POWER SYSTEM OPERATING INCIDENT REPORT MULTIPLE CONTINGENCY EVENT IN NORTH WEST TASMANIA ON 6 APRIL 2012

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POWER SYSTEM OPERATING INCIDENT REPORT MULTIPLE CONTINGENCY EVENT IN NORT WEST TASMANIA ON 6 APRIL 2012 PREPARED BY: Systems Capability DATE: 28 September 2012 FINAL

IN NORT WEST TASMANIA ON 6 APRIL 2012 Disclaimer Purpose This report has been prepared by the Australian Energy Market Operator Limited (AEMO) for the sole purpose of meeting obligations in accordance with clause 4.8.15 (c) of the National Electricity Rules (NER). No reliance or warranty This report contains data provided by third parties and might contain conclusions or forecasts and the like that rely on that data. This data might not be free from errors or omissions. While AEMO has used due care and skill, AEMO does not warrant or represent that the data, conclusions, forecasts or other information in this report are accurate, reliable, complete or current or that they are suitable for particular purposes. You should verify and check the accuracy, completeness, reliability and suitability of this report for any use to which you intend to put it, and seek independent expert advice before using it, or any information contained in it. Limitation of liability To the extent permitted by law, AEMO and its advisers, consultants and other contributors to this report (or their respective associated companies, businesses, partners, directors, officers or employees) shall not be liable for any errors, omissions, defects or misrepresentations in the information contained in this report, or for any loss or damage suffered by persons who use or rely on such information (including by reason of negligence, negligent misstatement or otherwise). If any law prohibits the exclusion of such liability, AEMO's liability is limited, at AEMO's option, to the re-supply of the information, provided that this limitation is permitted by law and is fair and reasonable. Abbreviations and Symbols Abbreviation CB EMS kv MW RTCA WF Term Circuit Breaker Energy Management System Kilovolt Megawatt AEMO real-time contingency analysis tool 2012 Australian Energy Market Operator Ltd. All rights reserved. 28 September 2012 Page 2 of 5

IN NORT WEST TASMANIA ON 6 APRIL 2012 1 Introduction During a severe lightning storm on 6 April 2012 at 1934 hrs, a transmission line fault resulted in the trip of a number of transmission lines in the north west Tasmanian network. During the event, Woolnorth wind farm (WF) tripped from 86 MW. Approximately 65 MW of customer load was also interrupted. This report has been prepared under clause 4.8.15 (c) of the National Electricity Rules (NER) to assess the adequacy of the provision and response of facilities and services and the appropriateness of actions taken to restore or maintain power system security. This report is largely based upon information provided by Transend Networks and ydro Tasmania. Data from AEMO's Energy Management System and Electricity Market Management System has also been used in analysing the incident. All references to time in this report are to National Electricity Market time (Eastern Standard Time). 2 Pre-Contingent System Conditions The status of the power system prior to the incident is shown in Figure 1. For clarity, only equipment relevant to this incident has been included in the diagram. Note that ampshire-savage River 110 kv line is operated normally open at ampshire end, i.e. CB B152 is normally open. Paloona hydro power station was not in service during this event. Figure 1 - Overview of the Tasmanian North West power system prior to the incident PALOONA WOOLNORT BLUFF POINT SMITTON PORT LATTA EMU BAY ULVERSTONE STUDLAND BAY SEFFIELD AMPSIRE SAVAGE RIVER B152 BURNIE 220 kv line 220 kv bus Open CB ydro station 110 kv line 110 kv bus Closed CB 220/ 110 kv transformer De-energised line Double circuit line 3 Summary of Events According to the records of AEMO real time systems, at 1934 hrs on 6 April 2012, following transmission lines tripped when a fault was experienced on the high voltage North West Tasmanian power system. Burnie Sheffield 110 kv line tripped Burnie Emu Bay 110 kv line open at Burnie Paloona Sheffield 110 kv line open at Paloona 28 September 2012 Page 3 of 5

IN NORT WEST TASMANIA ON 6 APRIL 2012 Burnie Sheffield 220 kv line tripped Ulverston Paloona 110 kv line open at Paloona Studland Woolnorth Smithton 110 kv line open at Studland Pt Latta Smithton 110 kv line tripped Burnie Smithton 110 kv line tripped Smithton Woolnorth 110 kv line tripped Burnie Pt Latta 110kV Line tripped Burnie ampshire 110 kv line tripped Lightning activity in the region was recorded in Transend lightning detection systems at the time. As a result, the North West Tasmanian power system disconnected from the rest of the Tasmanian power system. Woolnorth wind farm tripped from 86 MW resulting in a black out of the affected part of the power system. Approximately 65 MW of customer load was interrupted in this incident. Figure 2 illustrates that North West power system following the incident.. Figure 2 - Overview of the Tasmanian North West power system immediately after the incident PALOONA WOOLNORT BLUFF POINT SMITTON PORT LATTA EMU BAY ULVERSTONE STUDLAND BAY SEFFIELD AMPSIRE SAVAGE RIVER B152 BURNIE 220 kv line 220 kv bus Open CB ydro station 110 kv line 110 kv bus Closed CB 220/ 110 kv transformer De-energised line Double circuit line Fault 4 Immediate Actions Taken Transend commenced the power system restoration process at 1937 hrs, and the North West power system was restored to its normal configuration at 2009 hrs. Transend also undertook an aerial line inspection of the affected area based on lightning activity data records but no evidence of a fault was found. AEMO issued market notices 38579 and 38582 at 1953 hrs and 2042 hrs respectively to inform market participants of this event. 5 Follow-up Actions Following subsequent site inspections, Transend confirmed that evidence of a fault was located along the 110 kv Ulverstone-Emu Bay and Sheffield-Burnie 110 kv line corridor where no overhead ground wires are used. There has been a lightning strike on one of the transmission towers along this corridor initiating the fault. Records suggested that this fault had affected both B 28 September 2012 Page 4 of 5

IN NORT WEST TASMANIA ON 6 APRIL 2012 phases of the double circuit lines, which were the top conductors, and thus making them most vulnerable to lightning. Transend investigations revealed some issues on the operation of protections. The relatively low fault currents experienced during this event, which is indicative of a high impedance fault. For much of the fault period, the fault currents were close to the maximum load currents making it difficult for protection relays to discriminate correctly. Transend suggested that these low fault currents could be due to the high tower footing resistance. Transend have since replaced distance protection schemes along the Burnie-Emu Bay-Ulverstone lines with differential protection schemes to avoid these issues in future. 6 Power System Security Assessment The power system voltages and frequencies remained within the normal operating bands and the power system remained in a secure operating state throughout the incident. The provision and response of facilities and services of Transend and AEMO were adequate to restore the power system following this multiple contingency. 7 Conclusions From 1934 hrs to 2009 hrs on 6 April 2012, the north west Tasmanian power system experienced a transmission line fault caused by a lightning strike on one of the transmission towers between Sheffield and Burnie. This event had resulted in 86 MW and 65 MW losses of generation and customer load respectively. AEMO correctly applied the criteria published in section 12 of its Power System Security Guidelines1 in assessing that the circumstances of this incident did not warrant reclassifying similar incidents as a credible contingency event. 8 Recommendations Transend will investigate the operation of its protection systems during this incident and provide a report to AEMO. Transend will inform the progress of this investigation by the end of October 2012. 28 September 2012 Page 5 of 5