Analysis 5. STRUCTURE OF THE ANALYSIS

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1 . STRUCTURE OF THE ANALYSIS This chapter describes the structure of an analysis that demonstrates the HIMAX process by applying it to a real, complex policy problem. The chapter begins by describing the two time frames that the analysis is organized around, and introducing the five types of force options that are considered in each time frame. Next, the composition of the options, and the characteristics of the systems and operational concepts that comprise them, are presented for each time frame. This chapter ends by discussing a few key option comparisons, having set the stage for the chapters that follow, which describe the results.. TIME FRAMES AND OPTIONS TYPES The analysis consists of two separate evaluations, which compare a range of different force options in two time frames: Near Term (00 00). The options considered for the near term are evolutionary in nature. They do not include any entirely new systems or operational technologies. All of the component systems and operational concepts already exist, or involve only incremental improvements in existing systems and concepts, such as the addition of minor design modifications, or the introduction of mature or recently-developed technologies. Far Term (0 0). The options considered for the far term are more revolutionary than the near-term options. They include improved versions of existing systems, and some systems that are entirely new. These new systems incorporate various technologies that are extremely promising, but, as yet, undeveloped and unproven. The impact of advanced technology is also reflected in the characteristics of the far-term operational concepts. The purpose of this division in the analysis is two-fold. It avoids the temptation to mix risky, unproven technologies and systems, which could take - 0 -

2 many years to develop, with incremental force improvements that can be attained within just a few years. This approach still allows more aggressive revolutionary options to be considered, but it places them in an appropriately distant time frame. Keeping the evaluations separate ensures that the options compared in each time frame share a common technological basis. The same five types of force options are considered for each time frame: () heavy armored, () medium-weight, () light infantry, () air only standoff (aircraft and long-range missiles), and () air + SOF standoff (aircraft and longrange missiles, plus teams of special operations forces). In each time frame, these options have somewhat different names, and consist of different mixes of systems and operational concepts. In some cases, these differences are minor, involving slightly different numbers of the same systems, or improved versions of them, and the same operational concepts in similar proportions; in others, the two options are composed of different systems, and use different concept mixes. Force options are composed of systems from two different sets one for the near term and the other set for the far term and a combination of operational concepts from a single common set. The near-term and far-term component systems are listed and described in Tables. and., respectively. The five operational concepts described in Table. are used in both time frames, but have somewhat different characteristics in each to reflect changes in technology, tactics and other factors over time. The following two subsections describe the composition of the five options considered in each time frame, and discuss the characteristics of their components. These force options are roughly equivalent to a typical U.S. Army brigade, in terms of their organizational scope, the area they can cover, and how they would be used. Many of the component systems in these options are described by the Federation of American Scientists web site: last accessed May, 000. The composition of these force options was developed in consultation with RAND s two principal force-on-force simulation gamers, who have extensive experience composing forces like these to use in analyses for the Army, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, and other - -

3 Table. Component Systems of Near-Term Force Options Name of System Description MA Most recent version of Abrams main battle tank MA/MA Most recent version of Bradley fighting vehicle (M: infantry; M: cavalry) MA-FGM Infantry version of Bradley fighting vehicle, enhanced fiber-optic guided missiles (EFOG-M) M0A Paladin self-propelled mm howitzer MLRS M0 Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS), standard M rockets with AT warheads LAV-DFV Direct fire version of light armored vehicle (LAV), 0mm soft-recoil gun LAV-IFV Infantry fighting vehicle version of LAV, mm cannon and TOW anti-tank guided missile (ATGM) LAV-APC Armored personnel carrier (APC) version of LAV, 0-caliber machine gun LAV-MOR Self-propelled 0mm mortar version of LAV LAV-HOW APC version of LAV with towed mm howitzer LAV-FGM LAV mounted with EFOG-M LAV-REC Reconnaissance/scout version of LAV with telescoping sensor mast HIMARS High mobility multiple rocket system, Army tactical missile system (ATACMS) with brilliant anti-tank (BAT) munitions ( launcher) HMMWV-TOW High mobility multi-wheeled vehicle (HMMWV), TOW ATGM Javelin team Dismounted infantry teams, Javelin hand-held ATGM Mortar team Dismounted infantry teams, portable mortar tubes HMMWV-HOW HMMWV with a towed mm howitzer HMMWV-FGM HMMWV with EFOG-M AH-D Apache Longbow attack helicopter with Hellfire ATGM A-0 Thunderbolt armored ground-attack aircraft TAC-AIR F-E fighter-bomber with precision guided munitions (PGM) NTACMS Long-range Navy tactical missile system with brilliant anti-tank (BAT) munitions ( launchers) SOF-RST Team of special operations forces (SOF), trained for reconnaissance, surveillance and target acquisition (RST) defense agencies. They were provided with a list of systems for each option and then asked to provide an estimate of how many of them would be included in a brigade-sized force. They also estimated how often the forces would use each of the operational concepts. They compared their initial estimates and then provided a set of consensus responses, which form the basis for the numbers used in the analysis. The characteristic rating distributions were generated using a more subjective approach. The author estimated both the median values and the ± probabilities using a variety of sources, including his own knowledge of the systems from previous work. These estimates were then reviewed by a member of the dissertation committee to ensure that they were reasonable and consistent. These inputs were finalized at the outset, and none of them were altered during the course of the analysis. Nonetheless, they should be viewed as illustrative, rather than definitive. - -

