Artillery at Menin Road.

Transcription

1 1 Presentation to RAAHC Artillery at Menin Road. The Official Historian of Australia in the Great War, Dr Charles Bean, (Image of Dr Bean) has dominated the Australian interpretation of that titanic struggle for more that eighty years. To challenge his version of why things happened is a very brave step for anyone, historian or not. However, his volume dealing with the events of 1917 has been criticised as being one of his weakest works. There are many explanations proposed for why this is so: he was ill for much of the year; he was chronically overworked and he had not become as emotionally engaged with the key Australian participants in the battles of 1917 as he did in those of the years on either side. However, there is another, less-charitable explanation that has its foundation in the very nature of battle in Bean was an unapologetic fan of the Australian infantryman (image of an Australian infantryman) his audacity, bravery and determination yet as 1917 showed on far too many occasions, none of these characteristics were sufficient on their own to win the battle. By 1917, this war had become the artillery s war. Perhaps it always had been artillery killed more than all other weapons combined, usually estimated at 56% of all casualties however by 1917 even the most one-eyed infantry general would not think of planning an attack without first consulting his artillery commander. (Image of artillery on WF) Artillery now decided the

2 2 outcome and this technological face of battle did not fit Bean s paradigm. It was the artillery, not the infantry, that was winning the war and the battles of the 1917 Passchendaele campaign were the inescapable evidence of this new battlefield tactical truth. Artillery s dominance of the battlefield did not occur by mischance yes, there were factors such as the largely static nature of much of the war, especially on the Western Front, that contributed, but there were other, arguably more important, developments, often the work of the gunners and the gun-makers themselves that made artillery the true war-winning weapon system it became. Improvements in the sciences of physics, chemistry and metallurgy enabled gun-makers (Image of 18 inch gun) to design and build much heavier and more accurate guns and shells. New roles and tasks were added, including long-range interdiction, counter-battery fire and anti-aircraft responsibilities. (image of AA guns) New techniques evolved, requiring new skills - indirect fire meant learning how to deal with observers in aircraft and balloons, (image of Re8) accurate indirect fire meant factoring in an extraordinary number of variables such as weather conditions, barrel wear and ammunition temperature into fire solution calculations. As well, the traditional support for the infantry role became immeasurably more complex in implementation. New organisations, new doctrine and new tactics had to be developed to take advantage of these new developments. The introduction in significant numbers

3 3 of new types of artillery meant artillery doctrine was a fast-evolving process while, at the other end of the adaptation requirement, the introduction of very heavy guns demanded innovative methods to give them any useable mobility. (image of tractor) Apart from the new roles already mentioned, artillery planners had to learn to cooperate with new players in the barrage role mortars and machine-guns. By 1917, neither the fire support role nor many of the more capable guns that provided it looked much like the 1914 equivalent. Some changes of course did not always help improve the artillery s somewhat complex relationship with its principal client the infantry. The Somme experience of the power of Allied artillery had forced the Germans to devise new defensive tactics. These were based, not on a hard crust of formal defences but on defence in depth, with heavy and accurate defensive artillery barrages providing the main destruction of the advancing enemy and infantry counter-attack formations held well to the rear to come forward and recover lost ground. British artillery planners, recognising the implications of these changes, then gave higher priority to specialised counter-battery capabilities and to long-range interdiction of the rear areas that would slow and/or destroy the advancing counter-attack divisions. Direct support of the front line was still provided, especially when the attack was underway, but priority for heavy artillery support was no longer determined by the assaulting infantry. (image of a pill box) The War Diaries however

4 4 suggest that the attacking infantry, when held up by a difficult enemy strong-point, did not understand or perhaps appreciate the subtleties of the new doctrine: probably cursing the gunners for not solving their immediate problem more than eulogising their contribution to overall success. None the less, it is incontestable that these new tactics led directly to British artillery domination of the 1918 battlefield. And if you were looking for a single example of how new doctrine and training, technological developments, organisational sophistication and new tactics were both evolving and combining with hard-won expertise in tactical fire support planning to produce a near perfect example of artillery support for a major attack, the Battle of Menin Road is hard to go past. (image of Menin Road) Before discussing the battle itself, however, I must explain one major organisational change made in 1917 that continues to confuse modern understanding of how the artillery was organised in Field artillery was traditionally an organic arm of its parent Infantry Division, which meant that when the division rotated out of the front line, it took its artillery with it. The inefficiency of this arrangement was recognised in early 1917 and the artillery underwent its last major organisational restructuring of the war. (wiring diagram Infantry Division 1916) Infantry divisional artillery was reduced from the three 18 pounder and one 4.2 inch howitzer brigades in the image to two field brigades, each consisting of three batteries of 18 pounder field

