June 30, Re: British Columbia Transmission Corporation ( BCTC ) Transmission System Capital Plan F2006 to F2015

Transcription

1 B-9 Marcel Reghelini Director, Regulatory Affairs Phone: Fax: June 30, 2005 Mr. Robert J. Pellatt Commission Secretary British Columbia Utilities Commission Sixth Floor, 900 Howe Street Box 250 Vancouver, BC V6Z 2N3 Dear Mr. Pellatt: Re: British Columbia Transmission Corporation ( BCTC ) Transmission System Capital Plan F2006 to F2015 Further to BCTC s June 24, 2005 filing with the British Columbia Utilities Commission of the responses to the Commission s Information Request No. 2, Sea Breeze Pacific Regional Transmission System, Inc. s Information Request and the Island Residents Against High Voltage Overhead Lines (IRAHVOL) Information Request No. 2, BCTC files its response to BCUC IR Also, BCTC files the missing attachment to the response to BCUC IR (The covering letter to the June 24, 2005 filing incorrectly referred to this attachment as part of the response to BCUC IR ) The attachment is the referenced in BC Hydro s letter of March 22, This completes BCTC s responses to Information Request No. 2. Sincerely, Original signed by: Marcel Reghelini Director, Regulatory Affairs British Columbia Transmission Corporation, Suite 1100 Four Bentall Centre, 1055 Dunsmuir Street, Vancouver, BC V7X 1V5

2 British Columbia Utilities Commission Information Request Dated 3 June 2005 British Columbia Transmission Corporation Response Issued 30 June 2005 British Columbia Transmission Corporation Capital Plan F2006 Page Reference: ICBS, various pages RESPONSE: Several assets classes have ongoing Sustaining Capital programs or related OMA initiatives For each asset class that has one or more ongoing Sustaining Capital programs, please provide a brief update on the status of the programs that includes program descriptions, start and end dates, initial approved costs, expenditures to date, completion percentages, expected times to completion, and expected total costs at completion. Please see two attached tables: Transmission Projects; and Stations Projects. As discussed in BCUC IR , expenditures exceeding the approved amount by 5% are subject to approval by the appropriate level of BCTC management. Approvals for these additional expenditures are generally justified by approved scope changes or may relate to unanticipated circumstances such as difficult construction conditions.

3 Transmission Projects 1 Project Start Finish Initial Approved Costs Expenditures to Date Percent Complete Estimated Cost at Completion Class No Conductor Systems Overhead Life Extension Programs Vancouver Island 500 kv Supply Hazard Protection (VIHAZARD) $ 2,550,000 $ 2,087,019 74% $ 2,668, * OH Line Life extension - F2006 Program $ 8,150,000 $ - 0% $ 8,150, * Transmission Recurring Capital - F2006 Program $ 4,000,000 $ - 0% $ 4,000,000 Very Old Copper Conductor Replacement * OH Line Reliability Improvements - F2006 Program $ 1,350 $ - 0% $ 1,350 TX Rating Restoration kv Transmission Line Rating Restoration (60KVUPG) $ 336,000 $ 278,172 65% $ 385, Upgrade 5L51 & 5L52 to Present Ratings $ 95,000 $ 68,000 44% $ 163,501 A L71/72/75/76/77/79/91 - Line Clearance Upgrades $ 2,149,000 $ 1,116,000 64% $ 1,843,246 A L301 - Rating Study & Upgrade $ 630,000 $ 286,000 45% $ 564, * 5L87 Line Clearance Upgrade $ 480,000 $ 25,000 15% $ 471, Circuit 1L210 Rating Study (BKL - BAR only) $ 46,489 $ 7,400 3% $ 45,000 Class No Metal Support Structures Overhead Line Corrosion Protection Program Overhead T/L Structural Corrosion Protection Program (CORPRTTL) $ 2,315,000 $ 10,282 0% $ 2,315,000 Wind & Ice Withstand Program L98 Ice Mitigation (5L98UICE) $ 286,000 $ 22,627 12% $ 266,683 A99825 Transmission System - Ice Hazard Risk Reduction $ 897,000 $ 908,000 83% $ 1,049,700 A L390 - Skeena River Crossing Ice Damage Prevention (60L390X) $ 722,000 $ 709,078 83% $ 824,600 Class No Wood Pole Structures Overhead Life Extension Program * COB Clamp-Top Insulator Replacements $ 8,323,000 $ 6,549,000 $ 10,000, * COB Suspension Insulator Replacements $ 7,487,000 $ 7,507,000 50% $ 15,000,000 Overhead Reliability Improvements Program L364 - Half Way River Crossing Relocation (1L364Y04) $ 286,000 $ 170,454 52% $ 321,366 Class No Access Roads Rights of way acquisition A L271 - Right-of-Way Acquisition(60L271RW) $ 46,000 $ 5,399 13% $ 46,677 A kv - Deficient Right-of-way Acquisition (ROWTEN02) $ 739,000 $ 434,109 47% $ 798,440 A L274 and 1L275 - Right-of-way Acquisition(KANELKRW) $ 298,000 $ 141,639 26% $ 361,433 A00129 Farrell Estates - Lands Rights Renegotiation (FARRELL1) $ 76,000 $ 43,224 80% $ 58,498 A L205 (VNT-WDS) Right-of-way Acquisition (60L205RW) $ 70,000 $ 60,435 43% $ 97, * Lower Mainland Deficient Rights study & acquisition program $ 2,500,000 $ - 0% $ 2,500, * Misc land Rights Acquisition program F2006 to F $ 1,000,000 $ - 0% $ 1,000,000

