January 2019 Ministry of Defense

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MOD s final statement regarding the incident of an ROK naval vessel directing its fire-control radar at an MSDF patrol aircraft Reference Material (Provisional Translation) January 2019 Ministry of Defense

Types of Radars and Their Characteristics(1/2) Surface Search Radar Fire-control Radar Searches/detects targets in surrounding areas by emitting radar waves while rotating Continuously directs radar waves to target to obtain the target s location, speed, etc. for precise firing of missiles and ammunition 1

Types of Radars and Their Characteristics(2/2) Surface Search Radar Fire-control Radar Radio field intensity Periodical detection of radar waves Radio field intensity Continuous detection of intense radar waves Search radar waves converted to sound Time Time Fire-control radar waves directed at the P-1 by an ROK naval vessel converted to sound Parts of the sound are processed for information security This sound data is available at the MOD website(http://www.mod.go.jp/j/press/news/2019/01/21x_eng.html) 2

MOD s Evaluation of Fire-control Radar Irradiation by an ROK Destroyer Fire-control Radar(STIR-180) Upon careful and meticulous analysis of the frequency, intensity, waveform, etc. of the radar waves directed at the P-1, the MOD has confirmed that the P-1 was continuously irradiated for a certain period, multiple times by an ROK vessel s STIR-180. The STIR-180 is not mounted on the patrol and rescue vessel that was nearby at the time. 3

CUES(Code for Unplanned Encounters at Sea) 2.8 Assurance Measures for Naval Ships 2.8.1 Because nations may under international law grant their naval and aviation units the authority to respond with force to actions they perceive to reflect hostile intent, Commanding Officers or Masters (as applicable) need to consider the potential ramifications before engaging in actions which could be misinterpreted. Actions the prudent commander might generally avoid include: a) Simulation of attacks by aiming guns, missiles, fire control radars, torpedo tubes or other weapons in the direction of vessels or aircraft encountered. According to CUES, a code adopted by navies from 21 countries including Japan and the ROK, aiming fire control radars is considered a simulation of attack, and is stipulated as an action the prudent commander might generally avoid. 4

Overview of P-1 Flight(1/2) 4 Flight from the stern to the starboard side of the ROK destroyer 3Right turn and gradual descent to approx. 150m to observe the ROK destroyer 2Flight past the stern of the ROK destroyer (Altitude: approx. 230m, distance: approx. 500m) 5Flight past the abeam of ROK destroyer (Closest altitude: approx. 150m, closest distance: approx. 500m) Approx. 150m ROK Destroyer Approx.500m 6The distance from the vessel at the when flying past the bow of the ROK vessel was approx. 1,100m ROK Patrol and Rescue Vessel 7Gradual left turn to observe the full-view of the site 1Flight from the stern to the starboard side of the patrol and rescue vessel to observe the vessel P-1 Patrol Aircraft 5

Overview of P-1 Flight(2/2) P-1 飛行概要 ( イメージ )(2/2) 11Call-out to the ROK destroyer. From then on, continuous call out to the destroyer while moving away from the ROK destroyer 10In response to fire-control radar irradiation, left turn to observe the full-view of site once more ROK Destroyer ROK Patrol and Rescue Vessel 9Confirmed that the gun of the ROK destroyer was not directed to the P-1 8Right turn for separation from destroyer after firecontrol radar irradiation was confirmed P-1 Patrol Aircraft 6

Examples of Flight Patterns the JSDF Generally Avoids Crossing in frontal vicinity of vessel Flying towards vessel Simulation of attack near vessel Overview P-1 s flight Image Crossing in frontal vicinity of a vessel that may force the vessel to change its course/speed The P-1 maintained approx. 1.1 km distance from the bow of the vessel, and its course moved away from the said vessel. Therefore, the P-1 did not crosscut in frontal vicinity of the vessel. Flying towards a vessel that will result in the aircraft flying directly above the vessel if the aircraft were to proceed with its course The P-1 at no point took a course that would pass directly above the vessel. Therefore, the P-1 did not fly towards the vessel. The P-1 did not take any of these flight patterns Aiming weapons such as guns and fire control radars Maneuvering simulation of machine gun firing/bombing Sudden dive etc The P-1 did not simulate attack near the vessel for the following reasons: The P-1 was not equipped with antiship missiles or fire-control radars Machine guns were not equipped, and the bomb door was closed during flight Constant altitude/speed was maintained in vicinity of the vessel It is obvious from the exchanges between P-1 crew members filmed in the footage released by the MOD that there was no intention to threaten the ROK vessel 7

Past Flights around ROK Navy's Destroyer Gwanggaeto-daewang (Fiscal Year 2018) Photo taken on April 27 Closest Distance :approx. 500m Altitude:approx. 150m Photo taken on April 28 Closest Distance : approx. 500m Altitude:approx. 150m Photo taken on August 23 Closest Distance : approx. 550m Altitude:approx. 150m The ROK did not express its concern regarding these flights 8