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1 Introduction This document details German panzer unit organisations on the Eastern Front in 1941 and 1942, covering the period from Operation Barbarossa to the Stalingrad campaign. Many units have been selected for their departure from the norm in terms of establishment and/or equipment. Unless specified, vehicles and guns have been scaled down to the usual Rapid Fire! ratio of 1 to 5. The tables follow the now wellestablished Rapid Fire! format, but I have omitted the points values, as players using historical units are less likely to be concerned about a precisely balanced game. The following panzer battalions and battle groups pose particular challenges to the wargamer. This can vary from getting the best out of a force of technically inferior Pz 35ts, to successfully utilising the flexibility of amphibious tauchpanzers, or commanding the first Tigers in less than ideal circumstances. Overall, this publication will provide you with interesting units to bring variety and a touch of realism to your games. Contents Page Czech Tanks in Panzer Battalions Kampfgruppen Panzer Units in Motorised and SS Divisions rd and 23rd Panzer Divisions at Kharkov Panzer Units at Stalingrad 20 Tiger Heavy Panzers th Panzer Division Tauchpanzer Units 30 Early Flammpanzers 32 Early Funklenk Panzer Units 34 Miscellaneous Panzer Units 36 Vehicle and Gun Chart 39 Wargaming Ideas : A 13th Panzer Panzer III (37mm) leads a Battalion Panzer III Befehlswagen (command tank) over a newly completed Bruckengerat K pontoon bridge. Page

2 Czech Tanks in Panzer Battalions When Operation Barbarossa commenced on June 22nd 1941 the German panzerwaffe was able to field double the number of panzer divisions it had employed against France and the Low Countries in the preceding year. This is of course misleading, as the rapid enlargement of the panzer arm had been partially achieved by the simple expedient of splitting the original panzer regiments in half. Nevertheless, far more tanks were made available overall and this was largely achieved by fully utilising the production capabilities of the Czech armaments industry, which had been under the control of the Nazis since When the panzer divisions rolled across the border on to Soviet-controlled soil, fully one quarter of the tanks employed were of Czech origin. Despite the fact that, to all intents and purposes, these Panzer 35(t) and 38(t)s were light tanks, they provided the main striking power for six panzer divisions, with a seventh being transferred to the Eastern Front in early th Panzer Regiment (22 nd June 1941) 65th Battalion Panzer 35(t) (command) (37mm), Panzer 35(t) (37mm) 3 x Panzer 35(t) (37mm), Panzer II (20mm) 6th Panzer Division, the only German tank unit to be equipped with the Panzer 35(t), was one of three panzer divisions in Panzergruppe 4. Of the other two, 8th Panzer was equipped with the Panzer 38(t) and 1st Panzer with the Panzer III. This was the weakest of the four panzergruppen involved in the initial stages of Operation Barbarossa and the one with the most northerly objective: Leningrad. The 35(t) was a less sophisticated machine than its later stablemate the 38(t), but was armed with the same 37mm gun. It was also used in small numbers by the Slovak Rapid Brigade (under its Czech designation Lt vz 35) and equipped the Romanian 1st Armoured Division in the form of a 35(t) variant called the R-2. 3 x Panzer 35(t) (37mm), Panzer II (20mm) 2 x Panzer IV (short 75mm), Panzer II (20mm) Although a reasonable design for its time, the 35(t) was obsolete when compared to the latest Soviet tanks. 6th Panzer crossed the border little realising that its 10 ton tanks with 25mm frontal armour would soon be facing 52 ton monsters, with three times their protection and devastatingly more powerful guns. 6th Panzer Division s 11th Panzer Regiment consisted of three battalions: I, II and 65th. Using the latter as an example, they were organised as follows on the eve of the invasion: Because 6th Panzer was equipped with obsolete armour it always fought in mixed combat groups. The division s 6th Rifle Brigade had two regiments (4th and 114th) each with two battalions, with only one company carried in Sdkfz 251 APCs. With the 6th Motorcycle Battalion (often referred to as K-6 ) this gave 5 battalions that could be attached to the tank battalions. 1 or 2 battalions would be the normal support for a tank battalion, plus a company of AT guns. For a typical 1941 motorised rifle battalion organisation see page 12. As 65th Battalion As 65th Battalion 1st Battalion 3rd Battalion * 6th Panzer was equipped with five PzBef 35(t) command tanks and eight PzBef H/E. As command tanks are not strictly scaled down using the 1:5 ratio, either vehicle could be used to command any of the three battalions. 6th Panzer advanced across the border and by 23rd June had seized the town of Rossienie and was poised to cross the Dubissa River. Operating in two battlegroups (Raus on the left and Seckendorff on the right), the division seized two bridgeheads, although the southerly one - captured by elements of 1st Panzer Battalion and 114th Rifle Regiment - was recaptured during the night. The next morning, tanks of the Soviet 2nd Tank Division s 3rd and 4th Tank Regiments delivered both a counter-attack and a tremendous blow to Page 3

