DEPARTMENT OF THE ENVIRONMENT. ccurred IN THE < SCOTTISH REGION BRITISH JAILWAYS LONDON: HER MAJESTY'S STATIONERY OFFICE. llp net

Transcription

1 DEPARTMENT OF THE ENVIRONMENT ccurred IN THE < SCOTTISH REGION BRITISH JAILWAYS LONDON: HER MAJESTY'S STATIONERY OFFICE llp net

2 FROM INVERNESS

3 RAILWAY INSPECTORATE, DEPARTMENT OF THE ENVIRONMENT, 2 MARSHAM STREET, LONDON, SW 1. 21st June I have the honour to report for the information of the Secretary of State, in accordance with the Order dated 6th November 1973, the result of my Inquiry into the collision between a passenger train and a freight train that occurred at on 5th November 1973, at Dingwall in the Scottish Region of British Railways. I was assisted by Major A. G. B. King. The passenger train was the from Inverness to Kyle of Lochalsh, consisting of four passenger vehicles hauled by a diesel locomotive. The freight train was the from Invergordon to Inverness, consisting of 14 freight vehicles and a brakevan hauled by a diesel locomotive. The passenger train was drawing forward from Dingwall Station under clear signals towards Dingwall North signal box where the single line to Kyle of Lochalsh diverges from the single line to Invergordon. It was brought to a stand by its driver who saw the signalman displaying a red handsignal and the freight train approaching on the single line from Invergordon. The freight train, having run past two signals at Danger and travelling at mile/h, collided head-on with the locomotive of the passenger train. Extensive damage was caused to both locomotives. The first three wagons of the freight train each had their leading pair of wheels derailed. Minor damage was caused to the passenger vehicles. The police and ambulance services were alerted at by the leading railman at Dingwall Station. The police arrived at and the first ambulance at Two passengers and 'two train crew were taken to the Ross Memorial Hospital, one passenger and one train crew member being released that evening. Four passengers were given First Aid at the station. Passengers on the train involved and on subsequent trains were conveyed forward.to their destinations by specially arranged road transport. Because of the risk of fire associated with the heavy loss of whisky from barrels loaded in the derailed freight vehicles, the fire brigade was called at and remained until on 6th November. The lines were cleared by on 6th November. It was a dark night, with showers of rain and sleet but the visibility was good at the time of the collision. DESCRIPTION The Site l. The main line from Inverness North to Dingwall is a single line of railway which becomes double through Dingwall Station, between the North and South signal boxes. At the north end of Dingwall Station the line becomes single for 63 yards, before the diverging junction of the single lines to Kyle of Lochalsh and Invergordon, In the Up direction, the single line from Invergordon falls at a gradient of 1 in 100 for 2,300 yards to the Dingwall North Outer Home signal, when it becomes level for 730 yards up to the point of collision, then falling at 1 in.500 through Dingwall Station. Dingwall Station and the line to Invergordon lie in an exposed position beside the Cromarty Forth. The line to Kyle of Lochalsh bears away in a westerly direction inland from the junction. Details of the gradients and other features are given on the plan at the front of this report. 2. The double line through Dingwall Station is worked under the Absolute Block Regulations. The single lines to Kyle of Lochalsh and Invergordon are worked under the Electric Key Token Block Regulations. Semaphore signals are provided throughout. On the single line from Invergordon in the Up direction towards Dingwall, the junction with the Kyle of Lochalsh line is protected by two Home signals and a fixed Distant. The latter signal is 2,078 yards from the Dingwall Noi-th signal box, which is a low-level structure on the East side of the line opposite the points at the north end of the double line section. The Trains 3. The Inverness to Kyle of Lochalsh passenger train was hauled by Class 2612 locomotive No of 1,160 hp and weighing 73 tons. The train consisted of 3 Mk I passenger vehicles, with a Mk I bogie -guard's brake vehicle marshalled second from the locomotive. The Invergordon to Inverness Class 7 freight train was hauled by another Class 2612 locomotive No This train consisted of 14 freight vehicles and a 20 ton brakevan. Five of the 6 vehicles next to the locomotive were fitted with vacuum brakes and the other was piped. The total train load was 467 tons with a brake force of 65 tons, including 35 tons brake force for the locomotive. The maximum permitted speed of the freight train was 45 milelh.

