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2 RESTRCTED-Security nformation FOREWORD This account of the operations in Egypt and Libya has been written for use in the instruction of cadets at the United States Military Academy. t is based for the most part on material contained in the following publications: October 1948 De Guingand, Operation Victory. Charles Scribner's Sons, New York, Strategicus, From Dunkirk to Benghazi. Faber and Faber, London, Eventful Yea-rs. Encyclopaedia Britannica, nc., Chicago, Pamphlets published by the British nformation Service. RESTRCTED-Security nformation ARMY-U, S.M.A. WEST PONT. N.Y

3 CONTENTS PAGE NTRODUCTON 1 The Strategic mportance of the Middle East 2 WESTERN DESERT CAMPAGNS, SEPTEMBER 1940-JULY Graziani's Advance 5 Wavell's Offensive 5 Rommel's First Offensive 8 Wavell's Counteroffensive 9 WESTERN DESERT CAMPAGNS, JULY 1941-AUGUST Auchinleck's Offensive 10 Rommel's Second Offensive 12 The Battle on the Gazala-Bir Hacheim Line 14 THE FNAL BRTSH OFFENSVE, AUGUST FEBRUARY The Battle of Alam Haifa. 19 The Battle of El Alamein 22 The Pursuit to Tunisia 30

4 RESTRCTED-Security nformation THE WAR N NORTH AFRCA - - NTRODUCTON (Map 1) The year 1939 saw the beginning of World War and the conquest of Poland by Germany. By 9 April 1940 Hitler's troops had occupied Denmark. Two months later they were in full possession of Norway; and on 25 June the campaign in the West was completed, with Holland, Belgium and France entirely overrun. n July taly, not to be outdone, began the conquest of the British possessions in East Africa. And on 13 September 1940, while the Battle of Britain was in full sway, the talian army in Libya struck east across the border against the much smaller British army in Egypt. t was impossible to foretell at the time that the battles in North Africa were to have such a far-reaching effect on the strategy of the war as a whole, but subsequent events clearly demonstrated the importance of the operations in that theater. t was on the North African battlefields that the military weakness of Hitler's talian partner was first revealed. When the time came to exploit this weakness, taly's power had been so dissipated in the North African wastes that, strain as she did, Germany could not bolster it sufficiently to retain control of strategic Tunisia, Sicily, Sardinia, Corsica, or even the talian mainland. t was in North Africa that both British and American Armies gained much valuable experience and training in the tactics of all arms, and the desert provided a practical proving ground for newly developed weapons. Operations in North Africa demonstrated the necessity for, and methods of insuring, close cooperation between ground, air, and naval forces; and there the foundation of Anglo American cooperation on the battlefield was laid. f the talians did not suffer a loss of military prestige in the North African operations, it was only because they had none to lose. But German prestige received a serious blow, for it was in the deserts of North Africa that the Wehrmacht reached the high tide of its relentless march for world domination. t was there that the British and Americans seized the initiative and effected a strategic diversion which, although not a real second front, was nevertheless an important contribution to the cause of the United Nations. 1 RESTRCTED -Security nformation

5 2 A final important result of the North African operations was the actual physical conquest of the coast line that insured Allied domination of the Mediterranean Sea. This permitted the control and utilization of the far shorter sea lane to the Middle East* and opened new routes for the direct invasion of the continent of Europe. Tunisia pointed to the most accessible and direct route of invasion from North Africa, and with its occupation the Allies gained the strategic initiative. THE STRATEGC MPORTANCE OF THE MDDLE EAST From the standpoint of strategy the Middle East was a region of vital importance to both the Axis and the United Nations. This importance was due chiefly to its strategic location, in that it constituted a link between three continents and an avenue of approach by land to the main theaters of operation. n this respect there is no other area in the world which is similarly situated and which, as a consequence, affords a more vital central position in a global war. Specifically, should the United Nations have lost control of the Middle East, there would have been these major consequences: (1) Germany and Japan would have had a direct route for the junction of their military forces in closing a ring of strangulation about Russia and China; (2) Turkey would have been isolated and compelled to cooperate with the Axis; (3) our important southern supply route to Russia would have been closed; ( 4) the Axis would have secured the oil of the Caucasus, of raq, and of ran; (5) the air ferry route across central Africa to the Middle East and thence beyond to ndia and China would have been lost; (6) the shorter Mediterranean supply route to ndia and China would have been closed at the Suez Canal bottleneck; and (7) the United Nations would no longer have controlled the most likely point from which to strike at or threaten Hitler's rear. The inability of the Axis powers to capture the Middle East was for them a strategic failure of great magnitude. t At one time there were available to Germany four possible routes of invasion of the * The term "Middle East" bas no exact definition. n these pages it refers to the region made up of Turkey, Syria, Palestine, Trans-Jordan, Arabia, raq, and ran. t When in the fall of 1940 Hitler was trying to make up his mind whether to eliminate Britain or start a war with Russia, Goering and others were pressing for an all-out offensive against the British in the Mediterranean by assisting Spain to seize Gibraltar and then driving east to Suez. However, Hitler's ultimate decision to invade Russia delegated to North Africa a secondary role in the German grand strategy.

6 3 Middle East. The first of these, that through Turkey, was the most direct and offered the best communications. Another led from Greece to Crete and thence on to Syria. As late as November 1942 there were two other available routes. One was through the Caucasus, and the other led eastward from Libya into Egypt and thence on across the Arabian desert. Together these latter two routes offered to the enemy the possibility of executing one of his favorite maneuvers, a great pincers movement. And it is significant that along each of them Axis troops at one time or another made dangerous advances. The key to the Allies' tenuous hold on the Middle East was Egypt. Alexandria was the base of operations for the British Mediterranean Fleet; Cairo was the nerve center of northeastern Africa and the headquarters of the British Middle East Command; the Suez Canal was, of course, of great strategic importance. f these fell into Axis hands, only a miracle could save the Middle East. British prestige in the Middle East rested on a finely calculated balance of power; and the events of the summer of 1940 abruptly upset that balance, placing the full responsibility for the defense of the Middle East on the British Empire alone. The collapse of France eliminated Syria as a buffer in the north and the French colonies in northwestern Africa as a threat to taly from the west. Without the aid of the French fleet British naval domination of the Mediterranean was questionable. To add to the difficulties, the British retreat from Dunkirk, with its disastrous loss of equipment, meant that the Middle East would have to go short for some time. With France eliminated and Britain greatly weakened, taly boldly set out to conquer a new African empire. The Duke of Aosta had some 110,000 troops in talian East Africa (Ethiopia, Eritrea, and talian Somaliland), and on 4 August 1940 he began an invasion of British Somaliland with two divisions. Unable to halt the advance, the British evacuated Berbera by 19 August.* The talians also crossed into Kenya and the Sudan, but for the next five months fighting was confined mostly to patrol skirmishes along those wild frontiers. However, it was not in East Africa but in the north-in that inhospitable land on the southern shores of the Mediterranean between Alexandria and Tripoli, which the British called the Western * British forces in Somaliland consisted of a few British officers and 1,200 African soldiers. Whenever "British" troops are mentioned in these pages, the term means troops of the British Empire--Qr, more properly, the British Commonwealth of Nations.

