The 1957 Defence White Paper The Cancelled Projects

The 1957 Defence White Paper The Cancelled Projects Tony Buttler SUMMARY This paper, which is based on a presentation to a seminar on the 1957 Defence White Paper, describes the aircraft and engine projects that were cancelled as a direct result of the policies announced in the White Paper. It also describes a number of aircraft projects that were cancelled or on which development ceased in the mid-1950s. These are often identified as casualties of the White Paper, although that was not the case. One consequence of the 1957 White Paper was the decision by Hawkers to develop the P.1127 after it became clear that there would not be a British market for the P.1121 supersonic air superiority strike fighter. The Harrier was developed from the P.1127, which changed the face of high performance combat aircraft operations and is one of the most important of all developments in UK aviation history. 1. INTRODUCTION This paper is based on a presentation to a seminar on the 1957 Defence White Paper (1) (DWP) on 24 October 2017 by the Historical Group of the Royal Aeronautical Society. It considers the airframe and engine projects which were terminated by the White Paper, but first I would like to mention three projects which were NOT cancelled by this document, but which many publications say were, often I think to try to make out that the DWP had even more of an effect on UK military projects than it perhaps did. When assessing these programmes, it should be borne in mind that Harold McMillan became Prime Minister in January 1957 and he then made Duncan Sandys his Minister of Defence so all three projects had already gone by the time Sandys began work on this document. 2. PROJECTS NOT CANCELLED BY THE 1957 DEFENCE WHITE PAPER 2.1 Hawker P.1083 The first design to consider is a gorgeouslooking project from Hawker Aircraft, the P.1083. This was intended purely to be a supersonic development of the standard Hawker Hunter, fitted with a new 50 swept wing and armed just with guns. A full go-ahead for the P.1083 was given by the Ministry on 12th December 1951 (Figure 1). Then in April 1953, well into manufacture, the Air Staff requested that Figure 1 Original manufacturers model of the Hawker P.1083. 86

the P.1083 (and the Supermarine 545 which comes next) should be rearmed with the de Havilland Blue Jay (later Firestreak) air-to-air missile as its primary weapon. This created problems in both types due to a lack of space for radars, fuel and other equipment. The problems were never solved and in June 1953 the P.1083 was officially cancelled. The prototype airframe, due to fly later that year, was subsequently modified as the prototype Hunter F.Mk.6 with the Rolls-Royce Avon 200-series engine (Figure 2). Figure 2 P.1083 and Hunter Hawker models show their different wings. 2.2 Supermarine Type 545 The Type 545 was originally proposed as another 50 sweep wing development of an existing type, this time the Supermarine Swift, but as built it featured a crescent wing and was known as the Crescent Wing Swift (Figure 3). Go-ahead for this transonic project was given in 1952, but by 1954 the need for the aircraft was being questioned. Initially the programme was cut back to just the part-complete first prototype, and then the Type 545 was finally terminated in December 1955. This decision was made largely to conserve funds for other projects since the research Figure 3 Original manufacturer s model information the first aircraft would provide was now of the Supermarine Type 545 considered be of too little value and too late. At this point the prototype was not too far away from completion (Figure 4). 2.3 Gloster Thin Wing Javelin The first Gloster Thin Wing Javelin project was drawn in July 1953. When Specification F.153 was written around the aircraft the main structural difference between the standard Javelin and the new thin wing variant lay in the wing itself. Subsequently, larger engines were fitted, the strength factors were raised and the equipment requirements were altered so much that this project was no longer a Javelin with a new wing, but rather a Figure 4 Supermarine 545 at Cranfield 1960 Wikipedia commons 87