4 Table. Component Systems of Far-Term Force Options Name of System Description MA Improved version of Abrams main battle tank, 0mm main gun MA Improved version of Bradley (infantry) fighting vehicle (IFV), new 0mm gun and follow-on-to-tow (FOTT) ATGM MA-FGM Improved Bradley with EFOG-M Crusader Advanced self-propelled mm howitzer (and re-supply vehicle) MLRS M0 MLRS, ATACMS with BAT ( launchers) FSCS Future Scout Cavalry System (FSCS) reconnaissance/scout vehicle with telescoping sensor mast and signature reduction FCS-DFV Direct fire version of Future Combat System (FCS), advanced 0mm gun or line-of-sight anti-tank (LOSAT) hypervelocity missile FCS-IFV IFV version of FCS, with 0mm gun and FOTT ATGM FCS-APC APC version of FCS FCS-ART Artillery version of FCS, 0mm howitzer/mortar with PGM FCS-REC Reconnaissance/scout version of FCS with telescoping sensor mast ARES Advanced Robotic Engagement System (ARES); mobile, remote-control missile launcher Adv. MLRS Wheeled -ton version of MLRS, ATACMS with BAT ( pod) AHMV-FOT Advanced High Mobility Vehicle (AHMV), FOTT ATGM AHMV-APC APC version of AHMV RST-V Small, manned reconnaissance, surveillance and targeting vehicle Adv. Javelin Dismounted infantry teams with improved Javelin hand-held ATGM Adv. Mortar Dismounted infantry teams with portable 0-mm mortars Small AFSS Small version of Advanced Fire Support System (AFSS); missiles in a box Large AFSS Large version of AFSS AH-D+ Improved version of Apache Longbow attack helicopter RAH- Comanche reconnaissance-attack helicopter Adv. TAC-AIR Ground-attack version of Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) with advanced PGM Adv. NTACMS Improved version of NTACMS with advanced PGM SOF-RST SOF team for RST; uses a mix of human and robotic elements SOF-AST SOF team specializing in assault and sabotage in enemy territory. EVOLUTIONARY OPTIONS FOR THE NEAR TERM (00 00) This section describes the five near-term force options, and discusses the characteristics of their system and operational components. Two tables provide detailed information regarding the composition of these near-term options. Table. indicates the quantity of each system in every option, along with the - -

5 role assigned to it. Table. shows the mix of operational concepts used by each option. Two additional tables show the median ratings of each near-term force component on their respective rating scales ; the system characteristics of each system are shown in Table., and the operational characteristics of each concept are shown in Table.. Both of these tables also include the probability distribution assigned to each characteristic rating, expressed as a triplet of numbers that sum to one, which represents performance variations due to technological and environmental uncertainty. The following descriptions refer implicitly to the information presented in Tables.,.,. and. as they discuss the composition of each near-term option, and the characteristics of its components. Table. Operational Concepts Used in Both Near- and Far-Term Force Options Name Standoff (no ground info) Standoff (w/ ground info) Maneuver Warfare Ambush/ Envelopment Peace Keeping/ Enforcement Description Attack targets in enemy territory by air or from long range, using only overhead imagery or other external intelligence for targeting Use sensors or observers on the ground to locate targets in enemy territory, and direct precision fires or air attacks onto them Use mobile ground and air forces with direct fires (i.e., combined arms) to attack enemy, exploit weaknesses, and maneuver to gain advantage Insert forces and attack quickly to surprise, disrupt, confuse and stun enemy forces, thereby creating an opportunity to win early at lower cost Create order under a peace agreement by entering rapidly, establishing a visible presence, and responding quickly and forcefully to violations The system and operational rating scales are shown in Tables. and., respectively. These numbers represent, respectively, the probabilities that the rating is one notch lower than, exactly at, and one notch higher than the median rating. For example, if the median rating for mobility is, and its distribution triplet is (0., 0., 0.), then there would be a 0% chance that mobility is at level, a 0% chance that it is at, and a 0% chance that it is at. - -

6 Heavy This force is composed primarily of Abrams main battle tanks (MA) and Bradley fighting vehicles (MA/MA). These two vehicles both play a direct fire role, with the MA in attack, and the MA/MA in support. The MA has more firepower and protection than the MA/MA, but rates slightly lower on stealth, transportability and self-sufficiency because it is larger, heavier and less fuel-efficient. The remaining ground vehicle systems the Bradley with an Enhanced Fiber-Optic Guided Missile (EFOG-M) system, the Paladin M0A self-propelled howitzer, and the M0 Multiple-Launch Rocket System (MLRS) all play an indirect fire close role in the force. The EFOG-M version of the Bradley (MA-FGM) has more firepower than the basic infantry or cavalry version, but also has less protection, since it does not have reactive armor and other survivability-enhancing features that are standard on the MA/MA. Aside from differences in firepower, the characteristics of the MLRS and the Paladin are similar to those of the MA-FGM, with the Paladin somewhat weaker on mobility and self-sufficiency, since it is a bit slower and requires more support. A small contingent of a dozen dismounted infantry teams with the Javelin ATGM system is also included in this force to provide security support. Because these teams are dismounted, their characteristics are highly unbalanced; they are extremely weak on mobility and protection, since they have no armored vehicles, but they are very strong on transportability, stealth and self-sufficiency, since they are very light, very small, and not very dependent on support. The heavy force also includes a substantial air element, consisting of three companies of Apache Longbow attack helicopters (AH-D), and a fullydeployed air expeditionary force (AEF) that includes about equal numbers of ground-attack aircraft (A-0), and tactical fighter-bombers (TAC-AIR) with - -

