TRAIN MINIMUM IN-SERVICE STANDARD

Transcription

1 Engineering Standard Operations Rolling Stock MFST TRAIN MINIMUM IN-SERVICE Version: 1 Issued: June 2012 Owner: Standards Development Manager Approved By: Ahmed Dwidar Standards Development Manager Authorise For Use By: YS Au Chief Engineer PRINTOUT MAY NOT BE UP-TO-DATE; REFER TO METRO INTRANET FOR THE LATEST VERSION

2 ENGINEERING - OPERATIONS Approval Name Position Signature Document Author Document Endorsers Eddie Yeung Victor So Wayne Walsh Rolling Stock Independent Engineer Fleet Engineering Manger GM Current Operations Approving Manager Ahmed Dwidar Standards Development Manager Authorised For Use YS Au Chief Engineer Amendment Record Approval Date Version Description 25/06/ Initial issue under MTM. Originally prepared by Graham Vallance Consultant RMAus & Terry Lai MTR Support, 14/12/2010. PRINTOUT MAY NOT BE UP-TO-DATE; REFER TO METRO INTRANET FOR THE LATEST VERSION Page 2 of 19

3 ENGINEERING - OPERATIONS Table of Contents 1 Scope and Purpose Abbreviation Definition References and Legislation Responsibilities Safety & Approach Minimum in In-Service Conditions Related Documents Appendix...12 List of Tables Table 1: Minimum in In-Service Conditions... 7 Table 2: Comeng Critical Fault 1 st Level Table 3: Xtrapolis Critical Fault - 1st Level Table 4: Siemens Critical Fault - 1st Level Table 5: Hitachi Critical Fault - 1st Level Table 6: Comeng Critical Fault - 2nd Level Table 7: Xtrapolis Critical Fault - 2nd Level Table 8: Siemens Critical Fault - 2nd Level Table 9: Hitachi Critical - Fault - 2nd Level List of Figures Figure 1: Fault Classification and Handling... 6 Figure 2: Minimum In-Service Standards Development... 6 PRINTOUT MAY NOT BE UP-TO-DATE; REFER TO METRO INTRANET FOR THE LATEST VERSION Page 3 of 19

4 ENGINEERING - OPERATIONS 1 Scope and Purpose 1.1 The purpose of this document is to set out the Minimum In-Service Standards for passenger train service safety. Failure to comply with specified requirements of these standards may increase the risks in passenger safety and safety of railway operation. 1.2 Minimum In-Service Standards consists of two parts: i. Fit-to-Run Conditions after Maintenance, and ii. Minimum In-Service Conditions. 1.3 The Fit-to-Run Conditions after Maintenance are specified in RS Technical Maintenance Plan (TMP) and owned by General Manager Rolling Stock. This document shall serve as a baseline against which the preventive maintenance for RS fleets shall be developed and reviewed. 1.4 This document only defines the minimum performance requirements for equipment on RS fleets operating in-service. The achievement of such requirements shall be maintained through condition-based, preventive and corrective maintenance activities carried out by RS Department. 1.5 This standard is applicable to the following passenger train types: Comeng Train X Trapolis Train Siemens Train Hitachi Train 2 Abbreviation BVIC C CCTV CD CT DDU FSS H HVAC MURL PA PEI PPE Brake Valve Isolation Cock Comeng Train both Tread & Disc Closed Circuit Television Comeng Train Disc type Comeng Train Tread type Driver's Displace Unit Flinders Street Station Hitachi Train Heating, Ventilation and Air Conditioning Melbourne Underground Rail Link Personal Address Passenger Emergency Intercom Personal Protective R1 RMAus Risk Level 1 R2 RMAus Risk Level 2 PRINTOUT MAY NOT BE UP-TO-DATE; REFER TO METRO INTRANET FOR THE LATEST VERSION Page 4 of 19

