The Soft Side of BRT: Lessons from Developing Cities Sam Zimmerman Urban Transport Consultant J.Earnst, ITDP
JULY 17, 2012 The Vanguard, Lagos Fashola arrests Col, Sergeant on BRT lane Governor Babatunde Fashola of Lagos State, yesterday, arrested two military officers who drove on the dedicated BRT lane.
World Bank Study of Five BRT (or busway) applications in Asia, Africa Emphasis on soft aspects Political, Governance and Planning Context PT System Integration Operating Arrangements Finance Branding, communications A word on BRT and Upgrading to Rail
World Bank Study of BRT s Soft Side Most studies, presentations and discussions have been on hard elements of BRT; Stations Running ways Vehicles ITS, etc. Soft aspects of BRT less well covered; less interesting to most professionals Hard to grasp, harder to fix and less fun Critical to success
Five Applications Vary in geo-political settings Vary in quality, performance Cases Lagos Johannesburg New Delhi Ahmedabad Jakarta ITDP
Case Studies Delhi and Ahmedabad written by, Anal Baijal. former Chief Secretary (Director General) of Ministry of Urban Development, India Lagos, Johanesburg and Jakarta Case Studies done by Colin Brader, et al of ITD Synthesis Ajay Kumar, O.P Agarwal, World Bank urban transport staff and consultant SZ
Total System Length Lagos, BRT-Lite 22 Km, 20+ km under construction Jhnsburg, Rea Vaya 25.5 Km, 300+ Km planned Jakarta, TransJaka rta 135.11 Km Construction cost $US per Km $1.2m+/Km. $14.2m+/Km $1.3m/Km+ Percent segregated 60% 100% 90-95% No. existing stations 26 30 142 Vehicles High Floor 11.7m Medium Floor: 18m (trunk) 12m (feeder/ Cmplemntry.) High Floor: 11.5m, Some 18 m
Total System Length Delhi HCBS Busway 5.8 km, median transitway 8.7 km, curb lanes without enforcement Ahmedabad JanMarg 45Km 41 Km additional planned Construction cost $US per Km $5m/Km $3m/Km Percent segregated NA (<40%) 100% Number existing stations 29 67 Vehicles DTC: Primarily low floor, 12m; Some A/C Others: Variety of types and sizes High floor 12m; testing 18 m
Average daily ridership on system (Approx.) Max. Ld. Pt., Pk. Direction, Pk. Hr. Vol. (Approx.) Former mode of BRT passengers Av. Rev. Spd. ( Km/Hr) Travel time savings from previous Lagos, Johannesburg Jakarta, BRT-Lite Rea Vaya TransJakarta 200,000 45,000 280,000 10,000/Hr. 3,500/Hr. 10,000/Hr. Car (6%), PT (90%) 20 for local service 29% over length of corridor Not known Car (14%) Motorcycle (6%) Public Transport (69%) 40-50% over length of each corridor
Average daily ridership on system (Approx.) Delhi Ahmedabad HCBS JanMarg 85,000 135,000 Max. Load Point, Pk Direction, Pk Hr. Volume (Approx.) 10,000/Hr. 2,000//Hr. Former mode of BRT passengers Not known Bus (40%) Auto Rickshaw (35%) Taxi, Auto (13%) Av. Revenue Speed ( Km/Hr) Travel time savings from previous 18 on median transitway 30% over length of median transitway 25 20-30% over length of each corridor
New Delhi Initiated by Municipal Corporation Busway, not BRT: No other BRT elements Little change made to PT network service plan Substantial NMT improvements Traffic engineering difficulties Champion, communications, ownership issues Court intervention to open busway to car owners at behest of well-placed car commuters Could be result of weak communications as well as substantive technical issues Busway currently open to general traffic despite carrying 66% of person trips on 33% of lanes
Jakarta Was not on anyone s radar, but strong support from Governor Initial line built in less than one year Early design issues, later fixed Little change to rest of PT network Substantial, multi-line network today, but crowding and subsidy issues Lack of feeders and integration with rest of PT system cited as reasons for relatively low ridership density
Images courtesy of ITDP, Wikpedia
Lagos BRT lite Product of one of few multi-modal metropolitan transport authorities in any developing city dedicated funding source, strong technical staff, ongoing political support through two state governor administrations Profitably run by union of mini bus owner/operators Extension under construction, additional lines being prepared
Ahmedabad Janmarg People s Way First integrated BRT system in India Product of progressive municipal commissioner; help from technical staff at university Circumferential corridor with few ROW, and other problems selected as first priority Success generated support for larger system Planning, implementation, oversight by special purpose vehicle within municipality Breaking even out of fares, including vehicles TOD starting
Unique BRT Design, Operations Issues
Johanesberg ReaVaya We are Moving Initiated by National, City governments Mini bus (taxi) operators tough stakeholders Significant opposition BRT initially operated by competitively procured contractor, now by company formed of taxi operators Planning, oversight by special purpose vehicle within municipality Very high quality and costs relative to other systems in developing cities Relatively low ridership because of mini-bus competition and nature of initial corridor
Images from Neya Raya, ITDP
What Did We Learn?