4 The course of the collision and damage caused 4. The passenger train, having completed station duties at Dingwall, was drawing forward under clear signals towards Dingwall North signal box in order to pick up the key token for the Dingwall to Garve single line section when the driver saw a red handsignal being displayed by the signalman and became aware of the close approach of the freight train. He brought his train to a stand some 70 yards short of the signal box. 5. The freight train had been accepted, correctly, at 'Line Clear' by the signalman at Dingwall North from Invergordon. It passed both the Outer and Inner Home signals at Danger, ran through the junction points which were set for the Kyle of Lochalsh line and collided head-on at a speed of some 15 mile/h with the locomotive of the passenger train. Before the collision, the driver and secondman of the passenger train and the secondman and guard of the freight train jumped from their trains. The driver of the freight train retreated" into the engine compartment of his locomotive. 6. The leading passenger coach suffered damage at the forward end where it came into contact with the locomotive. In all the coaches, tables were displaced and fittings cracked. Both locomotives were extensively damaged. The two leading wagons of the freight train carried containers loaded with barrels of whisky. Considerable damage was caused to the wagons, both leading axles were derailed and there was a considerable spillage of whisky from the damaged barrels. The third wagon, a bogie vehicle carrying a demountable tank, was derailed leading axle only. 7. Some damage was caused to point and crossing work where the junction points wgre run through. Some wooden sleepers were damaged but overall damage to track was slight. EVIDENCE Evidence of events leading up to the collision 8. Signalman M. Campbell, the signalman on duty at Invergordon on 5th November when the freight train departed, noticed nothing out of the ordinary about its running, or in the way in which it was being handled. He said that it was accepted at 'Line Clear' by Dingwall North and that he had no knowledge of the Dingwall Up North Line Distant signal not showing a light on the day of the accident. 9. The signalman at Dingwall North, Signalman J. Ross, told me that after accepting the freight train at 'Line Clear', which he was entitled to do because there were two Home signals, he offered the passenger train to Garve and it was accepted. He set the points for the passenger train and when the driver whistled, he obtained the key token and cleared the Starting signal. He then went out of his signal box towards the exchange stand with the token, but suddenly became aware of the approaching freight train passing the Inner Home signal. He ran back to the box, replaced the Down Starting signal and came out with a red handsignal to try to stop the passenger train. He realised then that there would be a collision and that he did not have time to attempt to divert the freight train. 10. Signalman Ross said that he was not aware that the Up North Line Distant signal lamp was out. He claimed that the repeater had indicated that it was alight when he tested it earlier that day. He and the other signalman did the lamping alternate weeks and he believed that when he was shown the lamp after the collision there was still some oil in it. 11. Driver G. Sinclair, the driver of the passenger train, said that he was drawing forward with his secondman at the offside door to pick up the token. Just after passing the Starting signal, he saw the signalman with the token come out of the box and then run back in again to emerge with a red lamp. He then became aware of the freight train passing the Inner Home signal. He made an emergency brake application and told the secondman to jump from the locomotive, jumping off himself. He said that there had been occasions when the Up Distant 'at Dingwall had not been displaying a light, but every driver knew the position of the signal and if they did miss it there were other ways of knowing where they were. 12. The guard of the passenger train, Conductor Guard D. MocDonald, stated that he had given the 'right away' and when the train started he began sorting parcels loaded at Dingwall. The train then stopped and he was just going to investigate when the impact of the collision threw him to the floor. He picked himself up and, seeing what had happened, concerned himself with assisting passengers and protecting his train. 13. Guard D. Miller, the guard of the freight train, described the composition of the freight train and his calculations on the train preparation form. He appreciated that of the 6 vehicles in the fitted head 5 were braked and one piped. He himself made the train up and connected the brake pipes at Invergordon. He accepted that he had made an error in giving the brake force as 59 tons, since it was 65 tons, but this was on the safe side. He would have required a brake force of at least 70 tons to run his train as a Class 7 train, as booked, but because of the presence of short wheel-base wagons in the train, its maximum speed was in any case limited to 45 mile/h. This was shown on the driver's slip which he gave to Driver MacPherson personally before leaving Invergordon. Consequently the train was worked correctly under Class 8 conditions. i 14. Miller said that he had 12 years' experience of working on the North line and had landmarks to recognise his position. Just before passing the Up Distant signal he made a partial application of his van brake

