Running the Gauntlet Force Protection for Tactical Penetration in MOUT

Transcription

1 Running the Gauntlet Force Protection for Tactical Penetration in MOUT Lieutenant Colonel Charles Knight Headquarters Training Command - Army ABSTRACT This paper argues that well protected AFV, the ability to impose and operate within obscuration and automation of some existing combat functions might synergistically reduce the risks of operating in complex terrain and enable a manouverist capability. These means offer capability that is potentially decisive at lower to mid threat levels and still potent in higher intensity combat. Complex terrain offers opportunities to the defender, the guerilla and the local whilst reducing many of the technical advantages enjoyed by sophisticated forces. There are many historical examples of complex terrain being exploited to inflict reverses on apparently superior opponents. To project forces into the uncertainties of complex terrain, particularly urban areas, has either required time and substantial forces to clear thoroughly and systematically or an acceptance of higher risk. AS can accept neither, airmobile options are not the answer, yet we must be able to operate there. There is ample evidence of the value of armour in complex terrain, despite the risks if it is mishandled. Current armour technologies offer the ability to protect AFV against the shoulder fired weapons that are the main threat there. Perversely, only recently have we seen this protection applied to IFV rather than tanks, yet this offers projection into complex terrain at acceptable risk. Smoke has been used to screen manouvre since ancient times. TI technology has reached a maturity where it is possible to equip a force so that it can see within a smoke screen. Various low-lethality delivery methods can be used to impose and maintain local obscuration. Together these capabilities provide a force with psychological and tactical advantage that applies across the spectrum of conflict.

2 We are getting tantalising glimpses of entirely new tactics that unmanned technologies will soon offer us. Right now however, robotic methods already proven in ordnance disposal, enhanced by artificial intelligence could allow us to automate vital high risk key activities such as reconnaissance and search, casevac and resupply as well as enhance the survivability of dismounted troops.

3 1. Introduction The future Regional battlefield is likely to be on complex terrain. An arc describing Australian strategic interest sweeps across jungle, mountain or swamps. In most areas, it is simply impossible to find scope for effective manouvre over land that is not complex. Much of the cultivated land is farmed in small plots and relatively densely populated. The recent trends in conflict involve warring civil populations and therefore cities and towns. Future combat is complex and the most complex part is Military Operations in Urban Terrain (MOUT). This paper will describe the need for reach into urban terrain considering risks, opportunities and the contradictions the Australian Army faces. It will then proceed to explain three concepts which applied together appear to offer a way forwards. 2. The Need for Reach 1.1 Urban Terrain as Risk Urban terrain tends to assist the defender, particularly if he seeks to engage in an aggressive attritional battle. It offers an obstacle, cover and concealment and channels the attacker. Often the defender gains advantages of interior lines of communication and an outnumbered and outgunned force may need quite disproportionate effort to dislodge. In 1945, Japanese naval forces defending Manila imposed 6,000 casualties and a months delay on the attacking Americans, despite the lack of training of the defenders and the resultant static character of the defences. In the Eastern European theatre, the turning point of the war was at Stalingrad when the German Army was drawn into an attritional battle. Urban terrain negated Wehrmacht manouverist operational capability, allowing qualitatively inferior forces to be concentrated to impose a devastating strategic defeat. Subsequently, as the Germans were increasingly on the defensive, it was when on complex terrain that they were able to defend most effectively.. The list of reverses and checks imposed on the Allies in the West is a list of towns, cities and forests, places such as Cherbourg, Cassino, Ortona, Arnhem and the Ardennes. On the Eastern front, complex terrain was often the basis of tactical defence,. The same patterns of terrain offsetting inferiority are repeated since WW2. The highest Israeli casualties of the 1967 War were inflicted in their recapture of Jerusalem. At Hue in 1968 Tet offensive, an infantry force of the North Vietnamese Army and the Vietcong were able to hold parts of the seized city for three weeks against intensive US and South Vietnamese