3 German confidence with their heavy KV-1 and KV-IIs. As part of this counter-attack, a lone KV-II blocked the bridge leading to Group Raus s forward positions. This well-documented action graphically illustrated the inadequacy of the German anti-tank arsenal, with 37mm, 50mm and even 88mm guns struggling to knock out their stubborn adversary. Further south, Group Seckendorff was reinforced by the reserve 2nd Battalion, which had been ordered to recapture the lost bridgehead. Instead, it found itself up against the marauding Soviet heavies, which it held by forming a firing line just east of Rossienie and disabling KVs with Panzer IV 75mm fire aimed at hatches and vision slits! Above: a company of 6th Panzer Division Panzer 35(t)s pass an abandoned KV-II after the battle against 2nd Tank Division. The 35(t) had already been out of production for 3 years by the time Barbarossa was launched. The fact that it was used to equip a front line panzer division indicates both the desperate need for tanks and the arrogance of the commanders who expected the invasion of Russia to be a re-run of France in x model 35(t)s and 1 x Panzer ll from the table to represent 11th Tank Regiment on October 31st). By November 30th the division had no serviceable tanks at all, effectively ending the 35(t) s front line service with the German army. Only the intervention by 1st Panzer Division - outflanking the Soviet units to the north - saved 6th Panzer from devastation. Ultimately however, the Soviet tanks lack of ammunition and fuel rendered their position untenable. Despite these obvious shortcomings, 6th Panzer Division had no option but to struggle on with its inadequate main battle tanks. It is interesting to note that the Slovak Rapid Brigade decided its own Lt vz35s were unfit for battle after just one major action - at Lipovec - and that was against Soviet artillery rather than tanks. After successfully advancing to the outskirts of Leningrad, 6th Panzer was transferred to Hoth s 3rd Panzer Army for Operation Typhoon - the drive on Moscow. The rigours of combat and the deteriorating state of the Russian roads speeded up the process of attrition. By 31st October the total tank force of the entire division amounted to virtually the same strength as 65th Battalion on 22nd June (deduct 2 The Panzer 38(t), which equipped 7th, 8th, 12th, 19th and 20th Panzer Divisions during Operation Barbarossa, was available in far greater numbers and soldiered on to serve with a number of units (including 22nd Panzer Division) during much of 1942, before its relegation to reconnaissance and security duties. This agile and reliable tank was in its element when surging across the steppe and making the deep thrusts characteristic of the summer battles. However, it shared the Panzer 35(t)s limitations of thin armour and poor armament and in tank v tank encounters suffered badly at the hands of the new Soviet mediums and heavies. 12th Panzer Division was attached to Panzergruppe 3, whose four panzer divisions were all equipped with the Panzer 38(t). When Operation Barbarossa began the 12th had three battalions, each of which was organised as follows: Tank warfare on the Eastern Front took a tremendous Page 4

4 29th Panzer Regiment, 12th Panzer Division (22 nd June 1941) Battalion Panzer 38(t) (command) (37mm), Panzer I (MGs) By the beginning of July, the operational order of battle for a typical 12th Panzer tank battalion scales down as follows: 29th Panzer Regiment, 12th Panzer Division (1 st July 1941) Battalion Panzer 38(t) (command) (37mm), Panzer I (MGs) 3 x Panzer 38(t) (37mm), Panzer I (MGs) 3 x Panzer 38(t) (37mm) 2 x Panzer IV (short 75mm), Panzer II (20mm) Panzer IV (short 75mm) * 12th Panzer, as a newly formed division, was allocated 40 Panzer Is to make up for a shortage of Panzer lls. The exact allocation of each type is unknown, so this distribution is conjectural. toll on the panzer divisions. Despite the 38(t) s renowned reliability, the sheer distances involved pushed machines and repair facilities to the limit. Add the vulnerability of the light Czech tanks to the latest Soviet weapons and it is hardly surprising that the numbers of operational vehicles fell rapidly. Below: a company of 12th Panzer Division passes a disabled T-28 as they drive east. T-28s were remnants of the 1930s landship concept that also led to the creation of the huge multi-turreted T-35. However, adequately led and maintained these tanks could still have given the light Pz 38(t)s a run for their money. Page 5