7 4 Deser~that the principal battles in Africa and the Middle East were to be fought during 1940, 1941, and Between El Agheila and El Alamein there was no natural defensive position that could not be readily turned. There was only one highway, along the coast. There were only three large ports, Tripoli, Benghazi, and Alexandria, although there were several small ones. Water was scarce. Apart from the Jebel Akhbar, the bulge of Cyrenaica which the talians had attempted to colonize and which was outflanked regularly throughout the campaigns, the terrain was fiat and desertlike. Between El Agheila and El Alamein there was ample room for maneuver, particularly for mechanized forces; airfields were readily constructed; and, save for a small number of Arabs and a few talian settlers, there was no civilian population. The nature of the country, with its solitary coastal road and the dispersion of its small ports, gave the campaigns their pattern: a series of mechanized envelopments with infantry hugging the coast, to secure in each case a port which would nourish a further advance. "North Africa," said von Ravenstein, the commander of the 21st Panzer Division, "is a tactician's paradise and a quartermaster's hell." The campaigns in Egypt and Libya, marked by repeated advances and retreats across the desert, which the British soldiers quickly dubbed the "Benghazi Handicap," were dominated by three gifted commanders whose careers overlapped but whose ascendancy fell into three marked periods: General Sir Archibald P. Wavell (until July 1941), General Erwin Rommel (August 1941 to July 1942), and Lieutenant General Bernard L. Montgomery (from August 1942). WESTERN DESERT CAMPAGNS September 1940-July 1941 n spite of the inadequate state of defense in the British sles in the summer of 1940, some men and materials were transferred to Egypt. Fortunately Britain could still rely on her communications with the East, and reinforcements were brought in from Australia, New Zealand, and ndia, as well as from South Africa. By June 1940 General Wavell's Middle East Command, which at that time included Egypt, the Sudan, Kenya, British Somaliland, Palestine, Trans-Jordan, and Cyprus, numbered some 100,000 British troops. At that time the talians had more than 200,000 men in Libya alone and enjoyed a considerable numerical superiority in aircraft..,

8 GRAZAN'S ADVANCE (13-16 September 1940) (Map 2a) 5 With the Battle of Britain in full swing at home, the British in North Africa were holding the Egyptian frontier with an armored detachment while their main body of two divisions remained at Mersa Matruh, 120 miles farther east. On 13 September, after a heavy artillery preparation on the deserted escarpment above Sollum, the talians under Marshal Graziani invaded Egypt on a narrow front along the coast with two divisions in the van, two in rear, and a reinforced division in reserve. Sidi Barrani was reached by 16 September. These forces, subsequently increased to a strength of 80,000 men, then settled down for more than two months in a series of fortified camps which extended from the coast east of Sidi Barrani to the escarpment about Sofafi, fifty miles away. The defenses lacked depth and mutual support, and a gap of more than twenty miles lay between the main group of camps and the one on the south flank. Although the Western Desert front remained inactive for the next three months, Admiral Sir Andrew Cunningham, commander of the British Mediterranean Fleet, continued his operations against the talian fleet. A carefully prepared attack by carrier-borne torpedo aircraft was delivered against the talian naval base at Taranto on the night of 11 November. Three battleships were hit and left in a sinking condition, two cruisers were badly damaged, and two fleet auxiliaries were sunk. The British lost only two aircraft. This shattering blow established British naval supremacy in the Mediterranean; but shore-based aircraft operating from Sicily, Sardinia, and the African coast still interfered with the free movement of British transports. WAVELL'S OFFENSVE (9 December February 1941) By early December General Wavell was ready to launch an offensive. The Western Desert Force, commanded by General O'Connor,. consisted of the reinforced British 7th Armored and 4th ndian Divisions, some 40,000 men and 120 tanks. The advanced talian forces were still deployed in the scattered fortified camps between Sidi Barrani and Sofafi. After an approach march by night over the open desert the two British divisions advanced on the gap between the Sofafi and Nibeiwa camps. Complete surprise resulted in the rapid capture of Nibeiwa early on 9 December, and by nightfall all the camps to the north had either fallen or were about to fall. Sidi Barrani was retaken the next day and the road to the west cut; Sollum fell on the

9 6 16th. "Something is wrong with our Army," wrote Count Galeazzo on 11 December, "if five divisions allow themselves to be pulverized in two days." By mid-december all talian units had been driven from Egypt, leaving more than 38,000 prisoners in British hands; and most of the talian troops remaining in Cyrenaica had withdrawn within the invested perimeter of Bardia. The British paused for two weeks to bring up supplies and then launched an attack on Bardia from the west with the 6th Australian Division (which had relieved the 4th ndian Division) while the 7th Armored Division patrolled the road between Bardia and Tobruk to prevent the arrival of talian reinforcements. Bardia fell to the Australians on 5 January after a heavy naval bombardment, about 45,000 prisoners and 460 guns being captured. By the next day the 7th Armored Division had isolated the garrison of Tobruk by cutting the road and trails to the west. The southern face of the perimeter of Tobruk was attacked by the Australians on 21 January, with effective air and naval support; the town capitulated the next day with its garrison of 38,000. The remaining talian forces in Cyrenaica were disposed in two main groups: most of the infantry east of Derna and a mechanized group about Mekili, the nodal point of the trails south from the Jebel Akhdar and the direct westward route to Benghazi. While the Australians pushed into the Jebel, the 7th Armored Division moved on Mekili. By 3 February it was evident that the talians were abandoning the "bulge." The 7th Armored Division advanced swiftly on Msus in a bold move to cut off the talians south of Benghazi by moving northwest on Soluch or southwest on Agedabia as required. By 5 February, after a gruelling march in unreconnoitered desert, detachments were astride the main route southwest of Beda Fomm. Eighty-four talian tanks were put out of action the next day by a British armored pincers closing from Soluch and Beda Fomm. After an abortive attempt by thirty of their tanks to break through at dawn on 7 February, the talians surrendered unconditionally. The talian Tenth Army had thus been wiped out, and Cyrenaica was in British hands. n two months the Western Desert Force had advanced about 500 miles. t had destroyed nine enemy divisions and had taken 130,000 prisoners, 400 tanks, and 1,290 guns. n these operations General O'Connor, Wavell's tactical commander, had never employed more than two divisions at a time, the 7th Armored Division (the "Desert Rats") being engaged throughout. British casualties totaled 1,928 men. The support of the Royal

10 7 Navy had been most effective, while the R.A.F., though much inferior in numbers, had gained complete superiority over the talian Air Force. But Wavell was still gambling on a strategic shoestring, and more compelling events in other parts of the Middle East forced him to risk holding Cyrenaica with an understrength armored brigade covering its western approaches and a new Australian division forming in the Jebel. To remove the talian threat from East Africa the 4th ndian Division had already been sent south from the Western Desert (Map 1). Wavell's tactical commander in East Africa, Lieutenant General Sir Alan Cunningham (brother of the commander of the Mediterranean Fleet), had a conglomerate force of some 70,000 British, Free French, Belgians, Bengalis, Sikhs, Ethiopians, and South Africans massed along the frontiers of Kenya and the Sudan. Beginning with converging attacks from the frontiers on 19 January, 1941, a remarkable series of British successes resulted in the surrender of talian Somaliland on 7 March, the capture of Addis Ababa on 6 April, and the conquest of Eritrea in April. The Duke of Aosta withdrew into the mountains north of Addis Ababa with the bulk of his army and continued fighting until May, when, hopelessly trapped, he surrendered. By the end of September the Allies had recaptured British Somaliland and all of talian East Africa, thus definitely removing the threat of any attack on Egypt from the south and securing the Red Sea as an Allied base area. The Mediterranean Fleet achieved another remarkable victory in March;* but Axis air power had neutralized Malta as a base for the battle fleet, and Hitler came to the rescue of his talian ally by sending panzer forces into Tripoli. However, even more ominous events were transpiring in the Balkans, where Hitler was preparing to march toward Greece (whose forces were already severely strained in containing Mussolini's invading divisions). Suddenly the whole framework of Wavell's strategy in the Middle East was changed when orders were received from London to give the defense of Greece top priority. The Western Desert Force, whose eyes were on Tripoli and the final eradication of Axis forces in North Africa, was stripped to the bone when Wavell sent some 40,000 men and * n this action, known as the Battle off Cape Matapan, a British force of three battleships, one carrier, four cruisers, and a number of destroyers engaged an talian fleet of three battleships, eleven cruisers, and fourteen destroyers southeast of Sicily. One talian battleship was badly damaged; and three heavy cruisers, a light cruiser, and two destroyers were sunk. The British lost two aircraft.

