Excess capacities and competition Reinhard HAAS Institute of Power Systems and Energy Economics, Vienna University of Technology Salzburg, September 2005
CONTENT: 1. Introduction: The European electricity sub-markets 2. Price setting in liberalised markets 3. The relevance of excess capacities in generation 4. Mergers and aquisitions 5. Long term contracts 6. Perspectives for future price development 7. Conclusions
1. INTRODUCTION Competition: expectations of EC -> very simplified assumptions on strategic behaviour of generators / grid operators! General lack of competition: in generation and supply in every country and sub-market In wholesale markets: strong suspictions regarding exertion of market power in every sub-market
Motivation: Centralised or decentralised electricity supply? Currently, incumbent utilities make money with power plants constructed and depreciated under regulated monopoly conditions without any additional investments -> Optimal solution for society? How long? Enhanced due to the exertion of market power
5,0% Electricity demand growth in Europe 4,0% 3,0% 2,0% 1,0% 0,0% -1,0% 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003-2,0% -3,0% FR DE IT CH SLO CZ AT
IMPACT PARAMETER ON ELECTRICITY DEMAND IN CENTRAL EUROPE (DE, FR, AT, CH) 1.4 1.2 1.0 Electricity demand GDP index 0.8 0.6 Price index 0.4 0.2 0.0 Price elasticity: - 0.6 (High significant!) 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
2. PRICES IN LIBERALISED MARKETS Price, costs (EURO/MWh) Average costs Strategic or monopoly prices? Long term marginal costs? time Short term marginal costs?
PRICE SETTING IN A COMPETITIVE MARKET WITH EXCESS CAPACITIES Price, Costs (EURO/MWh) Price = Short term marginal costs PP1 PP2 D t0 PP3 PP4 Supply MWh
Price, Costs (EURO/MWh) Strategic price D t1 Price = Short term marginal costs Supply curve PP2 PP1 No excess capacities! (KW3 and KW4 are closed) PP3 Former excess capacities! PP4 MWh
Note: If there is no reserve capacity every player can exert market power and bring about high strategic prices!
3. EXCESS CAPACITIES IN GENERATION Remark 1: CROSS-BORDER TRANSMISSION CAPACITIES ENSURE A LARGER MARKETS Remark 2: POLITICAL DECISION: ELECTRICITY HIGHWAYS OR DECENTRALISED GENERATION?
Electricity Price AMBIGOUS ROLE OF EXCESS CAPACITIES 1. Efficiency gains 2. Strategic prices Shut-down of capacities Market power Time
3. EXCESS CAPACITIES DE+FR+AT+CH: TRENDS IN LOAD VS. GENERATION CAPACITY 240 Gross capacity Load 200 GW 160 120 Net capacity 80 40 Source: UCTE, Platts, 0 IAEA 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 2020
Eastern Europe 70 60 EASTERN EUROPE: TRENDS IN LOAD VS GENERATION CAPACITY Net capacity Gross capacity 50 GW 40 30 Load 20 10 0 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 2020
Italy 90 80 ITALY: TRENDS IN LOAD VS GENERATION CAPACITY Gross capacity Load 70 60 GW 50 40 30 Net capacity 20 10 0 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 2020
Spain&Portugal 70 SPAIN & PORTUGAL: TRENDS IN LOAD VS. GENERATION CAPACITY Gross capacity 60 50 Net capacity 40 GW 30 Load 20 10 0 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 2020
RECENT TRENDS MW, Preis Generation capacity Start Liberalisation Start construction of new power plants??? Excess capacities Demand time
ENGLAND 1989 Price 1989 Demand MWh Price, Costs (EURO/MWh)
ENGLAND 1993 Price, Costs (EURO/MWh) Demand Price 1989 Price 1993 Profit of entrepreneur! MWh high market price, new capacities cheap
100 90 80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0 England&Wales: Spotmarktpreise Introduction of NETA EUR/MWh April 1990 Oct 1990 April 1991 Oct 1991 April 1992 Oct 1992 April 1993 Oct 1993 April 1994 Oct 1994 April 1995 Oct 1995 April 1996 Oct 1996 April 1997 Oct 1997 April 1998 Oct 1998 Apr 1999 Oct 1999 Apr 2000 Oct 2000 Apr 2001 Oct 2001 Apr 2002 Oct 2002 Apr 2003 Oct 2003 Gaming Increase of number of players
CALIFORNIA 1998 Price, Costs (EURO/MWh) Price 1998 Demand New capacities MWh
CALIFORNIA 2000 Price, Costs (EURO/MWh) Price 2000 Demand New capacities MWh
400 350 300 250 200 150 100 50 0 California: Wholesale electricity prices Capacity shortages, final customer prices frozen Summer price spikes Abolishment of the PX power exchange Quelle: Blumstein et al 2002 US$/MWh Feb.98 Jun.98 Sep.98 Dez.98 Mär.99 Jul.99 Okt.99 Jän.00 Mai.00 Aug.00 Nov.00 Feb.01 Jun.01 Sep.01 Dez.01
MW, Price CAPACITY DEVELOPMENT CALIFORNIA Start Liberalisation Capacity Excess capacities Desired demand Actual demand Price 1998 2001 time
4. MERGERS AND AQUISITIONS Electricity sector National and Cross-border M&As in the EU 150 140 130 120 110 100 90 80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0 47 10 88 14 10 13 42 5 10 22 19 27 3 3 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 National M&As Cross-Border M&As
NUMBER OF LARGE GENERATORS IN EU-15 HEW VEW Fortum VEAG EnBW Pow er Gen Iberdrola National Power British Energy Endesa Ele k tr abe l Largest European generators 1999 Fortum Iberdrola National Power British Energy Ende s a Largest European generators 2003 Bayernwerk Elektrabel Vattenfall ENEL PreussenElektra RWE ENEL Vattenfall RWE/VEW E-ON Major mergers and aquisitions EdF EdF/EnBW 0 100 200 300 400 500 TWh 0 100 200 300 400 500 TWh 17 11!
