Lessons learned as Mosul operation intensifies [Content preview Subscribe to IHS Jane s Intelligence Review for full article] Despite a faltering start, the operation to recapture Mosul from the Islamic State has gathered pace. Jonathan Spyer reports from the city on the Iraqi forces' tactical improvements and analyses those tactics' applicability to the eventual Raqqa offensive In mid-february 2017, the battle in Mosul between Islamic State militants and Iraqi government forces was at a pivotal point, with the government having recaptured the east of the city by early February and, on 19 February, launching an offensive on the western half. The Islamic State had held Iraq's second city since 10 June 2014. An operation to expel the group from the city began on 17 October 2016 and Iraqi government forces initially entered Mosul on 1 November. Encountering fierce resistance, the progress of the offensive was slower and costlier than the Iraqi government and allied forces had expected. By early December 2016, Iraqi forces had captured only a number of outlying villages and made minor incursions into eastern Mosul city. At this point, the Iraqi government ordered a temporary halt to operations to review the strategic and tactical approach for the conquest of the city. Page 1 of 6
Iraqi special forces parade to celebrate the liberation of the eastern side of Mosul on 27 January 2017. The operation to expel the Islamic State from the city began on 17 October 2016 and Iraqi forces entered Mosul on 1 November. (PA) 1685302 The operation resumed on 29 December 2016 and subsequently made rapid progress. The assault was conducted along three axes, with the army predominant in the north, the Iraqi Special Operations Forces (ISOF) in the centre, and the federal police in the south. By early February 2017, the capture of the eastern section of Mosul had been completed. The Rashidia neighbourhood in the northern part of the city was the last to fall, although Islamic State forces continued to fire on the neighbourhood from the western side of the river. By this point, preparations were under way for the launch of the second phase of the operation: the conquest of western Mosul. That operation began on 19 February as an operation with three lines of attack from the south. Military sources suggested that the battle could take up to three months, with the west being better defended and more difficult for assaulting forces to breach. Islamic State tactics In the battle for eastern Mosul, the Islamic State was faced by a far superior attacking force (approximately 75,000 government troops against around 8,000 Islamic State fighters) and which was able to employ vastly superior firepower, including the air power and heavy artillery of the USled coalition. Nevertheless, the Islamic State managed to extract a heavy cost from Iraqi security forces and to avoid defeat in eastern Mosul for three months. Iraqi commanders and fighters interviewed by IHS Jane's repeatedly cited the Islamic State's tactical use of suicide vehicle borne improvised explosive devices (SVBIEDs), driven by fighters intending to detonate themselves along with the vehicle. The Iraqi forces' initial attempt to enter the city with Humvee convoys resulted in heavy losses and slow progress as the Islamic State launched attacks using SVBIEDs that were able to slow and trap convoys by their creative placement and to draw Iraqi forces into ambushes by snipers, fighters wielding rocket-propelled grenades, suicide bombers on motorcycles, and other fighters concealed within buildings. Iraqi soldiers and special forces personnel testified that Islamic State fighters routinely wore suicide belts, which they used when cornered or as an assault tool. This tactic has been used by the Islamic State since its inception. The 'Inghimassiyin' (infiltrators) equipped with these belts appear to constitute a kind of elite assault force separate from the main bulk of fighters. The Islamic State also made use of smoke from burning tyres to obscure visibility for coalition aircraft and attack helicopters, thus complicating targeting and increasing the likelihood of civilian losses (in itself, a propaganda tool for the Islamic State). The burning of oil wells in Qayarra and at the Al-Mishraq sulphur mine was an example of a similar tactic being deployed elsewhere in Iraqi conflict theatres before the Mosul offensive. In the fight for Mosul, the Islamic State also made use of commercially available unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) on a large scale for the first time. UAVs were used both as tactical intelligencegathering devices when equipped with cameras and to drop grenades on government forces. Facilities where Islamic State militants construct some devices from scratch or modify onlinepurchased UAVs have been discovered by Iraqi forces, with the majority being quadcopters. Page 2 of 6
Variants in use noted by IHS Jane's Terrorism and Insurgency Centre include fixed-wing Skywalker X7s and similar, DJI Phantom quadcopters, and hexacopters, such as the DJI Matrice 600. The Islamic State UAV threat appears to have been successfully countered, although it remains unclear how this was accomplished. Officers of the army, ISOF, and federal police told IHS Jane's of sometimes successful efforts by fighters to bring down UAVs through direct fire, although the UAV problem may also have been addressed by the use of 'classified technical assistance' from US forces, probably including the use of weapons specifically designed to deal with UAVs, such as the Battelle Drone Defender gun and the Spynel infrared camera, which is used to locate incoming UAVs. An IHS Jane's source nevertheless reported that the Battelle was only effective in about 50% of attempts, and in December 2016 was only available to US - not Iraqi - forces. Many solutions are likely to employ electronic means - typically jamming - to disable the vehicle or take control of it. On 2 February, the US Army also awarded a new contract for the urgent development of a counter-uav system. On the ground, improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and booby traps were placed in houses and on corpses to slow the advance of the attacking force. However, because of the large-scale presence of civilians, the Islamic State was not able to make use of this tactic extensively; the civilian population of Mosul is largely Sunni and Arab, and therefore not entirely expendable to the Islamic State. Iraqi special forces patrol in the eastern side of Mosul, Iraq, on 28 January 2017. By early February 2017, the capture of the eastern section of Mosul had been completed. (PA) Iraqi response 1685303 Page 3 of 6