11 8 perhaps his best tactician, General Henry M. Wilson, to Greece. Against these numerous commitments the British cupboard was terribly bare. The Army possessed few tanks, was short of transport, and lacked modern equipment. The R.A.F. was equipped with obsolescent aircraft, and few of them at that. The Navy was holding its own, but the shortage of shipping was keenly felt. ROMMEL'S FRST OFFENSVE (24 March-30 May 1941) (Map 2b) By the end of February German aircraft had made the port of Benghazi untenable, and on 24 March General Erwin Rommel made his appearance in the desert by capturing El Agheila from the British armored outposts. The British attempts to delay, first around Agedabia to cover Benghazi and then on the line Derna-Mekili to cover Tobruk, were foiled by the faster and more powerful German tanks of the 21st Panzer Division which operated on the open flank. The Germans, reversing O'Connor's westward march, thrust with two main spearheads, one forcing its way through the Jebel toward Derna, the other dashing via Msus across the open desert toward Tobruk. Back in Cairo 6 April 1941 was a black day; for news had just arrived that Germany had attacked Greece, and reports from the desert were very bad. However, at a meeting attended by Wavell, Anthony Eden, and Field Marshal Sir John Dill it was decided to hold Tobruk. Having captured many British prisoners, including General O'Connor, and having driven a small delaying force back from El Adem to the Egyptian frontier, Rommel launched an ill-prepared attack on Tobruk on 10 April. Failing after three tense days to break through the British gunners and Australian infantry who had withdrawn within the perimeter, the Germans, with talians in attendance, settled down to prepare a less impetuous assault. Rommel overhauled his tanks and moved the 15th Panzer Division up from Tripoli. On the night of 30 May he renewed the attack but narrowly failed in his purpose, and Tobruk settled down to the rhythm of its long seige. There is no doubt but that the British decision to hold Tobruk was the right one. With it in his hands, Rommel would have had a port to support an advance deep into Egypt. nstead the garrison (regularly supplied by the Navy) held out with the greatest courage until relieved seven months later, and Rommel did not advance far beyond the frontier.

12 WAVELL'S COUNTEROFFENSVE (15-17 June 1941) 9 The escarpment running southeast from Sollum was generally impassable to vehicles for about fifty miles inland save at Sollum itself and the pass at Halfaya. While Tobruk remained besieged, operations on the Egyptian frontier developed into battles for possession of the two passes. As a result of political pressure to relieve Tobruk, Wavell ordered an attack over the frontier on 15 June, the attacking force consisting of one infantry division and an armored division. Capuzzo fell, but Halfaya and Sollum remained in German hands. On the night of 16 June a battle between German and British armor took place south of Sidi Omar. After suffering heavy tank losses, particularly from 88-mm. guns, the British began to withdraw. Perhaps the greatest British tactical mistake in this counteroffensive (which according to British observers were numerous) was breaking up their two available divisions into six semi-independent task forces and then committing them piecemeal. Rommel here revealed the qualities which were to stamp his desert career: a forceful and inspiring personal leadership, disdaining either risk or advice; a capacity to take advantage of his opponent's mistakes as rapidly as he recovered from his own; a tendency to improvise and to repeat his tactics. Wavell had other worries at this time, for the campaign in Greece had ended in disaster on 1 May (Map 1), and Crete had fallen one month later. n view of subsequent events the comments of a prominent British staff officer * on the operations in Greece are of interest: contend that from the military point of view an intervention in Greece never had any chance of success. There were so many disturbing elements present... f Greece had asked for assistance, then we were in honor bound to do our best; but contend we misled her as to our ability to help. We led her to believe that this help would be effective. The grounds for arriving at this view appeared extremely scanty. And the result was that we lost many lives, all our valuable equipment, and jeopardized our whole position in the Middle East. We brought about disaster in the Western Desert and threw away a chance of clearing up as far as Tripoli. Whether the politician forced the soldier's hand do not know. During this period the British undertook certain minor operations for the purpose of making the Middle East secure. n the * Major General Sir Francis W. de Guingand, then on the staff of the Middle East Command and later Montgomery's chief of staff in Africa, taly, and Europe. This and other paragraphs quoted in these pages are contained in his splendid book, Ope-ration Victory, written after the war.

13 10 spring the friendly raq Government was assisted in putting down ' a rebellion, and Syria was wrested from the Vichy French during the summer. n August and September British and Russian troops moved into ran as a counter to Nazi infiltration. WESTERN DESERT CAMPAGNS July 1941-August 1942 On 5 July 1941 General Sir Claude Auchinleck succeeded General Wavell, who was transferred to ndia. Admiral Andrew Cunningham remained in command of the Mediterranean Fleet, and Air Marshal Arthur Tedder still headed the R.A.F. in the Middle East. With the change of command in Cairo and the promise of reinforcements, great optimism prevailed in the British ranks. Two major preoccupations existed at G.H.Q. at this time. The first was the formation of the Eighth Army and the planning of an offensive to the west; the second was the strengthening of the defenses in the area between ndia and Syria, made necessary by the German advance into Russia. General Wilson was given command of the new British Ninth Army in Palestine and Trans-Jordan. The old Western Desert Force was reorganized in early October as the Eighth Army; and General Alan Cunningham, fresh from his victories in East Africa, became its first commander. AUCHNLECK'S OFFENSVE (18 November-31 December 1941) (Map 3a) Rommel had developed his 15th and 21st Panzer Divisions into an efficient desert-trained armored force known as the Afrika Korps; and a new unit, the German 90th Light nfantry Division was being formed. The Axis frontier defenses had been strengthened by the fortification of Bardia, Sollum, Halfaya, and Sidi Omar. The British, who had received reinforcements of American light tanks (a type they called the "Stuart"), planned to make a short "left hook" from Maddalena toward Tobruk-which was of course still invested-and force Rommel to give battle. They hoped to possess a considerable numerical superiority in tanks, guns, and troops, and counted on strong support from the Desert Air Force, which was in good fettle. The bulk of the Eighth Army was concentrated between the frontier and Mersa Matruh, a railroad having been pushed into the desert to supply the troops. The British attacked at dawn on 18 November and achieved complete surprise.

14 11 Swinging an armored force across the frontier from Maddalena, they sought to bring the German armor to battle south of Tobruk while on the inner flank the X Corps attacked northward to isolate Sollum and Bardia. During the next two weeks operations in the Tobruk-Sollum-Bir el Gobi area took on the characteristics of typical whirligig desert warfare, with both sides employing their forces in small, independent, and uncoordinated actions and with no semblance of an organized front in evidence. On 18 November the British seized the commanding terrain southeast of Tobruk; but by the 23d this ground had been retaken by the Germans, a premature sortie from Tobruk had failed, and the spearhead of the British armored force had been blocked by the Germans between Tobruk and Gambut. German panzer forces also operated around Bir el Gobi and west of Sidi Omar, where they were engaging other elements of the British armored force. While uncertainty existed in the British command (a mood relieved by Auchinleck's decision to take over personally), Rommel threw away his opportunity to destroy the dispersed British armor in a characteristic gamble to finish the battle quickly. Collecting all available tanks on 24 November, he led a "dash to the wire," a raid over the frontier through the British lines. Failing to unseat the British from their essential purpose, his disruptive columns on 26 November swung back toward the rear of the New Zealanders of the X Corps, who had by then pushed beyond Gambut. The next day the Tobruk garrison made a second sortie and effected a junction with the New Zealanders. Although the Afrika Korps was split by this move of the British, on 1 December the Germans managed to break through and join the panzer forces south of Tobruk. During the first week in December Rommel pulled back the rest of his scattered forces and abandoned the area east of the general line Bir el Gobi El Adem. General de Guingand describes these operations as follows: Our armoured brigades were commanded with great dash, but perhaps not with comparable skill. When once they came into contact with Rommel's main forces, very heavy casualties occurred. The tank "returns" that came in to army headquarters were positively frightening. Some units hardly had a "runner". At this stage Rommel undertook a very bold and well-timed armoured raid deep into our area. The spearhead crossed the frontier wire and was not far short of railhead and important supply dumps. Army H.Q. was also threatened. Eighth Army did not react to this as Rommel had hoped, and went on with their task of gaining control of the tactical area south of Tobruk with a view to a link up with that garrison, as well as taking considerable toll of the enemy. During this fighting a New Zealand casualty clearing station was overrun by the en-