4 attempts to retake it. At Khorramshahr in 1980, irregular Iranian forces offered prolonged resistance to the Iraqis, at a cost that served to halt the latter s wider offensive. Helimobile forces are an obvious tactical option for urban penetration, yet for warfighting may be extremely vulnerable. The risk is to both the aircraft and the inserted force. During the 1987 Indian peacekeeping operation in Sri Lanka, the Indians attempted a coup de main seizure of the Tamil Tiger HQ at the University of Jaffna by insertion of a company of troops using Mi-8 helicopters. The three aircraft escaped from the ambush that the Tamil guerillas had set on the landing site, but the entire force was wiped outi. During the UN operations in Somalia in 1993, the US Delta Force and Rangers conducted an operation in Mogadishu to arrest and recover a warlord. Two helicopters were brought down by RPG- 7 fire and subsequently the inserted American ground force found itself fighting desperately to survive and extricate itself.ii During the Chechnya campaign of 1995, and again in 1999, the Russians learned to keep even their well armoured Hind helicopters clear of urban areas. a reverse. Another option is essential for urban reach. 1.2 Urban Terrain as Opportunity The potential for complex terrain assisting the defence as described so far is well understood. What is less well appreciated is the penalty paid by the defender for a defence on urban terrain that does not prevail. In the 1980 s Rowland at the Defence Operational Analysis Establishment (DOAE) in the UK conducted an analysis of urban combat that led to 'counter-intuitive' findings that in many respects favoured the attacker. In the 73 urban battles studied, the defender, for all his advantages, lost three to four times as many casualties as the attacker. iii An interesting further finding was that where the attacker had armour (tanks) and the defender had few or none, the urban casualty exchange ratio could shift as far as 25:1. In warfighting, there will probably still be opportunities to exploit surprise and weakness and employ helimobile forces. However, Australia has few aircraft or crews and cannot afford the level of risk involved if helicopter insertion is our only method of urban reach. The risk is then high because of the predictability of the helicopter option, and the lack of alternative backup if an aviation insertion sustains

5 This might be explained by the observation that urban attacker will generally seek to isolate first the urban area itself, then parts of the area, then individual buildings. Concurrently the defender will tend to fight from known prepared positions rather than accept the exposure and uncertainty of redeployment. The isolating effect is enhanced by the ability of armour to move to positions that impose isolation. The consequence is that defenders are separated and killed or captured piecemeal. The implication is that urban terrain might be a battle ground of advantage, if existing vulnerabilities are overcome. 1.3 Contradictions for Australia Current MOUT Current US concepts for MOUT warfighting call for systematic clearing and securing of ground travelled. For an urban area of any size, this will inevitably be slow. As an illustration, a US Army After Next wargame postulated the thorough clearance of a section of the South Korean capital, Seoul. Allowing for 10 seconds to clear a room and with the assets of a division, clearance was calculated at many months before even considering enemy action. Combat of this nature is attritional, requires sheer numbers and is slow AS Imperatives In contradiction to the traditional MOUT concepts, Australian circumstances demand results with low numbers, quickly and minimal casualties. The Australian Ready Deployment Force is able to project forces of the order of an Infantry Brigade, therefore two battalions of infantry is a realistic force for urban tasks. This is probably sufficient only to clear in detail and secure either a small town or a single axis a few kilometers long across a large city. The detailed combat clearance of large urban areas using a WW2 approach is unachievable by standing Australian forces on numbers grounds alone. In likely offshore scenarios, without National survival at stake, heavy or regular casualties are likely to be politically unendurable and there will be an increasing pressure for swift results once warfighting commences Risks The contradiction between MOUT realities and Australian constraints is stark and evident to the thoughtful observer. It is highly likely that any adversary would seek to exploit this and draw Australians into urban terrain, where the benefits of technological advantage are reduced and firepower is inhibited Conclusion no no-go Whilst we cannot mount a large detailed clearance, we cannot afford to allow urban areas to be 'no go', and must have the means to reach into them to selectively strike, secure key points or recover elements. These imperatives and the tiny size of the Army demand manouverist solutions. Manouvre by air and sea offer operational options but at