5 ENGINEERING - OPERATIONS R3 RMAus Risk Level 3 R4 RMAus Risk Level 4 RS Rolling Stock S Siemens Train TMP Technical Maintenance Plan VICERS Vigilance Control and Event Recorder System X X TrapolisTrain 3 Definition Nil 4 References and Legislation Nil 5 Responsibilities Nil 6 Safety & Nil 7 Approach 7.1 Risk based approach is adopted for the development of standards. The review results documented in the report Functional Safety Risk Assessment to determine Minimum Requirements for Electric Trains prepared by RMAus is the basis for the development. 7.2 R1 & R2 hazards identified are classified as Critical Faults which are further divided into 2 levels depending on the fault handling requirements. A complete Critical Faults list is shown in Appendix A. The remaining hazards with risk ratings lower than R2 are classified as Non-Critical Faults. The approach for the fault classification is illustrated in the below flow chart. In principal, a train reported as having a Critical Fault shall be withdrawn from service. A Level 1 Critical Fault demands train withdrawal ASAP whilst a Level 2 Critical Fault (ie. Serious Fault as per Metro Train Operating Standard) allows a train to be withdrawn at the best opportunity to minimize interruption to train service. PRINTOUT MAY NOT BE UP-TO-DATE; REFER TO METRO INTRANET FOR THE LATEST VERSION Page 5 of 19

6 ENGINEERING - OPERATIONS Fault Classification Risk Assessment Results No R1 or R2 Hazard? Non - Critical Fault Yes A Single Independent Failure Event Resulting in R1 & R2 Hazard? No Need to be removed from service i.a.w with Service Pledge? No Yes ASAP? No Yes Operational Mitigation in Place? Yes No Yes Yes Critical Fault 1st Level Critical Fault 2nd Level Fault Handling Train Handlingi.a.w Service Pledge Train Withdrawal from Service Train Withdrawal in the Best Opportunity to Minimise Train Service Impact Figure 1: Fault Classification and Handling 7.3 Based on the Critical Fault List, the functional requirements of the equipment whose failure will lead to a Critical Fault then form the Minimum In-Service Condition requirements. The approach for the development of the Minimum In-Service Condition requirements is illustrated on below flow chart. Fit - To- Run Condition After Maintenance Train Maintenance Standards/ Specifications + Minimum In Service Condition List of Min Train Condition Requirements (Free from R1 & R2 hazards) Train Exam Checklists Major Eqt ( e.g Bogie & T/M Overhaul Specifications) Minimum In-Service Standards Figure 2: Minimum In-Service Standards Development PRINTOUT MAY NOT BE UP-TO-DATE; REFER TO METRO INTRANET FOR THE LATEST VERSION Page 6 of 19

7 ENGINEERING - OPERATIONS 8 Minimum in In-Service Conditions 8.1 Identified mitigations shall be applied when the minimum requirements of the inservice conditions stipulated in the below table cannot be met. Train handling shall follow the requirements for Level 1 or Level 2 Critical Fault accordingly. Table 1: Minimum in In-Service Conditions Component Train Type (Note 1) Min Requirements Recommended Operational Control if Min Requirements cannot be met Body & External Fittings Saloon Windows H,C,S,X All Saloon windows shall be correctly installed and fully secured with key rubbers and safety clamps. Competent employee to protect the open area if there is any window glass missing. Windows, external panels, mirrors, handrails, steps, tread plate, equipment covers, underframe equipment Drivers mirror / side windows Driving Cab Windscreen Brake H,C,S,X H,C,S,X H,C,S,X All externally mounted equipment shall be in compliance with allowable train outline. All Driver's mirrors and windows shall provide clear rear view of train. Lead cab to be within operating standard. The train may proceed where damaged equipment can be secured to ensure it does not drag, threaten other equipment or in any way exceed allowable outline. Swept area of the windscreen wiper to be cleaned to provide sufficient view to permit safe operation of the train. Air Brake H,C,S,X (i) All Service brakes shall be fully functional with braking to each axle in compliance with each braking mode. (ii) All emergency brakes shall be fully functional with braking to each axle. Brake Valve Isolation Cock (BVIC) and switch Auto Park Brake Switch Park Brake Switch - local Park Brake Switch - train line C,H C,H C,H C,H, S The Brake Valve Isolating Cock and Switch shall be fully functional. All Parking Brakes and operating equipment shall be fully functional. The train may proceed at reduced speed under bogie isolated conditions. Details will be provided once mutual agreement with TSV is achieved. Minimum number of operating Park Brake Cylinders must be 50% or greater to hold a fully loaded train in the suburban system. PRINTOUT MAY NOT BE UP-TO-DATE; REFER TO METRO INTRANET FOR THE LATEST VERSION Page 7 of 19