4 Transmission Projects 2 Project Start Finish Initial Approved Costs Expenditures to Date Percent Complete Estimated Cost at Completion Class No Civil Works Civil Protective Works L79/2L240 Erosion Protection Structure 7/2 (SHUSWAPR) $ 450,000 $ 47,827 5% $ 473, L9 Erosion Control - Structures 576 and 587 (2L9Y04) $ 399,000 $ 82,944 28% $ 368, L20 Slide Protection - Structures 9-07 and 9-08(60L20Y04) $ 240,000 $ 97,280 95% $ 97, L101 - Riprap Erosion Protection Strs 77/3, 77/4(2L101Y04) $ 1,489,000 $ 1,419,899 93% $ 2,263, L15 Erosion Protection - 15 poles Hayward Lake Reservoir (60L15HLE) $ 136,000 $ 16,874 0% $ 156, L63 Str Anchor C Stabilization (5L63Y05) $ 403,500 $ 29,546 0% $ 458, Deflector Berms - Circuits 5L42 & 5L45 (5L42EW05) $ 122,000 $ 2,457 0% $ 139, L45 Noon's Creek Crossing Erosion Protection - Str (5L45NCXE) $ 143,500 $ 963 0% $ 164, Replumb 5L79 guyed Strs and (5L79SS05) $ 41,000 $ 1,144 0% $ 46, L101 (SKA-RUP) Riprap Erosion Protection (2L101M83) $ 298,500 $ 7,104 0% $ 338, L1 Bent Steel Members Strs ,10-04 and (2L1BS05) $ 140,000 $ 1,905 0% $ 161, Rutherford Creek Erosion Control - 5L42, 2L1, 2L2 (RUTHERCK) $ 527,139 $ 574, % $ 636,974 A L10 (WAH-BBR) - Riprap Erosion Protection, Peter's Island(60L10Y02) $ 1,205,595 $ 1,153,257 88% $ 1,330,186 Class No Underground and submarine cables and oil systems Replacement of defective cables L55/2L56 (Ingledow to Camosun) - Cable Upgrading $ 7,100,000 $ 5,267,000 45% $ 8,856, Cable life Extention prog & Sheath Bonding Switch(CABDEF) $ 50,000 $ 5,132 10% $ 49,963 A L29/31 Thermal Assessment and Optimization $ 2,418,000 $ 1,974,000 91% $ 2,176,250 A Metro Vancouver kv Reinforcement Development(MV230DEF) $ 789,000 $ 785,952 83% $ 916,456 A HVDC Pole 2 - Cable #9 Replacement(P2C9REPL) $ 3,513,000 $ 2,212,098 76% $ 3,037,744 A L50 (Burrard to Murrin) - Cable Upgrading $ 806,000 $ 674,000 77% $ 852,287 A L39/40 - Cable Replacement $ 31,613,000 $ 28,691,000 92% $ 31,028,791 Replacement of problem stop joints A Oil Stop Joint Replacement Program $ 2,345,000 $ 2,229,000 95% $ 2,345,971 A L53 - Stop Joint Replacement (2L53SJ) $ 1,916,462 $ 1,913, % $ 1,996,270 Upgrade of oil alarm and control systems to improve circuit restoration time Metro Supply kv Oil Alarm System Upgrade $ 1,798,000 $ 428,000 16% $ 1,804,766 A L53 (MAN-MUR) - Cable Oil Pressure Alarm Upgrade(2L53ALUP) $ 190,000 $ 185, % $ 201,654 Upgrade of pumping plants and oil reservoir systems A kv Oil fill cable Circuits-Oil Reservoir Capacity Upgrade-Defini $ 686,000 $ 220,000 14% $ 682, L50 Oil Pump Alarm System Upgrade (2L50PUMP) $ 311,000 $ 173,244 50% $ 325,633 A GVWD Capilano Pumping PLant 69 kv Connection Project (GVWDY05) $ 1,375,000 $ 1,380,982 94% $ 1,477, kV SCOF Cables Reservoir Capacitor Upgrade - Station $ 188,000 $ - 0% $ 188,000 Installation of protection barriers for 500 kv potheads vulnerable to vandalism A kv Cable Pothead Barrier Additions (CIP02CPB) $ 298,000 $ 304,350 24% $ 450,912