7 precision guided munitions (PGM) 0. The AH-D and the A-0 both play a close air support role in this force, while TAC-AIR plays a deep air interdiction role. All of these aircraft are fast and have some ability to self-deploy, so they rate highly on both mobility and transportability. They are only moderately strong on firepower and stealth, and weak on protection (less so for the A-0), since they rely on speed, agility and distance to be elusive. They are also weak on self-sufficiency, since they consume fuel rapidly and require extensive support. The heavy force also has at its disposal a total of Navy tactical missile systems (NTACMS) which are similar to the Army s ATACMS, with two pods per system that play a deep air interdiction role. In addition to providing a high level of firepower, these missile launchers are also strong on transportability, self-sufficiency and stealth, because they are on U.S. Navy ships, which deploy and support themselves, and are fairly hard for enemy ground forces to find. The NTACMS is also moderately weak on mobility, which is determined by the speed and range of its host ship, and is very weak on protection, since it has no defenses of its own. As Table. shows, the heavy force relies mostly on maneuver warfare, but also uses three other operational concepts standoff (with ground information), ambush/envelopment, and peace keeping/enforcement about equally. The characteristics of the maneuver warfare concept are fairly balanced, with moderate ratings on adaptability and ability to support, and somewhat stronger ratings on economy, awareness and, to a lesser extent, coordination. These balanced characteristics stem from this concept s reliance on combined arms, robust organization, careful preparation, and flexible implementation (U.S. Army, ). 0 According to Cook (), a full AEF would include a total of A-0s, and F-s with PGM (consisting of A-0s and 0 F-Es forward-deployed, and of each on-call). The host ship may, of course, have defensive systems that provide the NTACMS with added protection, but his was not assumed to be the case in this analysis. - -

8 Table. Roles and Quantities of Systems in Near-Term Force Options Quantity, by Force Option System Role* Heavy Medium Light Air Only Air + SOF MA MA/MA MA-FGM M0A MLRS LAV-DFV LAV-IFV LAV-APC LAV-MOR LAV-HOW LAV-FGM LAV-REC HIMARS HMMWV-TOW Javelin team 0 0 Mortar team HMMWV-HOW HMMWV-FGM AH-D 0 A-0 0 TAC-AIR 0 NTACMS SOF-RST * - Key for system roles: () direct fire attack, () direct fire support, () indirect fire close, () indirect fire far, () close air support, () deep air interdiction, () reconnaissance scout, () reconnaissance attack, () special operations. Medium This force option is built around the eight-wheeled Light Armored Vehicle (LAV). Roughly equal numbers of DFV, IFV and APC versions of the LAV form the core of this force, all playing direct fire roles (DFV in attack, and IFV and APC in support). Close-range indirect fire support is provided by smaller This medium option resembles the Light Recon-Strike Group described by Macgregor (), and is similar to the medium-weight force advocated by Gordon and Wilson (, ). - -

9 numbers of other LAV variants carrying an EFOG-M (FGM), a towed mm howitzer (HOW), or a 0mm mortar (MOR). These vehicles each provide a different degree of firepower, depending on their function and armament, and they all have a moderate level of transportability, mobility and self-sufficiency, because they are relatively light, fast and fuel-efficient vehicles. They are, however, a bit weak on protection and stealth since they lack advanced defensive features, but still have to behave like fully-armored systems. Longer range indirect fire is provided by several HIMARS trucks with one ATACMS pod which have considerable firepower, and are moderately transportable, mobile and self-sufficient, due to their low weight, range and quickness, and overall efficiency. They are not well-protected or particularly stealthy, however, since they have no armor and are quite conspicuous when they fire. Several LAV reconnaissance variants (REC), which have little firepower, but are fairly stealthy, are also included in the force, along with a dozen dismounted Javelin teams. The air and missile element of this option is similar to that of the heavy force, except that it has one third fewer Apaches and NTACMS. The medium option employs standoff (with ground information) and ambush/envelopment about equally, and uses them twice as often as maneuver warfare and peace keeping/enforcement, resulting in usage proportions of /, /, / and /, respectively. The standoff (with ground information) concept is balanced, like maneuver warfare, but is slightly weaker across the board, with its weakest rating in adaptability. These deficiencies are due mainly to poorer intelligence, longer communication delays, more rigid rules of engagement, less efficient targeting, and weaker support infrastructures. Ambush/envelopment is also a well-balanced concept, but is superior to maneuver warfare on most characteristics. It has particularly high ratings for coordination, adaptability and The LAV vehicles in the near-term medium force are based on the new LAV-III, not the older LAV- version. - -

10 ability to support, since it relies on efficient, well-trained, independent teams with substantial flexibility to execute short, focused, well-planned missions. Table. Mix of Operational Concepts Used by Near-Term Force Options Proportion of Use, by Force Option Operational Concept Heavy Medium Light Air Only Air + SOF Standoff (no ground info) Standoff (w/ ground info) Maneuver Warfare Ambush/ Envelopment Peace Keeping/ Enforcement Light This near-term light force option includes three types of high mobility multi-wheeled vehicle (HMMWV), each equipped with a different weapon an ATGM version with TOW, an FGM version with EFOG-M, and an HOW version with a towed mm howitzer to give it a moderate level of firepower. These HMMWV variants are all very light, so they have a high level of transportability. They are also fairly quick, small and efficient, so they have moderate levels of mobility, stealth and self-sufficiency as well. But, because of their minimal armor they have very little protection. This force also includes twice as many Javelin teams as the heavy or medium option, and several mortar teams as well. Both of these dismounted systems have similar characteristics; they have a moderate level of firepower, are highly transportable and quite stealthy and self-sufficient, but have very little mobility or protection. The light force s air and missile element includes only the forward-deployed part of an AEF (Cook, ), and one third as many Apaches and NTACMS as the heavy option, since it must respond rapidly with the air and sea forces that are already in the conflict region. - -