6 the tactical level, manouverist capability on complex terrain is essential. This paper suggests three concepts to achieve urban reach: fighting protected by armoured vehicles, fighting obscured by smoke and fighting by proxy using robotics. 2. Fight Protected Armour as an Enabler Evidence of the value of armour on urban terrain comes from a range of sources. Mirroring some of the findings of the work of Rowland at DOAE in the UK, described above, McLaurin et al in their analysis of 22 modern urban battles iv found that 'tanks and armoured personnel carriers have (also) proven vital to the attacker inside the city, as long as they were protected by infantry". An earlier study by Campbellv of the task organisation used in 18 WW2 battles hypothesized a proper relationship of infantry, armour engineers and artillery. In this work, he demonstrates the emerging recognition of the need for an all arms team. Examples note the German change at Stalingrad from previous doctrine of not bringing tanks into urban areas. Similarly, the Soviets reaching the same doctrinal conclusions that are only reinforced when deviations occur. At the battle for Poznan in 1945, the Soviets had to regroup after the first assault without armour failed. In the Cold War period, the American, German and Soviet armies doctrine echoed their WW2 experience, they prescribed a combined arms force for urban tasks. The Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982 provides a more recent validation of that approach. The PLO defenders were only lightly equipped and had limited tactical ability, however they were fighting on familiar and prepared urban terrain. As already discussed, this very situation has frequently imposed serious reverses on superior attacking forces. The Israelis first isolated towns, then advanced tanks, armoured engineers and infantry on key axes. Any resistance was met with air strikes and direct fire from self propelled guns and tanks before the infantry and bulldozers moved forwards to clear, screened by the dust and smoke of the bombardment. Whilst the reluctance of the Israelis to advance into Beirut city itself indicates limitations, their tactics were extremely successful in avoiding casualties. In their attack on the city of Sidon, they suffered no fatalities. From this, we can conclude that armour is vital to offensive operations in complex terrain generally and urban areas in particular, but must be protected against infantry anti-armour weapons. In most of the world the emphasis has been on protection by infantry and fire support. Interestingly, those who have recent experience of urban combat, the Russians and the Israelis, are looking to the vehicles themselves for greater protection. 2.2 Armour for Manouvre Another aspect of the urban battle less well recognised is the benefits of the

7 apparently high-risk tactic of mounted armoured assault. The Commonwealth and US approach to urban attack has generally been to conduct a methodical and thorough clearance on one or more axes, securing all ground moved over and accepting of the time penalty involved. In contrast, the Soviets during WW2 identified the possible benefits of assaulting a disorganised urban defence with tanks alone. This was put into practice by 'forward detachments' during the advance from the Vistula to the Oder. During the Cold War period, an endorsed Soviet tacticvi was a thrust by mechanised columns to bounce urban objectives directly. In the West these tactics were (and in many cases still are) viewed as inherently suicidal. In 1985, as part of the research mentioned above, the British Army in Berlin ran a series of interactive instrumented urban field trials. These were known as the 'Kings Ride' trials and involved opposing laser-simulatorequipped forces with infantry, APC's and armour conducting a series of attacks and defences employing both UK and Soviet doctrine. One of the unexpected findings of the trial was that the then current British deliberate attack tactics sometimes failed, whereas more rapid, Soviet tactics did not seem to. Casualty levels were similar for both tactics. In the words of the trial officer Maj Lynham; "This came as a surprise to all. It had been generally held that a British approach, employing slow methodical methods involving (outwardly) less risk, would lead to success in slower time but with fewer casualties. In the event, however, conducting staff and observers noted that it tended to lead to failure to maintain the momentum and cohesion of the attack."vii 2.3 Risks To Armour There are many historical examples of armoured forces sustaining heavy casualties in urban areas. In the Soviet final thrust on Berlin, the 2nd Guards Tank Army attacked in massed formations in contravention of doctrine and lost 64% of its vehicles to the German defenders Panzerfaust.viii In Suez city in 1973 an Egyptian force of about two battalions ambushed the Israeli 217 th Armoured Brigade in the streets, who had attempted a mounted assault without regrouping for an allarms operation. The Israelis lost 28 vehicles and 88 killed. In Grozny in 1995, the Russian 131 st Malikop Bde drove into the central city, not grouped for combat, nor in radio communication nor prepared for heavy resistance. They also mistakenly thought that paratroops had secured the tops of buildings along the route. The subsequent Chechen ambushes destroyed 100 out of 120 BMP s and 20 of 26 tanks. From this kind of example, the conclusion that is often drawn is that armour is inherently and unacceptably vulnerable in urban areas. A slightly different perspective might be that most armour is inherently vulnerable to unsuppressed infantry anti armour weapons, and an all arms force is required to achieve supression. During the 1973 War, Israeli armour