5 Stations Projects 1 Project Start Finish Initial Approved Costs Expenditures to Date Percent Complete Estimated Cost at Completion Class No Circuit Breakers 230 KV Walters 230kV CB Replacement (WLT05CB) $ 399,586 $ 6,410 0% $ 399, kv Circuit Breaker Replacement (230CBR05 & NEL05CB) $ 1,975,000 $ 135,708 6% $ 1,964, KV Williston 5CB2 Replacement (CB04WSN5) $ 758,000 $ 615, % $ 615, Malaspina 5CB3 Replacement (MSA5CB3) $ 994,000 $ 515,251 38% $ 2,071, Circuit Breaker Replacements /05 (CB04KI22, CB04MLN2, CB04WHY2) $ 2,717,000 $ 1,969, % $ 1,968, Circuit Breaker Replacements / $ 9,543,000 $ 2,715,000 45% $ 8,586, Williston - Circuit Breaker (PK8) Replacement Program $ 4,319,000 $ 47,000 33% $ 2,886, Williston 5CB5 Replacement (WSN5CB5) $ 750,000 $ 597, % $ 760,457 Class No Disconnect Switches GMS - Disconnect Switch Replacement (GMS04DS & GMS05DS) $ 465,000 $ 334,000 78% $ 408,719 Class No Circuit Switchers A /230 kv Circuit Switcher Replacement Program (CB03NIC,CB04KLY,CB04WSN) $ 4,839,000 $ 4,525, % $ 4,525, Circuit Switcher Replacements - Williston and Dunsmuir (CB04DMRS,CB04WSNS) $ 2,789,000 $ 2,353,000 90% $ 2,385,925 Class No Transformers/Tap Changers Station Animal Outage Reduction - F2006 (PG05SAO) $ 365,000 $ 82,153 37% $ 229, Station Animal Outage Reduction (PG03SAO) $ 1,895,000 $ 2,175, % $ 2,175,000 Class No Shunt Capacitors PCB Filled Capacitor Can Replacements /05 (PCB04REP) $ 1,715,000 $ 340,670 33% $ 1,993,883 Class No Station Insulators A Pin & Cap Type Insulator Replacements (PG03PIN & PG04PIN) $ 3,472,000 $ 3,411,000 98% $ 3,720, Pin & Cap Type Insulator Replacements (PG05PIN) $ 1,440,000 $ 51,073 10% $ 1,598,069 Class No High Pressure Air Systems Air Compressor Replacements /06 (ACREP05) $ 489,000 $ 35,657 4% $ 474,297 Class No Protection and Control Systems Line Protection Systems Replacements - over 500 kv kv Line Protection Replacement - Stage 4 (500PNS4) $ 3,826,000 $ 379,766 22% $ 3,298,597 Line Protection Systems Replacements - under 500 kv U-500 kv Line PN Replacements Stage 6 & Transformer PN Replacement (U5PNS6) $ 5,727,000 $ 1,026,643 28% $ 5,111,520 A72041 Line Protection Replacements - Under 500 kv, Stage $ 5,232,000 $ 4,742,000 88% $ 5,288,960 Station Equipment P&C Systems Replacements Transformer PN Replacements (Gas Relay) - F2006 (TXPROT06) $ 25,000 $ 17,550 5% $ 23, Transformer Protection Replacements /05 (TXPROTO3) $ 1,876,000 $ 1,374,786 76% $ 1,657, Port Kell - Auto Reclose (PKL05AR) $ 114,000 $ 76,386 92% $ 84,079 Circuit Breaker Failure Protective Relay Replacements

