COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC UTILITIES

Transcription

1 COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC UTILITIES ) Investigation by the Department of Public Utilities ) on its own motion as to the propriety of ) the rates and charges proposed by ) D.P.U Massachusetts Electric Company and ) Nantucket Electric Company ) in their petition for approval of an increase ) in base distribution rates for electric service ) filed with the Department on November 6, ) ) INITIAL BRIEF OF ACADIA CENTER Acadia Center appreciates the opportunity to file this brief concerning the Petition of Massachusetts Electric Company and Nantucket Electric Company, each d/b/a National Grid (collectively National Grid or the Company ) for approval by the Department of Public Utilities (the DPU or Department ) of an increase in base distribution rates for electric service in the above-captioned proceeding. As a non-profit, research and advocacy organization committed to advancing the clean energy future, Acadia Center believes that consumer-friendly electricity rate reform based on good economic principles is key to enabling a distributed energy future. Changes to rate design must also protect low-income ratepayers, preserve access to community energy, and be properly integrated with other programs, such as the new solar incentive program currently under development. Acadia Center urges the Department to reject the Company s proposals for tiered customer charges and unreasonable access fees for new stand-alone distributed generation 1

2 facilities for several reasons. The proposed tiered customer charges do not meet the standards of fairness and continuity, violate the principles of simplicity and understandability, and do not improve the efficiency or cost causation basis of rates. The proposed access fees do not improve the fairness or efficiency of rates, and could undermine recent legislative direction to support community shared solar and low-income solar. As a result, these proposals do not satisfy the Department s criteria for rate design or comport with modern ratemaking principles and should be denied as not just and reasonable. These proposals were not justified with reasonable economic analysis, and recent legislation addresses any unfair cost shifts. The Attorney General s proposal for seasonal rates does meet the relevant standards and should be implemented instead. I. Procedural Background A. National Grid Petition, Acadia Center Intervention, and Initial Intervenor Testimony On November 6 th, 2015, National Grid filed a request for a general increase in rates and related proposals and supporting pre-filed testimony ( Petition ), in accordance with M.G.L. c. 164, 94 and 220 C.M.R et seq. This included the Pre-Filed Direct Testimony of Pricing Panel 1 ( Pricing Panel Testimony ) supporting the Company s rate design proposals. On November 12 th, 2016, the Department issued an order suspending the proposed rates and, on November 17 th, 2016, issued a Notice of Filing, Public Hearing, and Procedural Conference. Pursuant to the Department s notice, Acadia Center filed a timely petition to intervene on December 10 th, On December 17 th, 2016, a Hearing Officer ruling denied Acadia Center s petition to intervene, instead granting limited participant status. After a timely appeal to the Department, Acadia Center was allowed to participate as a limited intervenor and directed to focus 1 Exh. NG-PP-1. 2

3 on the Company s rate design proposals. On March 18 th, 2016, the intervenors and limited intervenors filed initial testimony, including Acadia Center s submission of the Direct Pre-Filed Testimony of Abigail Anthony, Ph.D. ( Anthony Testimony ). 2 B. Passage of An Act Relative to Solar Energy On April 11th, 2016, Governor Baker signed into law An Act Relative to Solar Energy, also known as Chapter 75 of the Session Laws of 2016 ( 2016 Solar Energy Act ). 3 The 2016 Solar Energy Act contained many provisions that significantly impact the legal and policy context for the National Grid petition, notably: Sections 3 and 4 create a transition to market net metering credits, valued at 60 percent of the previous rate, for a significant category of new solar facilities; 4 Sections 5 and 6 increase the private net metering caps from 4 percent to 7 percent, and public net metering caps from 5 percent to 8 percent; Section 9 allows distribution companies to propose a monthly minimum reliability contribution ( MMRC ) on accounts that receive net metering credits; and Section 11 mandates the development of a new statewide solar incentive program. This law was not anticipated at the time of the Company s Petition or the filing of initial intervenor testimony in March Current proceedings in D.P.U have implemented Sections 5 and 6 by increasing the net metering caps, are addressing the transition to market net metering credits under Sections 3 and 4, and are laying out the basic framework for proposals for an MMRC. 2 Exh. AC-AA-1. 3 At different points in the legislative process, versions of the underlying bill were numbered as S.1979, H.3854, S.2058, and H Sections 7 and 8 shield projects that are exempt from the net metering caps from the transition to market net metering credits. Public net metering projects are shielded from the transition by the definition of market net metering credits. 3