8 ENGINEERING - OPERATIONS Component Train Type (Note 1) Min Requirements Recommended Operational Control if Min Requirements cannot be met Couplings Scharfenberg Dellner Auto-coupler Semi-permanent coupler Transition coupler Gangway & Safety chains Communications C,X S H C,S,X C,S,X H,C (i) All Automatic Couplers, semipermanent couplers and Transition Couplers shall be fully mechanically, pneumatically and electrically functional. (ii) All train separation detection devices shall be fully functional. At least one chain shall be securely and correctly connected and 2 handrails to be available. PA H,C,S,X All PA communication equipment shall be fully functional to ensure correct and reliable operation. Cable ties are available for Driver to effect temporary repair or Communication Doors are to be locked to prevent passengers using the walkway. PA of lead car must be operational. Fixed Train Radio H,C,S,X Fixed Train Radio The train may proceed if the Driver has adequate communication via his mobile telephone and portable radio. Saloon area intercom and emergency call button. C,S,X 000 Stickers Regular PA announcements Whistle H,C,S,X At least one whistle tone warning shall be functional. Doors Serious with a Priority shunt Door control H,C,S,X (i) All Saloon Doors shall be fully functional. (ii) Door interlock circuits (Door closed and traction control circuits) shall be fully functional. (iii) Door obstacle detection shall be fully functional. Cab to Saloon Door C,S,X Cab to Saloon doors shall be operated properly. The train may proceed where the Driver can detect the fault and take steps to secure the doors or vacate the car. No more than 1 door per side per car to be inoperative. The Cab to Saloon Door of the leading and unattended cabs must be able to lock. Or competent employee travelling to protect PRINTOUT MAY NOT BE UP-TO-DATE; REFER TO METRO INTRANET FOR THE LATEST VERSION Page 8 of 19

9 ENGINEERING - OPERATIONS Component Train Type (Note 1) Min Requirements Recommended Operational Control if Min Requirements cannot be met Cab Door C,S,X Cab Door of the leading cab shall be able to be operated properly. Cab Door of the unattended cabs must be able to be locked and secured. Cab Door H The Cab Door shall be open and close properly. Controls For Siemens, withdraw the train if door loop is bypassed. For Comeng, the leading cab door may be fitted with door latch or dead bolts to Cab Door as redundant device provided that the Cab to Saloon Door is operative. The driver shall secure the Cab Door at the leading and unattended cabs and withdraw the train from service. HVAC heating, cooling for cab. 2xCab heaters. HVAC x2 heating, cooling for cab. 2xCab heaters. HVAC heating, cooling for cab. 1xCab heater. HVAC heating, cooling for saloon. Ventilation & Air filtering. HVAC ventilation fans. C,X. H S C,S,X C,X H,S When ambient temperature > 30 deg C, all leading and trailing car air conditioning units shall be able to provide the required cooling requirements When ambient temperature > 30 deg C, all leading and trailing car air conditioning units shall be able to provide the required cooling requirements. At least one air conditioning unit per car shall provide conditioned air flow. At least one air conditioning unit per car shall still provide fresh air flow. The train may proceed where the Driver s exposure to the hot cab does not exceed 1.5 hours. The driver shall carry a Thermos flask and drinks and cooled water shall be available at FSS and terminal stations. The train may proceed where the Driver s exposure to the hot cab does not exceed 1.5 hours. The driver shall carry a Thermos flask and drinks and cooled water shall be available at FSS and terminal stations. Cab booster fan. Cab fan. C,X S When ambient temperature > 30 deg C, all cab fans shall be able to provide adequate air flow to the cabs. The train may proceed where the Driver s exposure to the hot cab does not exceed 1.5 hours. The driver shall carry a Thermos flask and drinks and cooled water shall be available at FSS and terminal stations PRINTOUT MAY NOT BE UP-TO-DATE; REFER TO METRO INTRANET FOR THE LATEST VERSION Page 9 of 19