11 Table. Characteristic Ratings of Near-Term Systems System MA MA/ MA MA-FGM M0A MLRS LAV-DFV LAV-IFV LAV-APC LAV-MOR LAV-HOW LAV-FGM LAV-REC HIMARS System Characteristics Mobility Firepower Protection Stealth Selfsufficiency HMMWV- TOW Javelin team Mortar team HMMWV- HOW HMMWV- FGM AH-D A-0 TAC-AIR Transportability (0.0, 0., 0.) (0., 0., 0.0) (0., 0., 0.) (0.0, 0., 0.) (0., 0., 0.) (0.0, 0., 0.) (0.0, 0., 0.) (0.0, 0., 0.) (0.0, 0., 0.) (0., 0., 0.) (0., 0., 0.) (0., 0., 0.) (0., 0., 0.) (0., 0., 0.) (0., 0., 0.) (0., 0., 0.) (0., 0., 0.) (0., 0., 0.) (0., 0., 0.) (0., 0., 0.) (0., 0., 0.0) (0., 0., 0.0) (0.0, 0., 0.) (0.0, 0., 0.) (0.0, 0., 0.) (0.0, 0., 0.) (0.0, 0., 0.) (0.0, 0., 0.) (0., 0., 0.) (0.0, 0., 0.) (0., 0., 0.) (0., 0., 0.) (0., 0., 0.) (0.0, 0., 0.) (0.0, 0., 0.) (0.0, 0., 0.) (0., 0., 0.0) (0., 0., 0.0) (0., 0., 0.0) (0., 0., 0.) (0., 0., 0.) (0., 0., 0.) (0., 0., 0.) (0., 0., 0.0) (0.0, 0., 0.) (0.0, 0., 0.) (0.0, 0., 0.) (0.0, 0., 0.) (0.0, 0., 0.) (0.0, 0., 0.) (0.0, 0., 0.) (0., 0., 0.0) (0.0, 0., 0.) (0., 0., 0.0) (0.0, 0., 0.) (0.0, 0., 0.) (0.0, 0., 0.) (0.0, 0., 0.) (0., 0., 0.0) (0.0, 0., 0.) (0.0, 0., 0.) (0.0, 0., 0.) (0.0, 0., 0.) (0., 0., 0.0) (0., 0., 0.) (0., 0., 0.) (0.0, 0., 0.) (0., 0., 0.0) (0., 0., 0.) (0., 0., 0.0) (0.0, 0., 0.) (0., 0., 0.) (0., 0., 0.0) (0., 0., 0.) (0.0, 0., 0.) (0.0, 0., 0.) (0.0, 0., 0.) (0.0, 0., 0.) - 0 -

12 System NTACMS Transportability (0., 0., 0.) System Characteristics Mobility Firepower Protection Stealth Selfsufficiency (0.0, 0., 0.) (0., 0., 0.) (0., 0., 0.) (0., 0., 0.) SOF-RST (0.0, 0., 0.) (0.0, 0., 0.) (0.0, 0., 0.) (0.0, 0., 0.) NOTE: The median m and probability distribution (P[m-], P[m], P[m+]) are shown in each cell. A higher value on the -to- rating scale indicates a more positive level of the characteristic. The light force uses peace keeping/enforcement and standoff (with ground information) in a ratio of two to one. The peace keeping/enforcement concept is rated highly on ability to support because it is used mostly in low-intensity situations, where supply lines are fairly secure. This concept is moderately strong on awareness and economy as well, since available intelligence can be used to allocate resources fairly well, but is weaker on adaptability and coordination, due to strict rules of engagement and the command and control difficulties they create. In combat situations, the light force uses the standoff (with ground information) concept, which provides more awareness and coordination, since intelligence-gathering and decision-making are more straightforward, but does not rate as highly for ability to support because supply lines may be tenuous, or even nonexistent. Air Only There are no ground vehicles in this pure standoff force, which is composed entirely of TAC-AIR and NTACMS in a ratio of four to one. AH-D helicopters and A-0 aircraft are not included in this force, since they are most effective when used in concert with some type of ground force element. The air only option uses just one operational concept: standoff (no ground information). This concept has a moderately high rating for ability to support, and a moderate rating for coordination, since it focuses on the application of air power, which is deployed with effective infrastructures for support, and for command, control and communications (C). It is, however, slightly weak on awareness and economy, since it lacks reliable intelligence and can have difficulty finding and - -

13 hitting high-value targets on the battlefield. The air only force is especially weak on adaptability because it has to use very tight rules of engagement to minimize collateral damage, since aircraft have such difficulty discriminating between military targets and civilians without ground-based confirmation. Table. Characteristic Ratings of Near-Term Operational Concepts Operational Characteristic Awareness Coordination Adaptability Economy Ability to Operational Concept Support Standoff (no ground info) (0., 0., 0.) (0., 0., 0.) (0., 0., 0.) (0., 0., 0.) (0., 0., 0.) Standoff (w/ ground info) (0.0, 0., 0.) (0., 0., 0.0) (0., 0., 0.) (0., 0., 0.) (0., 0., 0.) Maneuver Warfare (0., 0., 0.) (0., 0., 0.) (0., 0., 0.) (0., 0., 0.) (0., 0., 0.) Ambush/ Envelopment (0., 0., 0.) (0., 0., 0.) (0., 0., 0.) (0., 0., 0.) Peace Keeping/ Enforcement (0., 0., 0.) (0., 0., 0.) (0., 0., 0.) (0., 0., 0.0) (0., 0., 0.) NOTE: The median m and probability distribution (P[m-], P[m], P[m+]) are shown in each cell. A higher value on the -to- rating scale indicates a more positive level of the characteristic. Air + SOF This option augments the air only force with a limited ground element, in the form of SOF teams that conduct reconnaissance and surveillance, and assist with target acquisition, confirmation and damage assessment (SOF-RST). These teams support a balanced air and missile element that includes two companies of AH-D helicopters, a full air expeditionary force, with both A-0s and TAC- AIR, and as many NTACMS as the heavy option. The SOF-RST teams are very strong on transportability, stealth and self-sufficiency, since they are so light and well-trained, but are extremely weak on mobility, firepower and protection because they are dismounted and have only basic weapons for personal defense. Their strengths, however, compensate for the weaknesses of the force s air element on stealth and self-sufficiency, but may pull down its overall levels of mobility, firepower and protection to some degree. But, the real benefit of these - -