6 Stations Projects 2 Project Start Finish Initial Approved Costs Expenditures to Date Percent Complete Estimated Cost at Completion A72073 Circuit Breaker Failure Protection Replacement - Stage 2 (CBFPN04) $ 645,000 $ 285,188 56% $ 519,068 Station SCADA RTU Equipment Replacements Britt Creek - Control Upgrade (BCKCTRUP) $ 105,000 $ 75,000 64% $ 105,000 A00239 SCC - Telemetry Additions for Security Applications (SCC01TM) $ 200,000 $ 157,166 93% $ 152, Long Beach RTU Addition (LBH05RTU) $ 69,932 $ 61, % $ 63,096 A02107 Valemount and Avola - Remote Control of Feeders (VLMCBCR) $ 11,000 $ 16,278 93% $ 16,962 Minor and Emergency Capital P&C Program P&C Additions/Replacements (MInor Capital) /05 (PG04MCP) $ 318,000 $ 114,949 n/a $ 158, Surge Arrestors Surge Arrester Additions/Replacements Program (SA206DEF) $ 2,421,000 $ 258,708 6% $ 2,421, Batteries Station Battery Bank Replacements /06 (PG05BATS) $ 500,000 $ 9,579 10% $ 633, Facilities - General Roof Replacements Roof Replacements /05 (PG04ROOF) $ 436,000 $ 487,000 92% $ 701, Roof Replacements /04 (PG03ROOF) $ 263,000 $ 254, % $ 254,674 Seismic Upgrades Murrin Curtain Wall Seismic Reinforcement (MUR06SEI) $ 125,000 $ 43,656 35% $ 102, Kidd 1 Sheet Pile Wall (KI106SHT) $ 310,000 $ 187,000 17% $ 343,684 Auxiliary Equipment Upgrades As-builts for closed projects $ 700,000 $ 684,000 91% $ 732,642 A00172 Ingledow - Station Service Upgrade (ING02SS) $ 874,000 $ 732,788 74% $ 1,519,939 Spill Containment Improvements Oil Spill Containment - Group $ 2,307,000 $ 186,000 8% $ 2,326, Oil Spill Containment - Group 10 Sites $ 145,000 $ 10,000 2% $ 146,476 Gravel Refresh Substation Gravel Replacement 2004/05 to 2007/ $ 1,250,000 $ 732,000 49% $ 1,371, Fire Protection Systems A72065 Fire Risk CO2 and Halon Replacement (FRCO204) $ 87,000 $ 75,245 96% $ 75, Fire Risk Reduction /2004 Site Assessments (FRRP03) $ 182,000 $ 151,792 91% $ 153, Cathedral Square - CO2 System Replacement (CSQ04REM,CSQ05REM) $ 428,000 $ 289,000 76% $ 370, Microwave Equipment A01180 Microwave System Replacement - Peace/Skeena Northern Region (MWPESC) $ 21,778,000 $ 18,576,199 90% $ 21,907, Power Line Carrier Equipment Power Line Carrier Replacements /06 (PLCREPS3) $ 4,078,000 $ 105,429 44% $ 4,111,394

7 Stations Projects 3 Project Start Finish Initial Approved Costs Expenditures to Date Percent Complete Estimated Cost at Completion HVDC Pole HVDC - Pole I Mercury Cross Contamination and HVAC Upgrade $ 3,482,000 $ 422,000 14% $ 3,755,923