4 Similarly, the Department of Energy Resources ( DOER ) is beginning the development of the new statewide solar incentive program under Section C. Rebuttal Testimony and Hearings On April 19 th, 2016, National Grid filed rebuttal testimony, including the Rebuttal Testimony of Jeanne A. Lloyd, Peter T. Zschokke, Scott M. McCabe, and Timothy R. Roughan supporting the Company s rate design proposals ( Pricing Panel Rebuttal Testimony ). 6 On April 28 th, 2016, a number of intervenors and limited intervenors filed rebuttal testimony, including Acadia Center s submission of the Rebuttal Testimony of Abigail Anthony, Ph.D. ( Anthony Rebuttal ). 7 Evidentiary hearings commenced on May 2 nd, 2016 and concluded on May 26 th, Rebuttal testimony and the hearings did include testimony on and cross-examination regarding the 2016 Solar Energy Act. II. Background on Our Changing Energy System Massachusetts energy system is evolving and will look very different from its current form in years to come. Electricity produced by solar, wind, and other renewable technologies will power our cars and provide efficient heating. Residents and businesses will anchor an integrated grid, with power flowing between consumers and among smart appliances and batteries, within energy efficient buildings. 8 The transition is underway Massachusetts electric customers increasingly have access to new lower cost technologies that enable clean local generation and customer Exh. NG-PP-Rebuttal-1. 7 Exh. AC-AA-Rebuttal-1. 8 Exh. DPU-AC at 7. 4

5 engagement. 9 Community energy will provide equitable access to renters, low-income ratepayers, and those who cannot site clean energy at their own homes. 10 However, technological trends and consumer preferences are running up against a utility business model and rate design that assumed ever-growing electricity consumption, centralized power generation, and one-way power flow. 11 The rules written for the old model incentivize infrastructure investments so that the grid can meet infrequent peak demands. But new technologies and customer-side resources may offer lower cost and cleaner solutions that reduce energy demand and avoid the need for additional grid infrastructure. 12 In this docket, as well as other proceedings, the Department is exploring how regulatory change including rate reform can enable utilities to become full partners in this transition and remove barriers to the deployment of clean energy resources and advance consumer choice and control. 13 For instance, in D.P.U , the Department is considering a proposal to deploy energy efficiency measures and new technologies to minimize the use of diesel generation and defer the construction of a more expensive distribution infrastructure investment for Nantucket. 14 On a broader scale, the Department is considering proposals for a range of distribution grid modernization investments for National Grid in D.P.U , including advanced metering infrastructure that would enable new rate design options. 15 Policy and regulatory changes will influence the pace at which the energy system inevitably shifts to a more decentralized model with deep energy efficiency and local renewable generation. 9 Exh. AC-AA-3 at Anthony Testimony at Exh. DPU-AC at Attachment DPU-AC-1-1 at Anthony Testimony at Id. 15 Id. 5