new aircraft having the same general appearance. It was almost a full redesign and as such was expected to be just supersonic in level flight at altitude (Figure 5). Then during a visit to Washington in December 1955 the UK Minister of Supply Reginald Maudling saw secret papers relating to the Avro Canada CF-105 Arrow interceptor fighter then under evaluation by the US Air Force. As a consequence a UK evaluation team was sent to Canada in the New Year to assess the Arrow for its potential use by the RAF. Both Arrow and Figure 5 Model of the Gloster Thin Wing Javelin Javelin were produced by firms within the Hawker Siddeley Group, but the Arrow clearly had a far superior performance and capability. The Thin Wing Javelin was out of date and as a result was cancelled in May 1956. Further and much more advanced versions of the Thin Wing Javelin were produced by Gloster and published works which refer to these designs indicate that the Thin Wing Javelin would have been capable of around Mach 1.8. But they were all produced after the real Thin Wing Javelin project had been cancelled. 3. AIRCRAFT PROJECTS CANCELLED BY THE 1957 DEFENCE WHITE PAPER Five aircraft projects were destroyed by the 1957 DWP, while the development programme for another (the English Electric Lightning) was badly affected. And it was not just fighter types that were lost there were bombers as well and two jet engine programmes will also be discussed. Without wishing to criticise any decisions taken long ago in a different situation, in this paper I would like to make some observations as to what I think might have happened had each of these projects not been cancelled what stage might they have reached? These are purely my own thoughts and are presented to encourage discussion, and to perhaps suggest that in some cases their demise might not have been such a loss as we might imagine. 3.1 Avro 730 The Avro 730 project started with the issue in 1955 of Specification R.156T and Operational Requirement OR.330 for a supersonic highaltitude reconnaissance aircraft capable of Mach 2.5. Designs were submitted by Avro, English Electric, Handley Page, Short Brothers and 88 Figure 6 The Avro 730 as proposed

Vickers. The Avro 730 was declared the winner and was ordered in prototype form in late 1955. In its earliest form the 730 still fell short of the requirements but it was considered to be the best choice (Figure 6). In particular it was to have an airframe made throughout in high tensile steel because, thanks to the problems of kinetic heat, this was the only way of securing the specified Mach 2.5 speed. In due course a nuclear weapon/bomb-carrying capability was added under OR.336 and the design was revised quite extensively (Figure 7). In February 1957 service entry for Avro 730 was scheduled to be 1965 and the manufacture of the first test fuselage was well under way at Avro. But in March the Air Staff completed an examination of the contribution which manned fighter aircraft could make to the defence of the United Kingdom, which of course formed the Figure 7 The Avro 730 as built basis of the famous April 1957 Defence White Paper. At the same time the Air Staff examined the problem of maintaining the deterrent and, in view of the increasing capacity of the Soviet defensive system (which included surface-toair guided weapons), it was now considered most unlikely that the Avro 730 could survive during the period it would be operational. OR.336 was, therefore, cancelled in April 1957 along with the Avro 730. The 730 was to have been powered by the Armstrong Siddeley P.176 engine and extra prototypes of the Bristol 188 research aircraft were to have been built as P.176 test beds. The 188 was another steel aircraft and its first flight did not take place until 1962 nearly a decade after it was first proposed primarily because of the time required to develop new fabrication techniques for its steel structure (several changes of engine also contributed to the delays). Figure 8 Bristol 188 research aircraft The Avro 730 was full of advanced systems and equipment and there was plenty of scope for problems. There were also concerns about how well the aircraft could fly if it was damaged (would it be able to return to base?) and whether there would be sufficient stiffness in such a long slim fuselage. Finally, as noted the all-steel Bristol 188 proved very difficult to build, and so would manufacturing the larger 730 s structure have been an even more difficult and longer task? 89