10 ENGINEERING - OPERATIONS Component Train Type (Note 1) Min Requirements Recommended Operational Control if Min Requirements cannot be met Internal Fittings & Furnishings Drivers blinds H,C,S,X The Blind shall be adjustable to the degree that driver can safely control train including the use of PPE. Saloon Windows. H,C,S,X All Saloon windows shall be correctly installed and fully secured with key rubbers and safety clamps. Competent employee to protect the open area if there is any window glass missing. Lighting Headlights -Low & High beam Suspension H,C,S,X At least one Headlight per side of the leading cab shall illuminate. During daylight hours no headlights required. In MURL/Richmond tunnel a 50kph speed restriction is to be applied. During night hours no headlights required normal white marker lights are to be illuminated and speed must not exceed 50kph and 15 kph through sidings and stations. Secondary suspension. Coil with rubber element. X All Primary and Secondary suspension components shall be intact and set at correct ride height. The train may proceed at reduced speed (30kph) where the suspension height cannot be maintained. Secondary suspension. 2x Airbags. Bump stops. H,C,S, All Primary suspension components shall be intact. Airbags shall be inflated and set at correct ride height The train may proceed at reduced speed (30 kph and 80 kph for Siemens) where the suspension height cannot be maintained. Traction Gear case C All Gear cases shall be fully and correctly secured to the traction motor and axle. Gear box/wn coupling Traction cables & connections. H,S, X H,C The Gearbox and traction motor coupling shall be fully functional. All traction cables shall be fully insulated and secured. PRINTOUT MAY NOT BE UP-TO-DATE; REFER TO METRO INTRANET FOR THE LATEST VERSION Page 10 of 19

11 ENGINEERING - OPERATIONS Component Train Type (Note 1) Min Requirements Recommended Operational Control if Min Requirements cannot be met Traction Control Foot& Hand pilot valve H,C,S,X All Safety devices such as Hand and Foot Pilot Valves and Control Governors shall be fully functional. Master Controller H,C,S,X All Traction and control equipment shall be fully functional and comply with specified operational requirements Wheels Wheel Set H,C,X,S Wheels shall be fully functional and shall fully comply with the conditions specified in the relevant maintenance documentation Wheel Set CT, Bogie mounted equipment in contact with wheel sets shall be fully functional. Wheel Set H,S,CD,X Wheel set mounted equipment shall be fully functional. Either foot or hand pilot valve must be operative. The train may proceed at reduced speed (40kmh) where wheel flats are detected in excess of 60mm long and/or 2mm deep, if the wheel still rotates and displaced metal is not attached to the tread. The train may proceed at reduced speed (80kph) where defective brake rigging does not prevent the wheel from rotating. The train may proceed at reduced speed (80kph) where defective disc brake does not prevent the wheel from rotating. Note: Train Type Abbreviations as per section 2 9 Related Documents MFIS Functional Safety Risk Analysis for Electric Trains PRINTOUT MAY NOT BE UP-TO-DATE; REFER TO METRO INTRANET FOR THE LATEST VERSION Page 11 of 19