14 teams is that, because of the ground information they provide, they allow the air + SOF option to use the better of the two standoff concepts. Indeed, standoff (with ground information) is most superior to standoff (no ground information) on its three worst characteristics: awareness, adaptability and economy.. REVOLUTIONARY OPTIONS FOR THE FAR TERM (0 0) This section describes the five far-term force options, and discusses the characteristics of their system and operational components. As in the case of the near-term options, detailed information regarding the composition of the farterm options, and their components characteristics, is provided in four tables. Table. indicates the role played by each system, and the quantity included in every option, while Table. shows how often the operational concepts are used by each option. Tables.0 and. show the characteristic rating distributions for the far-term systems and concepts, respectively. Lean Heavy The lean heavy option is a trimmed-down, more advanced version of the near-term heavy force. The current versions of the Abrams and Bradley are replaced with notional next-generation variants, the MA and MA, which incorporate significant improvements in both firepower and protection. The MA has a 0mm main gun, as compared to the 0mm gun on the MA, and a combination of sophisticated heavy armor and an advanced active protection system (APS) that together protect it against most antitank weapons, including those with top-attack munitions, and even some kinetic energy weapons. The MA includes an upgrade from a mm to a 0mm gun, and a much better ATGM in the form of the Follow-on-to-TOW (FOTT), as well as advanced reactive armor and a suite of defensive aids to protect it against most types of ATGM. The FOG-M version of the Bradley (MA-FGM) and the new MLRS are - -

15 improved versions of their near-term counterparts, with slightly more protection and stealth because they both have better armor and a lower signature. The farterm MLRS also uses ATACMS, which improves its firepower and allows it to play an indirect fire far (rather than close) role in the force. Table. Roles and Quantities of Systems in Far-Term Force Options Quantity, by Force Option System Role* Lean Heavy Future Medium Enhanced Light Advanced Air Only Advanced Air + SOF MA MA MA-FGM Crusader MLRS FSCS FCS-DFV FCS-IFV FCS-APC FCS-ART FCS-REC ARES Adv. MLRS AHMV-FOT AHMV-APC RST-V Adv. Javelin Adv. Mortar Small AFSS Large AFSS AH-D+ 0 0 RAH- Adv. TAC-AIR Adv. NTACMS SOF-RST SOF-AST * - Key for system roles: () direct fire attack, () direct fire support, () indirect fire close, () indirect fire far, () close air support, () deep air interdiction, () reconnaissance scout, () reconnaissance attack, () special operations. Tables. and. define the levels of these rating scales. - -

16 The lean heavy force also includes two new vehicles that are currently in development: the Crusader self-propelled howitzer, and the Future Scout and Cavalry System (FSCS). Crusader provides higher levels of mobility, protection, self-sufficiency, and firepower than Paladin because it is faster, has better armor, is more efficient and independent, and has a higher rate of fire with more accuracy. But, Crusader and its re-supply vehicle are together much less transportable than Paladin due to their larger size and weight (Matsumura, Steeb and Gordon, ). The FSCS is a new type of reconnaissance vehicle that plays a scout role in this force. In some sense, the FSCS replaces the MA Bradley cavalry vehicle, providing much more stealth, due to its lower profile and signature, and slightly better transportability, mobility and self-sufficiency, because it is lighter, faster and more efficient. It does, however, have somewhat less firepower and protection; to avoid drawing added attention, it only has a mm gun for self-defense, and it has less armor to keep its weight down. The air component of the lean heavy force includes the following systems: a future version of the Apache Longbow attack helicopter (AH-D+), the Comanche reconnaissance attack helicopter (RAH-), advanced TAC-AIR, and an advanced version of NTACMS. Because of its sleek design, and its use of lighter, stronger materials and other technological advances, the RAH- has slightly higher levels of stealth, protection, transportability, and self-sufficiency than the AH-D+. It does, however, have a bit less firepower because it carries fewer missiles. A third of the attack helicopters in the lean heavy force are RAH- s, which play a reconnaissance attack role, while the other two thirds are AH- D+s, which play a close air support role. The force also includes a full wing of advanced TAC-AIR, along with an allotment of advanced NTACMS, both still in a deep air interdiction role. Due to incremental technological These aircraft are all ground-attack versions of the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF), since it is assumed that the A-0 will have been phased out by

17 improvements, these two systems are both slightly better, across the board, than their near-term versions. Table. Mix of Operational Concepts Used by Far-Term Force Options Operational Concept Standoff (no ground info) Standoff (w/ ground info) Maneuver Warfare Ambush/ Envelopment Peace Keeping/ Enforcement Lean Heavy Proportion of Use, by Force Option Future Enhanced Advanced Medium Light Air Only Advanced Air + SOF The lean heavy force uses the same operational concepts, in the same proportions, as the near-term heavy force. The characteristics of these concepts, however, improve substantially between the two time frames. In particular, the maneuver warfare concept, which is used most often, is better across all characteristics, with its largest gains in adaptability and ability to support. These improvements are attributable to the extensive use of advanced information technologies to facilitate intelligence filtering, target classification, decision making, virtual training, decentralized control, and real-time logistics. Future Medium The future medium force option is, like its near-term counterpart, built around a single vehicle platform. Five different versions of this vehicle the future combat system (FCS) are included in the force. All of the FCS variants have fairly high levels of transportability, mobility, stealth and self-sufficiency. These levels exceed those of the MA and the MA/MA because the FCS is lighter, smaller, faster, and more efficient than these contemporary fighting vehicles. The FCS-DFV, which plays a direct fire attack role, has an advanced - -

