metered taxis and the recently added Bus Rapid Transit. The pictures of these modes of public transport are shown in Figure 3.4. Metered taxis, unlike other route based modes, offer a demand responsive public transport service not confined to specific routes. Minibus taxi Train Bus Others Cycling use is limited. Motorcycles are not used for public transport. 93

94 Long distance coach Metered taxi Bus Rapid Transit Under Construction: High speed rail Gautrain Figure 3.4: City of Johannesburg public transport modes The public transport network comprising minibus taxi routes, bus routes, first phase BRT lines and rail lines for the City of Johannesburg is shown on Figure 3.5. Minibus taxis provide the most extensive spatial coverage in the city. In addition to existing modes of public transport, Figure 3.5 shows the location of the high speed rail line station under construction, as well as the feeder and distributor routes for the high speed rail. Figure 3.5: City of Johannesburg public transport network Table 3.1 provides a summary of statistics relating to road based modes of passenger transport in the City of Johannesburg, including private cars and motorcycles. Registered private cars in June 94

95 2009, numbering 852,935, are approaching one million. Out of the 43,570 minibuses registered, it is estimated that 19,600 operate as public transport vehicles. The fleet of motorcycles is more than seven times the fleet of buses in the City. However, motorcycles in South Africa, and in Johannesburg, are not used for public transport purposes. The average rate of occupancy for each mode is estimated from a database of 2009 occupancy traffic counts in the City. It should however be noted that the traffic in the City of Johannesburg tends to peak in one direction at a time and the occupancies also differ accordingly. A two week long survey of private cars in the City estimated the average annual private car kilometres at 21,900 km. The annual bus kilometres were derived from the diesel consumption statistics obtained from large bus operators, and for minibus taxis from discussions with operators as well as route length data. Average daily unit trips and annual passenger trips were estimated from a combination of timetables, survey data and discussions with operators. Table 3.1: Performance of modes of transport in the City of Johannesburg Mode attribute Fleet (number of units) Capacity per unit Average rate of occupancy per unit Annual kilometres per unit Annual total number of passengers (passenger trips) Daily unit trips Private car Bus (including midibuses) Minibus (all minibuses) Private taxis (metered sedan taxis) Collective taxis (minibus taxis part of minibuses) Motorcycle (mainly private) 852,935 4,936 43, ,600 38, ,900 27,260 2,194,601,755 28,561,840 21,900 for those operating as private vehicles and 64,680 for those operating as public transport vehicles 2,513,817,600 for those operating as public transport vehicles 16,350 64,680 Unknown but probably similar to private car 360,500 2,513,817,600 35,299, Table 3.2 provides a summary of the City s transport model relating to the peak hour performance of the road network for the years 2002, 2010 and The model was calibrated on the basis of a 2002 household travel survey and land use audits. The 2010 and 2020 projections were made on the basis of the City s transport and land use plans. In the table, the performance of the road 95

96 network is expressed in terms of total peak hour vehicle kilometres, total peak hour travel time, average volume to capacity ratio and average peak hour speed. For analytical purposes the road network is segmented in terms of road function and ownership. In the base year, the average peak hour speed on city owned roads is 51km/h. However, on the strategic public transport network (planned Bus Rapid Transit routes) the average speed is lower. Over time, the average speed and other indicators, across all road categories, deteriorate significantly and the roads on which the strategic public transport network operates become severely affected. Indications are therefore that, left without interventions, the performance of the road network in the City will deteriorate drastically. A basket of interventions that include improved land use management, improved public transport services and road user charging are anticipated to reduce the overall rate of network performance deterioration. 96

97 Table 3.2: Extract from City of Johannesburg transport model for the trend scenario with no transport interventions BASE YEAR (2002) ANALYSIS ELEMENT ROAD NETWORK ELEMENT Total veh km travelled (km) Total travel time (hours) Average v/c ratio Average speed (km/h) Total veh km travelled (km) Total travel time (hours) Average v/c ratio Average speed (km/h) Total veh km travelled (km) Total travel time (hours) Average v/c ratio Average speed (km/h) Road Network Hierarchy Strategic Public Transport Network (SPTN) Road Ownership Class 1 1,338,748 18, ,645,917 39, ,097, , Class 2 1,626,264 39, ,331,803 91, ,436, , Entire SPTN 1,160,702 29, ,601,273 64, ,309, , North South Flagship 121,666 2, ,310 7, ,612 42, SPTN 132,296 2, ,962 8, ,881 45, National 1,041,566 14, ,250,092 29, ,573, , Provincial 694,049 18, ,619 37, ,432, , City of Johannesburg 2,701,973 52, ,040, , ,216, , Entire modelled network 4,956,036 92, ,908, , ,095, , Source: City of Johannesburg transport model 97

98 In 2003, the number of road accidents amounted to 107,740. Out of these accidents, 690 fatalities occurred in addition to 4,006 serious injuries and 19,018 slight injuries. Of the 690 people killed, 280 were pedestrians, representing 40.6% of all the traffic fatalities. While the largest number of road traffic accidents occurred on Fridays, most of the fatalities occurred on Saturdays and Sundays, clearly showing that weekends contribute the most to the rate of fatal accidents. The severity of accidents tends to be the most severe at night. Figure 3.6 illustrates the proportion of road accidents in terms of vehicle types, juxtaposed against the proportion of each type of vehicle in the population. Minibuses in particular are shown to have disproportionately more accidents than the other vehicle types. Vehicles involved in Accidents Other and Unknown Trucks Motorcycles Vehicle population Fatal accidents All accidents Buses Minibuses Source: City of Johannesburg, 2005 Light delivery vehicles Passenger cars 0% 20% 40% 60% 80% Figure 3.6: Vehicles involved in accidents in the City of Johannesburg in 2003 Table 3.3 summarises modal share statistics in the City of Johannesburg for work and education trips. The numbers were derived from the 2003 household survey in the City (which is the latest available). The dominant modes of transport are private car and minibus taxis for work trips. In contrast, walking is the dominant mode for education trips. Table 3.3: Modal share in the City of Johannesburg Work trips Education trips Modal share One way passenger trips (%) One way passenger trips (%) Private car 453, , Bicycle 1, ,672 1 Walking 143, , Motorcycle Public transport (bus) 54, ,601 3 Public transport (train) 121, ,597 3 Private taxis 4, ,511 1 informal (minibus, collective taxis) 417, , Others 37, ,580 7 Total 1,232, , Department of Transport (2003) 98

99 Table 3.4 summarises the results of experimental work conducted on cars in the City of Johannesburg to estimate fuel consumption and emissions on the City s roads. It is estimated that private cars in the City of Johannesburg consume 1.78 Giga litres of fuel, over 80% of which is petrol. The estimated carbon dioxide emissions amount to 4.13 Mega tons. Table 3.4: Estimated private car fuel consumption and emissions in the City of Johannesburg Car operating parameter Petrol cars Diesel cars Total Fuel consumption (Giga litres) CO 2 (Mega tons) CO (Kilo tons) HC (Kilo tons) NO x (Kilo tons) Source: Goyns (2008) C. PUBLIC TRANSPORT REFORMS IN THE CITY OF JOHANNESBURG Public transport reforms in the City of Johannesburg follow a pattern that is largely replicated in many parts of South Africa. However, there are aspects of public transport reform that are unique to the City of Johannesburg given its history and administration system. The reforms pertaining to public transport are described below, and the analysis is focused on: Land use reform: This is in recognition of the interdependence between public transport and land use. Public transport regulatory reform: These include the laws and regulations for management purposes, and their impact on: o Public transport services, o Public transport governance, and o Public transport financing. For each reform package, the background pertaining to the reform package, the reform process followed, and the impact of the reform are provided in detail. While the report attempts to quantify the reform s impact as much as possible, the availability of necessary data is a constraint. Nonetheless, estimations and data imputations are made where possible from existing datasets. Not all the reform interventions have been successful, and these are also highlighted. 99