5 5 guns and one battery of 4.5 inch howitzers. The remaining guns were organised into Army field brigades and became a strategic reserve, for use anywhere extra support was required. In addition, it became common for divisions to leave their artillery in situ when they rotated out of the front line. Thus, just because the 1st Field Artillery Brigade War Diary reports being in action, it does not automatically follow that the 1st Infantry Division was also in action. Greater flexibility was also introduced for the heavy artillery by adopting a somewhat utilitarian method of tactically grouping batteries together for specific purposes in a specific operation. Heavy artillery had traditionally been managed at the battery organisational level. In 1916, they had begun to be grouped into larger force elements called Heavy Artillery Groups. These groups could contain weapons of widely different calibres and mobility 12 inch railway guns and wheeled six-inch howitzers for example - and were held as Corps or Army-level troops, to be allocated on a needs basis for specific operations. The Army-commanded field artillery brigades also would often be split and combined into groups with medium and heavy howitzers and different calibre mortars. The rather utilitarian description for these temporary blocks of massive firepower was usually simply the right, centre and left bombardment group, with another designated as the counter-battery group.

6 6 There are four slides following the next one - which will illustrate the size and organisation of the bombardment groups supporting Menin Road. However, for an audience like this, it is important to remind you first of some other elements in the bombardment plan. As mentioned, mortars and machine-guns were also included in the artillery effort, with barrages by the Divisional machine-guns 64 Vickers medium machine guns complementing and expanding the traditional artillery barrages. (machine gun barrage map) This is the standard method of explaining a barrage I draw your attention to the yellow dots on the bottom left of the diagram. These show the machine gun contribution the dots indicate the machine guns were to commence their barrage at zero hour, firing five hundred yards in front of the start line. At zero hour plus three minutes they were to extend their range i.e. lift 100 yards for another three minutes. There were also enough mortars in the barrage plan to get the defenders attention as well. Sixteen heavy, 9.45 inch, and usually around 12 medium, 6 inch Newton mortars were operated by each Division s Heavy and Medium Mortar Batteries. These were operated by gunners, functioned as artillery and were integrated into the fire plan. The 48 light trench mortars remained an infantry weapon but, when available, could also be given roles in a planned barrage. Their main role though was, advancing with the assaulting infantry, to provide immediate local support.

7 7 At Menin Road, the large number of artillery brigades available meant that for each of the two Corps in the Second Army attack, rather than be organised into the by now standard three single groups, they could be combined into two groups but each group was now a double bombardment group. As promised, the next four slides illustrate the size of these formations so I will roll through them slowly. Please note too, field artillery is not included in these tables. (Slides showing composition of a double bombardment group. (Battle of Menin Road map)the Battle of Menin Road started at 0540 on 20 September 1917 and for most of the assaulting infantry it lasted less than five hours for those taking the first objective, the Red Line, it was less than one hour. However, to fully understand what had been achieved, some context is necessary. Menin Road was the third of eight major battles in the Passchendaele operation there were numerous smaller ones as well. The Passchendaele campaign ranks just behind the Somme for the volume of emotion, missunderstanding and rancour it generates among historians and nonhistorians alike. I do not have the time to go through all the arguments about the strategic justification for, or the implementation of the campaign. However, in summary, it was launched for two basic reasons: to drive the Germans out of western Belgium and clear their submarines from their bases on the Belgian coast, and to keep German attention away from the French Army, which at this stage was