8 without infantry or artillery support counter-attacked Egyptian infantry, who had crossed the Suez canal and dug in on open ground. The resulting first major defeat of the Israeli armoured corps was widely ascribed to the Sagger missile system, overlooking the role of shorter-range systems, especially the RPG-7. The point is that armour is also technically vulnerable on open terrain, but that complex terrain concentrates this vulnerability in time and space. The primary warfighting threat to armour on complex terrain has, since 1942, been hand held infantry anti armour weapons with hollow-charge warheads. The RPG-7 family of weapons has been by far the most widely used system. The secondary threat has been anti tank mines, which can be efficiently deployed on constricted routes, although concealment is more difficult in paved urban areas. There is no indication that the threat will soon change substantially, although weapons with more advanced warheads might be quickly deployed. Off route mines conceled beside roads and which launch a warhead or explosively formed fragment will present an increasing detection problem. 2.4 Unsuitability of AFV Protection for MOUT Most armoured vehicles are designed with manouvre and open spaces in mind. They are not suitably protected for combat in close terrain against the weapons they will face there. When the first tanks appeared in WW1, they were all intended to protect against small arms fire and shell splinters. As anti-armour weapons were fielded, designers began the search for balance between the competing design requirements of mobility, firepower and protection that continues to this day. Until well into WW2, defeat of the increasing armoured protection was by ballistic means (or hand placed charges). The physics of firing high velocity projectiles to achieve this dictated that an effective infantry anti armour weapon was a crew served gun of increasing size and decreasing mobility. Well-concealed guns could wreak havoc on attacking armour in urban areas, but their siting was constrained The advent of the hollow charge warhead changed this. An infantryman armed with a Panzerfaust, PIAT or Bazooka could, at close range, defeat any tank. The cover of urban terrain provided the opportunity to get close to do so. The Germans fielded tanks with additional stand off armour plates to reduce the threat, and experimented with very heavy tanks, but the near impunity of the tank to dismounted infantry fire was over for many years. The early development of infantry carrying armoured vehicles took a path that would reduce their protection and therefore utility for urban operations. In WW, personnel carrying variants of tanks (Mk V** and Mk IX tanks) were developed, but between the wars the notion of equivalent protective mobility vanished. During WW2, with the exception of the Anglo-Canadian Kangaroo or turretless

9 Sherman tank, armoured personnel carriers were brought into service as lightly armoured battle taxis, not assault vehicles. This trend continued after the war with the M113 series as well as the BTR wheeled AFV in the USSR, although the Soviets planned a more aggressive employment under massive artillery superiority. The BMP series of infantry fighting vehicles, designed for the nuclear battlefield was similarly lightly armoured. Its Western equivalents, the Marder and the Bradley are better protected, but still not sufficient to protect against the threat. This vulnerability was demonstrated during Operation Desert Storm on 27 th Feb 91 when an RPG-7 round penetrated a Bradley. The irony is that whilst better protected tanks can at least theoretically stand off outside of the anti armour range to engage, the infantry, whose role is to close with the enemy, have the less protected vehicles. 2.5 New Developments A challenge to the supremacy of the RPG-7 was heralded with the British development of Chobham armour, a heavy complex armour for their Challenger tank. The Americans and Europeans followed suit, yet still only for tanks. Outside of Israel, the only APC with close country levels of protection was the British Warrior APC in its hastily uparmoured Bosnia/Gulf War guise Israel The Israeli army, with its bitter experience of a series of wars has taken a different approach to armoured vehicle development, placing a premium on the preservation of the lives of its soldiers. The indigenous Merkava main battle tank has an unconventional front-engined layout, low silhouette and advanced armour design for increased survivability. This has been demonstrated on the Lebanese battlefield with one vehicle sustaining 20 warhead strikes without penetration of the crew compartmentix. The Merkava has other survivability features such as a 60mm mortar and the ability to carry and dismount through a rear door, a small squad of infantry. It has been described as a Combined Arms Tank. The vulnerability of the M113 was made clear during the 1973 war at Buq atta when most of the vehicles of the Israeli 7 th Recon Company attempting to assault a Syrian commando position were knocked out. The lesson was driven home during the 1982 invasion of Lebanon when the lesser protection levels of the infantry and engineers mounted in M113 compared to the tanks became evident. A major development programme took two strands. One was to improve the protection levels of the large fleet of M113 s in service; the other was to convert tanks into personnel carriers. Work in hand led to a passive armour suite for M113 known as Toga, which provided greatly improved ballistic protection. Subsequently a light reactive armour system was developed which will protect against RPG-7 type threats from the front and sides.

