The Inspiration, Design and Legacy Behind the P-51 Mustang. Matthew Hundt. English 11. Ms. Morris. Lake Mills High School

Transcription

1 The P-51 Mustang 1 The Inspiration, Design and Legacy Behind the P-51 Mustang Matthew Hundt English 11 Ms. Morris Lake Mills High School February 25, 2013

2 The P-51 Mustang 2 The Inspiration, Design, and Legacy Behind the P-51 Mustang The year is Britain s Royal Air Force (RAF), and later the American Army Air Force (AAF), were in dire need of a long-range escort fighter that would be capable of fending off the Luftwaffe, which was a potent force (Ludwig, 2003, p.94). In his 1982 work, Jablonski concluded that the only way for bombers to survive the hazardous trip to and from Germany was to have fighter escort that could accompany them round trip (p. 103). The response to that limitation was the P-51 Mustang, which became a major factor in the Allies triumph in the air war in the European Theater of Operations (ETO). During World War II, the British, due to extreme shortages of fighter aircraft, contacted North American Aviation (NAA), an American aircraft company, and asked them to design and subsequently manufacture an innovative fighter plane that would be superior to all German opposition. The ensuing plane, the P-51 Mustang, became the most revered and feared escort fighter of the war because of its extensive range, impressive aerodynamics that afforded maneuverability and speed, and the deadly armament it possessed (Jablonski, 1982, p. 97). The Mustang may be the most important and innovative fighter plane in history due to its impeccable combat record and sleek design. After France had been successfully defeated by Nazi Germany, the British realized that they needed to strengthen defense measures. In Haggerty s 2010 work, he noted that by the time the Battle of Britain began, the RAF was "critically short" of fighter planes to fend off the German advances (p. 511). Haggerty also stated that since the British economy was already strained, the Air Ministry needed to look elsewhere (America) for a plane manufacturer that would build bomber escorts for the RAF (p. 511). RAF agents initially approached the dominant U.S. aircraft supplier, the Curtiss-Wright Corporation, with a request to place an order for more than 300 of their best fighters the P-40

3 The P-51 Mustang 3 Warhawk which was also the main fighter in U.S. Army Air Corps service. Curtiss-Wright turned the order down due to lack of factory capacity" (Haggerty, 2010, p. 511). Ludwig (2003) stated that "on 11 April 1940 the BPC [British Purchasing Commission] signed a Letter of Intent to purchase ' aircraft, type NA-50B'" from NAA. One of the few provisions that the British made was that the plane be built around the same Allison V engine that the Warhawk utilized. Naturally, NAA, which was a small company at the time, accepted the offer (Ludwig, 2003, p. 35). According to Haggerty (2010), Mr. Dutch Kindelberger, NAA s president, stated that NAA could design and produce a high-performing aircraft from scratch (p. 511). Haggerty (2010) also declared that the British gave NAA exactly 120 days to produce their first prototype a very difficult task to complete for a small and inexperienced company like NAA (p. 513). Despite the time limits that were imposed by the British, NAA s young and accomplished team of engineers was able to meet the deadline with the NA-73 (later changed to XP-51). In 2003, Ludwig stated that Kindelberger gave [Edgar] Schmued credit for designing the Mustang (p. 35). When the first Mustang prototype rolled out of the factory in 1940, it was virtually ignored [by the United States Army Air Force] because it was a British project (Ludwig, 2003, p. 32). Ludwig stated in 2003 that the USAAF did not favor the XP-51 because it never was properly examined by AAF officials operating with an American set of standards (p. 85). Due to this serious obstacle, even when the XP-51 outperformed all other newly designed American fighter aircraft; it was not employed by the AAF until much later in the war (Ludwig, 2003, P. 32).