8 8 on the point of disintegration. Initial planning was for the attack to be conducted by the British Fifth Army under General Sir Hubert Gough. (photo of Gough) Gough had a reputation as a thruster and Haig, the Commander-in-Chief, wanted the attack prosecuted with some vigour. The plan was innovative and comprehensive there was even an amphibious landing (Operation Hush) planned to land a division behind the German lines. Unfortunately, there were also some errors in the plan: the main flaw being an overly-optimistic assumption about the ease with which the dominating high ground in the area of operations the Gheluvelt Plateau -could be cleared of the enemy. Gough launched his first attack the Battle of Pilckem Ridge (map of Picklem Ridge) at 0350 on 31 July. It made good progress but the Gheluvelt plateau, on its southern flank, proved impossible to capture. Having an exposed right flank severely limited the Fifth Army s ability to keep advancing nor did the miserable weather help. The attack ground to a halt, with some progress made but nothing like the depth of penetration planned. A series of smaller efforts were made to try and capture Gheluvelt while the main attack further north paused and consolidated captured ground. Haig, under considerable political, allied military and timing pressures, pressed Gough to recommence the main attack as soon as possible, even if the Gheluvelt remained in enemy hands. Consequently, a second major attack, the Battle of Langemarck, was launched on 16 August. (Map of Battle of

9 9 Langemarck) It also made some progress but again the exposed southern flank held it back. Haig lost patience with Gough and in late August brought in the British Second Army, under General Plumer, (photo of Plumer) on the southern flank of Fifth Army which shifted north to accommodate the new forces specifically to take the Gheluvet and free up the Fifth Army to press on with the main attack. (map of Menin Road again) The plan Plumer devised to capture the plateau was similar in concept to that for Messines: he proposed a four-stage, step-by-step attack with strictly limited depths of advance (1500 metres maximum for each attack), and a six-day pause between each attack. During the pause, while the infantry consolidated the captured positions, ready to repel German counter-attack, half of the artillery would be moved forward to provide the additional range necessary to support the next attack. Contrary to widespread British and French thinking on offensive tactics, each attack would be on a comparatively narrow front. The frontage for Plumer s Menin Road attack was essentially the same as that attacked on 31 July by II Corps. II Corps had attacked with two divisions. The same frontage would now be attacked by four, ensuring there would be sufficient combat mass to both make the advance, and secure it from counter-attack.

10 10 This is where the Australians, the artillery and Menin Road all come together. Plumer, knowing the challenge of the Gheluvelt, had demanded significant reinforcement of his Second Army: it had been heavily stripped of combat assets in June to build up Fifth Army for the main attack. The Australian infantry of I Anzac Corps, who were to mount part of the Menin Road attack, were resting and refitting in BEF Reserve and Plumer requested them as replacements for his worn-out II Corps. As II ANZAC was already in Second Army, this brought all the Australian Divisions together for the first time. Menin Road was the first major battle of Second Army s involvement in the Passchendaele operation, noting though it had been conducting operations in support of Fifth Army s attempts to capture the Gheluvelt Plateau in July and August. I need to make another important aside here we Australians always tend to think that Menin Road was an Australian battle and given 1st and 2nd Divisions were involved, it was. What many forget though is that it was not JUST an Australian battle. The battle called Menin Road involved three corps from Fifth Army, which attacked at the same time as Second Army. In Second Army, the main effort was by I ANZAC and X Corps, while on the right flank of X Corps, IX Corps also attacked. In all 10 infantry divisions advanced on 20 September, of which only two were Australian.

11 11 The key point about Plumer s plan for the Menin Road attack was that every aspect of it was subordinate to the artillery plan. As well as infantry reinforcement, Second Army s artillery assets were greatly increased. A large number of artillery units were transferred from the British Fourth Army, including three Australian Army Brigades of field artillery and the 22nd and 54th Heavy Artillery groups. Other brigades came from Army reserve. All the artillery of all the Corps and Divisions in Second Army were to support the initial attack, which meant I Anzac Corps, for example, had nine field artillery brigades (three hundred and twenty four 18 pounder field guns and one hundred and eight 4.5 inch howitzers) in direct support. In addition, other field batteries plus the medium and heavy guns shown earlier conducted the broader bombardment and augmented the barrage fire support. Plumer assembled over 3.2 million shells of all calibres to support this attack. Between 1914 and 1917, planning artillery fire support had become immeasurably more complex. Gone were simple linear barrages or localised engagements initiated by infantry commanders. Barrages could now be offensive, defensive, rolling, lifting, box, interdicting or feints and all of these could be programmed during an attack. The capability of specific gun types was closely matched to tasks. (image of RMA 15 inch) Long range guns tended to be used for long range interdiction and counter-battery, not used as in 1916, merely to add