10 The first tank based personnel carrier known as the Nakpadon was derived from the Centurion. The turret was removed, the fighting compartment extended upwards and advanced armour installed, very noticeably on the track skirts where the thickness of the protection is evident. The result is a 55 tonne vehicle that is protected to heavy tank levels and which appears to have been refined to develop the Puma armoured engineer vehicle. The other tank based personnel carrier is the Achzarit. This uses an obsolete T55 tank from which the turret is removed and the old engine replaced with a more compact one, offset to the left. This allows the installation of a rear access passageway and back hatch to the right of the engine. 14 tonnes of advanced composite armour is then added to the hull, giving an all up weight of 44 tonnes for a vehicle that can carry 10 troops with near immunity from the weapons of enemy infantry. It is a true close assault vehicle Russia In response to the losses of BMP vehicles in Chechnya in 1995 the Russians have also developed a close assault vehicle, the BTR-T. This, like the Achzarit, is based on the T55 tank, in this case with the turret removed and a 30mm cannon installed. Troop capacity is five men, who must dismount from roof hatches. 2.6 Description of Concept Close Assault Vehicle Well protected armoured vehicles that have a good chance of withstanding the main urban threats may provide one means of enabling reach into urban areas. Total invulnerability is neither possible nor sought. What is necessary is a level of close terrain survivability, equivalent to that of existing vehicles on open terrain. For this to be assured it must be achieved through physical protection means. Such a vehicle will have increased close range survivability generally, which will be valuable for all complex terrain. It will be a close assault vehicle, able to deliver troops through the zone of enemy infantry and artillery fire. Few armoured vehicles and none in Australian service qualify. The primary warfighting purpose of the close assault vehicle is to move troops rapidly across unsecured terrain to a location where they deliver effects dismounted. Depending on the situation, this might be a rapid move of many kilometres or merely across a street. Occupants should be able to fight mounted, preferably from under armour. Characteristics that meet this requirement will exceed those required for peace support operations. All recent MOUT experience and the inventories of the armed forces of the region suggest that the RPG-7 will continue to be the greatest threat to armoured vehicles operating on close terrain. The requirement is therefore firstly protection against penetration by shoulder fired anti armour weapons, specifically and secondly, occupant survivability from track attack anti armour mines. Protection must extend around both sides and the front and up or down for at least 30%. Ideally it

11 should extend over the upper surfaces and rear of the vehicle. The necessary level of hollow charge warhead defeat is likely to provide a significant level of ballistic protection also. (Further details of the defeat of hollow charge warheads are at Annex A.) It is desirable that the vehicle have provision for rear debussing, however for MOUT warfighting purposes alternative protected exit may be possible, using sheilds to dismount off vehicle hulls sideways into buildings, or conceivably through a front hatch screened behind a dozer blade. The vehicle should ideally be capable of fitment with at least a simple dozer blade and must be reinforced to withstand deliberate breaching collision with light buildings. Ideally close protection weapons should be fitted that can be fired from under armour. Further refinements for a close assault vehicle for urban terrain would be means of delivering troops into upper levels and an extendable boom with CCTV. The requirement for this vehicle is to redeploy any dismounted soldiers for specific tasks in a high threat environment. This can be met by a relatively small fleet of vehicles that provide support to all units of a formation rather than permanent assignment to the lifted unit. 2.7 Options A simple method of achieving the necessary levels of survivability would appear to be to fit active protection devices to the upgraded M113. These fire disruptive charges at incoming warheads. Little is known about performance of these new systems, which are principally being developed in Russia. Given the unfortunate track record of Russian automatic radar controlled self defence systems such as the Shilka anti aircraft system, it seems unlikely that active systems would give acceptable assurance of protection without unacceptable risks to crew and non-combatants. An equally simple, but mid to long term solution would be to procure a specialised vehicle such as the Achzarit. This seems unlikely to occur unless the vehicle was also to meet a wider requirement such as replacement of the Armoured Engineer/Recovery Vehicle. Should Australia follow the development path towards a standard wheeled armoured vehicle, it will still need a tracked platform for high traction tasks. Alternatively, should a tracked standard vehicle be specified, an optional modular protection version would be feasible. For combat in complex terrain a heavy combined arms tank such as the Merkava would be an ideal base vehicle. In the foreseeable future any close assault vehicle would need to be based on the existing fleets. This appears to give two options. Reactive armour could be procured for part of the M113 fleet. Reactive armour is the only current means of giving RPG-7 protection within weight limits. Both Rafael of Israel and SNPE of France offer bolt on solutions that will achieve this, with the former able to