6 While new technologies are giving consumers more choices and control over their energy consumption and production, the transition to a modern, low carbon electricity grid also offers a pathway to deep reductions in greenhouse gas emissions. Acadia Center analysis shows that converting all passenger vehicles and all fossil-fuel heated homes in the Northeast to highly efficient electric technologies would cut greenhouse gas emissions from these sources in half. 16 By maximizing energy efficiency and clean renewable energy resources, the region can achieve long-term greenhouse gas reductions of 80% below 1990 levels by The future energy system is already taking shape. New approaches to energy management and declining costs for solar and other consumer energy technologies have the capacity to give us a cleaner, smarter, and more inclusive energy system in the future, but the Department s rules and criteria for decision-making will have to change to accommodate innovation. III. Legal Standards and Ratemaking Principles A. Statutory Provisions The primary provision providing for Department review of electric distribution company rate proposals is M.G.L. c. 164, This section requires rate filings every 5 years, provides for Department investigation of the propriety of proposed rates, and dictates that orders of the Department on rates are controlling. In reviewing the propriety of proposed rates, the Department must determine that the rates in question are just and reasonable. 18 In 2008, 78 of the Green Communities Act 19 added a new provision addressing rate design: In all decisions or actions regarding rate designs, the department shall consider the 16 Exh. AC-AA-3 17 General Department authority over electric distribution companies is provided by M.G.L. c. 164, Attorney General v. Department of Telecommunications and Energy, 438 Mass 256, 264 n. 13 (2002). 19 Chapter 169 of the Session Laws of

7 impacts of such actions, including the impact of new financial incentives on the successful development of energy efficiency and on-site generation. 20 This section also created the basis of the current provisions for net metering of distributed generation, notably M.G.L. c These provisions have been amended several times since 2008, most recently by the 2016 Solar Energy Act. For different categories of distributed generation facilities, these provisions tied the value of net metering credits to different portions of the relevant retail rate. Historically, there was also an absolute prohibition on special fees for Class I net metering facilities 21 (those with design capacity of 60 kw or less) but an exception to this prohibition has been recently created by the monthly minimum reliability contribution under the 2016 Solar Energy Act. M.G.L. c. 30, 61 states that [u]nless a clear contrary intent is manifested, all statutes shall be interpreted and administered so as to minimize and prevent damage to the environment. This provision requires the Department, unless otherwise mandated, to promote environmental objectives, including minimizing greenhouse gas emissions and their resulting impacts on our Commonwealth and its citizens. B. Department Precedent In previous orders, the Department has articulated several goals for rate structure, which includes rate design. These goals include efficiency, simplicity, continuity, fairness between rate classes and corporate earnings stability. 22 The Department has further elaborated that meeting the goal of efficiency should involve rate structures that provide strong signals to consumers to decrease excess energy consumption in consideration of price and non-price social, resource, and 20 M.G.L. c. 164, M.G.L. c. 164, 139(d). 22 D.P.U and at

8 environmental factors. 23 Department precedent also makes clear that [a] company submitting a rate case filing before the Department has the affirmative burden of proof on all issues relevant to its rate filing. 24 C. Principles for Modern Rate Design Canonical rate design principles were laid out by James Bonbright in The Pricing Panel Testimony cites to these principles but does not reproduce them exactly, providing editorial gloss in several respects that is not contained in the text. 26 Roughly speaking the principles may be summarized as (1) simplicity, understandability, and feasibility, (2) effectiveness at yielding revenue requirements, revenue stability, and rate stability, (3) fairness of apportionment of costs and avoidance of undue discrimination, and (4) efficiency in discouraging wasteful use. However, these general principles are best considered as guideposts that do not provide precise answers to modern questions. 27 Acadia Center proposes more specific principles to advance modern rate design: 1. Monthly customer charges should be no higher than the cost of keeping a customer connected to the grid and the related customer service, but can be kept lower based on public policy considerations. 2. Other components of electricity rates can be reformed to better align customer incentives with cost drivers and the value they can provide to the system. 3. Ratepayers must be able to understand significant reforms and have a basis on which to respond and manage bills Id. at D.P.U at Anthony Testimony at Pricing Panel Testimony at See Tr. Vol. 5 at 768, lines (Cross-Examination of Pricing Panel). 28 Anthony Testimony at 5; Exh. AC-AA-4 at