15 u emy. Rommel found time to walk round and talk to some of the patients. He certainly had something about him, this German general. We always felt he was a fitting and chivalrous opponent. After about nine days' fighting our losses had been so heavy--our tanks being no match for the enemy's antitank guns and tanks-that doubts arose in the army commander's mind as to the advisability of pursuing the original plan at such a cost. General Auchinleck decided to fly up to Eighth Army headquarters to study the situation... t was then that the Commander in Chief showed great courage and leadership. He decided to make a change in command and to drive the army forward in spite of what they had suffered.* Our ntelligence showed that the enemy's situation was anything but good. Tank reinforcements having revitalized the Eighth Army, Rommel began to withdraw his units on 7 December; and by the 12th, after expensive rear-guard actions, the Germans had reached a line running southwest from Gazala. A heavy battle for disengagement ensued, but by 15 December it was evident that Rommel's lines were both pierced and turned. He then retreated to Agedabia, picking up a delivery of tanks from Benghazi en route. Escaping an attempted British envelopment at Agedabia in late December, he continued on to El Agheila. Strengthened by the arrival of a convoy at Tripoli and by two talian divisions, Rommel now rested and refitted in the strong El Agheila position, back where he had started nine months before. The British eliminated the isolated forces that he had left at Bardia, Sollum, and Halfaya. ROMMEL'S SECOND OFFENSVE (21 January-7 July 1942) n the Middle East the year 1941 closed upon a relatively high note. The British offensive into Cyrenaica had been a great success, and the siege of Tobruk had been lifted. The Russians, fighting with the greatest determination, had saved Moscow. The talian colonies in East Africa had been finally reduced, Ethiopia had been liberated, and there was no immediate danger to Turkey, ran, or raq. But Japan's entry into the war on the side of the Axis offset this satisfactory picture, and in the Middle East the Allies soon began to feel the effects of this additional commitment. ndia and Australia had to look to their own defenses, and all three services were forced to dispatch resources from the Middle East to help deal with the menace from Japan. Stout hearts and clear heads would be required to see the Allies through the next few months. Out on the El Agheila front, 450 miles by road from the main Axis base at Tripoli and more than 800 miles from Cairo, both *Major General Ritchie was appointed the new Eighth Army commander, but General Auchenleck remained with the army until the end of the campaign.

16 13 Rommel and Ritchie were building up their supplies in preparation for further offensive action. The British had withdrawn their heavier units from contact, using only light patrols in front of the enemy lines (Map 3b). Rommel was ready first. He attacked strongly on a narrow front on 21 January; and the Eighth Army, dispersed and under strength, fell back to avoid disaster. The British were caught off balance, and things did not go well for them. Rommel captured valuable dumps of fuel and stores that helped maintain the momentum of his attack. By the end of January Benghazi and its British garrison had fallen, and Rommel had been made a field marshal. However, General Ritchie and his commanders managed to overcome the initial confusion and succeeded in establishing a defensive line that extended south from Gazala. By the morning of 4 February the retreat was over. The new Gazala line was still weak, but the Germans had come so far so quickly that they needed time to reorganize before they could attack it. Apparently desiring to use the eastern foothills of the Jebel Akhdar for a rest and training area, for four months Rommel made no attempt to push the British farther east. For the second time the British had learned their lesson, and a very costly lesson it had been. t was not sound tactics to "stick their necks out" in the El Agheila area without having defeated the enemy so that he had no power to launch a counterstroke; nor was it safe to maintain troops in western Cyrenaica without having strong forces available to protect Benghazi or to strike at the enemy's line of communication if he attempted to by-pass that port. Although the attention of the world was focused on the Philippines, the Southwest Pacific, and the German U-boats in the Atlantic, March, April, and May 1942 were busy months in North Africa. Both the British and the Axis were planning another offensive, but first sufficient supplies had to be accumulated to support such an operation. The efforts of the Royal Navy and the R.A.F. to help the Eighth Army in its forthcoming struggle were outstanding during this period. The more Rommel's supplies were interfered with, the less he would be able to achieve. Attacks were made against Axis ships at sea and in harbors, against the ports at which the enemy loaded in Europe and unloaded in Africa. His dumps and fuel reserves were attacked where possible, and his transport was shot up along the roads. Malta, the "unsinkable aircraft carrier" and a forward submarine base, played a significant part in these operations.

17 14 THE BATTLE AT THE GAZALA-BR HACHEM LNE (Map 4) After four months of the Gazala stalemate the Allied defenses had been developed into a group of irregularly spaced strong points called "boxes," which were connected by mine fields and extended generally from Gazala to Bir Hacheim. An important point in the defensive system was Knightsbridge, a trail junction where the Trig Capuzzo running west from El Adem crossed the north-south trail between Acroma and Bir Hacheim. South and east of Bir Hacheim the British left flank lay open; so their armor, principally the 1st and 7th Armored Divisions, was disposed between the Trig Capuzzo and Bir el Gobi to cover the flank. Although the Allies had been able to build up a superiority in troops, tanks, and aircraft,* Rommel believed that he could execute a swift drive around the open flank and, after defeating the British armor, capture Tobruk. On the night of May Rommel started his attack in the moonlight. Broadly speaking, he moved the Afrika Korps around Bir Hacheim, with his two panzer divisions directed on Acroma and the 90th Division making for El Adem, which he hoped to capture the first day. At the same time he attacked frontally in the coastal sector. This latter operation, entrusted to the talians, was never pressed very strongly against the concentrated artillery fire the British could bring to bear. The flanking march by the Afrika Korps, supported by some talians, was executed with precision but was observed by British reconnaissance planes. The talians who were to seize Bir Hacheim received an unpleasant surprise from the Free French brigade (commanded by General Joseph P. Koenig) that was defending the "box," and they suffered heavily in the mine fields. As soon as the enemy's main effort was discovered, General Ritchie moved some of his mobile reserves to face the panzers; and bitter fighting developed east of the mine fields. From 28 to 30 May the battle grew in scope and intensity as more British armor moved into the area. t Rommel struggled to supply his tanks over his long, exposed line of communication which the Desert Air Force was pounding. The British 50th and 1st South African Divisions held their positions south of Gazala while the great tank battle was going on in their rear. t soon became apparent to Rommel that * Approximate strengths, May 1942: Allies-125,000 troops, 740 tanks, 700 aircraft. Axis -113,000 troops, 570 tanks, 500 aircraft. t Although not shown on the map, the fighting extended north of the Trig Capuzzo at this time.

18 15 rapid success had escaped him. His tank losses had been very severe, and his supply and fuel situation was fast becoming acute. He decided, therefore, to pull back the Afrika Korps toward the mine field north of Bir Hacheim. Although the Eighth Army had also suffered heavily, a feeling of false optimism prevailed during the first days of battle. As Rommel withdrew toward the west, skillfully covering the movement with his 88-mm. guns, the talians succeeded in clearing two gaps in the mine fields. This opened up an alternate supply line for the Afrika Korps, which disposed itself east of the gaps so as to form a sort of bridgehead-called the "Cauldron" by the British. n spite of heavy damage inflicted on German transport by the Desert Air Force and by the Eighth Army against the retreating tanks and guns, Rommel's men, with characteristic determination and skill, kept their heads and saved an ugly situation from further deterioration. During this stage of the operation a fierce four-day armored battle was raging around Knightsbridge. From 2 to 10 June the British tried unsuccessfully to pinch off or drive back the Germans in the Cauldron while the French tenaciously hung on against repeated Axis attacks against Bir Hacheim. The unfounded Allied optimism had resulted in insufficient care being taken in the preparation of the counterattacks, many of which were piecemeal. The French had to be evacuated on the night of June, a step which started the disintegration of the whole Allied defensive system. Rommel now debouched from the Cauldron, and another series of armored battles took place southeast of Knightsbridge. The end of the conflict, which had raged indecisively for over two weeks, came on 12 and 13 June. Up to this time the main weakness of the Allied tanks had been their inability to cope with the 88-mm. guns. But during the 12th and 13th the German tactics of luring British tanks into concealed antitank ambushes caused such heavy losses that Rommel gained definite tank superiority.* These final battles were fought between Knightsbridge and El Adem, where the British armor was trying to cover the withdrawal of the 50th and 1st South African Divisions by attacking the panzer forces along the Trig Capuzzo. This battle of the Gazala-Bir Hacheim line t was one of the greatest tank engagements of the war in North Africa. Although it followed the confused pattern of earlier desert armored battles, *By the night of 13 June the British had only 65 tanks left of their original 740. t Sometimes called the Battle of Knightsbridge.

