Updated information of Fukushima Daiichi NPP. October Ki Sig Kang 1

Transcription

1 Updated information of Fukushima Daiichi NPP October Ki Sig Kang 1

2 Tsunami Phenomenon 2

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4 TEPCO ; Kashiwazaki Kariwa Nuclear Power Plants in Japan Tohoku EPC ; Higashidori J-Power EPDC ; Ohma Hokkaido EPC ; Tomari Hokuriku EPC ; Shika TEPCO ; Higashidori 3 1 Tohoku EPC ; Onagawa Japan Atomic Power Co. ; Tsuruga Kansai EPC ; Mihama Kansai EPC ; Ohi Kansai EPC ; Takahama Tohoku EPC ; Namie Odaka TEPCO ; Fukushima Daiichi TEPCO ; Fukushima Daini Chugoku EPC ; Shimane Japan Atomic Power Co. ; Tokai Daini Chugoku EPC ; Kaminoseki Chubu EPC ; Hamaoka Kyushu EPC ; Genkai Kyushu EPC ; Sendai Shikoku EPC ; Ikata Output scale Under 500MW Under 1,000MW Over 1,000MW :ABWR plants Operating Under construction Planning Number of Units Total Output (MWe) Operating 54 49,112 Under Construction 2 2,756 Planning 12 16,552 Total 68 68,420 4

5 Outline of Tokyo Electric Power Company (TEPCO) Service Areas of 10 Utilities in Japan TEPCO Service Area Equity Capital billion yen As of March 31, 2009 Gross Assets trillion yen As of March 31, 2009 Sales turnover billion yen FY2008 Generating Capacity 62.5 GW (Nuclear: 17.3 GW/17units) As of March 31, 2008 Electricity Sales 289 billion kwh FY2008 Maximum output 64.3 GW July 24, 2001 Number of Employees 38,030 As of March 31,

6 Earthquake and affected NPPs Higashidori Automatic Shutdown Power Tsunami height Epicentre Onagawa Units 1-3 Available GL>Tsuna mi Fukushima Daiichi Fukushima Daini Units 1-3, 4-6 Unis 1-4 SBO One offsite power and EDG GL(10-13m) < Tsunami (14-15m) GL(12m) < Tsunami (14-15m) Tokai Daini 1 Available GL>Tsuna mi 14 Units under operation were successfully shutdown after the earthquake occurred at 14:46 (05:46) of 11 March

7 Fukushima Daiichi NPP Unit Output(MW) Start Operation Manufacturers No.1 No.2 No.3 No.4 460, BWR-3, 400 FA ( 68T, UO2) 784, BWR-4, 548 FA ( 94T, UO2) 784, BWR-4, 548 FA ( 95T, MOX) 784, BWR-4, 548 FA ( 94T, UO2) 1971/3 1974/7 1976/3 1978/10 GE GE/Toshiba Toshiba Hitachi No /4 Toshiba No /10 GE/Toshiba Total Emergency Diesel Generators, each unit has 2 DG, but No.6 has three DG(one- air cooled) 7

8 BWR Design Features small primary containment housed in large building EL.290'-0" EL.265'-4" EL.234'-0" Spent Fuel Pood Drywell 195'-0" EL.218'-10" EL.200'-10" Wetwell (Torus) EL.165'-0" EL.165'-0" EL.134'-6" EL.110'-0" GRADE LEVEL EL.116'-0" EL.106'-6" EL.92'-6" EL.84'-0" Diesel Bldg 10m above SW 8

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10 Pier destroyed Storage vessels Power supply Water intake Gas and fuel storage Power supply Water intake Water intake Screens destroyed 11 NOV 2010 Barrier defense destroyed MAR 2011

11 Barrier defenses destroyed Gantry crane Power supply Water intake Gantry crane 11

12 Fukushima 1 Npp unit 1 ~

13 Hydrogen leak path 1 : Excessive leakage by over-pressure at CV flange/airlocks Hydrogen leak Path 2: Vent line SGTS R/B HVAC (vent line merge with adjacent units) Unit 1 Unit 3 SFP zone Unit 2 Unit 4 1F2 blowout panel opened by 1F3 blast, which released H 2 SFP zone FP escape path to the environment by R/B hydrogen explosion 13

14 4 3 14

15 Site Road Conditions 15

16 1.1 Km away from Unit 3 west gate Mar 17 07:00 : msv/h Mar 17 15:00 : msv/h after Helicopter operation Mar 17 23:00 : msv/h after fire car operation Mar 18 04:00 : msv/h after Helicopter operation 16