9 Regulatory Assistance Project ( RAP ) has recently proposed a related set of three principles in Smart Rate Design for a Smart Future: 1. A customer should be able to connect to the grid for no more than the cost of connecting to the grid. 2. Customers should pay for grid services and power supply in proportion to how much they use these services and how much power they consume. 3. Customers who supply power to the grid should be fairly compensated for the full value of the power they supply. 29 These more specific proposed principles are well-aligned with the Bonbright principles and Department precedent, and provide actionable guidance for the Department in this docket and future rate cases. IV. Proposals from National Grid for Tiered Customer Charges and Access Fees For residential and small commercial customers, National Grid has proposed a two-phase approach to rate design. 30 For Phase I, the monthly customer charge for residential customers would rise from $4 to $5.50, the inclining blocks would be eliminated, and the remainder of the revenue requirement would be collected through a flat volumetric per-kwh charge. In Phase II, after six months for customer education, National Grid would implement tiered customer charges for both customer classes, based on a customer s maximum kwh consumption in the previous 12 months ( 12-month ratchet ), and make corresponding reductions in the volumetric charge to maintain the same revenue levels. 29 Attachment DPU-AC at Pricing Panel Testimony at 8. 9

10 National Grid has also proposed a monthly access fee for new stand-alone distributed generation projects. This would be initially defined at $7 per kw-month for projects connected at primary voltage and $8.50 per kw-month for projects connected at secondary voltage, and then adjusted based on a technology-specific capacity availability factor. The proposed factors would be based on the coincidence with system peaks: 40% for solar, 30% for wind, 10% for hydro, and 50% for anaerobic digestion. V. The Department Should Reject the Company s Proposals for Tiered Customer Charges and Unreasonable Access Fees Changes in rate design and net metering structures can improve the efficiency and cost causation basis of rates and address any proven cost shifts from distributed generation ( DG ) customers to other traditional mass-market customers. Such changes should not undermine incentives for energy efficiency, restrict access to community and low-income solar, or unduly impact low-income ratepayers and traditional mass-market customers. Here, National Grid has not provided reasonable analysis to demonstrate a cost shift and the proposals for tiered customer charges and unreasonable access fees do not satisfy the criteria for good rate design, so these proposals should accordingly be rejected. Lastly, the 2016 Solar Energy Act provides for two concrete steps to address any unfair cost shifting from distributed generation customers, so the Company s proposals to address that issue are now unnecessary. A. National Grid Failed to Provide Sufficient Analysis of the Costs and Benefits of Distributed Generation A key concept that has been less emphasized in historic ratemaking practices is the value of power and services provided by end-use customers. 31 This concept is reflected explicitly in both the Acadia Center principles and the RAP principles for modern ratemaking described above 31 Anthony Testimony at

11 because of the changes that are starting to occur in our energy system. This means that traditional cost of service studies are no longer sufficient for the purposes of rate design because they do not take into account the historic shift to cost-effective distributed energy resources and miss a significant part of the overall picture for system costs. Incorporation of the value of distributed energy resources into rate cases and other regulatory proceedings is a cutting edge topic that is worthy of significant consideration by the Department and discussion among stakeholders. The economic analysis that goes into cost of service studies has evolved over time and was the idea of regulators in the decades since the electric industry was created in the United States. 32 The value of distributed energy resources should be a part of the next evolutionary phase in the economic analysis for ratemaking. The value of distributed generation is also a key element of analysis of cost shifts. 33 Gross cost numbers for net metering credit value are not sufficient and the value of energy monetized in wholesale markets is only one category of relevant benefits. Benefits related to capacity, transmission, reduced energy prices, and the avoided cost of compliance with greenhouse gas emissions requirements are all potentially very significant and must be analyzed. 34 All segments of electricity system costs matter with respect to ratepayer incentive and impacts, not just distribution. 35 National Grid did not present any analysis for most of these categories of potential benefits. Even with respect to the distribution system, DG-specific costs or benefits were not 32 Tr. Vol. 5 at (Cross-Examination of Pricing Panel). 33 Anthony Rebuttal Testimony at 3-4; Exh. VS-NP-1, Amended Direct Testimony of Nathan Phelps on Behalf of Vote Solar ( Phelps Testimony ) at 8; Exh. EFCA-TW/MW-1, Corrected Direct Testimony of Tim Woolf and Melissa Whited on Behalf of EFAC ( Woolf/Whited Testimony ) at Anthony Testimony at Anthony Rebuttal Testimony at 4; Tr. Vol. 11 at (Cross-Examination of John Howat). 11