100 1. LAND USE REFORM The interaction between land use and transport has long been recognised as critical for systematic management of the built environment. Therefore, the reform of public transport needs to be also supplemented by land use reform in order for reform interventions to be sustainable. In recognition of this, the public transport reform process in the City of Johannesburg was strongly linked to land use reform. Background Land use reforms implemented in the City of Johannesburg were largely guided by national policy and legislation. For the purpose of this report, the following legislation is relevant: Development Facilitation Act (Act 67 of 1995): The Act was introduced at a time when South Africa was in the process of rapidly transforming land development in order to facilitate the implementation of a government led Reconstruction and Development Programme, which entailed, among others things, state sponsored housing. The Act promoted integrated land use development, close proximity of residential and non residential developments and the minimisation of urban sprawl. The Act was institutionalised through the appointment of a Planning Commission and a Tribunal that resolves disputes relating to land development. Transport is recognised as an integral part of the land reform process. Municipal Systems Act (Act 32of 2000): The Act provides for the systems that should be implemented by municipalities in order to ensure sustainable municipal service delivery. The Act also provides for municipalities to formulate Integrated Development Plans (IDPs), which are required to guide overall municipal budgeting. In terms of the Act, only projects and programmes budgeted for in the IDP are to be implemented, including transport related projects and programmes. Theoretically, therefore, Integrated Transport Plans (ITPs) are some of the sector specific plans that are inputs to the IDPs. An important component of the IDPs is the Spatial Development Framework (SDF) that determines municipal spatial development direction. Transport usually has an important role in the SDFs in respect of spatial restructuring. In terms of the Act, public participation is a critical component of the IDPs, including the formulation of the SDFs. Municipal Property Rates Act (Act 6 of 2004): Municipal rates and taxes, especially in cities, provide the largest proportion of the income streams. The Act gives municipalities powers to derive revenue from property rates. In terms of the Act, property rates can be differentiated on the basis of spatial attributes that may include transport. The Act therefore enables the implementation of the transport revenue generation concept of value capturing. 100

101 Land use reform process and results The City of Johannesburg formulated a Spatial Development Framework as part of its Integrated Development Plan. Initially, through a consultative process, the Spatial Development Framework proposed to transform development densities as shown in Figure 4.1. The increased densities towards the western side of the City were notable. However, through a transport modelling process, it was shown that the proposed densities, in the manner initially put forward, would result in increased roadway congestion and would generally be unsustainable. Through a number of revisions, the Spatial Development Framework eventually aligned land use and public transport. In fact, public transport was recognised as a strong city restructuring element. Based on the City s transport model, the spatial nodes that produced and attracted a large number of trips were identified. These nodes formed the basis of a Strategic Public Transport Network shown in Figure 4.1. The Strategic Public Transport Network had as some its aims to allow direct public transport connections between the nodes and also focus the investment of limited resources of the City. Furthermore, the City devised a capital investment framework that used spatial attributes linked to the Strategic Public Transport Network to spatially allocate capital investments in the City, where budget requirements located in the vicinity of the network and its nodes attracted higher weights. Development densities along the Strategic Public Transport Network were revised to allow for increased densification, especially around the nodes. In addition to the City s Strategic Public Transport Network, the Gauteng provincial government initiated a high speed rail line project, namely Gautrain, whose stations are shown in Figure 3.5. Gautrain is an 80km long high speed rail line linking Johannesburg, Tshwane and Ekurhuleni, comprising 10 stations, five of which are located in the City of Johannesburg. The City of Johannesburg supported the project and ultimately aligned its planning processes to Gautrain, especially the areas around the proposed stations. The Spatial Development Framework was revised to allow for increased densification and land use mix around the Gautrain stations. Given the long term nature of the impact of land use changes, it is still early to quantify the resulting impact of the above interventions. However, early indications from discussions with City officials are that private developers and the City s budget are strongly aligning to the plans. 101

102 Figure 4.1: Initial density proposals in the City of Johannesburg Spatial Development Framework Figure 4.2: The City of Johannesburg Strategic Public Transport network and nodes Source: City of Johannesburg transport model (2006) 102

103 2. PUBLIC TRANSPORT REGULATORY REFORM Public transport services have always been seen as an essential public service and critical for the functioning of a region. This implies that the performance of public transport remains an inherent political risk. It is therefore in the interest of the political leadership of a region to ensure that public transport functions properly. In order to achieve this, regulation is often seen as a tool to ensure the functioning of public transport in line with the political agenda of the region. In the context of this report, public transport regulatory reforms include measures implemented to regulate public transport in respect of aspects such as safety, economics, access and transition management. Background on public transport regulatory reforms Public transport regulatory reform in South Africa, and in the City of Johannesburg, can be attributed to the 1996 White Paper on National Transport Policy, as well as subsequent legislation, notably the National Land Transport Transition Act (Act 22 of 2000), which was revised to National Land Transport Act (Act 5 of 2009). Among the important regulatory reforms introduced by the legislation, the following stand out: Anyone wishing to provide a public transport service needs to apply for permission to do so. An operating licence is not a right, and further, the provision of a public transport service as a business is not a right. The state therefore holds all the rights to an operating licence, and can decide to award or withdraw it. The supply of a public transport service must be needs driven. Therefore, the government holds the right to limit the number of public transport vehicles and routes. At a municipal level, transport management is governed by an Integrated Transport Plan. Any intervention that is not included in the Integrated Transport Plan is therefore unlawful. The Integrated Transport Plan itself is subject to an extensive public consultation process. The issuing of public transport operating licences needs to be in line with the Integrated Transport Plan. Competition between operators will be for the right to operate on the road, not on the road itself. Therefore, the modes of public transport need to be operated as an integrated system, as opposed to allowing competition between modes. The provision of public transport subsidies will be on the basis of competitive bidding. All pre existing subsidised contracts will be advertised for tender from prospective operators, and re advertised after the expiry of contracts. 103

104 Subsidised public transport services need to be identified and rationalised through the Integrated Transport Plan. Subsidised contracts will be on a routeby route basis as opposed to a radius basis. Minibus taxis will be transformed into a regulated formal mode of transport with legal status. Separation between operations and regulation for publicly owned public transport services. Public transport regulatory reform process The public transport regulatory reform process followed in South Africa, including the City of Johannesburg, can be summarised as follows: Model tender and contract document regulations were formulated to govern the awarding and management of subsidised public transport services. The City of Johannesburg formulated a subsidised public transport rationalisation plan as part of its Integrated Transport Plan based on which subsidised operations would be restructured. The dispute between Labour Unions, Government and incumbent Bus Operators resulted in the formulation of a Tri partite agreement, also called Heads of Agreement, which would manage the transition between the past subsidy regulatory environment and the proposed changes to the system. Also, a negotiated contracting regime was established in which publicly owned and subsidised bus services would be provided with a transition period to prepare for competitive tendering after the expiry of negotiated contracts. Operating licensing boards and public transport registrars were established in each province to manage the awarding of operating licences and the registration of legal public transport operators. For minibus taxis, a process referred to as the Be Legal campaign was initiated. It aimed to register all the existing operators onto a database. This was shortly followed by a minibus taxi democratisation and formalisation process, which aimed to facilitate the establishment of representative minibus taxi associations with democratically elected leadership. Both localised and regional minibus taxi associations were established in each province. It was also a requirement for minibus taxi operators to register as tax payers. A minibus taxi recapitalisation process was initiated with the aim of replacing old minibus taxis with vehicles complying with set minimum standards. Incumbent minibus taxi operators would be given an amount of R 50,000 to return their old vehicles for scrapping and would be provided with an opportunity to either exit the industry or purchase a new vehicle. Only operators who had undergone a legalisation process described above would benefit from the taxi recapitalisation process. 104