18 hypervelocity missile system, sophisticated armor and a robust APS that give it almost as much firepower and protection as the MA, but at a much lower weight. Both the FCS-IFV and the FCS-APC play a direct fire support role in the force, and have a similar level of protection. The main armament of the FCS- IFV is a FOTT ATGM, so it has slightly less firepower than the FCS-DFV, and is a bit more stealthy, since its behavior is less conspicuous. The FCS-APC has even more stealth for the same reason, but because it only has a 0-mm gun for selfdefense, it has much less firepower. A self-propelled howitzer/mortar version, the FCS-ART, provides considerable firepower in an indirect fire close role, and has about as much stealth as the FCS-IFV, but a bit less protection, since it only has smart armor for top-attack threats, and no APS. A reconnaissance scout role is played by the FCS-REC, which is as stealthy as the FCS-APC, but has slightly more firepower, even though it has the same gun, because its targeting system allows it to fire at a higher rate and with greater accuracy. The bulk of the FSC vehicles in the future medium force are DFV, IFV and APC versions, each in about equal numbers, with ART and REC versions making up the remainder. The future medium force also includes two other types of vehicles: an Advanced Robotic Engagement System (ARES) and an advanced MLRS. The ARES, which is essentially a remote-control missile pod, provides substantial firepower in an indirect fire close role. Because it is efficient, light, small and fairly quick, this robotic vehicle is highly self-sufficient and transportable, and quite stealthy and mobile as well. It is not armored, however, so it has very poor protection (although this may be less important since it is unmanned). The advanced MLRS is a light-weight, wheeled missile system that plays an indirect fire far role. Its characteristics are similar to those of the ARES, but it has a bit Estimates of the combat weight of an FCS vehicle range from 0- tons (Sharoni and Bacon, ) to as low as 0- tons, as compared to the MA which weighs in at -0 tons. - -

19 more mobility and protection because it is manned, which also makes it a little less self-sufficient. The mix of systems in the air component of the future medium force is similar to that of the lean heavy force. This option, however, includes only half as many advanced TAC-AIR and two thirds as many advanced NTACMS. Since it has to respond to crises more quickly than the lean heavy force, the future medium force will have fewer aircraft and missiles at its disposal, relying primarily on pre-deployed air and sea power. The future medium option uses a slightly different mix of operational concepts than the near-term medium force, placing equal emphasis on maneuver warfare, standoff (with ground information), and ambush/envelopment, and only half as much on peace keeping/enforcement. Standoff (with ground information) is better in the far term than in the near term on every characteristic because it uses advanced sensor and communication technologies to improve the accuracy of long-range weapons, and the acquisition, classification and selection of targets. The coordination of this concept, in fact, improves to a level that even surpasses that of maneuver warfare in the far term, since it uses information technology to greatly increase the speed at which decisions are made, conveyed and implemented. The ambush/envelopment concept improves even more dramatically between the two time frames; every characteristic except ability to support increases to the top level on its rating scale. This concept rates so highly because it takes even greater advantage of the technological advances used by Unmanned robotic vehicles are generally less mobile than manned vehicles because they have to be driven either remotely or by an autonomous program. If the vehicle is driven remotely, as is the case with the ARES, the operator will not have the same range of sensory inputs that an on-board driver would have. As a result, his reaction times will be longer, and he is more likely to make mistakes, so he will have to drive slower and more carefully, thereby reducing the effective mobility of the vehicle. An autonomous program would have great difficulty making even routine driving decisions, like choosing a route to avoid an obstacle, so the mobility of an autonomous vehicle would be reduced even more severely. Such programs are notoriously bad at replicating adaptive human behavior, so they have to proceed very slowly to give themselves enough time and room to correct the errors they will inevitably make. - -

20 the other far-term concepts; its flexibility, decentralization and focus allow it to benefit extensively from improvements in training, intelligence, communications, planning, decision aids, and targeting. Enhanced Light The enhanced light force includes three types of vehicle systems: ATGM and APC versions of an Advanced High-Mobility Vehicle (AHMV), which both play a direct fire support role, and a small, light-weight Reconnaissance, Surveillance and Targeting Vehicle (RST-V) in a reconnaissance scout role. Both versions of the AHMV are better protected and more mobile, stealthy and self-sufficient than a HMMWV because of their light-weight armor, defensive aids, lower signature, and greater efficiency. The FOT version of the AHMV, with a FOTT ATGM on board, even provides a moderate amount of firepower. The RST-V has very little firepower or protection, as it has no armor and only a small gun, but rates higher on transportability, mobility, stealth and selfsufficiency than the AHMV, since it is even lighter, faster, smaller, more elusive and more efficient. This mix of capabilities reflects the nature of the RST-V s job, which is not to fight, but rather to get in quickly, hide, provide valuable information, and then get out safely. Thee light force also includes substantial numbers of infantry teams and unmanned missile pods. Advanced dismounted Javelin and mortar teams both provide about the same firepower and excellent transportability as their nearterm versions, and are even more stealthy and self-sufficient, due to improved training, camouflage and weapon materials. These teams still, however, have no vehicles, and therefore very little mobility or protection. Small and large The RST-V is a prototype vehicle developed by the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA). Detailed information about the RST-V is available at: tto/programs/rst.html, last accessed January,