5 as usual, but became aware that the train was running a little faster than 35 mile/h which was normal at that point. He estimated the speed at 45 mile/h at the Distant signal. He thought that it might have slowed down between the Distant and Outer Home signals., 15. As the locomotive passed the Outer Home signal he gave another two turns to the hand brake and after his van passed the Outer Home, when he realised they were going to run past the Inner Home signal, gave another quarter turn, all that was left, before getting down onto the step where he saw sparks from the locomotive wheels. Near the Inner Home signal he saw the signalman with the red lamp and the passenger train, realised what was going to happen and jumped clear. 16. He picked himself up and went to the signal box. After caring for his driver, he protected his train. Miller said that he had never been in a freight train that had run past these signals before. He admitted that through an oversight he omitted to carry out a brake continuity test before leaving Invergordon. 17. The driver of the freight train, Driver J. G. MacPherson, who had driven locomotives on the North line for four years, told me that his turn of duty was from Inverness to Invergordon and back and that he had permitted the secondman to drive on the inwards trip since he was passed to drive Class 26 locomotives and he considered him to be a competent driver. He said that the journey was quite normal up to passing the Up Distant signal at a speed of between 40 and 45 mile/h which was not too fast. He could not actually see the speedometer and his figures for speed were based on judgement. He was confident that the train could be controlled if it started down the bank at a speed of 40 mile/h. He agreed that he had taken the train slip at Invergordon but had not checked it and he admitted that no brake continuity test had been made before starting, nor had he seen the secondman carry out a running brake test. 18. He noticed that the secondman made a slight application of the vacuum brake after passing the Distant signal, followed by progressively increasing applications as the train did not appear to be checked. A full application of the vacuum brake was made on sighting the Outer Home when still travelling at mile/h, followed, on his advice, by a full application of the straight air brake. However the train did not seem to slow down significantly until it was on the level, approaching the Inner Home, and even then it kept rolling on. He realised when they passed the Outer Home that they would not stop at the Inner Home and he used the whistle. When he saw the passenger train, he realised there would be a collision. He left jumping too late and went into the engine room. 19. Passed Senior Secondman J. MacMillan told me that he was passed to drive Class 26 locomotives 7 years ago on coming to Inverness. He did not get many driving turns and usually his driving experience was while working as a secondman. He had been with Driver MacPherson for about 6 weeks and had been allowed to drive fairly consistently and he felt quite confident in his ability to handle Class 26 locomotives. He said that he had been told the tonnage and assumed the maximum speed was 45 mile/h. He admitted that he was not well versed on brake force power, the braking variation found between trains and the effect on train running, although he was sure he could control the train after starting down the gradient past the Distant signal at 45 mile/h. He admitted that he had not made a running brake test on the return journey. On approaching the Distant signal he shut off power and recollected making a normal application of the vacuum brake, down to about 15 inches of vacuum. He realised that this was not holding the train and made a second application of the vacuum brake. He claimed that he had made a full emergency application of the brake somewhere within the sighting distance of the Outer Home signal, followed a few seconds later by a full application of the straight air brake. He also released the Driver's Safety Device. The vacuum brake application did not seem to slow the train at all until just before he made the emergency brake application. He seemed a little unsure of the precise amount of vacuum brake application that would result in the locomotive's straight air brake being applied through the combination brake and could not recollect exactly where he made the final brake application. Evidence of events after the collision 20. Evidence was given by the Area Manager, Mr. G. Hendry, and by Mr. J. J. Douglas, an S. & T. Supervisor, that shortly after the accident they checked the position of the levers in the frame, the outside equipment and the instruments at Dingwall North signal box. The route was correctly set for the passenger traintrom Inverness to Kyle of Lochalsh. The branch line points were set and locked for the Kyle line and had been run through. The Dingwall North Inner and Outer Home signals on the Invergordon line were both well lit. The Dingwall North Distant signal on the Invergordon line was not lit, the wick was dry, and there was no oil in the lamp reservoir. The light proving switch in the signal box was in the down position indicating that the buzzer had operated and been silenced. When a filled and lit lamp was placed in the signal, the lamp proving device failed to operate due to a faulty pyrometer contact at the signal. This would have indicated the light as out, whether or not the lamp was lit. On replacement of the pyrometer, the light proving arrangements worked correctly. 21. Evidence was given by Mr. N. Douglas, ajitter, that an 'A' examination of the freight train loco- 'motive No. 5330, carried out 48 hours before the incident, showed that the locomotive straight air brake, the vacuum brake and the DSD were all in good order. The brake blocks were in serviceable condition and there was- no evidence of flanging. 22. Mr. J. L. Bruce, a Traction Inspector at Inverness, told me that he examined the locomotive at the 3