5 The attrition continued. By mid August, the 18th Battalion, 29th Panzer Regiment had been reduced to the following strength: 29th Panzer Regiment, 12th Panzer Division (19 th August 1941) Battalion Panzer 38(t) (command) (37mm), Panzer II (20mm) 2 x Panzer 38(t) (37mm) To illustrate what these units were up against, on 19th August the 1st Battalion was ordered to secure a defensive position on the division s right flank, centred on the railway station at Popovka. After the regimental reconnaissance platoon had reconnoitered the village - reporting enemy infantry near the station and east of the railway track, supported by a lone KV-1 - a tank company was sent forward to link up with elements of the division s motorised rifle brigade. This was accomplished and the Soviet infantry were driven back towards the village of Tschernikovo. However, as the battalion established its defensive positions four KV-1s emerged from the south of the enemy-held village and began to shell the German troops. This fire was then thickened by two more heavy tanks that took up position N.E of the station. The Soviet tanks eventually pulled back after concentrated tank fire on each vehicle in turn unnerved their crews. Nevertheless, the 38(t)s had been unable to penetrate the KVs thick armour and their own losses exceeded those of the Soviet force. Panzer 38(t) (37mm) Panzer IV (short 75mm) Although clearly obsolete by the end of 1941, the 38(t) nevertheless soldiered on into the following year - even being used to equip a new panzer division - 22nd Panzer. 22nd Panzer Division s 204th Panzer Regiment was formed as an independent unit in July 1941 and equipped with captured French tanks, a common practice amongst tank units being formed or reformed in France and the Low Countries. It was then assigned to the 22nd and re-equipped with Panzer 38(t)s. The fact that this tank was still in production well into 1942 highlights the inability of German production to produce enough Panzer III and IVs to replace enormous losses suffered during the first winter in the East. Below: a light and medium company of 22nd Panzer Division in battle formation. See diagrams on pages 7 and 8. Page 6

6 22nd Panzer Division was hastily transferred to the East in March 1942 and assigned to the Crimea, where the German forces had previously lacked tank support. At this time the division s two tank battalions were organised as follows: 204th Panzer Regiment, 22nd Panzer Division (20 th March 1941) 1st Battalion Panzer 38(t) (command) (37mm), Panzer II (20mm) Sevastopol isolated from landward reinforcement. The regiment was drawn up in a relatively standard battle formation; the 1st Battalion leading the 2nd with the single armoured rifle company just behind and to the right flank of the line of leading tank companies. A second rifle company was mounted on the tanks of the 2nd Battalion and the latter was also supported by a company of self-propelled 20mm flak guns. The diagram on the next page shows a scaled down representation of this formation (2nd Battalion following directly behind the 1st). Unfortunately, the problems began even before the regiment set off, with the discovery that the armoured rifle company radios weren t tuned to any of the tank frequencies. When the advance finally got underway it was dogged by thick fog and 204th Panzer Regiment gave the order to halt, hoping visibility would improve. It didn t, and when the advance re-started the 1st Battalion veered away to the north, whilst the rest of the regiment (including the CO) headed east towards the objective, believing the 1st to be moving directly ahead. The armoured rifle company soon lost contact with 1st Battalion and stayed with the 2nd. 2 x Panzer IV (short 75mm), Panzer II (20mm) As 1st Battalion 2nd Battalion * No Panzerbefehlswagens are listed for this division and it is assumed that 38(t) command vehicles were issued. On March 20th the 22nd took part in a disastrous first engagement. It must be remembered that in all armies green troops tend to do poorly in their battlefield debut; but when these troops are part of the much-vaunted panzertruppen this may seem more surprising. In the case of the 22nd, a lack of battle practice and proper divisional exercises prior to combat led to great confusion that ultimately resulted in the failure of its mission. 204th Panzer Regiment was spearheading a counter-attack against Soviet forces on the Parpach Front, in the area of Korpetsch near the northern coast of the Crimea. This was part of a German move to keep the besieged port of Page 7 As it advanced northwards on its own, 1st Panzer Battalion was hit by a series of tank attacks. First, light tanks were driven off and then a mixed group of 10 KV-1s and T- 34s were encountered, supported by light armour and both artillery and anti-tank fire. A minefield added to the 1st Battalion s tribulations. As the pressure mounted, it sent a radio report (which neglected to mention its true position) suggesting it had suffered very heavy casualties. As a result, Regimental permitted a withdrawal. In fact the battalion had only lost 14 tanks out of approximately 65, many of which were repairable. Meanwhile, the 2nd Battalion had reached the outskirts of Korpetsch. After the Armoured Rifle Company accidentally drove into a minefield, the tanks found their path blocked by an anti-tank ditch where artillery fire caused casualties. With the rest of the battalion fighting off infantry attacks on the left flank, 6th Panzer Company (Panzer IVs with short 75mm) advanced on the right, trying to contact the phantom 1st Battalion. Eventually, the Regimental Commander ordered a general withdrawal and only as his units were retreating did he finally learn the true position of his 1st Battalion. Unfortunately, 22nd Panzer Division s problems were not yet over, as infantry and support elements in the rear started a panicky withdrawal as they saw the tank companies pull back; requiring 204th Panzer Regiment s Adjutant to drive after them and steady morale. All in all it was a less than auspicious start to the 22nd s combat career. Poor co-ordination and inexperience had resulted in a multitude of calamities, compounded by the failure to recover repairable tanks from the battlefield. 22nd Panzer Battle formation (next page) The diagram shows a scaled-down version of the standard formation for an advancing panzer regiment. Each tank represents a five-strong Zug (platoon) which would have adopted an arrow head formation