8 1 Circuit Breakers Materiality: HI should be accurate within TRANSMISSION ASSETS 1.Circuit breaker design type (e.g. oil, air blast, SF6). Should penalize obsolete technologies (e.g oil CBs) 2. Doble Test bushing capacitance loss angle (to detect moisture ingress). 3. Dissolved gas analysis of oil-filled bushing oil. 4. Number of operations 5. Age 1. Bushing tests are particularly important because of the risk of explosive failure. 2. The significance of fatal end-of-life criteria is diminished by non-critical criteria in the Health Index (HI) formulation (based on typical weightings). 3. Composite results, that include all different breaker designs, can be misleading Disconnect Switches 3 Circuit Switchers 1. Too few older (>40 years) disconnects. 1. The key condition indicator reported is a thermographic test. That is important but not diagnostic, it will only tell about the ability to carry current if it is carrying current at the instant of the test. Missing is data on a simple operation of the disconect to prove the disconnect is not seized. 1. Should penalize obsolete models no longer supported. 2. Number of operations 3. Age 1. Loss of SF6 gas which accounts for most circuit switcher failures. 1. Results do not agree with actual field problems and failures of disconnect switches. Report states all disconnects are "good or very good". The assessment should factor in past failures and known problems with certain types of disconnects. 1. An HI of 98.3 "good or very good" rating is not consistent with numerous past failures. 2. The reported distribution with almost all good or very good and two very poor but with none fair or poor is inconsistent with known continuous statistical distributions Transformers 1. Largest transformers are not identified. The system has 3 phase autotransformers up to 500MVA and a number of 1200MVA banks made up of 400MVA single phase units. 1

9 5 Instrument Transformers 1. Dry type lower voltage VTs missing (e.g 67kV). 2. Dry type 230kV and 500kV CTs don't exist. Materiality: HI should be accurate within 1. Doble Test bushing capacitance loss angle. 2. Partial discharge for dry type equipment (may lead to explosive failure). 1. Transformation Ratio. 2. Propensity of oil filled CTs to explode violently is omitted in evalution. 1. and repeatability of the results are in doubt since about half of the population was assessed using the 50% Rule 2. of CVT health index data is at odds with recorded failure rates (at least 10 failures within the last 8 years) Shunt Reactors 1. Dry type reactors incorrectly characterized. 2. Age information incorrect (e.g. Peace River 500kV system shunt reactors.) 3. Nonexistent voltage class identified (138kV shunt reactors). 7 Shunt Capacitors 1. Too many 138 kv banks and not enough 230 kv banks. 1. Condition assessment inappropriate in Table 7.3.3, rating D&E are failed units, not poor condition 8 Station Insulators 9 Station Cables 1. Demographic data is not included for this asset class. 1. No 360 kv or 500 kv station cables. 2. New 69 kv cables at McLellan Substation are not shown. 8 cables unidentified as to voltage or station, therefore 55% of population either unidentified or non-existent % of the cables have incomplete age information. 1.The assessment considers primarily aging cap & pin insulators which are not the current standard. Whether all types were considered for the HI, and whether the HI includes composites, is not clear. 1. Age. 1. Report should discuss the fact that 23% of cables are years old and nearing their life expectency Low because of large errors in demographics 10 Synchronous Condensers 1) Readily available demographic information (age) not identified for 40% of units. 2. The condition rating critera are very subjective, mostly based on observation. A different auditor may choose a different rating. 2

10 11 Gas Insulated Switchgear 12 Static VAR 1. Fort St. James STATCOM is missing Compensator (or should appear in SDA section). s Materiality: HI should be accurate within 1. Large portions of the SVC equipment (capacitors, reactors and transformers) were not included in the health assessment. 2. SVC controls. 3. Availability of spares for key power components and controls may be an issue and is missing from the condition criteria. 1. Report's ranking of HSY does not agree with comments by Acres' expert. 2. Results mainly based on expert opinion rather than condition data. No end-of-life measurements. 70 No comment. 13 High Pressure Air Systems 1. Missing high pressure air system for Murrin distribution (SDA issue as the air system only supplies the 12 kv distribution breakers) than the receiver, ratings (e.g air dryer and compressor) are very subjective. 14 Protective Relays 1. Control cables that connect relays to 1. Dust switchyard equipment (breakers and other accumulation is controlled devices). usually benign. 1. Relay condition data and the HI calculation methodology were not used. Instead, the HI is based on the technology used to implement the relaying system (electro-mechanical, static or numerical). The correlation between technology of implementation and the actual health of the P&C system is questionable. 2. The unexplained differences of the HI calculation rules between transmission relaying systems and distribution relaying systems casts doubt on the accuracy of both these HIs. Based on design type 1. The relay technology was used as the basis to determine HI and since it is not subject to any aging or deterioration mechanisms, the HI should be repeatable but for the wrong reason. 15 Surge Arrestors 1. Failure of hermetic seal. 2. Age. 1. A divider was used in HI calculation which results in significantly different HI from that calculated for identical distribution arresters. 2. Exceptionally low rating of gapped type surge arresters is inconsistent with failure to similarly rank explosion prone oil filled CTs. 70 3