GAMING BY TAKING PLANTS OUT OF THE MARKET Demand Price, costs ( /MWh) Strategic Price Supply MWh
IF I OWN 30 GW OF GENERATION CAPACITY I CAN AFFORD TO TAKE OUT 3 MW. IF I OWN 3 GW OF GENERATION CAPACITY I CANNOT AFFORD TO TAKE OUT 3 MW.
5. THE RELEVANCE OF LONG-TERM CONTRACTS Nordic market: long term bilateral contracts always allowed England & Wales (till 2001): mandatory pool led to contracts for differences
GWh Long term contracts : Bilateral Futures Date of delivery Short term markets: Spot markets Pools Balance market Months/weeks day 1/4 h
CORRECT UNBUNDLING COMPETITION Generation REGULATED NATURAL MONOPOLY NO UNBUNDLING! Grid Supply UNBUNDLING!
A PERFECT MARKET? Tatsächliche Nordic Poolpreise und gehandelte Forwardpreise (Jahresband) für den selben Zeitraum 30,00 25,00 Day Ahead Spotmarket 20,00 1999 gehandeltes Jahresband (Durchschnitt) /MWh 15,00 10,00 Bandbreite 2000 gehandeltes Jahresband (Durchschnitt) Bandbreite 5,00 0,00 Jän.00 Mär.00 Mai.00 Jul.00 Sep.00 Nov.00 Jän.01 Mär.01 Mai.01 Jul.01 Sep.01 Nov.01 Jän.02 Mär.02 Mai.02 Jul.02 Sep.02
FUTURES FROM YEAR X, PEAK Spotmarkt Peak (EEX) vs. Futures Peak (EEX) Tradingday Dez 2001, Dez 2002. Dez 2003, Nov 2004 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0 Dez.2001 Apr.2003 Aug.2004 Jän.2006 Mai.2007 Time Spotmarkt Peak Dez 2001 Dez 2002 Dez 2003 Nov 2004
FUTURES FOR NOV. 2004, PEAK 70 Peak Load Spotmarkt vs. Futuremarkt "FÜR" Nov 2004 60 50 [ /MWh] 40 30 20 10 Spotmarkt Monats Futures Quartals Futures Jahres Futures 0 Feb.2001 Sep.2001 Apr.2002 Okt.2002 Mai.2003 Nov.2003 Jun.2004 Dez.2004
6. Wholesale price 90 development Spot market prices (Central Europe) 80 70 60 EUR/MWh 50 40 30 20 10 0 Feb.99 Aug.99 Mär.00 Okt.00 Apr.01 Nov.01 Mai.02 Dez.02 Jun.03 Jän.04 Aug.04 Feb.05 Sep.05 APX (NL) /MWh EEX Mix /MWh POL-X /MWh Italy
Market power? A marginal cost model Marginal cost model spot market base 45.0 40.0 35.0 30.0 25.0 20.0 15.0 10.0 5.0 0.0 EUR/MWh Jän.99 Apr.99 Jul.99 Okt.99 Jän.00 Apr.00 Jul.00 Okt.00 Jän.01 Apr.01 Jul.01 Okt.01 Jän.02 Apr.02 Jul.02 Okt.02 Jän.03 Apr.03 Jul.03 Okt.03 Jän.04 Apr.04 Jul.04 Okt.04 Spot market price Base EEX EUR/MWh Marginal costs Base Model EWI Köln EUR/MWh Marginal costs Base Model TU Wien EUR/MWh
CAPACITY DEVELOPMENT: MODEL BOTTLENECK MW, EUR/MWh Generation capacity Start Liberalisation Excess capacities Start construction of new power plants Demand Price time
cent/kwh 5.0 4.5 4.0 3.5 3.0 2.5 2.0 1.5 1.0 0.5 0.0 Perspectives for price development Spotmarket Base (Coal price +2%/yr, Natural gas price +5%/a) 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 Short term MC historical Base (c/kwh) Short term MC scenario (c/kwh) Spot-Base historical (c/kwh) Long term MC historical Base (c/kwh) Long term MC scenario (c/kwh) Spot base scenario (c/kwh)
7 CONCLUSIONS I am in favour of higher electricity prices but not by means of monopoly rents of large generators but by means of higher energy taxes A certain magnitude of reserve capacity in the system is absolutely necessary for effective competition If reserve capacity falls below this margin incentives for new plants (by IPPs? ) or demand side activities must be developed
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