12 12 weight to short range barrages. Heavy howitzers were used to attempt to destroy strong-points or pill-boxes while the lighter 4.5 inch howitzers became skilled at suppressive fire. (Fire plan image 1 of 3) The fire plan just for the support of the Australian attack at Menin Road was a complex and two phased affair. The first was a sporadic barrage of variable weight in the five days preceding the attack. While firing a heavy barrage to maximise the effect was desirable, such a tactic also warned the enemy that the infantry assault was imminent. Consequently, while the preliminary bombardment was very heavy, intended as it was to locate and destroy German artillery and as many German fixed defences (pill boxes, barbed-wire entanglements, and trench strong points) as possible, it was done in a manner that appeared routine. I don t know quite how over a thousand barrels of six inch or larger could be made to look routine but that is what the Artillery Orders demanded. More emphasis was placed on accuracy than weight or rate of fire. The fire support phase for the attack itself was based on an innovative new approach for the barrage. Given the nature of the enemy s deep and interlocking defences, there was little purpose in having a single, thin line of shells rolling just in front of the advancing infantry. This barrage was certainly not a single line of shells: it was a

13 13 storm of shells 1000 yards deep, comprising five separate lines, four separated by 200 yards while the interval between lines four and five was only 100 yards. The line closest to the attacking infantry was laid down by the 18 pounder field guns a mere 150 yards in front of the infantry forming-up positions. The second line was by 18-pounders together with 4.5 inch howitzers, the next three by combinations of machine-guns, six-inch, eight-inch and nine point two- inch howitzers. The barrage would not commence until the assault troops had begun to form up in No Man s Land trying to achieve a small element of tactical surprise. At Zero Hour it rested in front of the start line for plus three minutes before it began to roll forward at a specified rate. Initially this was 100 yards in four minutes for the first 200 yards then slowing to 100 yards in six minutes. Although the Australian infantry would later complain the rate of advance was too slow, it was based on the bitter experiences of the Somme where being separated from the barrage saw entire battalions destroyed. (Fire plan image 2 of 3) It would pause for an hour just past the first objective - the Red Line - to enable the infantry to consolidate their initial gains. It would then roll forward again at the even slower rate of 100 yards in eight minutes to the second objective the Blue Line - and beyond it. After a two-hour long pause beyond the second objective, it then rolled forward at the 100 yards in eight minutes rate to the final objective the Green Line. The infantry advanced as close behind the barrage as possible so that when it lifted, they could

14 14 engage the objective before the defenders had recovered. Within this general arrangement, the heavy howitzers engaged specific targets, (Fire plan image 3 of 3) such as pill-boxes or enemy field artillery within the zone. In all, the barrage at Menin Road lasted for eight hours and eight minutes, while the infantry were consolidated on the third objective after five hours. However, the artillery continued to provide protection, mainly through pre-planned barrages on specific areas, when called for by infantry SOS signals or when spotting aircraft detected enemy build-ups, for the next four days. At the same time they were repositioning guns and beginning their preparatory barrage for the next phase of the attack at Polygon Wood. The gunners were very busy on 20 September. The fire support at Menin Road was an outstanding success. Without it, the outcome of the battle would likely have been very different. Ending where I started, however, I can understand to some extent Charles Bean s reactions to warfare as it was now being conducted. While the infantry still had hard fights to face in the broken ground of the Gheluvelt and while they still won Victoria Crosses for acts of outstanding valour, the work of actually killing the Germans in sufficient numbers to enable the infantry to move at all was done largely by the gunners. No gunners won a VC at Passchendaele, even though they worked immeasurably harder and longer than their infantry colleagues and even though the German s frightful new

15 15 invention of mustard gas was used for the first time specifically on them. Reading Bean, I felt he seemed almost repelled by the disembodied feel of indirect killing. I found myself wondering, what would he have made then of the modern battlefield, where even more remote killing by semi-autonomous drones has become the norm? Thank you.