11 16 Grounding Systems Materiality: HI should be accurate within 1. No information on the stations that 1. Measurements that confirm 1. Crushed rock. If the comprised the population or discussion of performance (e.g. fall of potential crushed rock is particular stations. measurement). inadequate (depth or 2.The demographics show 35% are Age. quality) safety hazards plus years. may exist in the substation. 1. End of Life criteria to account for system changes should be considered. For example, system changes over the life of a substation may result in fault levels above the design value. 17 Batteries 1. Charging system should have been considered separately from batteries The condition rating critera are very subjective, mostly based on observation. A different auditor may choose a different rating. 18 Standby Generators 19 Facilities General 20 Fire Protection Systems 1. The numbers of facilities appear to vary 1. Seismic vulnerability. with information filed by BCTC with Grid West. See: tieslist_bchydro_july xls.xls This shows a total of 257 stations in July The types of fire extinguishing equipment and fire protection systems noted in the tables are vague and do not cover the numbers and types of systems in place. 1. Corrosion, damage, deterioration or any abnormality are good measures of system health. 2. The repeatability is low because the scoring is very high level, does not identify critical elements and all of the fire protection inventory. The condition ratings are very subjective and therefore, subject to interpretation. 21 Microwave Equipment 22 Power Line Carrier Equipment 1. Coupling capacitors 2. Wave traps 70 4

12 23 Series Capacitors 1. Count of capacitor platforms is incorrect. Materiality: HI should be accurate within 1. 5% to 20% failed capacitors is unreasonable (Table ). Use 0.5% to 2%. 1. Bypass circuit breaker and other switching devices. 1. P&C system Low because of large errors in demographics suggesting lack of appropriate evaluation 24 HVDC Pole 1 1. Considering that approximately 90% of the condition assessment tests for Pole I are simple visual inspections, and that one of the two converter terminals is in the Lower Mainland, sufficient data should be available to meet the Rule. 2. Some of the data and associated health assessment tests are incorrect (e.g. checking fuses in the case of internally fused capacitors and no MG checks for the first grade power supply). All of this suggests the HI is not accurate. 3. HI is lower than expected. 25 HVDC Pole 2 1. Considering that approximately 90% of the condition assessment tests for Pole I are simple visual inspections, and that one of the two converter terminals is in the Lower Mainland, sufficient data should be available to meet the Rule. 2. Some of the data and associated health assessment tests are incorrect (age of one converter transformer incorrect, no PCB capacitors at Arnott, valve electronics failure rate cutoffs seem out by a factor of 10). All of this suggests the HI is not accurate HI is lower than expected. 5

13 26 Conductor Systems 27 Metal Support Structures 28 Wood Pole Structures 1) Composite HI must consider total conductor lengths. The composite HI results for the 500 kv conductor systems (or any voltage class with more than one conductor per span) appears to be skewed. For 500 kv, the conductor span is about 1500 feet with a 4-conductor bundle and for 60 kv the conductor span is about 300 feet with a single conductor. The individual results for 60 kv, 138kV, etc. should be okay but the combined results for the system will be lower due to skewing by the number of the 60 kv spans compared with the 500 kv spans rather than the amount of actual conductor. Materiality: HI should be accurate within 1) It appears that the HI ratings have come more from the age of the lines rather than actual structure condition information in STARR (Page bottom). This is probably why the 138 kv towers are rated lower as most of these are on Vancouver Island, which has an older metal line. This is probably okay but only gives a rough approximation and perhaps this should be stated in the Report. 1) No data was available for assessment largely due to inadequate information regarding the age and condition of the poles The condition assessment is largely based on age rather than actual condition, so the boundaries for the various categories would have to be defined in order to make the results repeatable. Conductors that were 38 years old would be 41 years old in next survey and that might put them in a different category. Should be repeatable but for the wrong reason. 1. The condition assessment is largely based on age rather than actual condition, so the boundaries for the various categories would have to be defined in order to make the results repeatable. Metal Towers that were 38 years old would be 41 years old in next survey and this might put them in a different category. Should be repeatable but for the wrong reason. 29 Vegetation/Ri ghts of Way 1. No data was available for assessment and assessments were made from discussions with Field staff. Assessment was quite subjective so will be difficult to repeat. 30 Access Roads 1) No data was available for assessment. This is largely a subject where input needs to come from Field Services. 70 Not rated. 6