It is also worth bearing in mind that for the proposed SST (which became the Concorde), the Supersonic Transport Aircraft Committee (STAC) rejected steel in 1959 as too difficult and too expensive. In America the North American XB-70 Valkyrie bomber was built in steel and that too failed (few people realise that this was the heaviest aircraft it the world when it first flew at Mach 3). I appreciate that the XB-70 was a rather different animal to the 730, but it still illustrates that if you choose to use a heavy material like steel or titanium for a new airframe, instead of a light alloy such as aluminium, the complexity and cost automatically rise. And once a programme becomes very expensive, then justifying its existence becomes even more difficult. The 1957 DWP was not just about the replacement of manned aircraft by missiles the extreme cost of modern aircraft and weapons was another key aspect. My feeling is that had the Avro 730 been continued then it would have been very expensive, the difficulty of a steel airframe would have brought delays, and by the time it entered service it might have been out of date because guided weapons worldwide had forced the world s bombers to fly at low level. Even without the 1957 DWP I would not have been surprised if the project had failed to survive beyond prototype flight. 3.2 Rocket Fighters and the Saunders-Roe SR.177 Britain s rocket fighter programme was opened in 1952 by the issuing of Specification F.124T to which 11 designs were proposed. The two selected for prototype construction were the Saunders-Roe (Saro) SR.53 and the Avro 720 (Figures 9 and 10). All of the original proposals were to be powered solely by rocket motors, but after further assessment both of these aircraft were to have a mixed jet/rocket powerplant, the additional small turbojet providing a get you home capability. Figure 9 SR.53 at Farnborough in 1957. Figure 10 Avro 720 mock-up made in metal! This is the second example which was lost It had only one wing in a crash Source: Avro Heritage In due course neither the 720 nor SR.53 were looked upon as full production machines for operational service, but rather for limited production only to provide experience in rocket motors and operations at great heights. Developed versions of both aircraft were subsequently produced but the Saro P.177 (or SR.177) only was accepted since it was considered to be superior over the updated 720. Consequently, the Avro 720 was cancelled in April 1955 before it had flown. This by the way was another design NOT terminated by the 1957 DWP. 90

The P.177 was a larger design than the SR.53 and powered by a de Havilland Gyron Junior jet and de Havilland Spectre rocket (Figure 11). It was to be capable of Mach 2.35 and the armament consisted of two de Havilland Red Top air-to-air missiles. An Instruction to Proceed was given in September 1955 and a 27 aircraft programme was planned with 5 flying shell airframes for basic aerodynamic and engine development, 3 more for weapon system development and the remainder for more advanced testing and for trials with both the RAF and Royal Navy both services were to get the type as the P.177R and P.177N. This was a Figure 11a SR.177 model Figure 11b SR.177 artwork showing the aircraft on approach for a carrier landing big programme and there was also German Air Force and Navy interest as well. Indeed a German technical mission visited the UK and made a detailed examination of the P.177. However, the April Defence White Paper cancelled the RAF prototypes and cut the development batch back to 18 aeroplanes though at this stage the Navy s allocation was to be retained. However, these too were cancelled in June 1957. The SR.53 prototypes were continued as research aircraft and the first of two built and flown made its maiden flight in May 1957, but after the P.177 s demise the Air Staff did not know what to do with them. However, after a re-appraisal in August 1958 it was fully intended to keep the SR.53 flying because, in its present form, it was capable of Mach numbers as high as any aircraft then flying in the UK, and greater altitudes. One of them was lost in a crash but the second SR.53 was used for research until 1960. It is understood that after Germany in World War 2 no rocket interceptor ever entered service, though several programmes were started worldwide. Had the P.177 been flown and developed then it would probably have entered service. But I wonder if it would have been produced in numbers? Having a dual powerplant added to the complexity it also meant different fuels and rocket fuels are usually quite nasty chemicals (the Spectre used hydrogen peroxide and kerosene). Had the 1957 DWP not occurred then it might be safe to assume that the Lightning would have been developed into a more capable aircraft far earlier than it was. That alone might have pushed out the P.177, or at least restricted its service to just a few RAF squadrons. And would the Navy have been keen to operate a rocket fighter aboard a carrier using unpleasant chemicals in a war zone? I think it is quite possible that the P.177 might have had a limited service career. 91