19 16 the lessons learned by the British were never again forgotten. The futility and extravagance of piecemeal attacks, the danger of committing armor unsupported by infantry, and the folly of throwing armor against emplaced antitank guns were lessons that were driven home by the destruction of the initially superior British forces. Once more Rommel proved himself a skillful leader of armored units. After the disastrous defeat on the Gazala-Bir Hacheim line a real crisis faced the Eighth Army. General Auchinleck belatedly decided to hold Tobruk and halt the remainder of his forces at the Egyptian frontier (Map 3b)-a repetition of the strategy used in But Tobruk, so long the symbol of British resistance to Rommel, fell suddenly on 21 June after a powerful coordinated attack of the Afrika Korps supported by dive bombers and artillery. Unfortunately much transport, gasoline, and other supplies fell into the enemy's hands. This no doubt persuaded Rommel, and eventually Hitler, that the capture of the Nile Valley was practicable. But once again Auchinleck rose to the crisis and assumed personal command. General de Guingand describes the events that followed in these words : was up visiting Eighth Army headquarters when the news of Tobruk's fall came in. t was a heavy blow, for no one had expected it quite so early. However, that resilient force kept going, and morale was still surprisingly good. Reinforcements were on their way from all over the Middle East, most welcome amongst them being that great fighting machine, the New Zealand Division with Freyberg at its head. ncredible scenes occurred along the long desert road from Sollum eastwards. Transport was to be seen nose to tail crawling along four deep. Everything appeared mixed up. You saw a tank followed by a truck, then a bulldozer, an R.A.F. vehicle, several guns, and so on. How all this mess got sorted out could never tell. t was a great achievement, and the army's thanks are due in no small way to the Desert Air Force, who by their efforts prevented the. German Air Force from turning this retreat into an uncontrollable rout. They worked unceasingly and with a great spirit of sacrifice. After an unsuccessful attempt to hold the small port of Mersa Matruh, the army arrived back at Alamein very exhausted, but still very ready to fight. The New Zealand Division had come straight up against the crack German Panzer 15 and 21 Divisions, south of Matruh. Here a memorable engagement took place, and believe this mauling of the enemy's spearhead probably went a long way to saving the situation. t is said that Freyberg was seen directing the operations with one foot on a pile of German dead when he was wounded through the neck... Gradually the army sorted itself out into the defensive position of El Alamein. Gradually the enemy attacks grew weaker, and Rommel became short of ammunition and supplies. They were most anxious days, but

20 17 great days. Neither side had fresh reserves sufficient to alter the stalemate. An extra fresh corps on either side might have meant a great victory. One began to see that the enemy were at least as exhausted as ourselves. The 90th Light Division attacked time and time again on the vital coastal road sector, but each time the operation petered out shortly after our artillery and the R.A.F. got at them. t was now pretty certain the Axis forces, in soldier's slang, had for the time being "had it." By the end of the first week of July an exhausted and depleted British army * had finally stopped an equally exhausted and depleted Axis army on the defensive position that Wavell had reconnoitered and Auchinleck had made ready. THE FNAL BRTSH OFFENSVE August 1942-January 1943 During the dark months of July and August 1942 the hopes and fears of the Allied world again rested on the fate of their armies that were guarding the Middle East. Rommel's success in the Western Desert had advanced his panzer columns almost to the gates of Alexandria. Hitler was driving hard into the Caucasus after overrunning most of southern Russia, and the threat of a gigantic Nazi pincer closing about the Middle East became more real every day. With the fall of the Philippines, the East ndies, and Burma the possibility of an even more ominous disaster-the junction of German and Japanese forces in ndia-became a distinct possibility. To meet the apparently insurmountable demands upon their strained military resources the Allies had little to offer immediately. The latent industrial might of America was beginning to turn out new and better armaments, but still in insufficient quantities to meet even the most critical demands. The military forces of the British Commonwealth had suffered severely, and those of the United States were not yet fully mobilized. During this fateful summer of 1942 President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill met again in Washington; and the Combined Chiefs of Staff, those Anglo-American military leaders who (after our entry into the war) held a firm hand on the reins of Allied global strategy, were engaged in continual conversations in Washington and London. Their most important decision at this time was to postpone the invasion of western Europe and prepare for an invasion of North Africa in the fall. But, first of all, aid had to be extended to the * The British had lost some 80,000 men.

21 18 Eighth Army so that it could prevent any further Axis advance toward the Suez Canal. The British High Command in the Middle East was again changed; and this time the new leaders were to continue as a part of the first team of the Anglo-American High Command that was to lead the Allies to victory in Africa, taly, and western Europe. General Harold R. L. G. Alexander replaced General Auchenleck as Commander in Chief, Middle East; Admiral Cunningham and Air Marshal Tedder continued to direct the naval and air forces, and Lieutenant General Bernard L. Montgomery replaced Ritchie as the Eighth Army commander. Air Marshal Arthur Coningham headed the Desert Air Force, which continued to provide tactical air support for the Eighth Army. Major General Lewis H. Brereton's newly formed United States Ninth Air Force was established in Egypt in November and added its few aircraft to Tedder's overworked air forces. The El Alamein line, sixty miles west of Alexandria, was a strong defensive position that extended thirty-five miles south from the coast-to the Qattara Depression, a sand sea that was generally impassable for large forces. Like the Gazala position it had been originally laid out as a series of mutually supporting "boxes." Astride the coastal road lay the El Alamein "box" itself, upon which the other defenses pivoted. During July and August the "battle of supply" was the most important operation. Rommel was now at the end of a long and frequently interrupted line of communication, whereas the British were just in front of their main base in the theater. The flow of supplies to the Germans was a mere trickle, while the Eighth Army received a steady stream. Nevertheless, Rommel, a better tactician than logistician, was to make the first attack. When General Montgomery assumed command of the Eighth Army on 13 August, he took over a force that Churchill has described as "brave but baffled." He initiated a program of reorganization, re-equipment, and training. All instructions for further withdrawals were cancelled-rommel would be fought on the El Alamein line-and all resources earmarked for the defense of the Delta were used to strengthen the Eighth Army. Henceforth divisions would be kept concentrated and would be fought as divisions; there would be no more "Jock columns" (small independent task forces). Armor and artillery would be employed in mass. The Eighth Army and Desert Air Force headquarters were located in the same area so that closer liaison could be maintained. A re-

22 19 serve elite armored corps would be organized (a counterpart of Rommel's Afrika Korps). The Eighth Army was to take the offensive, but not until Montgomery was ready. THE BATTLE OF ALAM HALFA (31 August-7 September 1942) (Map 5) The British preparations for their coming offensive and for dealing with an anticipated enemy attack went on concurrently. The principal terrain features of the El Alamein position are shown on the map. Montgomery saw at once that the Alam Haifa Ridge was the key to the whole defensive system, since it commanded a large area of the desert and would have to be captured by Rommel if any envelopment of the main battle line was to be successful. A new division (the British 44th) was rushed up to man this ridge. More mine fields were laid, and the defenses were organized in depth. Mobile forces were stationed in the south to carry out harassing operations in the event of an enemy attack around the left flank. Since Montgomery considered that some of the armored units were far from trained, plans were made for the tanks to be fought from dug-in positions in front of Alam Haifa Ridge, supported by a great weight of artillery from behind. The army soon began to have confidence in its new commander, and the morale of all ranks improved rapidly. The Eighth Army front was held by four infantry divisions, an Empire force in the truest sense, for it included the 9th Australian, 1st South African, 5th ndian, and 2d New Zealand Divisions. The 7th Armored Division covered the left flank, the loth Armored Division and an armored brigade were in prepared positions in front of Alam Haifa Ridge, and the 50th Division was in reserve east of El Hammam. The Axis forces facing the British included four German and six talian divisions. The German troops, the Africa Panzer Army, included the Afrika Korps (15th and 21st Panzer Divisions) and the 90th Light and 164th nfantry Divisions. By the latter part of August it had become clear to Montgomery that the enemy intended to attack during the coming full moon. Rommel's attack, a repetition of the plan he employed at Knightsbridge, began shortly after midnight on 31 August with three simultaneous thrusts. The most northerly attempt was easily repulsed by the Australians, being no more than a raid. n the center a heavier holding attack hit the 5th ndian Division and achieved some initial success. The enemy was ejected from Ruweisat Ridge only after a strong counterattack had been launched at dawn on