14 Materiality: HI should be accurate within 31 Civil Works 1) No data was available for assessment. Soil erosion is shown as an asset, which seems odd. - Not rated. 32 Underground & Submarine Cables 1. No SCFF cable systems were listed in 'very good' condition, even though > $75M has been spent recently on 2L39, 2L40 and 2L Similarly, no XLPE cable systems were listed as 'very good', even though 60L50 was recently commissioned. We suggest updating the database to reflect true condition. 1. Tables 'Gas-in- Oil Analysis' and 'Sheath Bonding, CP tests, etc.' are benign and should not be used as end-oflife critera 2) Table shows 1 SCGF cable system as 'fair', and three as 'good', however all of the submarine cable circuits (including both of 1L17/18) were installed in 1956/58 and should be in the same condition. Since the circuits have been capacity derated due to advanced armour corrosion, we suggest they both be described as 'poor'. 2. BCH's submarine cable system is a ~$1B asset, yet methods are not provided to accurately gauge its health, uniquely defined by installation conditions different than land cables. 33 Manholes & 1. Only one manhole was classified as Duct Systems being in 'very good' condition (ref. Figs ), even though 11 new manholes were installed for new circuit 2L33 in Circuit Breakers 1. Seismic vulnerability. It is an important 1. Tables indicator of underground transmission through circuit health, which can be compared to are benign and performance expectations. Several Metro should not be Vancouver circuits are quite weak used a end-oflife critera. seismically; in some sections susceptible to liquefaction soil instability. Repairs are easy and overall asset health is not threatened. SDA ASSETS Suggestion: Separate End-of-life Criteria and Condition Rating tables should be created for ducts and manholes. It is expected that the results would considerably modify the HI Results in Table and Figure On the 2L39-40 (NEL-HIL) circuits which were redone a couple of years ago, about 75% of the ducts were redone due to the poor condition of the existing ducts. The reason that no defects were noted for the ducts is they largely have not been inspected whereas the manholes have been. 70 No comment.? See transmission comments. 2 Disconnect Switches 1. Only two 138 kv disconnects noted; there should be none or many more depending on the exact SDA boundary definition (probably none).? 7

15 3 Circuit Switchers 1. Only one 138 kv switcher is listed; there should be none or many more depending on the exact SDA boundary definition (ALL circuit switchers are probably for switching reactive equipment and not SDA). Materiality: HI should be accurate within? 1. Low due to errors in demographics; data for critical condition measures believed unavailable to auditors, data on operability believed unavailable or unknown. 4 Transformers 1. A number of large transformers that are larger than any supplying the distribution system were included. Also a 360 kv transformer is identified but there is no such transformer.? 1. Low due to large errors in demographics. 5 Instrument Transformers 1. Dry type VTs? 1. Low due to errors in demographics. 6 Shunt Capacitors capacitors in 0-9 year age bracket reported; the correct number is more like 13.? 1. Low due to large errors in demographics. 7 Insulators No data 8 Substation Cables and Terminations 1. The number of failures in recent years suggests an aging condition criterion that is missing 1. The only direct measure of actual cable condition is a thermographic scan that is not diagnostic, especially for underground cables.? 1. Low since the condition of the cables was not actually determined. 8

16 9 Protection and Control Systems Materiality: HI should be accurate within 1. Relay condition data and the HI calculation methodology were not used. Instead, the HI is based on the technology used to implement the relaying system (electro-mechanical, static or numerical). The correlation between technology of implementation and the actual health of the P&C system is questionable. 2. The unexplained differences of the HI calculation rules between transmission relaying systems and distribution relaying systems casts doubt on the accuracy of both these HIs. Based on design type 1. The relay technology was used as the basis to determine HI and since it is not subject to any aging or deterioration mechanisms, the HI should be repeatable but for the wrong reason. 10 Surge Arrestors? 1. Unsubstantiated difference of HI in comparison with identical distribution arresters. 11 Mobile Transformers and Unit Substations 12 Voltage Regulators 1. Four units were assessed; there are six. 1. Tap changers. These units get a lot of use and are a major cause of deterioration Low due to the failure to evaluate the tap changers and account for significant average age. 13 Series Reactors 1. There is a large population of CLRs serving the distribution feeders. It was overlooked entirely. - No results. 14 Static Var Fort St. James unit - No results. Compensator s 9