3.3 English Electric Lightning I would like to mention the English Electric Lightning briefly (Figure 12) because this aircraft did survive the slaughter. However, its development was curtailed or delayed quite considerably by the White Paper. The intention was to retain the Lightning to fill the gap in the short term until the service arrival of guided missiles, but after the ideas behind the DWP died down there was clearly still a future for manned fighters. So then the Lightning was developed further specifically as the F.Mk.3/6 with the Avon 300-series engine. Figure 12 Early Lightning in a photo produced for the 1959 Figure 13 The Lightning F.Mk.6 Farnborough Show had a bigger fin The F.Mk.3 was the first stretched or second generation Lightning and was first flown in June 1962 (Figure 13). This variant also introduced the more advanced Red Top missile. If it was not for the DWP, might the F.3/6 have appeared a few years earlier? Lightning s big weaknesses were its shortage of fuel/range and that it only carried two missiles but developing the aircraft earlier might have addressed these flaws. And there would quite likely have been bigger export possibilities which would have helped the situation. BAC (as English Electric became in 1960) did offer more advanced and more heavily armed versions, but by the mid-1960s it did not seem worth going ahead with them. Had it been known that the Lightning would remain in RAF service until 1988, it might have been different. 3.4 Short Seamew It would seem that this is the forgotten project from the losses incurred by the 1957 DWP. In 1950 a small lightweight anti-submarine aircraft was considered ideal to complement the larger forth-coming Fairey Gannet and Specification M.123 was raised to cover it. The winning design was the Short S.B.6 which became the Seamew and the first example flew on 23 August 1953 (Figure 14). It would carry over 1,800lb of weaponry, including a torpedo. 92

The Seamew prototype revealed some vicious handling characteristics and so there were development problems, but an initial batch of 41 aircraft was ordered in 1955 for the Navy and for RAF Coastal Command. A year later the RAF machines were cancelled and then the 1957 Defence White Paper disbanded the RNVR s Air Branch altogether, and that brought the cancellation of the Seamew order with it. By that stage twenty-four production machines had flown and several had been accepted by the Royal Navy. Figure 14 Short Seamew XA209 at Farnborough in 1954 Source: Terry Panopalis Unlike some of the projects considered here, relatively little sadness seems to have been expressed about the Seamew s demise. But a point to also consider is that by 1957 the antisubmarine helicopter was beginning to appear and was clearly the way forward. The Navy would eventually receive the Westland Wasp, which as the Saro P.531 first flew in prototype form in July 1958. The Wasp itself first flew in 1962 (Figure 15). The helicopter was an altogether more versatile machine than the Seamew ever could be. It could operate from destroyers and frigates as well as carriers, so one can assume that had the Figure 15 The Westland Wasp at the 1962 SBAC show, a month before the first flight Source: Wikipedia Commons Seamew been continued then its service career might have been relatively short because of the adoption of the anti-submarine helicopter. 3.5 Fairey Delta 3 Long Range Interceptor In early 1955 Specification F.155T was raised for a long range highly advanced all-weather interception system capable of destroying very high altitude enemy raiders operating at 60,000ft and Mach 1.3. Proposals from industry included the Armstrong Whitworth AW.169, Vickers-Supermarine Type 559 and Hawker P.1103 (see below). The winner was a design from Fairey which, unofficially, was known as the Delta 3 (Figure 16). This was a substantial enlargement and development of the famous record-breaking Delta 2 research aircraft and its wing, centre fuselage and fin were to be Figure 16 The Fairey Delta 3 was a spectacular aircraft design 93

made in high tensile stainless steel. A two seater, the Delta 3 would carry two huge radarguided Vickers Red Dean air-to-air missiles weighing 1,300lb each, it would feature a droop nose (like Concorde) for landing, and the maximum speed at height was Mach 2.27. The powerplant was to be two Rolls-Royce RB.122 jets plus two de Havilland Spectre Junior rocket motors, giving an all-up-weight of over 50,000lb. Figure 17 The AW.169 came first equal to Figure 18 Supermarine s Type 559 came third in the Fairy Delta 3 and after the latter s the F.155T competition selection was continued as a back-up wind tunnel project for about a year, in case the other project failed Duncan Sandys cancelled Specification F.155 on 29th March 1957, a few days prior to the release of the White Paper, though the prototype Delta 3s had not yet been ordered. As an aside this meant that Fairey s desire to see a fighter created from its successful Delta 2 died as well (Figures 19 and 20). But many within the Air Staff had campaigned strongly for orders to be placed. Figure 19 Fairey Delta 2 Figure 20 Drawing comparing the Delta 2 Source: Phil Butler and Delta 3 F.155T did represent the cutting edge of technology in the 1950s and in fact the designs drawn against the specification were some of the most monstrous and exciting combat 94

