Equipment tug collision with BAe , EI-CMS, 24 May 1999 at Dublin Airport, Ireland.

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Equipment tug collision with BAe 146-200, EI-CMS, 24 May 1999 at Dublin Airport, Ireland. Micro-summary: Baggage tug slides and collides with this BAe 146. Event Date: 1999-05-24 at 0644 UTC Investigative Body: Air Accident Investigation Unit (AAIU), Ireland Investigative Body's Web Site: http://www.aaiu.ie/ Cautions: 1. Accident reports can be and sometimes are revised. Be sure to consult the investigative agency for the latest version before basing anything significant on content (e.g., thesis, research, etc). 2. Readers are advised that each report is a glimpse of events at specific points in time. While broad themes permeate the causal events leading up to crashes, and we can learn from those, the specific regulatory and technological environments can and do change. Your company's flight operations manual is the final authority as to the safe operation of your aircraft! 3. Reports may or may not represent reality. Many many non-scientific factors go into an investigation, including the magnitude of the event, the experience of the investigator, the political climate, relationship with the regulatory authority, technological and recovery capabilities, etc. It is recommended that the reader review all reports analytically. Even a "bad" report can be a very useful launching point for learning. 4. Contact us before reproducing or redistributing a report from this anthology. Individual countries have very differing views on copyright! We can advise you on the steps to follow. Aircraft Accident Reports on DVD, Copyright 2006 by Flight Simulation Systems, LLC All rights reserved. www.fss.aero

AAIU Report No. 2000/015 AAIU File No. 19990030 Published.:12/09/2000 Aircraft Type and Registration: BAe 146-200 EI-CMS No. and Type of Engines: Aircraft Serial Number: Four, ALF 502-R5 Turbofans E2044 Year of Manufacture: 1985 Date and Time (UTC): Location: Type of Flight: 24 th May 1999, 06.44 hours Dublin Airport, Stand 42A Public Transport Persons on Board: Crew 4 Pax 40 Injuries: Crew - nil Pax - nil Nature of Damage: Score 22" in length, (incld 4.24" of skin pierced) at rear fuselage. Information Source: Operator s Flight Safety Officer. AAIU Field Investigation. SYNOPSIS Flight AF5003, with passengers on board, was about to depart Stand 42A at Dublin Airport when an equipment tug engaged in loading baggage on to the aircraft, slid and struck the aircraft rear fuselage. The skin of the aircraft was punctured in the process. 1. FACTUAL INFORMATION 1.1 History The BAe 146 aircraft arrived on Stand 42A at 20.44 hrs on Sunday 23 rd May 99 and was parked at this stand overnight. It was designated Flight No. AF5003 and was due to depart for Paris at 06.50 hrs on Monday 24 th May 99. The Operator s staff carried out a pre-departure inspection and the aircraft was cleared for flight. At approx 06.44 hours, with passengers on board and during loading of baggage, the equipment tow tractor came into contact with the starboard rear fuselage resulting in a rupturing of the aircraft's skin. 1

At 06.45 hours approx. a member of the Airport Police & Fire Service was called to the scene. He arrived, took photographs of the scene, withdrew the driver s permit and made out his report. The AAIU investigator arrived at 07.30 hours. At that time the aircraft had been removed from Stand 42A with the permission of the Chief Inspector of Accidents and repositioned on Stand 48. The Investigator then received a copy of the police report. 1.2 Witness Recollections The shift supervisor, who was a fully qualified licensed engineer, was engaged in a pre-departure inspection (PDI) of the aircraft, refuelling and removal of ground operation pins. He was on the flight deck discussing fuel figures with the Captain of the aircraft when they both felt the aircraft shudder. The supervisor then left the aircraft and went around to the rear of the aircraft where he met some of the Handling Agent employees. They informed him that they had a problem with the "aircraft and the baggage truck". On inspecting the aircraft, the supervisor found a score mark along the rear of the fuselage skin, with the roof of the equipment tug some inches away form the aircraft. He informed the Captain of the aircraft and they both inspected the damage. The aircraft was then declared unserviceable and unfit for flight. The supervisor then spoke to the tug driver who said that, as he was driving the equipment tow tractor, with loaded trolley attached, up to the rear of the aircraft, the tug slid and went into the side of the aircraft. The driver said that the ground was wet at the time with a lot of water at that loading point, so he drove accordingly. The supervisor said that the driver appeared to be the only witness to the incident. Another employee of the Handling Agent who was helping the tug driver to unload the trolleys said that they had completed loading the forward baggage hold and that he went to the rear of the aircraft, to the rear baggage hold, in preparation for loading the rest of the baggage. He climbed into the hold. He was opening the cargo nets when he felt the aircraft shudder. As he had his back to the door he did not witness the tug striking the aircraft. He contacted his superior, the Ramp Controller and he arrived with the Ground Equipment Maintenance Manager within minutes. 1.3 Injuries to Persons There were no injuries to persons. 1.4 Damage to Aircraft The damage was confined to an area in the vicinity of the rear cargo bay door on the starboard side of the aircraft. This area was bounded by frames 38 and 39 in the vertical, and stringers 19 and 20 along the horizontal. 2