6 site of the accident. The passenger/goods switch was correctly set at 'goods' and all the brake blocks were in good condition. After the type of braking described in earlier evidence he would not have expected there to be signs of heavy braking on the tyres or brake blocks of the locomotive and there were no such signs. The vacuum brake handle was in the emergency position. The straight air brake was in the 'off' position, but it was free and could easily have been moved into the 'off' position by the impact. 23. Mr. J. Ewan, Carriage and Wagon Assistant, Inverness, was called out and examined the vehicles at Dingwall. They were all coupled up and the vacuum pipe was correctly terminated<at the rear of the sixth vehicle. The brake blocks were all hard on the wheels of the five fitted vehicles, except for the leading wagon where, because of the way the wagon was supported, the blocks were off the wheels, although the piston was up to the neck indicating that the brakes had been fully applied. He measured the reserve strokes on the other' four fitted vehicles. Two of the vehicles were working well into the reserve stroke, but the fact that some reserve stroke remained meant that the brakes were still effective on these wagons. He found that the brakevan brake was tight on and could find no braking marks on the track and no signs of binding or dragging brakes on the tyres. From what he saw, he thought that the brake on the train was effective for the number of vehicles on it. TESTS F Results of tests carried out 24. Mr. A. Love, Assistant Maintenance Engineer (Rolling Stock), described how on the day following the accident he carried out a brake test on the fitted portion of the train. The leading vehicle could not be tested because of damage, but the brakes on the other four vehicles were functioning correctly. He explained that the initial calculated brake power of each wagon was 6.6 tons, but that on the Wagon Load and Brake Power Panel this is shown as 6-0 tons to allow for working into the reserve stroke and to simplify the guard's calculations. After measuring the working stroke, he calculated the actual brake power of the four wagons as tons, whereas the guard would have recorded 24 tons (4 x 6 tons) from the wagon panels. He had no reason to believe that the brake of the leading vehicle was other than effective at the time of the accident. 25. Mr. J. Bryceland, Locomotive Maintenance Standard Assistant, explained how a brake test was carried out at Inverness on the freight train locomotive after patching up the worst of the obvious collision damage. So far as could be established from the test, the braking system of the locomotive was in good order prior to the accident. He then described a practical test carried out with a freight train of virtually identical composition over the same track. The locomotive was of Class 2612 and the weight of the train was 457 tons, which was as close as could be achieved to the 467 tons weight of the freight train involved. The brake force taken from the locomotive and wagon panels of the test train was 65 tons, as for the actual train. Brake reserve strokes on certain wagons in the test train were altered to make the actual brake force of the wagons tons, compared with the likely value of tons for the freight train in collision, assuming that the actual brake force of the badly damaged wagon had been 5.8 tons. 26. The test train then travelled from Invergordon to ~in~wall under similar conditions to the train involved in the accident, approaching the sighting point of the Outer Home signal at about 42 mile/h, with 16 inches of vacuum just holding the speed on the falling gradient of 1 in 100. At the sighting point of the Outer Home signal (440 yards in rear of the signal) a full emergency brake application, using the vacuum and straight air brake, was made bringing the train to a stand in 570 yards, some distance in rear of the Inner Home signal. A speed-distance curve was produced for the test train. 27. Additionally, a theoretical calculated braking curve was produced for the train involved in the collision, assuming the emergency brake application to be made at the sighting point of the Outer Home signal. This agreed well with the test train result, giving a calculated stopping distance of 640 yards. 28. From the two curves the following deductions can be made:- a. An emergency brake application made 310 yards in rear of the Outer Home signal, should bring a similar train to a stand at the Inner Home signal from 45 mile /h. b. An emergency brake application made at the Outer Home signal at 45 mile/h, should result in the train speed being reduced to 15 mile/h at the point of collision. c. For an emergency brake application with the train involved in the collision at the sighting point of the Outer Home signal, the theoretical braking distance is 740 yards for a speed of 45 mile/h and 430 yards for a speed of 35 mile/h. 29. The weather conditions on the nights of both the collision and test were similar. It was dark and there were high winds. On the night of the collision there were showers of rain and sleet. On the night of the test there was heavy rain. 30. A subsequent test of the proportional brake valve on locomotive No. 5330, to establish the vacuum level at which the locomotive air brake started to come on, showed a NIL brake cylinder pressure at 16 inches of vacuum, 1 lb/in2 at 15 inches, thereafter increasing proportionately to 52 lbs/in2 at zero vacuum.