aircraft ever proposed. They were very powerful and in most cases the maximum speed was set by a kinetic heat structural limit, not a power limit. But, had it been built, I wonder if the Delta 3 would have reached no further than the prototype stage, in part because of its size and complexity. It would have been a very expensive aircraft to develop, while the policy of defence using guided weapons was being adopted worldwide. The need for an aircraft quite as large as this might have died altogether. The long range interceptor was by the way considered not just in the UK. America, Canada and the Soviet Union also produced designs and prototypes, and one service type (the Tupolev Tu-28). I would like to review the other Western types briefly because this also gives an opportunity to show that the ideas behind the 1957 DWP did not settle just on Britain alone. After the rise of the Soviet Union, America spent a huge sum of money developing interceptor aircraft to defend its homeland the Northrop F-89 Scorpion, McDonnell F-101 Voodoo and the Convair F-102 Delta Dagger and F-106 Delta Dart. In 1954 a requirement called Weapon System WS-202A was issued for a Long Range Interceptor. The competition was won by North American Aviation with a design which became the F-108 Rapier (Figure 21). This was due to fly in 1961 but in September 1959 the project was cancelled on grounds of cost, though the development of the ground-based Boeing Bomarc missile was another factor. Figure 21 North American F-108 Rapier. As built Figure 22 Avro Canada CF-105 Arrow this would have had modified wingtips In 1954 Canada ordered the Avro CF-105 Arrow interceptor (Figure 22) and the first prototype flew in 1958. But this was cancelled, very controversially, the following year after five examples had flown. The project was replaced by American McDonnell CF-101 Voodoo fighters and, again, the Boeing Bomarc surface-to-air missile. Perhaps it is unfair to compare these programmes against those closed by the 1957 DWP, but again part of the problem with these overseas designs was their cost. Once again it is important to consider that one of the reasons behind the new UK policy was the expense incurred in the development of new advanced combat aircraft programmes, and defence spending in general. 95

4. The Hawker P.1121 This project evolved from one of the losing F.155T long range interceptor contenders, the Hawker P.1103 (Figure 23). The P.1103 was dropped early in the F.155T competition because it was too small, but the Hawker team decided to continue its design and construction. It was revived in early 1956 as the P.1116 Mach 2 interceptor and long range strike fighter, and then refined in June 1956 as the P.1121 Mach 2 air superiority strike fighter (Figure 24). Hawker eventually financed the project as a private venture but some within the Air Staff were amazed by this decision (and irritated at having to reassess it) because the basic configuration had been rejected in the P.1103. In particular it was not looked upon by the Air Staff as a complete weapon system, and indeed it was considered that Hawker Aircraft had yet to grasp the weapon system concept as a whole. Figure 23 Hawker P.1103 artwork Figure 24 Hawker P.1121 manufacturer s model The P.1121 was to be powered by a single de Havilland Gyron jet engine, it was to be armed with Red Top missiles, rocket projectiles and Aden cannon and was expected to reach Mach 1.35 at sea level and 2.35 at height. In January 1957 Hawker was told that the Ministry was not interested in ordering the P.1121, but a full scale mock-up was completed soon afterwards (Figure 25). Then the release of the 1957 DWP killed any hopes of a home order. In September 1957 the Hawker board agreed to continue with the P.1121 but at a much reduced rate of expenditure, and the project finally fizzled out in 1958. Figure 25 Hawker P.1121 mock up Figure 26 Hawker P.1121 prototype under construction. This did not progress too far beyond what can be seen here but does still survive in museum hands Source: Chris Farara 96