The score mark ran for 22 inches along the fuselage skin and terminated with a puncture to the skin where it was pierced for 4.25 inches. The depth of puncture was almost 0.4 inches and was evident when viewed internally from the pressurised area of the aircraft. 1.4.1 Other damage There was very slight damage to the left hand corner of the equipment tug roof where some paint was removed on impact with the aircraft fuselage. 1.5 Personnel Information The Investigator was given information on courses conducted by the Handling Agent. The tug driver attended the following courses: Course Date Conducted Signed Off Ramp Safety Pre-Trip Procedure Equipment Defect Reporting Belt Loaders Equipment Tug Ground Power Unit Aircraft Marshalling Towable Passenger Steps F.D.P. Power Walk Round Checks Wing Walking 18/3/99 18/3/99 18/3/99 22/3/99 1.6 Ramp Area Stand 42A was inspected by the investigator more than an hour after the occurrence. At that time the concrete surface was quite dry. However there was evidence that it had been raining in the area some time previously. There were some old oil stains on the surface near where loading of the baggage would have taken place, but these appeared to be dry. 1.7 Impact Information The tow tractor was withdrawn from service and a technical inspection carried out by the Handling Agent's Ground Maintenance Manager. No fault was found with the tractor. 3

1.7.1 This tow tractor had been inspected on 18/5/99 and previously serviced on 30/3/99. The front tyres had a depth of tread of 7mm and the rear 10.5 mm. The electric tow tractor was inspected by the AAIU investigator at the handling agents servicing depot. Front and rear tyres had threads of different cut. The rear tyres had a fine thread whilst the front tyres had a block thread and were described as 23X5 Super- Cushioned. 1.8 Additional Information The following documents were provided by the Handling Agent:- (a) Equipment Tug Driving - 6 pages. (b) (c) Safety Statement - Safe Working Practices No. 2 - Driving on the Ramp. Safety Statement - Safe Working Practices No. 5 - Towing Tractors The above documents are included in the syllabus of driver training and require drivers to: Always drive with due care and attention to the prevailing weather conditions. Approach aircraft using a competent guide person. Not to drive within 6 feet of an aircraft. Not to park the vehicle too close to an aircraft. Never reverse a dolly to an aircraft - disconnect and position to aircraft. 1.9 Investigation of Tow Tractor This type of electric tow tractor has three independent braking systems: (a) (b) (c) Dual circuit hydraulic drum brakes on all four wheels Parking brake lever connected to rear wheels Regenerative electric braking The manufacturer s specification issued for this tractor indicates that the tyres for front and rear should be of size 23 X 5 Pneumatic. The manufacturer stated that the vehicle would normally be supplied with these tyres fitted. However, they stated that they had no reason to believe that the solid rubber Super-Cushioned tyre would have any adverse effect on the handling and control of the tractor. The tyre agent indicated that the pneumatic tyre might not always be available when requested. 4

2. ANALYSIS The objective of the tug driving course, which the driver had received, was to provide the trainee with sufficient knowledge of the equipment tug to ensure a safe working practice at all times. The driver is instructed to always drive with due care and attention to the prevailing weather conditions. The driver s helper was in the rear baggage hold at the time of the incident. With the tug manoeuvring so close to the aircraft it would have been safer if he had been outside the hold in order to guide the tug up to the rear of the aircraft. The tug was being driven so close to the aircraft that there was no margin for error in the event of a skid taking place. The brakes on the tug were found serviceable. However, the type of tyre used on the front of the vehicle which had a very course thread (block type) might not have had maximum grip, given the weather conditions prevailing at the time. A pneumatic tyre, with a finer thread, as recommended by the tug manufacturer would have been more suitable. 3. CONCLUSIONS 3.1. The tug was being driven too near the aircraft for the weather conditions prevailing. 3.2. A pneumatic front tyre with a finer thread similar to that fitted to the rear axle would be more suitable for this type of vehicle. 4. RECOMMENDATIONS 4.1 When fitting tugs with tyres, the manufacturer s specified tyre size and type should be used when commercially available. (SR 45 of 2000). 4.2 The Handling Agent should consider changing the regulation Approach aircraft using a competent guide person to a stronger- Do not approach an aircraft unless a competent guide person is present and available. (SR 46 of 2000) 5