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18 Previous Accidents 18

19 March End State Configuration 19

20 April Chernobyl 4 Destroyed 20

21 Molten Fuel Elephant Foot 21

22 A lot of equipment will be placed inside the Arch, i.e. lifting cranes, mechanisms and other industrial facilities.. 22

23 Accident Analysis - Engineering Progress 23

24 Main Sequence of Fukushima Unit

25 Normal Cooling using Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (without electric power 8 hr) 25

26 March End State Configuration 26

27 AC Power Supply Air Cooling Air Cooling Redundancy Diversity Separation Air Cooling 27

28 Emergency DG Cooling 28

29 Collapsed Tower 29

30 Verification of the Design Tsunami Consideration of Tide The Design Tsunami Maximum water ascent Maximum water decent Tidal Conditions Tsunami Evaluation Method for Nuclear Power Stations in Japan, SAKAI Toshiaki- TEPCO Design High Water Level Maximum water ascent = 10 M Mean of high tides Safe Margin Site Ground Level Highest Level of Tsunami Safe Margin for Tsunami * Other Npps 13.2 M(DG-active) High Tide Maximum Height of Tsunami 30

31 Summary of SBO 1 Earthquake Grid Line Tsunami (estimated more than 10m) Turbine Building Reactor Building Air cooling D/G Seawater level Seawater Pump Elevation: about 10m 2 D/G Inoperable due to Tsunami flood 1+2 Loss of all AC power All Motion operated pumps including ECCS became inoperable 31

32 Standby Gas Treatment System Exhaust Pipe Unit 4 Unit 3 32

33 TEPCO Dilemma How can inject Sea Water without information of Reactor Level RPV Cooling Injection of Water to RPV through FW line: 6 or 7 m 3 /h Less than 5 bar RPV, PCV Pressure Stable condition Radiation Hydrogen 33

34 Challenges 34

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36 Activities in complete darkness due to lack of power sources In some places, radiation does level was very high. Work in complete darkness : In the service building. Many scattered objects were also on the floor. Temporary power supply : connect temporary batteries to recover Ins. Supervising : Check indicated values only with a flashing in complete darkness. Supervising : Supervising at a deputy supervisor s desk wearing a full face mask in complete darkness 36

37 Site work and Future plan 37

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39 Status of Units 1,2 and 3 of Fukushima Daiichi Npps (As of August1) Unit 1 : Cooling with water at a rate of app. 3.6 M 3 /h Stably remaining below 100 o C at present Unit 2 : Cooling with water at a rate of app. 3.8 M 3 /h Stably remaining below 130 o C at present Unit 3 : Cooling with water at a rate of app. 7.0 M 3 /h Stably remaining below 120 o C at present 39

40 Site Working Engineers 40

41 Site Working Engineers 41

42 Main Root Causes Design Basis against Natural Disaster Loss of external power sources and failure to secure power sources in emergency Loss of seawater system to release heat eventually or loss of heat release function Disability to supply water to spent fuel pool when normal water supply stopped. Management Issues Transition of the regular management system into emergency management Respective roles and responsibilities of both on-site and off-site Emergency Management organizations Management of external, including international, resources Effectiveness of communications, Media and public information techniques and requirements for the national, and international, community 42

43 Future Plans TEPCO Chairman s Announcement on 17 April The 1st Stage (3 months): Cool the reactors in a stable manner; and Prevent water with high levels of radioactivity from flowing out of the plant. The 2nd Stage (6 to 9 months): Achieve a cold shutdown of the reactors; and Reduce the total amount of radioactive water. Chief Cabinet Secretary approved the plan as sufficiently feasible. 43

44 Current Priorities Six Project Teams have been established under the Integrated Headquarters: 1) Radiation Shielding/Radioactive Materials Release Reduction 2) Defuelling /Fuel Transportation 3) Remote Monitoring/Sampling 4) Long Term Cooling Circuit Establishment 5) Contaminated Water Management 6) Environmental Impact evaluation TEPCO s current priorities are on 4) and 5), and on Power System Recovery, which is the basis of all activities. 44

45 Existing Capacity :34,600t Procure Tanks: 27,000t 45

46 After installation of reactor building cover(47 m x 42 m x height 54 m), Polyester unit 1,3 and 4 Launch detailed design of full fledged measures such as container. 46

47 Reactor building cover [SOURCE] p- com/release/betu11_e/images/ e17.pdf 47

48 Reference Material nisterial-safety Conference Programme. Declaration on Nuclear Safety, 20 June IAEA Expert Mission to Japan, Mission Report, 16 June Japanese Government Report to the Conference, 7 June Announcements.asp?ConfID=42466 Declaration, Presentations and summaries 48