Political, Governance Weak institutions, poor governance a particular problem for BRT Only transport entity may be public works/highway agency with no PT policy, planning, oversight expertise or authority Competing institutions (e.g., distinct metro agency) not helpful Where there is one, existing PT operator may not have ability to plan, implement, operate BRT At minimum, may need to strengthen structure and institutions during planning, preparation; more likely to change structure and establish new, hopefully multi-modal authority
Political, Governance Strong opposition by informal PT operators because of legitimate fear about impact on livelihoods Need multiple champions, not champion; Nurture ongoing support through successive administrations (e.g., as in Lagos)
Communications and Branding Governance and political problems can only be overcome through strong communications process Key to initial and ongoing success Continuing lack of information about BRT and its benefits can hurt case, e.g. Delhi
Communications and Branding Two-way communications needed Brand identity for entire system helps communications process succeed Multi-media approach to dialogue works best Defining and managing stakeholders crucial Related institutions (e.g., traffic police), PT operators, regulators may need special focus
Planning Context Usually a transport master plan; may be out of date and not well prepared; Plan most often a list of projects and BRT may not be one of them Despite evidence that BRT can influence development and thus be used as development tool (Curitiba, Brisbane, Bogota, Boston, Ottawa, Pittsburgh, Cleveland, now Ahmedabad ): Little attention given to land use/transport interaction during planning
PT System Integration PT system integration an issue everywhere Few initial changes were made to rest of public transport network to integrate with BRT in terms of fares and service Politically challenging where mini-buses After successful initiation, easier to move to integrate with rest of system in terms of connections, fare integration, etc., e.g., Ahmedabad) First/last Km connectivity an issue Poor walking environments Other than Delhi, Ahmedabad, little done on NMT connections Missing formal bike, motorcycle parking at stations
Internal BRT System Integration Planning starting point often individual hard elements rather than service and system Designs of BRT elements often inconsistent with markets and service and to each other, e.g., All stops local only on transitway when expresses extending beyond needed Missing passing lanes at critical points Lack of level, no-gap boarding Limited vehicle capacity, less than ideal internal layout, door width and placement
Operating Arrangements Most success with independent public special purpose vehicle authority implementing and then managing competitively procured operation contractors as in Latin America Only Johannesburg authority for both BRT and complimentary and feeder services Lagos, later Johannesburg and Jakarta (some corridors) used companies formed from existing mini-bus operators
Finance Infrastructure always financed by public sector Bus most often operated by competitively procured contractor paid on a gross cost (per/km or Hr. of service provided) with revenue accruing to special purpose vehicle Operations and buses usually financed out of fares and owned by operators Ongoing operating/maintenance subsidies seen as a problem
A Word on Upgrading To Rail Cities with BRT success stories proceeding with rail projects Quito Curitiba Xiamen Ottawa Bogota Complex reasons, usually political (e.g., former mayor s project, not,mine ), not necessarily substantive capacity, declining quality often sited in developing cities wall of buses, O/M costs in developed cities
Is BRT Capacity the Main Issue??.
Quotes from Yogi Berra Not so Well Known Transport Planner (also Played Baseball) You ve got to be careful if you don t know where you are going, because you might not get there. "When you come to a fork in the road, take it."
"Nobody goes there anymore; it's too crowded."
Maximum Load Point, Peak Hour, Peak Direction Volumes* Guangzhou 28,000 Delhi Metro Phase I *From presentation by Dario Hidalgo, WRI/EMBARQ II-36
Bogota Crowding
Complex route structure Narrow station platforms
Istanbul
No passing at stations Inefficient boarding, alighting Inefficient vehicle interior Narrow station platforms
A fix??
Lessons from BRT to Rail Pressure Need commitment to continuing improvement by PT or BRT institution Sustain system quality and operations efficiency Need for more capacity not a reflection of failure BRT providing development and transport benefits while rail planning proceeds Less than ideal service planning, physical design and operation can limit BRT capacity, e.g., Low versus high floor vehicles, platform-vehicle interface Docking Stations without provision for expansion Complex service plans causing bunching, bus on bus congestion Transparent, objective alternatives analysis should always precede major investment decisions