12 ENGINEERING - OPERATIONS 10 Appendix Appendix A Critical Fault List of the New Risk Based Fault Classification System Item Sub-system description Component Table 2: Comeng Critical Fault 1 st Level Critical Fault - 1st Level Description 1 Brake Auto brake Fails to brake train. 2 3 Brake Body and External Fittings Brake Valve Isolation Cock (BVIC) switch Driving Cab Windscreen Fails to shut off: brake pipe will continually charge. Damaged, Scratched Graffiti reduction in visibility. 4 Couplings Scharfenburg Fails to remain coupled. 5 Couplings Scharfenburg Fails to close when uncoupled. 6 Couplings Semi-permanent coupler Fails to remain coupled. 7 Doors Door control Unable to close. 8 Doors Door control Fails to indicate correct status. 9 Traction Gear case Mechanical integrity. 10 Traction control Foot& Hand pilot valve Fails to hold brake pipe pressure and secondary safety device inoperative Traction control Foot/Hand pilot valve Fails to release brake pipe pressure and secondary safety device inoperative. Wheels Wheel Set Wheel damaged/over-heated. Skidded wheel with flats in excess of 60mm long and /or 2mm deep. Wheels Wheel Set Locked axle. Bearing failure. Lubrication failure. Hot axle box. PRINTOUT MAY NOT BE UP-TO-DATE; REFER TO METRO INTRANET FOR THE LATEST VERSION Page 12 of 19

13 ENGINEERING - OPERATIONS Table 3: Xtrapolis Critical Fault - 1st Level Item Sub-system description Component Critical Fault - 1st Level Description 1 Body & External fittings Saloon Door Fails to close. 2 Body and External Fittings Driving Cab Windscreen Damaged, Scratched Graffiti reduction in visibility. 3 Couplings Scharfenburg Fails to remain coupled. 4 Couplings Semi-permanent coupler Fails to remain coupled. 5 Couplings Gear box Mechanical integrity. 6 Doors Door control Unable to open/close Suspension Secondary suspension. Coil with rubber element Failure of secondary suspension. As well as excessive wheel loading and unloading. Traction control Foot/Hand pilot valve The primary and secondary safety circuits fail to maintain or break continuity of safety loop. Wheels Wheel Set Wheel damaged/over-heated. Skidded wheel with flats in excess of 60mm long and /or 2mm deep. Wheels Wheel Set Locked axle. Bearing failure. Lubrication failure. Hot axle box. PRINTOUT MAY NOT BE UP-TO-DATE; REFER TO METRO INTRANET FOR THE LATEST VERSION Page 13 of 19

14 ENGINEERING - OPERATIONS Table 4: Siemens Critical Fault - 1st Level Item Sub-system description Component Critical Fault - 1st Level Description 1 Body and External Fittings Driving Cab Windscreen Damaged, Scratched Graffiti reduction in visibility. 2 Couplings Dellner Fails to remain coupled. 3 Couplings Semi-permanent coupler Fails to remain coupled. 4 Doors Saloon Fails to close. 5 Traction Gear box Mechanical integrity Traction control Foot/Hand pilot valve The primary and secondary safety circuit fails to maintain or break continuity of safety loop. Wheels Wheel Set Wheel damaged. Skidded wheel with flats in excess of 60mm long and /or 2mm deep. Wheels Wheel Set Locked axle. Bearing failure. Lubrication failure. Hot axle box. PRINTOUT MAY NOT BE UP-TO-DATE; REFER TO METRO INTRANET FOR THE LATEST VERSION Page 14 of 19