12 presented by the Company, with the exception of interval metering costs and a purported estimate of incremental O&M for stand-alone facilities. 36 B. Tiered Customer Charge Proposals Should Be Rejected The Company s proposal for tiered customer charges with a 12-month ratchet appears to be without direct precedent. 37 This concept accomplishes a number of objectives for National Grid: (1) increasing revenue stability; 38 (2) addressing an alleged cost shift by reducing net metering credit value and increasing customer charges on distributed generation customers who do not end up in the lowest tier; 39 and (3) starting a potential shift to demand-based rates. 40 However, in addition to National Grid s failure to justify the proposal with proper analysis of the costs and benefits of distributed generation, this concept does not satisfy many of the Department s criteria for rate design or principles of modern ratemaking. As a result, the Department should reject the proposal for tiered customer charges as not just and reasonable. 1. Tiered Customer Charge Proposals Violate Principles of Fairness and Continuity The tiered customer charge presents two specific problems with respect to fairness and continuity: (1) unfair bill impacts because of the tier thresholds and ratchets; and (2) significant shifting of cost burdens from high usage customers to low usage customers. In general, any rate design where a single kwh of consumption (here, moving from Tier 2 at 600 kwh to Tier 3 at 601 kwh) could cost a customer $72 has the potential for unusual bill impacts. Using the Company s 36 Response to Information Request EFCA This choice was made in part because of the reaction in other jurisdictions to proposals to raise customer charges in a more traditional manner and the impacts of those proposals. Pricing Panel Testimony at 37. The Company s proposal uses existing metering infrastructure and is feasible within the restrictions of the net metering statutes and the thenabsolute prohibition on special fees for Class I distributed generation facilities. 38 Tr. Vol. 5 at 749, lines 9-15 (Cross-Examination of Pricing Panel). 39 Tr. Vol. 5 at (Cross-Examination of Pricing Panel). 40 Pricing Panel Testimony at

13 data sets of residential customers, the Attorney General s witness on rate design found that Phase II rates would result in bill impacts ranging from decreases of around 10% to increases over 100% in a customer s annual distribution bill. 41 This is a fairly extreme range of results that does not demonstrate fairness or continuity. In addition, the structure of the tiered customer charge would also cause a significant shift in cost burden from high usage customers to low usage customers. The tier thresholds were designed in a manner that 25% of customers are above the final 1,200 kwh cutoff. 42 After this threshold has been passed, a large number of customers would pay a per-kwh charge that is lower than the current per-kwh charge for the tail of the inclining block rate. 43 This is exacerbated by the fact that the Phase I rate design eliminates the inclining block structure, another measure that shifts burdens to lower usage customers. In combination, transitioning from current rates to Phase II rates leads to significantly larger monthly bill increases for certain small or moderate customers than for large customers. For example, a 2,000 kwh customer would see a bill increase of approximately $5 44 but a customer consuming just over 600 kwh would see an increase around $10 per month. 45 Shifting burdens from high usage customers to low usage customers is particularly troubling because low-income customers are disproportionately low usage customers Exh. AG-SJR-1, Direct Testimony of Scott J. Rubin on Behalf of the Massachusetts Office of the Attorney General, ( Rubin Testimony ) at Workpaper NG-PP-4; Tr. Vol. 5 at Compare current distribution charge in excess of 600 kwh of $ (Exhibit NG-PP-18 at 1) with proposed Phase 2 distribution charge of $ (Exhibit NG-PP-21 at 1). 44 Attachment AC Attachment NG-AC at See DPU-AC 1-2 and Attachment DPU-AC