21 versions of the Advanced Fire Support System (AFSS) play indirect fire close and far roles, respectively, in the enhanced light force. Both types of AFSS are unmanned, remote-control missile launchers missiles in a box that can be air-dropped onto the battlefield. Once deployed, however, they have no mobility and very little protection, but are quite stealthy and extremely self-sufficient, since they simply hide, without moving, until they are used. The large AFSS provides slightly more firepower than the small version, but is much less transportable because of its substantially higher weight. This enhanced light option has a much smaller air component than the future medium force. It has the same number of RAH- helicopters for reconnaissance attack, but does not have any AH-D+s for close air support. Also, it also has only half as many advanced NTACMS, and fewer than half as many advanced TAC-AIR, for deep air interdiction. The air component of this option is small because it must respond quickly to defuse an emerging crisis, or enforce a new peace accord, so it can only rely on air and sea power that is already deployed in the region. This force uses the peace keeping/enforcement operational concept half of the time, placing a bit more of its remaining emphasis on standoff (with ground information) and a bit less on ambush/envelopment. In the far term, the peace keeping/enforcement concept rates higher than in the near term on every characteristic, with substantial improvements in awareness, coordination and especially adaptability, bringing every rating up to a moderate or high level. These improvements, like those in all of the other far-term concepts, are attributable to the application of a broad range of advanced technologies, but also incorporate lessons learned form peace operations in the intervening period. The AFSS is a prototype system developed by DARPA. Detailed information about AFSS is available at: last accessed January,

22 Table.0 Characteristic Ratings of Far-Term Systems System MA MA MA-FGM Crusader MLRS FSCS FCS-DFV FCS-IFV FCS-APC FCS-ART FCS-REC ARES System Characteristics Mobility Firepower Protection Stealth Selfsufficiency Adv. MLRS AHMV- FOT AHMV- APC RST-V Adv. Javelin Adv. Mortar Small AFSS Large AFSS AH-D+ Transportability (0., 0., 0.0) (0.0, 0., 0.) (0.0, 0., 0.) (0., 0., 0.0) (0., 0., 0.0) (0., 0., 0.0) (0.0, 0., 0.) (0., 0., 0.0) (0.0, 0., 0.) (0.0, 0., 0.) (0., 0., 0.0) (0., 0., 0.) (0., 0., 0.0) (0., 0., 0.) (0., 0., 0.) (0.0, 0., 0.) (0.0, 0., 0.) (0.0, 0., 0.) (0.0, 0., 0.) (0., 0., 0.) (0., 0., 0.) (0., 0., 0.) (0., 0., 0.) (0., 0., 0.) (0., 0., 0.) (0., 0., 0.) (0., 0., 0.) (0., 0., 0.) (0., 0., 0.) (0., 0., 0.0) (0.0, 0., 0.) (0.0, 0., 0.) (0., 0., 0.0) (0., 0., 0.0) (0., 0., 0.) (0.0, 0., 0.) (0.0, 0., 0.) (0., 0., 0.0) (0., 0., 0.) (0., 0., 0.) (0.0, 0., 0.) (0., 0., 0.) (0.0, 0., 0.) (0., 0., 0.) (0., 0., 0.) (0.0, 0., 0.) (0., 0., 0.) (0., 0., 0.) (0., 0., 0.) (0., 0., 0.) (0., 0., 0.) (0., 0., 0.) (0., 0., 0.) (0., 0., 0.0) (0., 0., 0.0) (0., 0., 0.) (0., 0., 0.) (0.0, 0., 0.) (0., 0., 0.0) (0., 0., 0.0) (0., 0., 0.0) (0.0, 0., 0.) (0.0, 0., 0.) (0.0, 0., 0.) (0.0, 0., 0.) (0.0, 0., 0.) (0.0, 0., 0.) (0., 0., 0.0) (0.0, 0., 0.) (0.0, 0., 0.) (0., 0., 0.) (0., 0., 0.0) (0., 0., 0.) (0., 0., 0.) (0., 0., 0.0) (0., 0., 0.) (0., 0., 0.) (0., 0., 0.0) (0., 0., 0.0) (0., 0., 0.) (0., 0., 0.0) (0., 0., 0.) (0., 0., 0.) (0., 0., 0.) (0., 0., 0.) (0., 0., 0.) (0., 0., 0.) (0., 0., 0.) (0., 0., 0.) (0., 0., 0.) (0., 0., 0.) (0., 0., 0.) (0., 0., 0.) (0., 0., 0.) (0., 0., 0.) (0., 0., 0.) (0., 0., 0.) (0., 0., 0.) (0., 0., 0.) (0., 0., 0.) (0., 0., 0.) (0., 0., 0.) (0.0, 0., 0.) (0.0, 0., 0.) (0., 0., 0.0) (0., 0., 0.0) (0.0, 0., 0.) - 0 -

23 System RAH- Adv. TAC-AIR Adv. NTACMS SOF-RST SOF-AST Transportability (0., 0., 0.) (0., 0., 0.0) (0., 0., 0.) System Characteristics Mobility Firepower Protection Stealth Selfsufficiency (0., 0., 0.) (0.0, 0., 0.) (0., 0., 0.) (0., 0., 0.) (0., 0., 0.0) (0.0, 0., 0.) (0., 0., 0.0) (0.0, 0., 0.) (0.0, 0., 0.) (0., 0., 0.) (0., 0., 0.) (0., 0., 0.) (0., 0., 0.0) (0.0, 0., 0.) (0., 0., 0.) (0., 0., 0.0) (0., 0., 0.0) (0.0, 0., 0.) (0., 0., 0.) (0.0, 0., 0.) (0., 0., 0.0) NOTE: The median m and probability distribution (P[m-], P[m], P[m+]) are shown in each cell. A higher value on the -to- rating scale indicates a more positive level of the characteristic. Advanced Air Only The advanced air only option includes the same number of advanced TAC- AIR and NTACMS as the lean heavy option. The composition of this air only option differs from its near-term version, however, because it includes a fairly large number of RAH- helicopters twice as many as in the other far-term options. The RAH- can participate in this type of force because, unlike the AH-D+, it can conduct some operations without direct ground support. Since it has no access to ground information, the far-term air only option still uses the standoff (no ground information) concept exclusively. This concept is, however, somewhat better in the far term than in the near term. Every characteristic is rated higher, with coordination and adaptability gaining substantially, due to better communications, decision support and training, as well as changes in culture to accommodate strict rules of engagement. Advanced Air + SOF The advanced air + SOF option consists of three components: air power and naval missiles; robotic ground-based missiles; and multi-purpose SOF teams. This option includes the same air component as the lean heavy force, consisting of exactly the same numbers of AH-D+, RAH-, advanced TAC-AIR, and - 0 -