12 provide protection against top attack. This would involve in excess of 2.2 tonnes of additional weight and is therefore probably not compatible with the current upgrade, nor possibly the fitment of a turret. The reactive armour fitted vehicle would be capable of fulfiling the urban close assault role, retain airportability (with preparatation), be relatively agile in narrow streets and narrow enough to achieve clean breaches between vertical supports when ramming into light buldings. Explosive reactive armour poses some hazard to nearby dismounted troops if struck by explosive rounds, and the vehicle would be vulnerable to repeated strikes. The alternative solution is to adapt part of the Leopard tank fleet (or second hand vehicles bought for the purpose) along the lines of the Israeli conversions. This would involve removing the turret, developing a crew compartment, installing machine gun mounts and fitting passive supplementary armour. A front hatch behind a dozer blade is probably feasible. Such a solution would provide the basis of both a close assault vehicle and a combat engineer vehicle. The tank based vehicle would be very well protected against the spectrum of anti armour weapons, giving utility on all terrain. Durable 360 degree and partial overhead protection is possible. This vehicles manouvre would however be constricted in narrow streets. The close assault vehicle concept appears to offer a means of achieving sufficient mobility at an acceptable risk to enable manouverist options. The obscuration concept would assist. 3. Fight Obscured 3.1 Obscurant Use Smoke has been used throughout warfare to screen movement and disorientate the enemy. In WW1 smoke was used to screen infantry attacks and Naval manouvre, particularly during the battle of Jutland. During WW2 both allies and axis forces used smoke, especially to screen against air attacks. The Germans and Russians fired smoke onto objectives to screen their assault from depth and flank positions and the former developed weapons principally for this task. During the Cold War period, the Soviets developed the combination of artillery and tank exhaust injector smoke as the chief means of protecting their armoured formations against anti tank missiles. Activity within smoke remained a confused and disorienting prospect and this effect is also exploited by the use of irritant smokes to maintain public order. 3.2 TI and Smoke Developments In a dual response to a need to fight at night and to Soviet obscurant tactics the western armies developed and fielded thermal vision technology for anti armour weapons during the 1980 s. These cooled systems, able to view in the 9-13 micron band, were able to view through most smokes. Advances since have produced uncooled systems small

13 and light enough to fit individual weapons. These systems hold out the prospect of revolutionizing close combat. In a battlefield kingdom of the blind obscured by smoke, the one eyed man will be king! 3.3 Description of Concept A technologically superior force that is able to obscure a selected area of the battlefield and deploy thermal imagerequipped troops there will gain an local asymetric advantage. Even if both forces have access to imaging equipment, advantage will accrue to the side with the operational initiative, since the latter can concentrate capability at the point of decision. The concept suits the small well equipped force and is a counter to the usual advantage of the unsophisticated urban enemy as well as being an effective aid to countering threats concealed amongst the civil population Effect Requirements The effect required is to be able to rapidly and fully obscure sections of the urban battlefield, and maintain that condition until manouvre is completed. Obscurants and delivery systems used should pose little threat to civilians, own troops and, for warfighting, not breach chemical warfare conventions. The structures of urban areas assist in defining zones to be obscured and reduce the effects of ambient winds, however they can also cause local dispersion and concentration effects which may lead to exposure or asphyxiating atmospheres. Conventional indirect and direct fire methods of smoke delivery are inapropriate, because of the ballistic hazards from smoke carrier or base ejection shells and the fire hazards from phosphorous ammunition. The commonly used hexacloroethane filling poses an inhalation hazard also. Fog oil, Polyethelyne Glycol and Titanium Dioxide are preferred obscurants for reduced inhalation hazard and new materials such as micro fibre and brass flakes are under development to mask thermal viewers. New pyrotechnic ammunition might be designed for obscurant delivery, by mortars, or simple launchers, using a light projectile that is fitted with a safety drogue chute. This would dispense many small burning pellets that are bound by thermal insulation which would reduce fire hazard. Dispersing smoke from vehicles or smoke pots allows good control and localisation of effects but does not assure effects forwards or upwind of the force. Unmanned vehicles probably provide the simplest supplementation method. The wing tank dispenser technology, developed for fighter aircraft to simulate poison gas attack could probably be adapted to lay almost instant obscurant clouds by flying single low passes at high speed Operating in smoke will pose considerable challenges, particularly for dismounted soldiers. Fields of view are still much narrower than natural vision and using a weapon mounted viewer