23 20 31 August. When apprised of the initial enemy attacks, all that Montgomery said was "excellent, excellent" ; he then turned over and went back to sleep, breakfasting at the usual hour in the morning. t was soon apparent that the main effort was in the south between the left flank of the 2d New Zealand Division and Himeimat Hill. Here Rommel employed the German 15th and 21st Panzer Divisions, the 90th Light Division, and an talian corps of three divisions, two of which were armored. By 1000 hours, 31 August, strong tank columns had penetrated the mine fields and were moving eastward between Gabala and the Ragil Depression. Farther north the 90th Light Division had some difficulty in crossing the mine fields and did not reach Deir el Muhafid until evening. The three talian divisions were operating between the German wings, but during the whole engagement only one of them, the infantry division, succeeded in penetrating the mine fields. The British 7th Armored Division pulled back in the face of Rommel's onslaught, its orders being to avoid becoming pinned to the ground. From the area east of Gabala one armored brigade mounted harassing attacks against the south flank of the enemy's main-attack force. A motorized brigade was similarly employed farther north. Montgomery's main preoccupation during 31 August was to determine exactly the direction of the enemy's main attack. He hoped that Rommel would move in a tight wheel toward Alam Halfa-not wide toward El Hammam. British measures of deception had been directed toward that end. During the late afternoon the enemy armor began to move north, and by 1700 hours it had made contact with the 22d Armored Brigade. This brigade met the attack on ground of its own choosing, and Rommel's tanks were driven back with heavy losses. The R.A.F. pounded enemy concentrations throughout the night, beginning a period of intense night and day air action that was to be a very important factor in the British success. By 1 September it was clear that the enemy advance was directed toward Ruweisat Ridge. This being the case, Montgomery could now shift the loth Armored Division to the west to cover the ridge, its previous position being occupied by an infantry brigade. During the morning of 1 September the enemy renewed his attacks against the 22d Armored Brigade, but he was again repulsed. Rommel attacked farther to the west during the afternoon; but the whole loth Armored Division was by then firmly established in its new position, and once more the panzer formations disengaged with heavy losses. The relentless pounding of enemy concentrations from the air continued throughout the day.

24 21 During the afternoon Montgomery ordered planning to begin for a counterattack which would give the British the initiative. He decided to thin out the northern sector to provide reserves and to launch an attack southward from the New Zealand sector to close the gap in the mine fields through which the enemy attack had come. The operation was to proceed methodically and by easy stages. On 2 September Rommel was reluctant to resume the offensive. He was plainly disconcerted by his failure to draw the British armor from its prepared positions, and he was finding his supply situation difficult. The 7th Armored Division had a good day and intensified its harassing operations west of Gabala, while the Desert Air Force continued to damage and confuse the enemy. Early reports on 3 September indicated that the Germans had withdrawn from contact and moved south. Their main forces seemed to have edged slightly westward, leaving the area they vacated strewn with derelict vehicles. Montgomery issued very precise instructions at this stage, since he believed it was important to resist any temptation to rush into the attack. He ordered that there would be no movement west of the main fortified positions in the Alamein line except by patrols and light forces, but the attacks to close the gaps in the mine fields were to proceed vigorously. Also, the harassing attacks, particularly those directed against the enemy's supply vehicles, were to continue with the utmost intensity. On the afternoon of 3 September three large enemy columns were observed moving west from the mine-field area. On the night of 3-4 September the reinforced New Zealand Division began its attack to the south to close the gaps in the mine fields. Bitter fighting took place, the enemy launching heavy and repeated counterattacks on 4 September to repel the British attempts to cut him off. The 2d New Zealand Division did not succeed in trapping Rommel's troops, but they were forced slowly back during 4 and 5 September. Montgomery called the battle off on 7 September and would not allow his troops to follow the enemy beyond Deir el Munassib and Himeimat. From the point of view of both training and equipment he realised that his troops were not in a position to undertake a counteroffensive. He had made plans for his offensive, and he would stick to them. Also, he saw that it would be to his advantage to keep the enemy in the southern sector, for he planned to attack in the north. General de Guingand summarizes the results of the Battle of Alam Haifa in these words : This attack, which started on August 31st, proved a heaven-sent event. t gave the whole army, its commander, staff, and the fighting troops, a

25 22 great opportunity of running themselves in. n particular:- (a) t gave the troops confidence in themselves and in their new commander, for the battle was fought exactly as he predicted. The forces under him merely carried out his orders, and the battle virtually won itself. (b) Rommel's army was weakened in morale and material, and so our task at Alamein was made that much easier. (c) The Army and R.A.F. staffs got excellent practice in wielding the very formidable air power that was now available for the support of Eighth Army. While the Battle of Alam Haifa was significant as the last major Axis offensive operation in Libya and Egypt, historically it will be remembered as a prelude to one of the most decisive battles of World War, the Battle of El Alamein. THE BATTLE OF EL ALAMEN (Map 6) Plans and Pr"eparations.-Although the Battle of Alam Haifa had caused some delay in the offensive preparations of the British, no further time was lost in continuing with their plans. Montgomery emphasized three basic fundamentals: leadership, equipment, and training. By early October he was satisfied with his subordinate commanders. The equipment situation also improved rapidly as hundreds of tanks and self-propelled guns were rushed by fast vessels from the United States. n the new American Sherman tank the British at last had a match for the German armored vehicles; moreover, they had a great weight of artillery and ammunition. The whole basis of logistical support for the Eighth Army was changed. Before, when defense was paramount, the bulk of the supplies had been held back. With the offensive about to be resumed, supplies had to be placed as far forward as possible. The moving forward and the camouflaging of the dumps was no small task; six roads were built up to one corps' starting line alone. Preparations were made to extend the railroad forward as fast as operations permitted. A special team of experts was organized to open up ports immediately after their capture, shipping schedules were prepared so that supplies could be sent in by sea at the earliest possible moment, and shipping was preloaded and made ready for immediate use. Later in the war such detailed preparations became routine, but in 1942 the Eighth Army was pioneering in many directions. n the meantime the Axis forces, well aware that the Allies would soon undertake an offensive, were feverishly ~trengthening and deepening their defensive position in front of El Alamein. n the northern sector they had three belts of defended localities and mine

26 23 fields through which it was hoped any attack would lose both force and direction. n the south the defenses were not so highly organized but were sited to canalize any attempted penetration. n general, the mine fields alone extended for some 5,000 to 9,000 yards in depth. The greater part of the static defensive system was manned by five talian infantry divisions, held in place by a "corset" of German parachute battalions. The German infantry divisions, the 164th and 90th, were echeloned in depth to protect the vital coastroad sector. The four Axis panzer divisions were held in reserve and distributed equally between the northern and southern sectors. Early in October Rommel had boasted: "We hold the gateway to Egypt with the full intention to act. We did not go there with any intention of being flung back sooner or later. You may rely on our holding fast to what we have won." But we now know that, despite Rommel's boast, the odds were against the meager.german forces in North Africa. They were dependent upon the talians for logistical support over long and frequently interrupted lines of communication; and the German Supreme Command, focusing its attention on Russia and refusing to recognize its opportunities in North Africa, made little effort to maintain an adequate force in the desert. General Montgomery's plan was to aim first at the methodical destruction of the enemy's infantry divisions that were occupying the defensive system. This would be accomplished by means of a "crumbling" process, as the British called it. The armor would initially be employed in a defensive role to cover the "crumbling" operations and protect the Allied infantry from panzer counterattacks which, once the British armor was in position to receive them, might be very costly to the enemy. After the destruction of Rommel's infantry his panzer divisions would be vulnerable to attack by Montgomery's armor. Specifically, the British plan, which was issued on 6 October, provided as follows: 1. The XXX Corps (General Leese), with five divisions, would launch the main attack in the north. These divisions would open two corridors through the enemy's mine fields. 2. The X Corps (General Lumsden), the new British armored corps that initially included the 1st and loth Armored Divisions, would pass through these corridors, prevent enemy interference with the XXX Corps' "crumbling" operations, and, as its ultimate task, destroy the panzer forces.

