Simple-Offer vs. Complex-Offer Auctions in Deregulated Electricity Markets

Transcription

1 Simple-Offer vs. Complex-Offer Auctions in eregulated Electricity Markets Rimvydas Baltaduonis Gettysburg College IRLE May 23, 2012

2 What is an Economic System? Environment Performance Outcomes Behavior Institution Execution Messages

3 What is an Economic System? Environment Performance (efficiency) Institution A Clearing House Outcomes Behavior Messages I BI ASK I Execution B1 7 B B1 8.5 S S1 8 S5 S5 s offer

4 Motivation $1,200 Unconstrained ay-of/hour-ahead Market $1,000 Price ($/MWh) $800 $600 $0 $200 $0 26 June 2000 (M) 27 June 2000 (T) 28 June 2000(W) 29 June 2000 (T) 30 June 2000 (F) Hour

5 Some Questions What market design features foster competitive behavior in the market? How different market rules affect outcomes if a market becomes more concentrated? o competing suppliers end up offering their actual electricity generation costs?

6 Objective To compare the performance of two auction mechanisms a complex offer auction and a simple offer auction - when suppliers act strategically. Criteria: Price to consumers Efficiency Price volatility Risk of losses

7 Overview of Wholesale Power Markets in the U.S. ISOs run daily auctions to allocate generation contracts to the suppliers of electric power: 1. Suppliers submit complex-offers to the ISO Offer structure: quantities, energy prices, plant start-up fees, and technical constraints. 2. Buyers (LSEs) submit bids to the ISO. 3. An ISO runs a market clearing algorithm that allocates generation contracts ensuring that the system demand and reserve requirements are met over a particular time period. 4. Each selected supplier is paid his offered start-up fees and the market clearing price - MCP - (not the offered price!) for supplied units of electricity. It is a uniform-price sealed complex-offer auction.

8 Allocation Algorithms 1. Traditional Offer Cost Minimization (OCM) 2. Simple Offer Auction (SOA)

9 Offer Cost Minimization Auction The ISO minimizes the total offered cost of electricity, as if all selected sellers would be paid their offered prices and fees. Sequentially, after the offers are selected, a uniform MCP is determined as the highest accepted price for that period. All selected sellers receive their individual start-up fees and the uniform market clearing price for the supplied electricity during that period.

10 Simple Offer Auction The sellers can recover their generation costs both fixed and variable only through a uniform MCP. The ISO minimizes the total offered cost. Concerns about possible losses.

11 Environment: Supply Price 280 Supply (ATC) I S4 2 H S1 200 E E F G G S3 S4 S6 S5 S C S4 S5 S6 80 A A B S1 S2 S Units

12 Price Environment: Off-Peak emand Must serve emand H S1 Supply (ATC) I S E E F G G S3 S4 S6 S5 S Off-peak emand C S4 S5 S6 A A B S1 S2 S Units

13 Environment: Shoulder 1 emand Price 280 Must serve emand Supply (ATC) I S Interruptible emand E E F G G H S1 S3 S4 S6 S5 S C 80 A A B S1 S2 S3 S4 S5 S6 Shoulder emand Units

14 Environment: Peak emand Price 280 Must serve emand Supply (ATC) I S4 2 H S1 200 E E F G G S3 S4 S6 S5 S C S4 S5 S6 80 A A B S1 S2 S3 Peak emand Units

15 Environment: Shoulder 2 emand Price 280 Must serve emand Supply (ATC) I S Interruptible emand E E F G G H S1 S3 S4 S6 S5 S C 80 A A B S1 S2 S3 S4 S5 S6 Shoulder emand Units

16 Environment: emand & Supply Price 280 Must serve emand Supply (ATC) I S Interruptible emand E E F G G H S1 S3 S4 S6 S5 S Off-peak emand C S4 S5 S6 80 A A B S1 S2 S3 Shoulder emand Peak emand Units

17 Treatments Experimental esign (No. of Sessions; No. of Trading ays per Session) OCM SOA No Power (4; 53) (4; 53) Power (4; 53)

18 280 Findings: OCM/No Power Peak OCM 1 OCM 2 OCM 3 OCM 4 OCM price when true cost revealed Maximum 100% efficient price 160 Price Off-peak Shoulder 1 Shoulder 2 ay

19 Environment: Market Power Price 280 Must serve emand Supply (ATC) I S Interruptible emand E E F G G H S1 S3 S4 S6 S5 S2 160 S5 S1 120 Off-peak emand C S4 S5 S6 80 A A B S1 S2 S3 S1 Shoulder emand S5 Transfer of Ownership to Create Market Power Peak emand Units

20 280 Findings: OCM/Power Peak OCM/Power 1 OCM/Power 2 OCM/Power 3 OCM/Power 4 OCM price when true cost revealed Maximum 100% efficient price 160 Price Off-peak Shoulder 1 Shoulder 2 ay

21 Environment: emand & Supply Price 280 Must serve emand Supply (ATC) I S Interruptible emand E E F G G H S1 S3 S4 S6 S5 S Off-peak emand C S4 S5 S6 80 A A B S1 S2 S3 Shoulder emand Peak emand Units

22 Findings: SOA/No Power Peak SOA 1 SOA 2 SOA 3 SOA 4 OCM price when true cost revealed Maximum 100% efficient price 160 Price Off-peak Shoulder 1 Shoulder 2 ay

23 Grad Workshop Environment: emand & Supply Price Must serve emand F S12 Supply (ATC) G S C C E S7 S8 S9 S10 S Off-peak emand B B B S4 S5 S6 80 A A A S1 S2 S3 Shoulder emand Peak emand Units

24 Grad Workshop ata: Group 1

25 Grad Workshop ata: Group 2

26 Conclusions The good intentions of the complex offer auction are to help recover the avoidable fixed costs and reasonably appear to be benign, but the unexamined assumption of policy that people truthfully reveal their costs in a competitive environment have unintended consequences.

27 Let s take a look at your data!