15 ENGINEERING - OPERATIONS Table 5: Hitachi Critical Fault - 1st Level Item Sub-system description Component Critical Fault - 1st Level Description 1 Brake Auto brake Fails to brake train. 2 Brake Brake Valve Isolation Cock (BVIC) switch Fails to shut off: brake pipe will continually charge. 3 Body and External Fittings Driving Cab Windscreen Damaged, Scratched Graffiti reduction in visibility. 4 Couplings Auto-coupler Fails to remain coupled. 5 Doors Door control Unable to close. 6 Doors Door control Fails to indicate correct status. 7 Doors Saloon Fails to close. 8 Traction Gear box/wn coupling Bearing Failure, Seizure, Collapse. Misalignment due to uncompensated wheel machining Traction control. Foot/Hand pilot valve Fails to hold brake pipe pressure and secondary safety device inoperative. Traction control. Foot/Hand pilot valve Fails to release brake pipe pressure and secondary safety device inoperative. 11 Wheels Wheel Set Wheel damaged/overheated. Skidded wheel with flats in excess of 60mm long and /or 2mm deep. 12 Wheels Wheel Set Locked axle. Gearbox or Bearing failure. Lubrication failure. Hot axle box. PRINTOUT MAY NOT BE UP-TO-DATE; REFER TO METRO INTRANET FOR THE LATEST VERSION Page 15 of 19

16 ENGINEERING - OPERATIONS Item Sub-system description Table 6: Comeng Critical Fault - 2nd Level Component Critical Fault - 2nd Level Description Brake VICERS Fails to provide secondary protection for driver incapacity. Brake Park Brake Switch -local Fails to apply or release local park brake. Brake Park Brake Switch -train line Fails to apply train line park brake. 4 Brake Auto Park Brake Switch Fails to apply train line park brake Body & External fittings Body & External fittings Body & Ext fittings Saloon Windows Body & External fittings Drivers mirror Glass missing fails to contain passengers. out of gauge. out of gauge. Fails to provide clear rear view of train. Communications Whistle Driver unable to sound warning to trackside pedestrians and vehicles. Communications Fixed Train Radio Driver unable to contact train control using emergency call button. Communications PA Unable to communicate to passengers in an emergency. Communications DDU: PEI, CCTV Unable to communicate to passenger at any PEI location in an emergency. Communications PEI. Saloon area intercom and emergency call button. Unable to communicate to passenger in an emergency at individual PEI location. 13 Couplings Gangway & Safety chains Safety chains disconnected or missing. 14 Doors Door control Unable to release HVAC heating, cooling for cab. 2xCab heaters Ventilation & Air filtering Cab booster fan Fail to condition the air. Failure to provide adequate fresh air. Fails to increase air flow into cab at ambient temperature >25C Internal fittings & furnishings Internal furnishing & fittings Traction Drivers blinds Saloon Windows Traction cables & connections. Fails to protect driver from glare and direct radiation. Window integrity not to be compromised as per L3-ROS-MAI-007 Fleet Maintenance Instruction Inspection of Train Windows. Fails to provide electrical insulation. Traction control Master Controller Fail to power train or to shut off. Potential overspeed leading to derailment. PRINTOUT MAY NOT BE UP-TO-DATE; REFER TO METRO INTRANET FOR THE LATEST VERSION Page 16 of 19

17 ENGINEERING - OPERATIONS Item Sub-system description Body & External fittings Body & External fittings Table 7: Xtrapolis Critical Fault - 2nd Level Component Drivers mirror / side windows Windows, external panels, mirrors, handrails, steps, tread plate, equipment covers Critical Fault - 2nd Level Description Fails to provide clear rear view of train. Fails to contain passengers. out of gauge. Or internal crack in window. Communications Whistle Driver unable to sound warning to trackside pedestrians and vehicles. Communications Fixed Train Radio Driver unable to contact train control using emergency call button. 5 Communications PA PA of lead car must be operational Communications DDU: PEI, CCTV Unable to communicate to passenger at any PEI location in an emergency. Communications Internal fittings & furnishings Lighting PEI. Saloon area intercom and emergency call button HVAC heating, cooling for saloon HVAC heating, cooling for cab. 2xCab heater Ventilation & Air filtering Cab booster fan. Drivers blinds Headlights -Low & High beam Unable to communicate to passenger in an emergency at individual PEI location. Fail to condition the air. Fail to condition the air. Failure to provide adequate fresh air. Fail to increase air flow into cab at ambient temperature >25C. Fails to protect driver from glare and direct radiation. Failure to illuminate. Traction control Master Controller Fail to power, brake or to shut off train. Potential overspeed leading to derailment. PRINTOUT MAY NOT BE UP-TO-DATE; REFER TO METRO INTRANET FOR THE LATEST VERSION Page 17 of 19