27 24 3. The X Corps (General Horrocks), consisting of two infantry divisions, an armored division, the Free French Brigade, and a Greek brigade, would launch the secondary attack in the south. The object of the X Corps' operations would be to mislead the enemy as to the location of the main attack and to hold hostile forces (particularly the 21st Panzer Division) in the south. The 7th Armored Division was to be kept intact to exploit a breakthrough in the south or for use elsewhere if the situation should demand. t will be noted that this plan involved a penetration near the coastal road, a distinct variation from the envelopments that had characterized all previous operations in the Western Desert. A detailed artillery plan was prepared that provided for a very strong counterbattery preparation for the main attack and rolling barrages and concentration fires to support the advance. t would be the greatest British artillery effort of the war to date. The preliminary operations of the air force had neutralized many of the enemy's forward bases so that Coningham's aircraft could participate in counterbattery operations during the opening stage of the battle and then concentrate on the assembly areas of the panzer divisions. Obviously strategic surprise could not be secured, since the enemy knew that the British were planning an offensive. However, great pains were taken to insure tactical surprise as to the exact time, weight, and direction of the attack. Early in October the final pattern of materiel in the forward zones was established, using spare and dummy vehicles. As forces were brought in for the attack, these dummies were replaced with actual equipment, thus offering a pattern of constant density to enemy air observation throughout the build-up period. All of these change-overs took place at night. Guns were concealed beneath dummy vehicles, slit trenches were dug and camouflaged to accommodate the assaulting infantry that would be brought up at the last moment, and all movements forward were rigidly controlled. Much care was exercised to make the enemy think the main attack would be in the south, large dummy supply dumps and water installations being prepared there. t was so arranged that the work would appear to the enemy to be scheduled for completion a week or two after the actual date of the attack. On the night of the attack a spare armored division headquarters was employed to create radio traffic that would indicate the movement of large armored forces to the southern sector. On the night of the attack a landing behind the enemy's lines would be simulated. n the afternoon a convoy would sail westward out of Alexandria, but after dark all but a few fast craft would put

28 25 back into port. Shelling of the coast, mortar and machine-gun fire, and light signals were some of the means to be used to provide realism. The demonstration would be timed to take place about three hours after the attack had started, and it was hoped that it would tie down enemy reserves. The loading of the ships with tanks and troops would be carried out so that an enemy agent could see them. Despite considerable pressure from London to launch the offensive in September, Montgomery insisted that an early attack would probably result in failure, while an attack in October would assure complete victory. Moonlight would be required to assist the troops through the mine fields; so the night of October was set for the attack. n the final phases of the preparations Montgomery personally explained the plan to every subordinate commander down to the rank of lieutenant colonel. On 21 and 22 October the plan was explained to the troops. The air attacks against the Axis air forces and land communications reached a climax on 22 October, gaining air superiority in the battle area for the Desert Air Force. The British forces had been built up to seven reinforced infantry and three armored divisions, as opposed to twelve smaller Axis divisions, eight infantry and four panzer. The British were superior in armor, artillery, and air power.* During the night of October the assaulting infantry moved up to their slit trenches. Montgomery was determined that his men should go into the battle with enthusiasm and with a full realization of what was expected of them. His personal message to the troops was as follows: The battle which is now about to begin will be one of the decisive battles of history. t will be the turning point of the war... The Lord mighty in battle will give us the victory. With these words the Eighth Army was launched into battle. Operations, 23 October-4 November At 2140 hours on 23 October over a thousand guns of the Eighth Army opened up on the enemy batteries. Twenty minutes later the fire was switched to the enemy's forward positions, and the assaulting divisions of the X and XXX Corps advanced to the attack. The main effort, * Approximate strengths for the Battle of El Alamein: British-177,000 men, 2,180 guns (including 910 field pieces and 1,270 antitank guns), 1,110 tanks, and 700 aircraft (including 500 fighters and 200 bombers). Axis-93,000 men, 1,400 guns, 500 tanks, 700 aircraft (including planes based in Greece, Sicily, and Crete).

29 26 by the XXX Corps, was made with four divisions attacking on a seven-mile front between Tel el Eisa Hill and Miteiriya Ridge. At the same time an Australian brigade made a feint attack near the coast, and the 4th ndian Division carried out a strong raid on Ruweisat Ridge. Four hours later the 1st and loth Armored Divisions of the X Corps began their movement forward. As may have been noted already from references to the plan, the battle was to be divided into three distinct phases. The first phase, called the "break-in", was to be a battle for position; it was to give the British the tactical advantage. The second phase, called the "dogfight", was to reduce the enemy's strength and resources to such a degree that he would be unable to withstand the final knockout blow. The third phase, called the "breakout", would mark the final collapse of the enemy's El Alamein position. Heavy fighting continued throughout the first night, and the task of clearing the mine fields went well. However, the armor did not succeed in getting out into the open; for although the 1st Armored Division made some progress, the loth Armored Division met strong enemy artillery and antitank fire that prevented its advance toward Miteiriya Ridge. The enemy, once he rocovered from the initial shock, concentrated his artillery and mortar fire on the corridors; and the 15th Panzer Division launched several counterattacks. n the south the X Corps had started according to schedule with two attacks. The 44th Division made some initial gains but was held up between the belts of mine fields; and the French brigade, although successfully assaulting Himeimat Ridge, was driven back because soft sand had prevented the arrival of supporting artillery to hold the position. However, the X Corps achieved its objective of holding the 21st Panzer Division in the south. This first day saw the completion of the "break-in" phase, with general gains as shown by the dotted phase line on the map. Then began a week of heavy fighting-the "dogfight". A new attack was launched in the XXX Corps zone at 1500 hours on the 24th, and the 1st Armored Division managed to get some of its tanks beyond the mine fields east of Kidney Hill. But an attack that night by the loth Armored Division made little progress. By early morning of the 25th it looked as though the attack was beginning to bog down; but Montgomery insisted that the advance must be continued, and by 0800 hours on the 25th part of the loth Armored Division had pushed forward 2,000 yards and the New Zealand Division was advancing to the southwest. During the 25th the 15th Panzer Division launched another counterattack with about 100 tanks; but the British armor was then in position, and the en-

30 27 emy suffered heavily. During the next few days hard fighting continued around Kidney Hill. n the south the 44th Division continued to advance; but when it became apparent that heavy losses would be sustained if the attack were continued, the X Corps was authorized to break off action on the 25th. At that time the 50th Division mounted an attack in its zone that soon petered out in the thick wire and antipersonnel mines. About noon on the 25th Montgomery decided to switch the axis of the main effort to the north, with an attack by the 9th Australian Division. At the same time the 1st Armored Division was ordered to fight its way westward to threaten the enemy's communications in the Rahman track area. This attack made no appreciable progress until the night of October, when Kidney Hill was captured. However, the 9th Australian Division's attack went very well, even though it was launched against the strong defenses of the German 164th Division. This area saw what was probably the most determined and savage fighting of the campaign. The momentum of the offensive, however, was diminishing; and the X Corps had not broken out into open country. Having withdrawn troops and guns from their forward positions in anticipation of the British offensive, the Germans were in greater depth than had been expected; and although the British were through most of the mine fields, their "break-in" area was still ringed by a strong antitankgun screen. By evening of the 26th Montgomery had decided to regroup to give the XXX Corps an opportunity to reorganize and create fresh reserves. The New Zealand Division was pulled out of the line into reserve, the gap being filled by sideslipping the 1st South African and the 4th ndian Divisions to the north. The 21st Panzer Division moved north opposite Kidney Hill; so the XU Corps was ordered to move the 7th Armored Division and other troops (the Greek and two British brigades) to the northern zone. On the 27th and 28th both the 15th and 21st Panzer Divisions launched counterattacks against the British armor, but they were all repulsed, the 1st Armored Division alone knocking out nearly fifty German tanks. What appeared to be another major panzer counterattack was disrupted by the Desert Air Force before the German tanks could begin their advance. After this, Montgomery decided that the 1st Armored Division also needed rest; so he withdrew it into reserve. The 27th was a good day in the air, the Desert Air Force shooting down eighteen enemy fighters.