14 whilst moving is quite difficult. To accommodate this limitation, procedures are likely to require soldiers deployed forwards to be coverd by another behind who is in radio communication and can overwatch. The use of obscurants at night will heighten psychological advantage and reduce unintended exposure due to cloud gaps. As thermal imaging eqipment becomes more wideley available, smoke tactics might evolve to surround normal smoke with thermal imager opaque smoke. Fighting obscured appears to offer an assymetric advantage. Even a small group of soldiers could feasibly move across a hostile major city if obscuration could be maintained. The concept is particularly attractive in current strategic circumstances where Australia may require a potent intervention option. A relatively small investment that equipped a company/squadron sized organisation to fight obscured could only be countered by much wider investment. 4. Fight by Proxy 4.1 Robots as enablers The first military use of robotics was probably by the Germans in WW2. The Goliath, a small vehicle shaped like an early British tank, controlled by a 400m cable and packed with 85Kg of explosives was used for assault demolition tasks. In the 1970 s, the British began using small tracked robots with actuated devices for bomb disposal purposes. Similar technology was then used to produce remote controlled mechanical mine clearing vehicles such as the US Army Panther. This is based on a M60 tank with the turret removed that is fitted with mine rollers and is radio controlled from a safe distance. 4.2 New Developments Technological advances in processing power, artificial intelligence and the decrease in size and cost of electronic equipment have opened up a whole new field of military robotics. The US military in particular are developing a range of ground and air vehicles of decreasing size and increasing capability. There are a number of programmes specifically focussed on the MOUT requirements. The MPRS (man portable robot system) provides small low cost model tank sized devices with cameras for inspection of underground systems. Teleoperated vehicle control has now been extended to a wide range of military vehicles and mounted weapons systems whilst autonomous systems are being fielded for recconnaisance purposes. The REMOTEC ANDROS is similar to earlier bomb disposal machines but specifically designed for hazardous building search and clearance tasks and is capable of unlocking a door with a key. 4.3 Description of Concept There are almost unlimited tasks for robotic devices in MOUT. Most have the potential to reduce vulneratbilitiy and so increase reach. The difficulty is determining where to invest. It is logical to seek multiple roles, including those for other terrain, and address

15 greatest risks first. Historically the greatest operational or tactical risk has been from the major ambush. This suggests that a platform able to prove routes and threaten ambushing forces with being cut off or destroyed would be a high payoff system. Similarly, at the minor tactical level the the greatest risk occurs when teams are exposed on the street outside objectives. A platform that carries out tasks requiring such exposure would also be high payoff. The procurement of teleoperating systems for the M113 vehicle and weapons would appear to offer a robot with combat power, without the investment in a new platform. An added tactical and logistic advantage is the ability to interchange unmanned and manned vehicles. This would be a relatively low cost exercise using mature technology proven in mine clearing. The robot M113 vehicle could be expected to be more durable than many specialist devices, and with extra armour on the engine compartment would probably be very difficult to diable. The running costs would probably be larger than dedicated systems. The procurement of a version of the ECHIDNA bomb disposal robot would have similar commonality and proven technology advantages. The primary requirements are to be able to mount a weapon systems, including the Minimi LSW and grenade launcher, place external breaching charges and deploy smoke. It is desirable for the system also to be able to inspect through windows and to manouvre within buildings. A small number of systems of this kind would add capability on all complex terrain and act as a force multiplier for small elements. 5. Conclusion Each of the above concepts: fighting protected, fighting obscured and fighting by proxy offers increased reach. If the concepts are integrated synergies result. Armour gains increased psychological shock effect within obscuration whilst vehicles and dismounting troops are further protected. Armoured vehicles themselves can be used to generate smoke and provide a good platform for thermal viewers. The enemy difficulty of defeating protected vehilcles is compounded by using unmanned teleoperating systems for route proof The acquisition of capabilities as described would, even if only provided for a small force, offer the ability to rapidly reach into a hostile urban environment with a huge advantage, rather than the current vulnerability.

