Allied in Combat: Coalition Organization and Battlefield Performance

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1 Allied in Combat: Coalition Organization and Battlefield Performance Rosella Cappella Zielinski Boston University Ryan Grauer University of Pittsburgh Prepared for Peace Science Society Conference, South Bend, IN, October 2016

2 Why Do Coalitions Vary In Their? Theoretically and Politically Important Surprisingly Little Existing Literature Insights from Organization Theory Coordinative Structure Resource Asymmetry

3 Why Do Coalitions Vary In Their? U-forms and M-forms Executive Executive A B A1 B1 1A 2A 3A 4A A2 B2 1B 2B 3B 4B A3 B3 A4 B4 Intervening Effects of Resource Asymmetry

4 Why Do Coalitions Vary In Their? Coordinative Structure U-Form M-Form Resource Endowment Asymmetric Symmetric High Levels of Low Levels of Low Levels of High Levels of

5 Descriptive Statistics For World War I and II Major Battles (Clodfelter and Dupey & Dupey) Western, Eastern and Italian Fronts; North Africa; Pacific Theatre Frequency of Co-Belligerency on the Battlefield 55/129 43% Battles involved more than two belligerent forces 68% Allied; 32% Axis/Central Powers Number of Co-Belligerents on the Battlefield Allies 18 Battles involved 2 co-belligerents; 12 Battles with 3; 6 Battles with 4; 2 Battles with 5 Axis/Central Powers 17 Battles with 2 co-belligerents; 1 Battle with 3 Member Contribution and Parity

6 Research Design Four Case Studies Coordinative Structure Structural Variables Held Constant: Technology Offense Defense Balance Battle Variables Held Constant Parity Ad-Hoc Alliances Offensive and Defensive Operations Resource Endowment Asymmetric Symmetric U-Form High Levels of Axis in North Africa Low Levels of M-Form Low Levels of Axis in North Africa High Levels of First Battle of Ypres 1914

Axis in North Africa Axis in North Africa 1941-42 119,000 (Axis) vs.

7 Axis in North Africa Axis in North Africa ,000 (Axis) vs. 118,000 (Allies) Wide open terrain permitting fluid transition from offense to defense Axis battlefield victories Asymmetric Coalition Bastico: the infantry man and the mule Rommel: It made one s hair stand on end to see the sort of equipment with which the Duce had sent his troops into battle.

8 M-Form North Africa Command (Bastico) Mussolini Hitler Italian Mobile (20 th ) Corps (Gamberra) 21 st Italian Corps Italian Savona Armored Group Africa (Rommel) Ariete Amoured Trieste Motorized Trento Bologna Brescia Pavia German Africa Corps (D.A.K.) 15 th Armoured 21 st Armoured Africa (later 90 th Light)

M-Form + Asymmetry = Low In response to Allied offensive German General Crüwell insisted that the Ariete was unable to stand the pressure alone General Gambarra refused aid of Panzer divisions Rommel

9 M-Form + Asymmetry = Low In response to Allied offensive German General Crüwell insisted that the Ariete was unable to stand the pressure alone General Gambarra refused aid of Panzer divisions Rommel asks Mussolini to put Gambarra under his command. Mussolini agrees to remove Gambarra from official command yet Ariete and Trieste remain formally under Bastico. 15 th Panzer Division joins Ariete at Sidi Rezegh and Allies withdraw

10 Towards U-Form North Africa Command (Bastico) Hitler Italian Mobile (20 th ) Corps (Gamberra) Armored Group Africa (Rommel) Ariete Amoured Trieste Motorized German Africa Corps (D.A.K.) 21 st Italian Corps 15 th Armoured 21 st Armoured Africa (later 90 th Light) Italian Savona Trento Bologna Brescia Pavia

Increased Hierarchy and Increased Combat Power Exploiting Comparative Advantage Rommel and retaking El Agheila March 1941: Italian infantry in defense positions, freeing up German motorized divisions

11 Increased Hierarchy and Increased Combat Power Exploiting Comparative Advantage Rommel and retaking El Agheila March 1941: Italian infantry in defense positions, freeing up German motorized divisions for offensive engagements. Rommel and retaking Benghazi April 1941: Brescia Division brought up to Benghazi so that German 3 Reconnaissance Battalion was ready to continue its eastward advance. Improved training, morale, tactics of Italian troops

The Limits of Incomplete Hierarchy Ariete & Trieste Motorized Divisions remain separate December 1941 attack at Gobi to be made with Italian Motorized Corps Italians fail to arrive and the Africa

12 The Limits of Incomplete Hierarchy Ariete & Trieste Motorized Divisions remain separate December 1941 attack at Gobi to be made with Italian Motorized Corps Italians fail to arrive and the Africa Korps strike alone Rommel: The enemy fell slowly back on Bir el Gobi, but it was no longer possible to destroy, or even outflank and envelop any material part of their force. There was in fact a serious danger of our own force being outflanked round both sides by the superior enemy. Crüwell, who realized that the destruction of the enemy could only be achieved with the co-operation of the Italians, repeatedly wired: Where is Gambara?

13 Why Do Coalitions Vary In Their? Preliminary Conclusions A Small Literature, Ripe for Investigation Organizational Structures Should Matter Asymmetric M-form Coalitions Clearly Underperform Further Work is Necessary to Assess Other Hypotheses

TOBRUK AAR of Strategy & Tactics #278 Tobruk 1941

TOBRUK AAR of Strategy & Tactics #278 Tobruk 1941 Tobruk, with the German 15 th and 21 st Panzer Divisions deployed to the east and other Italian formations covering the coastal positions. The Axis can win a sudden death victory if they manage to capture