It is entirely wrong to say that the P.1121 was cancelled by the 1957 DWP because it was never ordered by the RAF. But the new policy certainly blocked any hopes that this design might have been bought to fill a role in UK service. For me this is the most difficult of the projects to assess as to what might have happened had it continued. Many reports suggest that the P.1121 would have flown and performed well. It would also have followed the highly successful Hawker Hunter and it seems logical to suggest that at least some of the countries who bought the Hunter would have taken the P.1121 as well. This aircraft could have been quite a success. However, as is well known, the P.1121 was replaced at Hawker by the P.1127 V/STOL aircraft (Figure 27), which of course was developed into the Harrier and we all know how successful that aircraft was and how it changed the face of high performance combat aircraft operations. In some ways it was a fluke that P.1121 was replaced by P.1127, but to my mind this was one of the most important of all developments in UK aviation history. The V/STOL design was surely a much more important project for the UK than P.1121 could ever be! One might even say that the P.1127 was the most positive outcome of the events brought about by the 1957 DWP in terms of combat aircraft design and procurement! Figure 27 Hawker P.1127 in June 1962 Source: Terry Panopalis 5. ENGINE PROJECTS CANCELLED BY THE 1957 DEFENCE WHITE PAPER A number of missiles became victims of the White Paper, as did two engine development programmes which were also abandoned the de Havilland Gyron and Rolls-Royce RB.106. Work started on de Havilland s single shaft Gyron axial jet engine in 1950 and it first ran on the bench on 5 January 1953 (Figure 28). And it soon achieved the planned 20,000lb thrust with reheat, which at the time made it the most powerful engine in the world. Uprated to 25,000lb, the Gyron was tested in the Short Sperrin bomber prototype from July 1955 but it never flew in a production aeroplane. It was intended to go in the Hawker P.1121 interceptor. Ministry support for the Gyron stopped in February 1956 but, after having seen prospects for overseas sales, de Havilland Engines decided to Figure 28 De Havilland Gyron engine complete further tests at its own 97

expense. However, in October 1957 the firm acknowledged that, with no backing for the P.1121, the development work should stop and the engine was abandoned despite demonstrating 29,300lb of thrust. Meantime, however, considerably scaled down versions, called the Gyron Junior, were developed and used in the Bristol 188 experimental supersonic research aircraft and, on a production basis, in the Mark 1 Blackburn Buccaneer naval strike aircraft. A Rolls-Royce engine project also aimed at supersonic fighter designs was the RB.106. This originated in 1953 and, in contrast to the Gyron, featured a more complex layout with two separate axial compressors, driven independently by single-stage turbines, to provide a higher overall a pressure ration of 8:1 and thus a lower fuel consumption during subsonic phases of flight. With external dimensions set to make the unit interchangeable with the RR Avon RA14, basic static thrust was rated at 15,000lb, and 21,750lb with reheat. A scaled down option, designated RB.112, was also offered as an alternative. Some compressor rig testing was carried out but no engines were built before the emergence of the 1957 DWP resulted in the disappearance of the envisaged advanced supersonic fighter projects. 6. CONCLUDING DISCUSSION The theories behind the 1957 Defence White Paper gradually died away and by 1960 attention was turning towards fighter aircraft again. Indeed, the UK did acquire new fighters updated versions of the Lightning as noted, and then the McDonnell F-4 Phantom from America. As regards new fighter design in the UK, for much of the 1960s the emphasis fell primarily on multi-role types, the best known of which was the Hawker P.1154 supersonic V/STOL strike fighter. Much later, in 1971, Air Staff Target 396 was raised to find a Buccaneer, Harrier and Jaguar replacement. In 1975 the air component of this requirement was split away as a separate requirement AST.403, the lead in to what would become the Eurofighter Typhoon. AST.403 was the first new pure fighter requirement to be raised after the 1957 DWP no less than 18 years afterwards! I would like to end on a lighter note. The politics behind the 1957 Defence White Paper, the claims for and against, and whether it was right or wrong, have been a very serious matter of discussion now for 60 years. Indeed, red faces and high blood pressures have often resulted. But there is one element about which historians cannot argue over at all if it hadn t happened then we would have had a lot less to write about and a lot less to talk about! REFERENCE Secretary of State for Defence Defence: Outline of Future Policy Command Paper 124, HMSO, London, April 1957 98

The Author Tony Buttler worked for twenty years in the aircraft industry as a metallurgist. In 1994 he took a Masters Degree in archives at Loughborough University and since 1995 has worked full time as an aviation historian. So far he has written 29 major books, numerous titles in the Warpaint series of modeller s publications and a large number of articles for historical aviation magazines. He also lectures to RAeS Branches and other enthusiast groups and is a member of the Committee of the RAeS Historical Group. 99