105 Municipalities were provided with budgets to formulate Integrated Transport Plans. The City of Johannesburg s Integrated Transport Plan was the first to be approved by Provincial and National governments. The City of Johannesburg s Metrobus operation was corporatised, where the public transport operations were managed by a City owned company, outside the transport regulatory function of the City. In the City of Johannesburg, a Strategic Public Transport Network was formulated as part of the Integrated Transport Plan. This network aimed tot rationalise public transport in the City and facilitate modal integration between minibus taxis, buses and rail services, in which the different modes have specific roles within the transport system in terms of modal economics. 105

106 D. IMPACT OF THE REFORMS The impact of the public transport regulatory reform on governance of public transport and the quality of public transport can be summarised as follows: In 2008, across the entire country, there were 113 subsidised bus contracts (excluding municipality owned operations), made up of 82 competitively tendered contracts and 31 interim contracts (old contracts). However, the subsidy allocation for tendered contracts was 34% of the whole bus subsidy budget. In Gauteng province, in which the City of Johannesburg is located, the total number of subsidised buses was 2,113, carrying out 133,898,725 passenger trips per annum at a subsidy budget of R 1.36 billion. Across the country, bus subsidies amounted to R billion, carrying out a total of 488,114,983 passenger trips with a fleet of 7,119 buses. The delays in the conversion of all contracts to competitively tendered contracts are often attributable to the implementation of the Head of Agreement. Democratically elected minibus taxi associations were formed. The associations assume the responsibility for the management of operators that make use of routes allocated to ranking facilities allocated to the association. Through a selfmonitoring mechanism, the associations are also able to identify and prevent operators who are not legally registered to operate. The associations also have internal organisational structures responsible for member discipline, training, liaison with authorities and overall administration. In the period 1999 to 2004, the taxi recapitalisation process and uncertainties relating to the future of the minibus taxis may have been responsible for the reduced rate of acquisition of minibuses, as shown in Figure 4.3. Figure 4.4 shows the vehicles before and after recapitalisation. Operators were particularly against the recapitalisation process and numerous protest marches were held. Some of the taxi operators that recapitalised the fleets express difficulties in repaying loans used to acquire their new vehicles. Moreover, operators frequently complain about the administrative backlogs in processing their operating licence applications, which often leads to confiscation of vehicles by law enforcement officials. 106

107 Figure 4.3: Evolution of registered minibus taxis in South Africa Source: Mccaul (1990) and Department of Transport (2009) Before minibus taxi recapitalisation After minibus taxi recapitalisation Figure 4.4: Photos indicating the state of minibus taxis before and after recapitalisation Despite efforts to integrate modes, different public transport modes continue to operate in isolation. In the City of Johannesburg, there are numerous examples where minibus taxis provide a feeder and distributor service to the rail lines, although passengers need to pay separately for each trip. The City of Johannesburg, through its capital expenditure programme and Integrated Transport Plan, identified minibus taxi ranking facilities that should be upgraded into formal facilities with minimum amenities to cater for the needs of minibus taxi associations and passengers. Figure 4.5 shows the types of facilities that were upgraded by the City, ranging from high capacity multi storey facilities to low capacity on street facilities. The decision to charge minibus taxi 107

108 associations for the use of ranking facilities was met with protest by minibus taxi associations, to the extent that the associations banned the use of the facilities, and in some cases law enforcement officials had to be dispatched to prevent the use of the facilities. The user fee dispute was ultimately resolved through the introduction of cab fees whereby the annual usage of ranking facilities would be paid upon renewing the operating licences annually. Off street multi storey minibus taxi ranks Off street surface access minibus taxi ranks On street minibus taxi ranks Figure 4.5: Minibus taxi facilities in the City of Johannesburg Over the years, the minibus taxis eroded the market share of buses, indicating that they became more accessible and acceptable to customers. As shown in Table 4.1, the City of Johannesburg, as in all the cities, experienced a net reduction in bus market share. Minibus taxis on the other hand experienced a net increase in market share. 108

109 Table 4.1: Market share for different public transport modes in 1996 and 2003 in South African cities 1996 Main Johannesburg Ethekwini Cape Ekurhuleni Tshwane Nelson All cities mode Town Mandela Train Bus Taxi Car Walking Other Public transport Public transport as % of all motorised trips % of all Train public transport Bus Taxi Number of work 841, , , , , ,000 3,740,000 trips 2003 Main mode Johannesburg Ethekwini Cape Ekurhuleni Tshwane Nelson All cities Town Mandela Train Bus Taxi Car Walking Other Public transport Public transport as % of all motorised trips % of all Train public transport Bus Taxi Number of work 1,232, ,000 1,021, , , ,000 4,664,000 trips Source: Lombard, Cameron, Mokonyama and Shaw (2007) 109

110 Minibus taxi operators have also been able to diversify their operations. As with the example shown in Figure 4.6, many use the vehicles for purposes other than commuter services, including tourism operations, ferrying of school children and special travel groups. Figure 4.6: Use of minibus taxis for purposes other than commuter services As shown in Figure 4.7, despite the minibus taxi recapitalisation process, the age of minibuses in the City of Johannesburg is on average higher than that of cars and buses. Figure 4.7 shows the age distributions (both actual and cumulative) for minibuses, buses and cars. 110

111 111

112 Figure 4.7: Age distribution of minibus taxis, buses and cars in the City of Johannesburg Source: Department of Transport (2009) In 2005, the Department of Labour prescribed minimum working conditions for minibus taxi drivers and minibus taxi rank staff, referred to as sectoral determination. In 2009 the minimum conditions were: o Monthly minimum salary of R 1, per month for drivers. o Monthly minimum salary of R 1, for administration workers. o Monthly minimum salary of R 1, for minibus taxi rank marshals. o Compulsory contribution to the unemployment insurance fund by both the operators and the salaried employees. Minibus taxi operations by nature are not scheduled, and en route, users hail them to indicate their desired destination using hand signals. In an effort to improve the usability of minibus taxis, especially for first time users, the City of Johannesburg designed a brochure with hand signals shown in Figure 4.8. Furthermore, the City designed a minibus taxi fare guide for users shown in Figure 4.9. Both these publications were made possible through a consultation with the minibus taxi operator associations. 112

113 Figure 4.8: City of Johannesburg minibus taxi user guide Figure 4.9: City of Johannesburg minibus taxi fare guide 113

114 Train services in Johannesburg and the rest of the Gauteng province were improved in respect of rolling stock refurbishment, the signalling system, and the introduction of limited stop express services. In order to entice the high income travelling market in the City of Johannesburg and the City of Tshwane, the highly specified business express services were introduced along selected corridors, one between Soweto and the Johannesburg city centre and the other one between the City of Tshwane and the City of Johannesburg. An example of business express infrastructure is shown in Figure 4.10, juxtaposed against parallel overcrowded rail services. The introduction of the business express services attracted criticism from civic associations on the basis of discriminating against providing good services for the poor. 114