18 ENGINEERING - OPERATIONS Item Sub-system description Body & External fittings Body & External fittings Table 8: Siemens Critical Fault - 2nd Level Component Critical Fault - 2nd Level Description Drivers mirror / side windows Windows, external panels, mirrors, handrails, steps, tread plate, equipment covers Fails to provide clear rear view of train. Fails to contain passengers. out of gauge. Or internal crack in window. Communications Whistle Driver unable to sound warning to trackside pedestrians and vehicles. Communications Fixed Train Radio Driver unable to contact train control using emergency call button. 5 Communications PA PA of lead car must be operational. 6 7 Communications DDU: PEI, CCTV Unable to communicate to passenger at any PEI location in an emergency. Communications PEI. Saloon area intercom and emergency call button. Unable to communicate to passenger in an emergency at individual PEI location. 8 Doors Door control Unable to open/close Internal fittings & furnishings Lighting HVAC heating, cooling for saloon. HVAC heating, cooling for cab. 1xCab heater. HVAC ventilation fans x 2 HVAC Air filtering Drivers blinds Headlights -Low & High beam Fail to condition the air. Fail to condition the air. Failure to provide adequate fresh air. Failure to provide adequate fresh air. Fails to protect driver from glare and direct radiation. Failure to illuminate. Suspension Airbag Fails to sufficiently dampen vertical vibration by under inflation Suspension Secondary suspension. 2x Airbags. Bump stops. Potential wheel loading. Traction control Master Controller Fail to power, brake or to shut off train. Potential overspeed leading to derailment. PRINTOUT MAY NOT BE UP-TO-DATE; REFER TO METRO INTRANET FOR THE LATEST VERSION Page 18 of 19

19 ENGINEERING - OPERATIONS Table 9: Hitachi Critical - Fault - 2nd Level Item Sub-system description Component Critical Fault - 2nd Level Description 1 Body & External fittings Saloon Windows. Glass missing at the bottom windows with competent employee to protect the area. 2 Body & External fittings Body & External Fittings out of gauge. 3 Body & External fittings Drivers mirror Fails to provide clear rear view of train. 4 Couplings Gangway & Safety chains Safety chains disconnected or missing. Fall from train. 5 Communications Whistle Driver unable to sound warning to trackside pedestrians and vehicles. 6 Communications Fixed Train Radio Driver unable to contact train control using emergency call button. 7 Communications PA PA of lead car must be operational. 8 Brake Park Brake Switch - local 9 Brake Park Brake Switch - train line 10 Brake Auto Park Brake Switch Fails to apply or release local park brake. Fails to apply or release train line park brake. Fails to apply or release train line park brake. 11 Doors Cab Door Fails to open. 12 Doors Door control Unable to release 13 HVAC x2 heating, cooling for cab. 2xCab heaters Fail to condition the air. 14 Internal fittings & furnishings Drivers blinds Fails to protect driver from glare and direct radiation. 15 Lighting Headlights -Low & High beam Failure to illuminate. 16 Traction control Master Controller Fail to power train or to shut off. 17 Traction Traction cables & connections Fails to provide electrical insulation. PRINTOUT MAY NOT BE UP-TO-DATE; REFER TO METRO INTRANET FOR THE LATEST VERSION Page 19 of 19