SC 77C -- EMC: High Power Transient Phenomena and Smart Grid Implications

Size: px

Start display at page:

Download "SC 77C -- EMC: High Power Transient Phenomena and Smart Grid Implications"

Moses Potter
6 years ago
Views:

1 SC 77C -- EMC: High Power Transient Phenomena and Smart Grid Implications Seattle, USA 24 October 2010 Dr. William A. Radasky Chairman IEC SC 77C Metatech Corporation Goleta, CA USA

2 Outline Introduction to High Power EM (HPEM) IEC SC 77C Scope Examples of HEMP and IEMI Standards Prepared by SC 77C Smart Grid and HPEM 2

3 Definition of HPEM High Power Electromagnetics (HPEM) has been defined to describe high level electromagnetic fields and their effects on systems, including Lightning EM Pulse fields (sometimes referred to as LEMP) Electrostatic Discharge (ESD) Radar fields (sometimes referred to as HIRF) EM pulsed fields in power substations due to arcing events High altitude Electromagnetic Pulse (HEMP) Intentional use of EM weapons against civil systems (IEMI) The interest in SC 77C is to primarily deal with the threats of HEMP and IEMI 3

4 Comparison of Different Types of HPEM Environments 4

5 IEC SC 77C Scope - 1 Standardization in the field of electromagnetic compatibility to protect civilian equipment, systems and installations from threats by man-made high power transient phenomena including the electromagnetic fields produced by nuclear detonations at high altitude 5

6 IEC SC 77C Scope - 2 The IEC has been developing High-altitude Electromagnetic Pulse (HEMP) standards and reports since 1989 SC 77C was formed in 1991 Initial emphasis was to provide the means to protect civil electronics equipment from the effects of HEMP generated by high-altitude nuclear bursts Scope of work in SC 77C expanded in June 1999 to include man-made High Power EM (HPEM) transient threats with emphasis on IEMI High power in SC 77C refers to radiated fields or conducted voltages which have the capability to disrupt electronic systems (e.g., greater than 100 V/m or greater than 100 V, respectively) 6

The Effects of HEMP (old technology) First reported during Starfish test conducted by the US in 1962 400 km burst altitude (exo-atmospheric) and 1 MT yield Above Johnston Atoll (1400 km to Oahu,

7 The Effects of HEMP (old technology) First reported during Starfish test conducted by the US in km burst altitude (exo-atmospheric) and 1 MT yield Above Johnston Atoll (1400 km to Oahu, Hawaii) In Hawaii from Starfish: Estimated field strength of 5.6 kv/m Burglar alarms and air raid sirens went off Some streetlights extinguished while others came on Several fuses blown Soviet Union exo-atmospheric tests in 1962 Wired communications failures 600 km from ground zero Damage to power line insulators Diesel generators failed Antenna systems affected Ref: IEC

8 Coupling Paths for Radiated IEMI Fields Mobile EM Transmitter Communication & Data lines Window Network Commercial Power 8

9 Membership of SC 77C Objective is to provide voluntary standards for civil systems to protect against man-made high power EM (HPEM) transients including a HEMP event Secretariat is held by UK: Dr. Richard Hoad is Secretary Chairman is Dr. William Radasky, USA Participating Nations (P-members) -- China, Egypt, Finland, Germany, Italy, Japan, Korea (Republic of), Mexico, Norway, Poland, Romania, Russian Federation, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, United Kingdom and USA (17) Observing Nations (O-members) -- Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, France, Ireland, Israel, Netherlands, Portugal, Slovakia, Spain, Turkey, and Ukraine (16) 9

10 Publications Produced by IEC SC 77C 10

11 HPEM IEC SC 77C Standards Summary The IEC has been very active for 20 years in producing basic standards and other publications dealing with the protection of civil systems from HPEM (HEMP and IEMI) 20 publications have been produced 2 additional publications are being maintained New projects are being considered SC 77C is working with the ITU-T to coordinate the HEMP and IEMI protection of telecommunications centers Data from SC 77C publications are being used to support the standardization work in the IEEE and CIGRE 11

12 Smart Grid: Impacts of HPEM on the Power Grid E1 HEMP (initial part) Damage to power distribution insulators on lines Damage to electronic equipment inside substation buildings and power plants Damage to building power transformers and telephone panels in control centers E3 HEMP (last part) Voltage collapse of the public power grid and damage to EHV transformers Impacts due to power harmonics injected into buildings, affecting UPS and backup power systems IEMI (local threat) Upset and damage to control and communications equipment in substations Upset and damage to computers in control centers and power plants 12

13 Impacts of HPEM on Smart Meters and Demand Response E1 HEMP (initial part) Damage to Smart Meters Damage to electronic appliances inside the home Damage to Smart Grid communications systems E3 HEMP (last part) Voltage collapse of the public power grid and damage to EHV transformers resulting in long term power outage Impacts due to power harmonics injected into homes and offices affecting UPS and backup power systems IEMI (local threat) Upset and damage to Smart Meters, home appliances and Smart Grid communications systems Upset and damage to computers in control centers and power plants 13

14 HEMP Burst Over Ohio 14

15 Large Electric Generation Plants Exposed (10,370-74%) 15

16 Smart Grid Implications Current power grids are vulnerable to a HEMP or IEMI attack In the U.S. efforts are being evaluated to protect the existing power grid Introduction of more electronic equipment to control the Smart Grid requires strong EMC and HPEM immunity standards Current home electronics are vulnerable to a HEMP or IEMI attack, although older non-solid state meters are expected to survive Some existing home electronics will fail due to connections to the low voltage power network and the penetration of EM fields inside the home Introduction of solid-state smart meters and demand response appliances will create more vulnerabilities unless strong EMC and HPEM immunity standards are applied Useful EMC and HPEM standards can be found in TC 77 and its subcommittees (including those discussed in this briefing) 16

AUSTRIA. Table 1. FDI flows in the host economy, by geographical origin. (Millions of US dollars)

AUSTRIA. Table 1. FDI flows in the host economy, by geographical origin. (Millions of US dollars) Table 1. FDI flows in the host economy, by geographical origin World 5 690 138 6 195 3 184 10 784 7 933 31 154 6 858 9 303 840 10 618 5 760 Developed economies 5 740 13 5 341 2 689 10 137 6 291 29 721