14 2. Tiered Customer Charge Proposals Violate Principles of Simplicity and Understandability The tiered customer charge proposals do not meet the principles of simplicity or understandability. These concepts go beyond simple intellectual understanding because, with solely historical information, it will be difficult for customers to understand whether their behavior is putting them at risk of moving into a higher tier or whether efficiency, conservation, or other measures would drop them into a lower tier. 47 This means that customers will not have a reasonable basis to respond to the rate structure and manage their bills, a violation of one of Acadia Center s modern rate design principles described above. 3. Tiered Customer Charge Proposals Do Not Improve Efficiency or Cost Causation Basis of Rates There are several levels at which the tiered customer charge can be reviewed with respect to efficiency and cost causation. On the first level, by shifting portions of the bill to a tiered structure with a 12-month ratchet and reducing the volumetric rate, the proposal reduces the incentives for energy efficiency. This effect may be modest for most ratepayers, but it is significant that high usage customers would have a lower per-kwh charge for their high usage under the Phase II proposal than the current tail of the inclining block rate. 48 With respect to cost causation, the proper analysis would focus on how the tiered customer charge corresponds to peak demands that drive distribution system costs. The Attorney General s witness on rate design examined this question closely and determined that the tiered customer charge proposal does not improve the cost causation basis of rates. 49 Instead of looking at system 47 Anthony Rebuttal at Compare current distribution charge in excess of 600 kwh of $ (Exhibit NG-PP-18 at 1) with proposed Phase 2 distribution charge of $ (Exhibit NG-PP-21 at 1). 49 Rubin Testimony at

15 peaks, the Company attempted to justify the tiered customer charge on the basis of the relationship between maximum monthly kwh consumption and individual kw peaks. This is an inferior metric because it does not link as closely to the distribution system peaks that drive costs. 50 However, even on this flawed metric, the tiered customer charge is not an improvement over standard volumetric charges. 51 Based on all three of these perspectives, it is clear that the tiered customer charge proposal is not an improvement with respect to efficiency or cost causation. The Department should, accordingly, reject National Grid s proposals on these grounds. C. Unreasonable Access Fees Should Be Rejected The proposed system of monthly access fees for new stand-alone distributed generation appears to have little direct precedent as well. The Company puts forward a theory that stand-alone projects must directly contribute to the full embedded costs of the entire distribution network in the same proportion as the demand cost allocations for G-2 and G-3 customers. This expansive theory is not necessary for fairness or efficiency, and may not save ratepayers any money because the access fee will need to be taken into consideration in the new incentive program under the 2016 Solar Energy Act. The Department should reject the proposed access fees as a result. 1. Fairness and Efficiency Stand-alone distributed generation projects already pay for interconnection costs, often in significant amounts. 52 Modest adjustments to these current practices may be reasonable, but it is not necessary to charge embedded costs of the network to stand-alone distributed generation. 50 Anthony Rebuttal Testimony at Exh. NECEC-RTB-1, Direct Testimony of R. Thomas Beach on Behalf of Northeast Clean Energy Council ( Beach Testimony ) at See Response to Information Request NECEC