115 Figure 4.10: Improved rail services in contrast but with notable backlogs The largest ever public transport intervention in the City of Johannesburg is the implementation of a Bus Rapid Transit (BRT) network (operations shown in Figure 3.5). The BRT network was designed on the back of the City s Strategic Public Transport Network shown in Figure 4.2. However, its implementation was phased. An integral part of the implementation of the BRT operations lobbying incumbent minibus taxi operators to support it. The City was successful in convincing some minibus taxi associations to support the BRT system on the condition that they will have a shareholding in the operations. Given the phased implementation of the BRT system, only a fraction of the minibus taxi 115

116 associations could participate in the first phase process, to the exclusion of many other associations. The situation in turn angered the excluded associations, exacerbated by the fears of associations on the impact of the BRT system on their businesses. Furthermore, a nationwide policy to implement the BRT system in all the South African cities attracted mass protests by minibus taxi associations, including violent protests. Despite these difficulties, the City of Johannesburg was successful in implementing its Phase 1A 25 km BRT system. The process leading to the successful implementation of the BRT system can be summarised as follows: o Consultation with minibus taxi associations on the Strategic Public Transport Network. o Changing the initial design concept of the Strategic Public Transport Network to BRT. o Identification of affected minibus taxi associations in the first phase of the project. o Signing of memorandum of understanding between the City and the affected minibus taxi associations on the implementation of the BRT. o Technical visit to Transmillenio system in Bogota and other public transport systems in South America involving the City and the affected minibus taxi associations in the City. o Establishment of a technical BRT steering committee involving the City and minibus taxi associations. Consultants were financed by the City to provide technical assistance to the minibus taxi associations on a day today basis, and help the associations with technical negotiations. o An initial BRT operating scheme was agreed upon by the City and the minibus taxi associations. o At the end of August 2009, the 25km BRT system began to operate. For a six month period following the official opening of the system, the operations were to be managed under a temporary legal arrangement to facilitate the finalisation of the negotiations between the City and affected minibus taxi associations. o Initial indications are that the 25km system transports 16,000 passengers per day. Financing for public transport, both capital and operations, increased to unprecedented levels. 116

117 Conclusions This report documents public transport reforms undertaken in the City of Johannesburg, as part of the European Union Seventh Framework Programmefunded project Trans Africa. The context in which public transport operates in South Africa, and in the City of Johannesburg, was provided. Furthermore, pertinent issues relating to the history of the City of Johannesburg that have an impact on public transport were discussed. The state of the public transport system in the City of Johannesburg was quantified and illustrated graphically and spatially in the form of maps. Public transport reforms in respect of land use transformation and public transport regulation, as well as their impact on public transport in the City, were investigated. Both successful and unsuccessful aspects of the reform were addressed. From a success perspective, it was shown that: It is essential to formalise the informal public transport sector. Without formalisation of the informal sector in the City of Johannesburg, many of the interventions would have been unsuccessful as they relied on organised representation from the sector. Political commitment is of fundamental importance. The City of Johannesburg as well as other spheres of government had a unified vision. Guiding policy at a national level is important to ensure sustainability of interventions. An integrated transport plan at a City level is required to guide systematic implementation of interventions. From a failure perspective, issues that surfaced were: Modal integration remains poor despite efforts to integrate modes through integrated transport planning. Among other things, lack of modal integration makes public transport relatively expensive. General unavailability of data to systematically monitor the transport system performance. These interventions had a significant role in improving professionalism in the minibus taxi industry. Furthermore, the government had an increased role in the design and monitoring of the public transport network and its operations, in order to be in line with plans. 117

118 For train services Customer satisfaction is over 70%. Crime incidents were reduced to serious crime incidents per 100,000 passenger trips. 88% of trains arrive on time. For minibus taxis Minibus taxi drivers had improved working conditions. Currently minibus taxi drivers earn more than 89% of the total population (including people not earning salaries), and earn more than 20% of people who earn a salary. The profitability of individual minibus taxi operators on a lucrative route can be as much as 20%. This is as a result of limiting the number of operators per route and allowing route associations to determine optimal operations. For buses The competitive tendering system requirements have increased the number of black entrepreneurs who operate subsidised bus services. The corporatisation of the City of Johannesburg Metrobus company has made the operational costs and revenue more transparent, making it easier to plan for cost reduction measures. For BRT The 25km corridor introduction of Euro IV BRT buses in the City of Johannesburg reduced at least 1,100 minibus taxi vehicle journeys in the corridor, as well as associated pollution and roadway congestion in some parts of the network. For City administration Following the conceptualisation of the BRT system and associated infrastructure, the year on year transport budget was increased by 32%. THE IMPLEMENTATION OF AMBITIOUS REFORMS BRINGS THE BENEFITS OF BETTER MOBILITY CHOICES TO A GREATER MAJORITY OF PEOPLE AND AN IMPROVEMENT IN TRANSPORT WORKERS CONDITIONS 118

119 LAGOS (NIGERIA) REFORMING THE PUBLIC TRANSPORT SYSTEM: IMPLEMENTATION OF A BUS RAPID TRANSIT A. INTRODUCTION The introduction of a Bus Rapid Transit scheme in Lagos (Nigeria) in 2008 was an unprecedented success, which places it as one of the best BRT networks in the world based on the level of the high patronage. Previously, public transport in the city was in the hands of unregulated small minibuses and midibuses, which operated to a haphazard schedule with fares varying according to demand levels. The implementation programme saw the conception to operation phase collapsed into a 15 month timeframe, and the system was delivered at a cost of USD 1.7 million per km, far less than the usual building costs of BRTs. It is now carrying around 200,000 people per day despite a capacity that does not allow it to meet all forecast demand. Given this achievement in a very short time, this experience might be relevant for the many in Africa seeking to develop BRTs. It was therefore necessary for the Trans Africa project to take steps to evaluate the achievements of this initiative and thereof recommend good practices for the sector in Africa. B. BACKGROUND With more than 15 million inhabitants, Lagos is one of the largest cities in the world, and its population is growing rapidly, at a rate of nearly 6% per annum. The poor condition of the road network and of the public transport system affects severely the development of the city and the working and living conditions of the population, particularly the most vulnerable. Rapid growth of the private vehicle fleet, combined with reliance on commercial vehicles and motorcycles (molues, danfo, taxis, okada etc.) has resulted in extreme traffic congestion throughout the city, and poor quality public transport. Before the Lagos Bus Rapid System (BRT) started up in March 2008, public transport in Lagos could best be described as unregulated, chaotic, inefficient, expensive, low quality and dangerous, both in terms of road traffic accidents and personal safety. There are about 2,600 km of roads in Lagos that are frequently congested, with over 1 million vehicles plying the roads on a daily basis. The density of bus public transport in Lagos is about 0.4 km/1000 population. A 1998 study shows that there were 222 vehicles per kilometre in Lagos, which by far outweighs the national average of just 11 vehicles per kilometre of road. 119