31 28 On the night of October the Australians attacked again and drove a wedge into the enemy position that almost reached to the coast road. On the 29th Rommel did all in his power to reduce the wedge; but all his attacks, made with both tanks and infantry, failed. During the morning of the 29th General Alexander and his chief of staff, General McCreery, visited the Eighth Army. From messages received it appeared that "some people" in London were disappointed that greater success had not been achieved, but Montgomery radiated confidence and stated that he had always predicted a ten-day "dogfight". Later in the morning British ntelligence reported that the German 90th Division had moved into the Sidi Abd el Rahman area. At this news Montgomery changed his plan for the breakthrough, which he had initially intended to launch near the coast road. Now he would direct the main axis of the final drive farther south. Regrouping continued in the rear, and the 2d New Zealand Division was refitted and reinforced. The 9th Australian Division continued its attack on the night of October and crossed the coast road. Although few Germans were trapped, the success of the Australians kept Rommel's attention focused on the coastal sector, to which area the 21st Panzer Division had by now been shifted (Map 7). Montgomery was now ready for the final phase of the battle. The "breakout" attack, called Operation Supercharge, was launched at 0100 hours on 2 November behind a rolling barrage of three hundred 25-pounders and the corps medium artillery. The plan was for the infantry to advance some 6,000 yards and then for an armored brigade to pass through to form a "bridgehead" west of the Rahman track. The 1st and 7th Armored Divisions were then to debouche from this "bridgehead". The attack by the 2d New Zealand Division was launched on a 4,000-yard front and achieved great initial success. The new corridor was established, and the armored brigade reached the Rahman track by dawn. However, as it became light, this brigade ran into a formidable antitank-gun screen and suffered over 75 per cent casualties during the day, although it tenaciously held the salient. A little to the south the 1st Armored Division also became involved, near Tel el Aqqaqir, where a fierce armored battle ensued. The British continued to widen their salient, and on 3 November reports came in showing that the enemy retreat had started. However, the breakthrough had not yet been completed because the enemy was still plugging the hole with his antitank guns. That night, though, the 51st Division and a part of the 4th ndian mounted a

32 29 speedily prepared attack south of Tel el Aqqaqir that achieved a clean breakthrough. The armored divisions and the New Zealanders were rushed through the gap to begin the pursuit. On 4 November the enemy was in full retreat, and the Battle of El Alamein had been won. Comments.-Over 30,000 Axis prisoners were taken;* their losses in tanks, guns, aircraft, and supplies were immense; and their transport situation was so critical that four of the talian divisions were left behind, with very little food and water. Near the end of the battle General Thoma, commander of the Afrika Korps, was captured. At dinner back in the Eighth Army officers' mess he paid tribute to the dogged fighting of the British and said that the Allied bombing had had a serious effect on the morale of his troops. He also stated that the British guns had knocked out most of the German antitank guns, so that there was little left to stop the British armor. Strategically the Battle of El Alamein was one of the most decisive operations of the war, for it broke the Axis wave of advance into the Middle East. This battle and the stubborn defense of Stalingrad by the Russians, which was taking place at the same time, marked the high tide of Nazi aggression. The victory provided a tremendous psychological boost to the morale of the Allied world and particularly to the British, who had suffered so long. Field Marshal Keitel, chief of staff of the Wehrmacht, acknowledged the strategic importance of El Alamein when he said: One of the biggest occasions we passed by was El Alamein. would say that, at that climax of the war, we were nearer to victory than any time before or after. Very little was needed then to conquer Alexandria and to push forward to Suez and Palestine. But we just were not strong enough at that particular point, due to the disposal of our forces and primarily the war against Russia. Tactically the Battle of El Alamein is of interest because it marked the rise to prominence of one of the outstanding tactical commanders of the Western Allies. This operation provides a good illustration of the characteristics which General Montgomery was to display in most of his future great victories: methodical and detailed preparation; accumulation of overwhelming combat power before launching an attack; frequent reorganizations and regroupings to maintain "balance"; and a deliberate, flexible, and precise conduct of the battle. At El Alamein British divisions and corps were fought as tactical units-which had frequently not been done in North Africa; and infantry, armor, artillery, and air power were * The British losses were about 13,000 men.

33 30 coordinated and employed in the roles which they had been designed to fill. The foundations for the efficient military force which would eventually join with the Americans to crush Hitler in his homeland were laid in the deserts of Egypt. THE PURSUT TO TUNSA (5 November February 1943) (Map 8) After the collapse of the Axis position at El Alamein Montgomery planned to cut the enemy off at defiles to the west. This task was given to the X Corps. The XXX Corps was to assemble in the area between Mersa Matruh and El Alamein and then follow the X Corps in the pursuit. n the south the X Corps rounded up the deserted talians and was then given the mission of cleaning up the battlefield.* On 7 November fate stepped in and interfered with these plans to destroy the remnants of the Axis forces in Egypt. General de Guingand describes this misfortune as follows : The army commander decided to cut the coast road at the bottlenecks of Fuka and Matruh. The 2d New Zealand Division was ordered to Fuka and the 1st and 7th Armored Divisions to Matruh. On November 5th these three divisions were grouped together under X Corps. The enemy desperately defended his rear-guard positions covering Fuka, but by the afternoon of the 5th we had broken through. Now everything depended upon our reaching the area of Charing Cross, which was the bottleneck in some hilly country southwest of Matruh. By the evening of November 6th, 1st Armored Division was nearing this locality; and it looked as if Rommel's fate was sealed. As luck would have it, one of those very heavy rain storms occurred which for a short period flood the desert. By the morning of November 7th this division, as well as the New Zealand Division, were completely bogged down. They could not move and neither could the petrol and supplies which were on their way to them. t must have been extremely annoying for the 1st Armored Division to be virtually in earshot of Rommel's troops as they slowly made their way along the coast road, the only navigable highway in that part of the Desert. The pursuit continued on the 9th, but the enemy had escaped. The Allies missed another opportunity to destroy Rommel's fleeing forces. The enemy vehicles were jamming the road back from El Alamein, and the R.A.F. enjoyed almost complete air superiority. Under the circumstances it would seem that the air force could have wreaked havoc on the confused enemy, but actually results were disappointing. The failure was no reflection on the Desert Air Force, but it was indicative of the air tactics of that time and showed that much still had to be done to perfect methods of supporting ground Shortly afterward General Horrocks took command of the X Corps, and the X Corps left the Eighth Army to rest and train for the Sicilian campaign.

34 31 troops. Up to that time the British fighter-bombers had been employed in air fighting and bombing, and pilots had not yet learned the technique of low strafing. As a result, the air attacks on the retreating German columns were made by bombing; and the aircraft were not permitted to come down low. Consequently, relatively few vehicles were destroyed. Three factors governed General Montgomery's conduct of the pursuit. First, the enemy must be given no respite and no opportunity to organize strong defensive positions. Second, forward airdromes must be established as the Eighth Army advanced to insure air protection and harrass the enemy's retreat. The Martuba group of airfields in Cyrenaica were particularly important, since they could also provide land-based air cover for the Malta convoys. Third, there was the logistical or administrative problem. Ports must be opened as the pursuit continued in order to maintain the army at its required strength. The pursuit of the Axis troops continued for many weeks, but they were never trapped. t was hoped that they could be cut off before they reached the El Agheila position, but rain again slowed the force that was sent across the desert. t appeared for a time that they would make a stand at El Agheila; but after Montgomery brought up his troops and was ready to attack, the German commander withdrew. There was some fighting at Buerat, but again the Axis units slipped away. The tempo of the pursuit, which had slowed down at times while the troops were awaiting supplies, was now quickened; and on 23 January the Eighth Army entered Tripoli, the final objective in Libya. n exactly three months Montgomery's army had advanced 1,800 miles. Only the 7th Armored Division continued after the enemy, the rest of the XXX Corps remaining in the Tripoli area. On 3 February the first British ship entered the harbor at Tripoli, and on the 4th the 7th Armored Division reached the Tunisian frontier. The Axis troops, which had received considerable reinforcements, took up a position at Mareth, where the French had constructed fortifications before the war. After a rest of several weeks, during which supplies and reinforcements were brought in, the Eighth Army attacked the Mareth position; but that and subsequent operations will be described in a later chapter. The arrival of Eighth Army troops at the Tunisian border had marked the end of the Libyan campaign. The great victory at El Alamein and the pursuit that followed were a fitting climax to the fluctuating struggle in Egypt and Libya. Once more the British had won the "last battle".

35 RESTRCTED-Security nformation RESTRCTED -Security nformation

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