16 National Grid has not shown that a system where stand-alone distributed generation pays for marginal costs and load customers pay for reliability, safety, and other embedded costs is unfair. Allocation of a large share of embedded costs to new stand-alone distributed generation facilities is not necessarily aligned with cost causation either, because those projects do pay for the direct costs that they cause and the network would still have to exist regardless to serve load customers. From a broader perspective, large access fees on stand-alone DG are inefficient because they may discourage cost-effective stand-alone projects in favor of more expensive types of projects Integration with Incentive Programs and Policy Goals The provision of the 2016 Solar Energy Act that creates a new statewide solar incentive program specifically provides for support for community-shared solar facilities and low-income solar facilities, 54 two types of projects that are typically stand-alone. 55 Application of an access fee to these projects would have to be addressed in the creation of the incentive program and, most likely, the cost of the access fee would have to be incorporated into the incentive levels for those projects, either directly or indirectly. 56 This means that, ultimately, there wouldn t be any ratepayer savings with respect to these categories of projects, and payments through the incentive program could be less efficient because of tax consequences. It is also relevant that, for many types of new solar projects including community shared solar and low-income solar, these fees would be in addition to the reduction in compensation from market net metering credits. Rather than undoing the Legislature s intent to support community and low-income solar facilities, the Department should reject National Grid s proposed Access Fee. 53 Anthony Rebuttal Testimony at Section 11(b)(vii) of the 2016 Solar Energy Act. 55 Anthony Rebuttal Testimony at Id. 16

17 D. The 2016 Solar Energy Act Addresses Any Unfair Cost Shifts from Distributed Generation The 2016 Solar Energy Act addresses the possibility of an unfair cost shift from DG customers to other customers in two primary ways. First, the transition to market net metering credits addresses any possible arguments about cost shifting for a significant category of new solar projects, including community shared solar and low-income solar, because the value of market net metering credits is reduced by 40%. 57 Second, National Grid is now explicitly allowed to propose a new system of monthly minimum reliability contributions for accounts that receive net metering credits in a new proceeding after the conclusion of this rate case. 58 Minimum bills are a blunt tool that do not provide smart economic incentives. 59 However, with proper economic analysis, this may be a more reasonable way to address any issues of cost shifting than the current proposals from the Company. Both of these provisions in the 2016 Solar Energy Act make it unnecessary to specifically address alleged cost shifts in this rate case, providing further grounds for rejecting the Company s proposals. VI. The Department Should Approve the Attorney General s Proposal for Seasonal Rates The witness on rate design for the Attorney General constructs a different proposal for seasonal distribution rates, where the per-kwh charge is modestly higher in July, August, and September than it is in the other nine months. 60 This rate proposal is an improvement over the Company s Phase I proposal on efficiency and cost causation because it better correlates with the 57 This includes community solar projects and low-income solar projects as discussed above. 58 Many implementation questions remain with regards to proposals for monthly minimum reliability contributions, including whether they should take the form of a minimum bill as that concept has been implemented in other states as an absolute floor on monthly payments. The Department has recently started to address initial issues in the comment process for the emergency net metering regulations in D.P.U See Attachment DPU-AC at 20 & Rubin Testimony at

18 summer distribution feeder peaks that drive costs. 61 The proposed seasonal rates also allocate costs more equitably and provide a simple and understandable signal for customers to manage their bills. The witness for the Attorney General also demonstrates that the range of bill impacts is reasonable. 62 Lastly, the Attorney General s proposal has the ancillary benefit of providing a signal that also correlates with the summer peaks that drive transmission and capacity costs. Because of all of these factors, the Department should direct the implementation of this approach for seasonal rates instead of National Grid s Phase I or Phase II proposals. VII. Conclusion Acadia Center appreciates the opportunity to submit this Initial Brief. Based on the foregoing, Acadia Center recommends that the Department reject the Company s proposals for tiered customer charges and unreasonable access fees and order the implementation of the Attorney General s proposal for seasonal rates. 61 Id. at Id. 18

19 Respectfully submitted, ACADIA CENTER By its attorney, /s/ Mark E. LeBel Mark E. LeBel (BBO #000526) ACADIA CENTER 31 Milk Street, Suite 501 Boston, MA x104 Dated: June 17, 2016 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I hereby certify that on June 17, 2016, I served the foregoing documents upon each person identified in the Department s service list for the above-captioned proceeding. /s/ Mark E. LeBel Mark E. LeBel (BBO #000526) ACADIA CENTER 31 Milk Street, Suite 501 Boston, MA x104 mlebel@acadiacenter.org 19