120 In order to provide consistent planning and efficient implementation of the policies and address some of the issues previously mentioned, the Lagos State government established, with the support of the World Bank, the Lagos Metropolitan Area Transport Authority (LAMATA) in 2003, the executive agency of the Lagos Urban Transport Project (LUTP). LAMATA has the overall role of coordinating the transport policies, programmes and actions of all transport related agencies and of implementing and managing public transport services in the Lagos metropolitan area. The BRT Lite scheme is one of the flagship programmes of LAMATA. C. DESCRIPTION OF THE REFORM In 2007, LAMATA was successful in passing the necessary regulation through the Lagos State House of Representatives to improve transportation in Metropolitan Lagos, such as the franchise regulation. It empowered LAMATA with the tendering of exclusive operating rights for specific transport services on defined routes or within geographical areas. In this framework, the pilot Bus Rapid Transport scheme called BRT Lite was designed and successfully implemented in March The franchise arrangement stipulates that it is the Lagos Government s responsibility to provide the operating infrastructures (corridors, terminals, shelters) in good condition, while each operator is responsible for the purchase of his own vehicles and for the profitability of their operation. Therefore LAMATA provided the following: exposure to best practices, through study tours to Bogota, Curitiba with all local stakeholders as well as creating synergies through various meetings, spending of over EUR 19 million on the building of infrastructure, regulation, route planning and operational methodology, capacity re engineering. The private operators were committed to the following: acquisition of their buses, recruitment and training of their staff, management of their operations. On the operational side, the Lagos Bus Rapid Transit (BRT) scheme is a high capacity bus system operating in segregated lanes, supported by quality infrastructure and management systems. The vision of Lagos BRT is: To have a modern public transport system at reasonable cost to the users and yet profitable to the operators, using quality high capacity buses which meet international service standards, environmentally friendly, operating on exclusive lanes, at less travelling time. The BRT Mission was stated as: Provision of a quality, accessible and affordable mass transport system for the residents of Lagos State which will subsequently: enable poverty reduction, 120

121 improve standards of living, act as a pioneer of private and public investment partnership in the transport sector in the state. The particularity of Lagos BRT explains why it is known as BRT Lite. It runs on about 60% exclusive lanes, and is mixed in with regular traffic in some locations. Stations are branded to match BRT bus livery and have level boarding and alighting designed to facilitate bus docking. Vehicles used for BRT operations are high capacity buses, easy to board, with wide door boarding and alighting. BRT buses run an all day service (16 hours each day). Ticketing is outsourced to appointed dealers. To encourage and promote BRT ridership by members of the public, an integrated marketing communications company was hired to help meet the following objectives: Promote public acceptance of the proposed BRT along Mile 12 to CMS; Build trust and socio economic acceptance among stakeholders in the transport system; Create awareness among stakeholders of the Lagos urban transport situation and the need for BRT; Create understanding of individual opportunities and responsibilities in the BRT system; Foster behavioural change among users of the transport system to achieve the conduct required for BRT system implementation; Massive use of all media to communicate on BRT operations. To achieve the above objectives, one of the methods used was TV/radio talk shows/discussion programmes promoting BRT. Two local television stations in Lagos currently broadcast a discussion programme under the banner BRT half hour. In this weekly programme, senior officials from LAMATA discuss key issues pertaining to the operations of the BRT scheme. The consultants also developed appropriate jingles and television commercials for campaigns on agreed corporate and thematic subjects. D. IMPACT OF THE REFORM 1. Impact on passenger mobility From a count carried out along the 22km BRT corridor, the entire flow of vehicles, including BRT buses and informal commercial buses, was estimated at around 30,000 vehicles in both directions of the corridor from 6.00 am to 8.00 pm on one day. An estimate of 700,000 passengers transported in both directions was also made. Among these vehicles, the BRT accounts for a flow of 2,500 vehicles counted in both directions, for an actual fleet of around 200 vehicles in daily operation, which corresponds to around six round trips per bus per day. The BRT carries around 200,000 passengers per day, that is an average of around 1,000 passengers transported per bus and per day. 121

122 It is estimated that the average travel time for a commercial vehicle to move along the whole corridor in one direction is 1h30min. Consequently, per day, each vehicle can only perform theoretically not more than six round trips during the same period of time from 6 am to 8 pm, and around 11 round trips if we extend the estimation to their full range time activity. From that data and an estimated flow of 25,000 commercial vehicles along the corridor during one day at present, it becomes clear that informal vehicles might number 2,000 2,500, the large majority being danfos. They carry in total 400, ,000 persons on average per day evaluated. Therefore, each vehicle of the informal category would move an average of people per day specifically on the corridor. After the introduction of the BRT system, a survey implemented on the corridor revealed that the number of collective transport vehicles (bus) dropped by 35% (and even by 40% if the BRT buses are not considered) for a number of collective transport users which globally remains stable. On the other hand, the flow of other vehicles (private cars and taxis along the corridor) did not evolve significantly from 2006 to 2008 as a result of the BRT implementation. We assume therefore that the respective fleets of these two categories did not actually evolve either. Then, inasmuch as buses (all types included) represent 25% of the total traffic on the corridor, we may conclude that the traffic was reduced by 10% as a consequence of the BRT introduction. Currently, that is to say one year after it was launched, the BRT system seems to have only captured the former informal transport users. Nevertheless, according to a survey carried out by LAMATA, 50% of private car users consider that the BRT is better than their private vehicle, as far as aspects of travel, safety, reliability, comfort and cost are concerned. The BRT may then attract a significant amount of people from other modes in the short and medium term, as much as its capacity allows. Bus flow - Maryland to Mile Year 2006 Year

123 Chart 1: Bus flow evolution from Maryland to Mile 12 Bus flow - Maryland to CMS Year 2006 Year 2008 Chart 2: Bus flow evolution from Maryland to CMS 2. Impact on passengers travelling conditions a) Reduction of travel time for users The average time to travel on the 22 km corridor per user before the introduction of the BRT was around 1h30, by the means of the informal commercial vehicles. Today, this average travel time on BRT buses decreased to 55 min, meaning a 1/3 reduction. Also, the average waiting times at stations before the BRT varied between 25 and 30 minutes, this has fallen to between 10 and 15 minutes with the BRT operations, and to five minutes at peak hours. Therefore, the overall travel time reduction including waiting times is of 35%. b) Reduction of travel cost for users The BRT introduction led to a significant transport fare reduction along the corridor. The BRT private operators apply a fare of EUR 0.62 for a trip along the whole corridor, while for the same trip before the implementation of the BRT, users used to pay EUR 1.34 on average through the informal carriers; that is more than double the BRT fare (a reduction of 53%). The BRT induced then considerable savings in transport cost for users. As a confirmation of these main benefits, a survey recently carried out amongst the BRT users disclosed that 90% of them agree that the BRT transport service is an actual improvement compared to their previous transport, in terms of safety, comfort, travel time and tariff aspects. 3. Impact on the fuel consumption of collective transport vehicles According to our previous estimations, there would be at present around 2,000 2,500 informal buses (danfos and molues) in activity on the main road adjacent to the BRT corridor, since its launch, along with around 200 BRT buses. Previously, the informal vehicles could be numbered at 3,500 4,000. These figures are actually 123

124 estimations drawn from surveys made by LAMATA before and after the BRT implementation. Some conversations on site allowed us to get an estimate of the average daily fuel consumption for each type of informal vehicle, which is 52 diesel litres per day for one danfo and 90 diesel litres per day for one molue. Assuming that 80% of the total number of informal commercial buses are danfos, the past fuel consumption before the BRT introduction might be valued at about 210,000 diesel litres per day for around 400,000 passengers carried daily, corresponding to a fuel consumption for the informal means of diesel litres per passenger transported per day (in another words 525 litres/1000 passengers transported). On the other hand, the BRT buses use an average of 15,840 diesel litres per day for around 200,000 passengers transported, that is diesel litres/passenger (80 litres/1000 passengers transported). Fuel consumption per passenger transported for informal transport is therefore 6 times higher than for BRT. In addition to the BRT buses, an estimated 2,000 2,500 informal vehicles would still be in operation along the corridor. According to the same estimation methods, they would use around 126,000 diesel litres per day. The total fuel consumption for both BRT and informal transport would presently be 141,840 diesel litres per day, that is a reduction of 1/3 or 69,000 litres/day. The introduction of the BRT has thus brought savings of 20.7 million litres in annual fuel consumption, representing about EUR 9.1 million. 4. Impact on the business environment From a survey covering a sample of 20 enterprises based along the BRT corridor, the following results were recorded: o 40% of the companies admitted that the introduction of the BRT was beneficial to the businesses and, among them, 35% actually quoted a profit increase. o 85% of the companies wished to stay close to the BRT corridor in case they had to relocate or branch out. 5. Impact on air pollution The indicator used here is first of all the CO2 emission rate. Surveys from LAMATA confirmed that there was a significant drop in the emission of CO2 along the corridor of around 25,000 tons annually, which represents around EUR 700,000 for a rate of EUR 30/carbon ton. Concerning the comparison with the private car with regard to pollution, the record of pollutants during an hour at peak times gives the following results: 124