16 Appendix A: Explanation of the Hollow Charge Warhead Mechanism and its Defeat A.1. Warhead Description In a High Explosive Anti Tank (HEAT) or hollow charge warhead the explosive surrounds an inverted cone of ductile metal. As the explosive is detonated from the rear, the huge pressures generated around the cone deform the metal and accelerate it in the direction of least resistance. This forms a long and thin rod of metal moving out of the cone, sometimes referred to as a jet. The tip of the jet travels at up to Mach 25 and the effects on target surfaces are mainly kinetic. The enormous momentum of the metal jet imposes plastic deformation on metal target surfaces. Because the tip of the jet travels faster than the rear, within a few tens of centimeters the jet becomes stretched then breaks up. Warhead design requires detonation at an optimum stand off and increasing the distance of the warhead from the target permits jet break-up and reduces penetration. A.2. Defeat Methods Defeating HEAT warheads with homogenous armour is difficult even exploiting sloping thickness. Warhead penetration is roughly proportional to charge diameter and warheads in the 60-70mm range will readily penetrate in the order of 300mm of RHAl: far more than any practical AFV can carry over most surfaces. There are four main approaches to counter HEAT warheads. Active protection detects an incoming warhead and fires an explosive charge in its path to break up or prematurely detonate it. The remaining methods aim to break up or degrade the jet. Passive systems do this by exploiting the distortions of the jet that occur at the interface of materials of different densities and angles. Such systems may present hazards for crew and third parties Lighter passive applique systems seek to detonate the warhead at increased stand off distances and place laminates (which may be angled) in the path of the jet, in front of and behind the vehicle armour wall. Typically this does not defeat the jet but greatly reduces penetration and behind armour effect. Heavy passive complex armours such as Chobham armour or that used on heavy Israeli vehicles use proprietary combinations of materials of different densities and shock transmitting properties, sometimes including air gaps and fuel storage. These armours are capable of completely adsorbing the attack of specified HEAT jets, will withstand a series of adjacent attacks and give good general ballistic protection. They are however very heavy and can only be fitted to vehicles with tank type suspensions. The Israeli Achzarit, for example, carries 14 tonnes of additional armour Explosive reactive armour provides an array of modules over the armoured

17 vehicle. The modules consist of explosive material sandwiched between armour material and are sited so that the armour surfaces will be at an angle to incoming warheads. When a warhead detonates against a module, the jet tip triggers detonation in the explosive causing the armour to fly apart, moving across and down the path of the jet and breaking it up. Reactive armour is much lighter than passive armour equivalents. A suite giving frontal and side protection on an M113 weighs in the order of two tonnes. The detonation of the protective module presents a greater hazard to exposed crew or personnel nearby than the warhead alone does. Once a module has detonated there is an unprotected area, and this effect can be exploited by firing explosive rounds to strip protection away..

18 3. References i Schilling A. and Sims D. CAPTs, The Battle for Jaffna, Field Artillery, April 1980 ii Task Force Ranger, a Case Study, George B.Akers, National Security Program Office, Feb 2000 iii Rowland D, The Effect of Degradation on the Urban Battle,Operational Research Society 1991 iv McLaurin R.D. et al Modern Experience in City Combat US Army HE Lab 1987 v Campbell J.D. Task Organising for Urban Combat, USAC&G SC 1976 vi Donnelly C. Soviet Techniques for Combat in Built up Areas, International Defense Review Feb1977. vii Lynham J.M. Kings Ride V Initial Impressions, Army Training News, April 1986 viii Vigor P.H. FIBUA: A Soviet View Pt 1 RUSI Jan 77 ix Eshel D. LTC, Armoured Anti-Guerilla Combat in South Lebanon, ARMOUR, Jul- Aug 1997, p 29.