24 advanced NTACMS. The force also has as many small and large AFSS as the enhanced light force, which give it a very responsive indirect fire capability. The ground-presence element of this option consists of an equal number of two types of SOF teams: RST teams that include a mix of human and robotic elements; and assault and sabotage (AST) teams that can attack selected targets in enemy territory. Because they are so light, inconspicuous and independent, both types of SOF teams have the highest ratings possible for transportability, stealth and self-sufficiency, but extremely low ratings for mobility and protection. The two types, of course, have different levels of firepower: AST teams have some handheld ATGMs, while RST teams only have personal weapons. Unlike the near-term air + SOF option, this far-term version does not rely exclusively on standoff (with ground information); it also uses another concept, ambush/envelopment, about a quarter of the time. The inclusion of SOF-AST teams in this far-term option enable it to use the ambush/envelopment concept occasionally. Since this concept is rated so highly, for reasons discussed earlier, using it instead of standoff (with ground information), even if only part of the time, will improve the overall effectiveness of the advanced air + SOF option. Table. Characteristic Ratings of Far-Term Operational Concepts Operational Characteristic Awareness Coordination Adaptability Economy Ability to Operational Concept Support Standoff (no ground info) (0., 0., 0.) (0., 0., 0.0) (0., 0., 0.) (0., 0., 0.0) (0., 0., 0.) Standoff (w/ ground info) (0.0, 0., 0.) (0., 0., 0.) (0.0, 0., 0.) (0., 0., 0.) (0., 0., 0.) Maneuver Warfare (0., 0., 0.) (0., 0., 0.) (0., 0., 0.0) (0., 0., 0.) (0., 0., 0.0) Ambush/ Envelopment (0., 0., 0.0) (0., 0., 0.0) (0., 0., 0.0) (0., 0., 0.0) (0., 0., 0.) Peace Keeping/ Enforcement (0., 0., 0.) (0., 0., 0.) (0., 0., 0.0) (0., 0., 0.0) (0., 0., 0.) NOTE: The median m and probability distribution (P[m-], P[m], P[m+]) are shown in each cell. A higher value on the -to- rating scale indicates a more positive level of the characteristic

25 . KEY OPTION COMPARISONS This section presents several key comparisons of the effectiveness of selected pairs of force options. Each comparison involves two options from the same time frame that are similar with respect to one of two important factors: reach, responsiveness and flexibility; or effective ground presence. These factors address substantive questions of military capability where can the force operate? how quickly can it be deployed? what sorts of ground missions can it perform? that affect how, and under what circumstances, a force option can be used by top-level decision makers. Two other important factors of a political nature are also considered: reduced risk of casualties; and organizational and budgetary stability. These two factors address the viability of an option the political circumstances under which it could be used, and the bureaucratic obstacles it is likely to face. The options in each time frame are rated low, moderate or high on all four of these factors, as shown in Table. for the near term, and in Table. for the far term. Table. Important Factors for Near-Term Force Options Force Option Important Factors Heavy Medium Light Air Only Air + SOF Reach, responsiveness and flexibility low moderate high ( ) high high Effective ground presence high high high low moderate Reduced risk of casualties high ( ) moderate low high moderate Organizational and budgetary stability high low high high high ( ) The following two subsections present the option comparisons that will be addressed in the two time frames. Each comparison five in the near term, and five in the far term is discussed in a brief paragraph that discusses how the options involved rate on the important military and political factors introduced - 0 -

26 above. In each case, one of the two military factors has the same rating for both options, and the differences among the remaining factors are highlighted. Near Term Medium-weight versus heavy armored. The medium and heavy options both provide an effective ground presence they are both rated high on this factor. The medium force has more reach, responsiveness and flexibility than the heavy force, since it can deploy more quickly to more places. But, it rates lower on reduced casualty risk and organizational and budgetary stability, because it is not as well-protected or as potent, and would require a significant amount of reorganization and new procurement. The larger issue, then, is whether the rapid, and reasonably potent, ground-force-projection capability provided by a medium-weight force is worth the associated political risks force structure disruption and the potential for higher casualties. Medium-weight versus light infantry. The light force, like the medium force, provides an effective ground presence. It is, of course, less potent than the medium force, so it entails a fairly high casualty risk (as indicated by its low rating on this factor). On the other hand, it requires less preparation time, lift and support, and can operate in a wider range of environments, so it has greater reach, responsiveness and flexibility. Also, since light forces are already a part of the current force structure, this option would not threaten organizational and budgetary stability, while developing a medium force clearly would. Thus, comparing these two ground force options provides some insight into what a new medium force can do relative to a contemporary light force, taking into account its greater survivability and any constraints on where and how fast it can be deployed. These capabilities can then be weighed against the overall cost of its introduction. Light infantry versus aircraft alone. Both the light force and the air only force provide a high level of reach, responsiveness and flexibility, since they can - 0 -