125 Pollutants Private car (kg) BRT Bus (kg) Source: LAMATA CO 273,308 20,853 VHC 127, Nox 7, The ratio of private vehicles per BRT bus is about 35 private vehicles for each BRT bus. The average occupancy rate of the private car is 1.8. The BRT carries around 1,000 persons per bus per day. Thus the emissions for 1,000 persons carried are as follows: Pollutants Private car (kg/1,000p) BRT Bus (kg/1,000p) CO 3, VHC 1, Nox THE DEVELOPMENT OF ORGANISED AND EFFICIENT PUBLIC TRANSPORT IMPROVES QUALITY OF LIFE FOR CITIZENS THROUGH A SIGNIFICANT ENHANCEMENT OF THEIR MOBILITY AND BY REDUCING LOCAL AND GLOBAL POLLUTION 125

126 NAIROBI (KENYA) ENFORCEMENT OF SAFETY REGULATIONS FOR IMPROVED MOBILITY OF PEOPLE A. Introduction and background Background Nairobi City lies at the southern end of Kenya s agricultural heartland, 1.19 degrees south of the Equator and degrees and east of the Prime Meridian. Its altitude is between 1,600 and 1,850 metres above sea level. The climate is generally a temperate tropical climate, with cool evenings and mornings becoming distinctly cold during the rainy seasons. Long rains fall between April and June, while the short rains come in November and early December. Nairobi has a constant 12 hours of daylight all year round. Average daily temperatures range from 29 degrees Centigrade in the dry season to 24 degrees Centigrade during the rest of the year. 1. Historical Background and Development of Nairobi The City of Nairobi owes its birth and growth to the Kenya Uganda Railway. The railhead reached Nairobi in May 1899 en route to the present day Kisumu, which was then part of what is Uganda. Moving the railway headquarters from Mombasa to Nairobi resulted in the subsequent growth of Nairobi as a commercial and business hub of the then British East Africa protectorate (Situma 1992:167). By 1900, Nairobi had already become a large and flourishing settlement consisting mainly of railway buildings and separate areas for Europeans and Indians, the latter being mainly the labourers employed on the construction of the railway. There was practically no African settlement. 2. Spatial development of Nairobi city In 1907, Nairobi was made the capital of Kenya and later, in 1950, became a city. The Nairobi Municipal Committee Regulations of 1960 defined the initial boundaries for the then Nairobi town. Although there have not been any boundary changes since 1963, efforts are currently underway to create a formal larger planning entity, to be referred to as the Greater Nairobi Metropolitan Area. This NMA area covers approximately 3,000 square kilometres. Nairobi s functions have developed and expanded so that today it has achieved an overwhelming dominance in the political, social, cultural and economic life of the people of Kenya and the whole of the Eastern Africa region. Currently, the City hosts approximately three million people (Nairobi Metropolitan Development Ministry, 2009). The City s population is rapidly rising, and is projected 126

127 to reach approximately nine million persons by the year 2030, if the current growth and settlement patterns are maintained. Nairobi is also known for its contrasts. On the one hand, the city is the capital of Kenya, and downtown Nairobi boasts paved streets, shiny skyscrapers, and busy street life, at least during the regular business hours. The city also serves as a gateway to East Africa for both tourists and corporations with business interests in the region, as well as for international aid workers. There is a large United Nations campus in Nairobi, as well as major offices of many corporations, international NGOs, and international research organisations that have operations on the African continent. But the city is also known for poverty. Nairobi s informal settlements are estimated to house approximately more than one million of the city s residents (Kenya Census 1999, World Bank, 2006). The Kenya government estimates the poverty incidence in Nairobi is 44 percent, according to the Kenya Bureau of Statistics (2005). From its early times, emerging spatial patterns in Nairobi showed segregation between the Central Business District (CBD) together with European, Asian and African residential areas. By 1963, Africans, who formed a major part of the population, lived in the eastern part of Nairobi, while the Europeans and Asians lived in the western suburbs, which had access to better services. This position is reflected today not so much in terms of race, but rather in terms of incomes and population densities. The people living in the western suburbs are generally more affluent while the lower and middle income populations of Nairobi dominate the eastern suburbs. Nairobi displays a complex surface structure, making it difficult to decipher the city surface into distinct land uses. Inevitably, there are wide variations in population density reflecting different land utilisation patterns, within what Obudho and Aduwo (1988) see as six distinct and different land use divisions, namely: the Central Business District (CBD); Industrial Area; public and private open spaces; public land; residential areas; and undeveloped land. 127

128 Figure 1: Residential Building Density in Nairobi Source: KIPPRA 2004 B. CONTEXT: Public transport in Nairobi 1. Current traffic conditions in Nairobi Kenya, like other developing countries, has been urbanising fast, with 3.4% of its population residing in urban areas (Nairobi Metropolitan Growth Strategy). The City of Nairobi contributes to slightly more than 51% of the National Gross Domestic Product (GDP), with a turnover of approximately USD 3.6 billion (National Development Plan, 2008). Nairobi also accounts for the largest proportion of wage employment in the country, at 44.3 % (Econ. Survey, 2004). Its commercial and industrial zones employ over 250,000 labourers in the formal sector, and in excess of 950,000 wage earners in the informal sector. Traffic conditions currently in Nairobi are characterised by congested and unsafe roadways with unreliable performance. For a city of roughly four million inhabitants, Nairobi has few streets to serve traffic demand relative to cities of a similar size in countries with more motorised traffic. The city s physical street infrastructure consists primarily of paved roads emanating radially from the centre of the city to surrounding neighborhoods and the communities beyond. There are only a handful of roads linking the radial arteries outside of the central business district (CBD). Major intersections are typically managed with traffic circles (roundabouts) and 128

129 there are no signalised intersections outside of the CBD. Within the centre, at least 18 intersections are reportedly equipped with traffic signals (JICA 2006), although phase timing data was only available for 11 signals. The intersections where major arterials from the surrounding neighborhoods enter the CBD are typically controlled with large traffic circles, such as those along the Uhuru Highway, Ring Road and the Globe Roundabout. All other intersections are managed by nothing more than posted signals. The compact city centre is composed of a grid like network of streets. Since there are few streets, and most arterials are radial, vehicular trips between different neighborhoods must share limited paved street space, concentrating traffic onto the sparse network of major roads. This is particularly problematic in and around the CBD. The connections between the major arterials are few and far between, so there are usually no more than one or two reasonable routes for any origin destination pair. This means that traffic cannot be redistributed to use street infrastructure more efficiently. Due to the lack of ring roads, many peripheral trips must pass through the CBD, which compounds traffic congestion in the centre. Main transport providers include matatu (which is a minibus), whereas the railway plays a pivotal role in public transport. In addition, taxis and tuk tuk (motorised 3 wheel taxis and cycle taxis) are operated in the metropolitan area. Matatus are minibuses with 14 passenger capacity and are the main operators in the City of Nairobi, but they are closely rivalled by bus companies. These companies include the Citi Hoppa, Kenya Bus and Double M connection, which unlike matatus have been licensed to operate in some parts of the Central Business District of Nairobi. Buses and Matatus have designated routes, following the introduction of new regulations by the government on public transport. They also have designated stopping areas, but this is normally disregarded, mainly by Matatus. Matatus are popular among some Nairobi residents due to their flexible operation, as mentioned above. However, they are the main source of traffic jams and accidents because of the dangerous manner in which their drivers shuttle them. By the year 2004, the Matatus had about a 30% share of total vehicle traffic in Nairobi (JICA, 2006). The share has dropped drastically since the year 2004, when the government introduced road safety reforms in the public transport sector that led to the introduction of strict regulations on public transport operations, such as the enforcement of a maximum travel speed of 80 km/h. The reforms also saw the entry of more bus companies into the public transport business in Nairobi metropolitan area (NMA). The traffic demand for Nairobi has been increasing rapidly during the past decade, culminating in a shortage of road capacity to meet the drastic rising demand for road use against the urgent need to improve and increase public transport supply in the city. Inadequate road capacity, road structure and traffic management have led to heavy traffic congestion and traffic accidents (KIPPRA, 2009). Accordingly, in order to improve this situation, it is necessary to undertake a number of initiatives, which include the improvement of the public transport system, the 129