In the initial phase of the battle, Iraqi forces attempted to respond to the Islamic State's use of such tactics by the deployment of armour, but this resulted in failure because of poor co-ordination between armoured units and infantry support. For example, the Iraqi Army's 9th Armoured Division entered the city on 7 December 2016, but its attempt to capture the Al-Salam Hospital complex in the southern part of the city was not successful. The five-storey complex had been turned into a command-and-control centre by the Islamic State and contained no patients. Under the cover of night, Islamic State fighters wearing suicide belts launched a counter-attack. Insufficiently supported by infantry, and with little experience of operating in built-up urban environments, the armoured force became trapped and was eventually extricated after US aircraft bombed the hospital and a relief force of 150 fighters and 30 vehicles was sent in. During 1 November-12 December 2016, Islamic State tactics succeeded in severely slowing the advance of Iraqi forces. However, following the resumption of the offensive on 29 December 2016, much more rapid progress was made, with the conquest of eastern Mosul completed by the beginning of February 2017. Several tactical changes adopted by the Iraqi forces after 29 December helped to account for this change in fortunes. Iraqi federal police personnel at their base after returning from a patrol on 29 January 2017. Regular personnel of the federal police are adequate for holding and securing ground. (Jonathan Spyer) 1685304 First, the practice of reliance on vehicles was abandoned. Captain Ra'ad Qarim Kassem, an ISOF Najaf Battalion officer, told IHS Jane's on 28 January 2016, "At the beginning of the operation, we came in with vehicles, and we were met with suicide bombers and IEDs in the street. So we moved then to fighting on foot, street by street. We entered the neighbourhoods by night, in sevenman sections. [The Islamic State] tried to use suicide cars against us, but on foot we were able to conceal ourselves, to use subterfuge, to enter homes for shelter, and so on." Page 4 of 6
Capt Kassem also stressed the role of civilian informants in providing information to the army. He claimed that civilians assisting the Iraqi forces even placed vehicles in particular areas before an offensive to prevent or restrict the ability of the Islamic State to move SVBIEDs, although IHS Jane's has no way of corroborating this assertion. Consequently, an important component of the armed forces' improved performance after 29 December was the greater use of dismounted forces, although the adoption of this tactic is liable to increase casualties, as relatively unprotected forces seek to directly engage the enemy. Second, Iraqi government forces loosened restrictions on the use of artillery after 29 December. ISOF commander Lieutenant General Abdel Ghani al-assadi declared in a statement to the Wall Street Journal on 29 December that political leaders had removed their earlier objections to the use of artillery, and as a result it was then deployed in eastern Mosul. However, the inevitable result of using artillery in a built-up and heavily populated area will be greater civilian loss of life, which political leaders - aware of the need for progress and the heavy loss of life among government forces - would have included within their calculations. Iraqi soldiers beneath a flag of Hussein Ibn Ali at Nabi Yunus mosque, Mosul, on 28 January 2017. (Jonathan Spyer) 1685305 Force attrition A problem for Iraqi forces was the high level of attrition of forces. This was exacerbated by the considerable discrepancy in abilities between different elements of the armed and security forces, acknowledged to IHS Jane's by representatives of all forces. ISOF has superior training and abilities to both the regular army and the federal police, and as a result, only ISOF (and the Page 5 of 6
Emergency Response Division, a special SWAT unit of the federal police) could be tasked with directly combating the Islamic State on foot in house-by-house clearance operations. This problem was partially addressed by the deployment of an additional 4,000 federal police personnel to Mosul after 29 December. The federal police is not a civilian police force, but rather a paramilitary force comparable to the Ministry of the Interior troops in other Arab countries such as Egypt and Morocco. Consequently, regular personnel of the federal police are adequate for holding and securing ground, but not for assault operations against the Islamic State. The deployment of additional personnel allowed ISOF to focus on the task of aggressive action against the Islamic State, but did not address the problem of high attrition among the best and most committed forces available to the Iraqi government. This problem may be insurmountable if Abadi's government is determined to conquer Mosul in the shortest possible timeframe. Outlook Islamic State forces remain vigorous, determined, and capable in Mosul, and the militant group has clearly elected to carry out a defence-in-depth of the city from where the 'caliphate' was proclaimed. Four months after the Mosul offensive began, only half of the city had been recaptured. Furthermore, the group retained a core of committed and able fighters despite a sharp decline in foreign fighter recruitment and some evidence of Islamic State fighters seeking to avoid combat. Nevertheless, the importance of physically isolating urban areas before recapture has been demonstrated by the Mosul offensive. Mosul will inevitably fall to government forces because it is cut off from other Islamic State-held areas and the group is running out of supplies, food, and ammunition. This will have read-across in terms of lessons to be applied to the recapture of Raqqa, which will also need to be completely isolated from surrounding areas before allied forces attempt to enter. Such a scenario may be close. For the full version and more content: IHS Jane's Military & Security Assessments Intelligence Centre This analysis is taken from IHS Jane s Military & Security Assessments Intelligence Centre, which delivers comprehensive and reliable country risk and military capabilities information, analysis and daily insight. IHS country risk and military capabilities news and analysis is also available within IHS Jane s Intelligence Review. To learn more and to subscribe to IHS Jane s Intelligence Review online, offline or print visit http://magazines.ihs.com/ For advertising solutions contact the IHS Jane s Advertising team Page 6 of 6