7 31. The cause of this collision was the mishandling of the brakes of the freight train from Invergordon to Inverness by Passed Senior Secondman J. MacMillan, who was driving at the time. Although he. had been passed to drive for 7 years, he did not fully understand the working of the proportional brake with the result that he failed to control the speed of the train on the 1 in 100 falling gradient between the Distant and Outer Home signals. By the time Driver MacPherson intervened and a full application of the straight air brake on the locomotive was made, somewhere in the vicinity of the Outer Home signal, it was already too late to prevent a collision. 32. Driver MacPherson must accept the prime responsibility for the accident since, as the rostered driver, he was still responsible for ensuring that the train was driven safely and correctly, even though the secondman was driving. He should have ensured that the secondman made a running brake test after leaving Invergordon; this would have allowed him to get the feel of the brakes and to observe at what level of vacuum the proportional brake started to apply the air brakes on the locomotive. As it was, the brake application to 15 inches of vacuum, made in the vicinity of the Distant signal did no more than hold the train's speed at about 45 mile/h on the falling gradient. The tests carried out after the collision showed that the brakes, both on the locomotive and on the fitted head, were in good order beforehand, the brake power was adequate for the weight of the train, and there was no evidence to suggest that the speed of the train had been in excess of the limit of 45 mile/h to which it was restricted. 33. The fact that the Up Distant signal was not lit had no bearing on this accident, since both the secondman and the guard were well aware of its location, but the fact that its oil reservoir was found to be dry and the pyrometer out of order suggests a degree of laxity in the carrying out of lamping duties at this signal which reflects on the quality of the supervision at Dingwall. I have the honour to be, The Permanent Secretary, Department of the Environment. Sir, Your obedient Servant, I. K. A. McNAUGHTON, Lieutenant Colonel. Printed in Scotland by Her Majesty's Stationery Office at HMSO Press, Edinburgh Dd K7 8/74 (1 1627)

8 O Crown copyright 1974 HER MAJESTY'S STATIONERY OFFICE Government Bookshops 49 High Holborn, London WClV 6HB 13a Castle Street, Edinburgh EH2 3AR 41 The Hayes, Cardiff CF1 1 JW Brazennose Street, Manchester M60 8AS Southey House, Wine Street, Bristol BSI 2BQ 258 Broad Street, Birmingham B1 2HE 80 Chichester Street, Belfast BTl 4JY, Government publications are also available through booksellers