130 construction of the missing links and the improvement of road structures/facilities and traffic management capacity (JICA Study, 2006, KIPPRA Study, 2005). Figure 2: Land use and public transport layout Source: KIPPRA 2004 Of the nearly 4.8 million trips made each day in Nairobi in 2004, only 16% were made in private vehicles; 36% used public transport and 48% were made on foot. The vast majority (about 80%) of public transport trips in Nairobi are carried by Matatus. The remaining public transport trips are served by traditional bus routes, commuter rail line and other shuttle services, such as those run by schools. On the major corridors, Matatus make up anywhere from 15% to 50% of the vehicles on the road, making them a significant component of the vehicular traffic on Nairobi s road network. As Nairobi s population grew following Kenya s independence, and the need to travel to the city centre for work became more important, so did the need for public transport services. Matatus were not always a prominent mode in Nairobi, but they emerged to meet unmet demand, as the British established formal bus company Kenya Bus Service (KBS) deteriorated (Aligula et.al, 2005). The vehicles are typically Japanese made minibuses with about 14 seats. Although the operation of Matatus was illegal at first, they were allowed to legally compete with formal bus operations in 1973, as KBS gradually lost market share. The network of scheduled bus routes was gradually reduced as routes were abandoned and taken over by Matatus. The modal share of formal public bus services in Nairobi dropped from 36% of all trips in 1994 to 3.5% in 2004 (Aligula et. Al., 2005). It is out of this decay of formal public 130

131 transport that the informal sector, namely Matatus, has emerged to carry the bulk of public transport demand. Matatus and now bus companies play a critical role in Nairobi s transport system because they serve a need that is not met by other modes. The wealthiest residents of Nairobi tend to travel by private vehicle or taxi, and they are motivated in large part by concerns about safety and security of travelling by Matatu or walking. At the other end of the socio economic spectrum is the vast population who cannot afford to travel by any means other than walking. The largest slums lie within a few miles of the city centre, so residents travel on foot. Where the Matatu service becomes critically important is in connecting the city centre to outlying township communities. Where distances are too far to walk, Matatus provide the only affordable means of transport for many people. With such a major role in the regional transport mix, disruptions to Matatu operations result in significant and hard felt effects on the population at large. The significance of this is that policies affecting Matatu performance will have an effect on Matatu riders, and thus strategies to improve traffic congestion must consider the effects on these users of the road network, in addition to people who travel in private vehicles. Apart from the Matatus, we also have the railway, which plays a partial role in public transport. In addition we have buses, taxis, tuk tuks (motorised 3 wheel taxis) and cycle taxis, are also operated in the metropolitan area. By January 2004 when reforms were introduced, we had 175 routes (50 bus routes and 125 matatu routes) served by 12,376 public transportation modes, i.e. bus and matatu. Of this number, approximately 12,000 were matatus and 78% of them were small, 14 seater matatus, which are the main contributors to traffic congestion in Nairobi. Total daily passengers of bus and matatu were approximately 830,000. When the government introduced reforms in the public transport sector more private bus companies were registered, including Citi Hoppa, Double M Services and others which operate with less than two buses. Until 2004, the fares were usually higher during peak hours, late at night and during bad weather conditions. Nowadays, the fare sometimes is lower during peak hours due to the presence of many competitors. Fares however are still higher late at night and during bad weather. Matatus largely ignore official bus stops, especially during peak hours. Matatus and buses depart from the terminal only when fully occupied and generally do not drive non stop to the final destination. In off peak periods, drivers try to pick up as many passengers as possible on the way, which leads to erratic driving and stopping behaviour. During congested periods, traffic rules are often ignored (e.g. they use the road shoulders or lanes for opposing traffic to bypass traffic jams). 131

132 Figure 3: Transport network in Nairobi Source: KIPPRA

133 Figure 4: Traffic congestion on Nairobi streets 133

134 Figure 5: Morning and peak hour flows Source: KIPPRA

135 2. Modes of Transport Taxi Taxis operate in many cities and towns in the Nairobi Metropolitan Area. Nairobi has the biggest share in terms of taxi companies and fleet among these cities/towns in the Nairobi Metropolitan Area. There are no metered taxis in the Metropolitan Area. Basically, the minimum fare of a taxi is approximately Ksh. 300 for services within the Central Business District (CBD). Tuk tuk The tuk tuk, which is a 3 wheel taxi, has its terminal near the intersection of Tom Mboya Street and Latema Road Avenue and Kimathi Lane. This is the only tuk tuk terminal in the Nairobi Metropolitan Area. The advantage of the tuk tuk is the affordable fare for short distance passengers. However, its main disadvantage compared to taxis is speed and seating capacity. Currently, over 40 tuk tuks are operating at a fare of approximately Ksh 100, which is almost half the taxi fare. Cycle taxis Cycle taxis operate in small suburban towns of the NMA located in relatively flat terrain, such as Thika, Tala and Athi River. Drivers of cycle taxis have organised a drivers association themselves. Operating zones and the drivers of each zone have a designated number that is colour coded. Drivers can wait for passengers at their designated zone. They can take passengers to other zones but cannot pick up passengers at the drop off zone. Currently, we have over 1,000 cycle taxis operating under the above system in Thika. The minimum fare of a cycle taxi is only Ksh. 10, which does not make good business. Nevertheless, the cycle taxi business is one of the limited income resources for the young generation living in the suburbs, where economic conditions are often not favourable. Cycle taxis also operate in Tala, Kangundo and Athi River. Over 100 cycle taxis are operating in the Tala area, which has fairly rough terrains, while only some 10 cycle taxis are operating from Mombasa Road to the town centre. Railway System The railway system in Kenya is operated by the Kenya Railway Corporation (KR) through a concessionaire with Rift Valley Railways. For passenger traffic, by the year 2004, we had 27,000 intercity daily passengers and 350,000 monthly commuters in the Nairobi Metropolitan Area. There are four commuter lines operating in the Nairobi Metropolitan Area from the centre of Nairobi Central Station. These are two lines for Thika and Kahawa (northeast direction from Nairobi), one line for Limuru (northwest direction) and another line for Embakasi (south direction). 135

136 Figure 6: Greater Nairobi Road Network Source: KIPPRA Public Transport Service Providers The NMA public transport system, apart from some limited commuter rail operations, consists entirely of road based services, which are fully private. The system operates in a regulated environment, where the government is overwhelmed in its pursuit to control and influence operations, characterised by crucial elements such as route structure, operational practices, timetables or fares. The system consists mainly of bus companies and mini buses, which are privately owned. The term matatu system refers to the system of public transport provision that has existed in Nairobi for the last 25 years. It is not a technical definition, but rather a description of a set of practices regarding ownership, route structure, operational structure, control (or lack of it), interaction between various economic interests in the society and the existence and indirect tolerance of certain traffic behaviour. When the matatu system was legalised in 1973, the establishment of new routes was in principle free to encourage small enterprises to make a living, besides the big business represented by a dominant bus company. Soon, however, syndicates emerged, and today, most routes are controlled by loosely composed associations who act as self appointed owners of the route. The vehicles themselves are owned 136

137 by individual investors, normally not the drivers and co drivers conductors. Matatu owners are from various levels of society. However, the official cost for starting operations includes the cost of registration, Kshs. 3,000 of parking fees to the City Council and Kshs.100 as payment to the cooperative. The malpractice, characteristic of the matatu industry, was accurately and outspokenly documented in the Ministerial Committee Report of 1986, and this led to the recommendation to actively fight the syndicates and to dissolve the Matatu Vehicle Owners Association (MVOA) and the Matatu Association of Kenya (MAK). Some control is at present exercised by the Nairobi Traffic Management Committee, which handles applications from the matatu industry to use terminals. When considering these, the committee takes into account such factors as availability of land in the city centre and entry routes there in, and also whether the proposed route is likely to interfere with the existing ones. In this way, some establishment of control can be said to exist. 4. Public transport systems in the five towns in NMA The Nairobi Metropolitan Area comprises Nairobi City and other small towns along the radial trunk road from the centre of Nairobi. Currently, most of the traffic problems seem to be concentrated only within the centre of Nairobi. However, it is expected that transport measures will be established to cope with the future increase of traffic demand in accordance with the future urban growth in these towns. The selected towns are Thika, Limuru Ngong, Athi River and Kangundo. A brief introduction of each town is discussed below. (1) Thika Thika is located 40 km northeast from Nairobi. The town has been developed as a distribution centre for agricultural goods in the adjoining areas. Rapid urban development can be observed along Thika Road, which connects Nairobi and Thika. Thika is an integral town within the commuting area of Nairobi. The town's relatively flat terrain makes bike taxis popular among the residents. The existing bus/matatu terminal is located in the town centre, while the new terminal is proposed near the entrance to the town, due to the rapid increase of public transport demand within the town and adjoining areas. (2) Limuru Limuru is a small town in the hills and is located northwest from Nairobi (approximately 30km). It has bus/matatu terminals and a railway station, which is the northwest station of the Nairobi railway. The town has a busy market because it serves as the daily life centre of the adjoining areas and many matatus have their origin/destination here. The route structure of public transport, location of matatu stops and the access to the railway station are some of the major challenges related to transport issues in the town. (3) Ngong 137

138 Ngong is located 20 km from Nairobi city centre and has a rich green environment surrounding the Ngong Hill. The town has an approximate population of over 120,000, due to its close proximity to Nairobi and conducive living environment. The traffic jams at the entrance of the bus/matatu terminal, located along the trunk road, are the main transport issues in this town. an improvement plan for the bus/matatu terminal has been proposed by the Kajiado Municipality. (4) Athi River Athi River is developing largely due to the establishment of the cement factory, which is one of the biggest cement factories in the country. However, the size of the urbanised area is still small. There are many commuters to Nairobi because of its relatively close proximity to the city (25 km). Most of the pickup points of passengers are along Mombasa Road, which is one of the National Trunk Roads. All public transport routes in this town have their origin from the neighbouring towns like Kajiado because of its relatively small size. There is a railway line to the Athi River but just for freight. (5) Kangundo Kangundo is located 60 km east of Nairobi. This town had been developing slowly since the British colonial era. The vehicle traffic volume and number of commuters to Nairobi has increased due to the rapid urbanisation in the town and adjoining areas. The new bus/matatu terminal is already completed but it is not yet in service, because the access road to the terminal is not yet improved. The municipality intends to revitalise the towns and villages by rerouting the public transport, following the completion of the access road to the terminal. 5. Traffics statistics in NMA The analysis of the JICA (2006) & KIPPRA (2005) findings on traffic surveys indicated the following information on statistics regarding transport within the NMA. a. Total number of trips The total number of person trips per day in Nairobi is 4,815,457 and the internal trips within the Metropolitan Area number 4,754,027. The number of internal to external zone trips is 30,550 and the number of external to internal zone trips is 29,331, with an average number of trips per person of b. Trip purpose Trip composition by purpose is presented in the figure below, in which the to home (HOME) trips have a share of 47%, to work (WORK) trips have a relatively high share of 25%, to school (SCHOOL) trips have a share of 10% and other (OTHERS) trip purpose have a share of 19%. 138

139 Figure 7: Distribution of trip distances by mode on a percentage basis Source: KIPPRA c. Trip distribution The main trip flows concentrate into the central area from the west area (WESTLANDS) and the east areas (KASARANI and EMBAKASI). 139

140 d. Composition by travel mode Trip composition by travel mode shows that walking trips had the highest share of 47%, while trips by private vehicle (car and taxi) account for 15%. Matatu and bus, which may represent the public transport share, handle about 29% and 4% of all trips. Figure 9: Composition by travel mode 18.70% 46.50% 9.80% Others To School To work To Home 25.00% Source: JICA Study 2006 e. Traffic Volumes The highest traffic volumes were recorded in the northwest on the Uhuru Highway connecting Nairobi with Nakuru, with about 46,000 vehicles in both directions. This is followed by the road going north to Machakos, with a volume of about 31,000 vehicles. Other information obtained from this survey includes peak hour factors and occupancy rate for persons in each vehicle category. 140

141 f. Household income and vehicle ownership Household income in Nairobi City is estimated to be 1.81 times higher in 2025, as shown in Table 1. Past data have revealed that car ownership has increased proportionally to the population increase in Nairobi City. However the real household income increase on a constant price basis was almost nil. This means that the conventional elasticity method is not applicable for future car ownership forecasts. Consequently, the cross sectional analysis of car ownership by income level derived from the Person Trip Survey was applied for future car ownership forecast. Figure 10: Distribution of monthly household transport expenditures Source: KIPPRA ( 2004) Household car ownership correlates strongly with household income in this case. Based on the Person Trip Survey data, the average household car ownership rate in 2004 was 23.3%, while the average household income was Ksh. 32,600 per month. Forecasting the future household car ownership rate using the above function and the future household income indicates a steady increase in the car ownership rate, from 23.3% in 2004, to 31.1% in 2010, 41.3% in 20l5, and 49.2% in 2025, the target year of the Master Plan. 141

142 Table 1: Household car ownership rate Year 2004 Year 2010 Year 2015 Year 2025 GRDP per capita (Nairobi) (at 1982 constant prices) 19,040 (1.00) 22,080 (1.16) 25,590 (1.34) 34,390 (1.81) GRDP per household (Nairobi) (at 2004 constant prices) 32,600 (1.00) 37,805 (1.16) 43,515 (1.34) 53,882 (1.81) Population aged 5 & above 2,143,254 2,540,716 2,834,559 3,507,666 Number of households 889,300 1,054,239 1,176,166 1,455,463 Car ownership rate (per household) 23.3% 31.1% 41.3% 49.2% Number of private cars 207,339 (11.00) 327,366 (1.58) 486,207 (2.35) 716,138 (3.45) Source: JICA

143 Figure 11: Household car ownership by wealth levels in Nairobi Source: KIPPRA