4 The P-51 Mustang 4 Jablonski (1982) stated that when the British first acquired the Mustang in mid to late 1940, they were duly impressed by the low level capabilities of this aircraft, and used it for cross channel low-level reconnaissance and strafing missions (p. 98). In fact, Gadney (2013), a former World War II veteran, proposed that the P-51 s early role favored low-level anti-german personnel dive bombing and strafing more than high-altitude air-to-air combat (p. 10). Among the many early problems that plagued the Mustang was its inefficiency as an all altitude combat fighter. In fact, Jablonski (1982) wrote that the plane struck both British and American experts as being unfitted for work as a high-altitude fighter - it lacked sufficient power (p ). As Kennedy (2013) verified, the problem was that the engine was not an adequate performer; it did not have enough power to compete with the top Luftwaffe fighters (121). Kennedy (2013) even stated that the Mustang could have been discontinued: while it flew well and had extensive potential as a low-level interceptor, both the RAF and AAF had superior planes that they preferred (p. 121). Later on, the British would find a remedy to the serious problem of an underpowered engine. Amid the other major problems incurred were many deadly complications that could have resulted in the death of the pilot. According to Rogers (2011) the Mustang unfortunately had an uncanny tendency for its guns to jam when forced into a high G (gravity felt as weight) maneuver (p. 23). As Jablonski (1972) noted, this could have been fatal in a dogfight against an experienced adversary because it left the Mustang defenseless (51). Another serious design flaw, as Rogers (2011) observed, was the long nose and high cowling of the Mustang. This forced a zigzag takeoff at low speeds, which fouled up spark plugs. In turn, this resulted in chronic engine failure forcing many missions to be aborted. The last straw was the reoccurrence of more engine failures in flight, which was potentially lethal to the pilot (p. 27).

5 The P-51 Mustang 5 The British must have seen serious potential in order to patiently stay committed to such a problematic plane as the Mustang. Not only did the British tolerate the plane due to need, but they actually thought rather highly of it. Jablonski (1982) mentions that the British favored the Mustang because of its clean design, extensive protective armor for the pilot, large and leakproof fuel tanks, and good performance at low altitudes (p. 98). As indicated by Rogers (2011) the self-sealing tanks were truly a Godsend: pilots would never have to worry about getting their fuel tanks holed (p. 50). In addition, Kennedy (2013) alludes to the fact that while the aerodynamics of the Mustang puzzled the British, they were deeply interested in its potential. Jablonski (1982) observed that the immense firepower of the Mustang was very satisfying for the British; the P-51 was equipped with six wing mounted.50 caliber machine guns (p. 110). The British were mystified by the Mustang s performance, but they were determined to exploit the plane s full potential. According to Kennedy (2013) the British contacted Rolls- Royce s test pilot, Ronnie Harker, and asked him to test a problematic U.S. plane, designated Pursuit Fighter 51 (P-51) (p. 121). Harker loved the plane even when he compared it to many of the other top-notch British fighters he had flown. He especially favored the Mustang because aerodynamically the plane was superb, and it turned easily, never stalled, and was fine at low to medium altitudes (Kennedy, 2013, p. 121). His report concluded The point that strikes me is that with a powerful and good engine like the Merlin 61, its performance should be outstanding, as it is 35 m.p.h. faster than the Spitfire 5 at roughly the same power" (Kennedy, 2013, p. 122). Essentially Harker had just recommended the imperative component that the plane was missing. This idea would prove to be the Mustang s savior because both the RAF and the AAF heavily preferred other planes at the moment. As Michel (2008) states, Fortunately, because of a serendipitous series of events, the P-51 was developed and survived" (p. 53).

6 The P-51 Mustang 6 Once the Merlin Packard 61 engine had been installed into the P-51, the effects on the performance of the Mustang were instantaneous. Kennedy (2013) states that after the first Merlin 61 engine had been positioned in the Mustang, it became an entirely new plane (p. 126). Tests showed that while the Mustang was considerably heavier than the Spitfire, it (the Spitfire) needed far more revs per minute to attain the same altitude and speed (Kennedy, 2013, p. 127). That engine, coupled with the Mustang s astounding fuel capacity (Kennedy, 2013, p. 127), which totaled approximately 269 gallons when all internal tanks were full (p. 127), more than doubled the range of the Spitfire, an astounding feat during World War II (Kennedy, 2013, p. 127). Hull (2013) mentions that when the Mustang entered the fray in its modified state, its exceptional range, speed, and armament quickly made it the scourge of Luftwaffe pilots flying the inferior Me-109 (p. 58). The British then produced another object that would further revolutionize the air war the drop tank (an external gas tank slung beneath the airplane). When the aluminum drop tank first appeared in the ETO, it had the desired effect on Allied aircraft of significantly extending their range of flight. Kennedy (2013) points out that the drop tank especially augmented the Mustang's range, because of its low rate of fuel consumption (p. 127). Ludwig (2003) writes that drop tanks were in such high demand, and the British had such a small supply of aluminum, that they eventually started manufacturing the tanks out of stiffened paper (p. 168)! Incredibly enough, Kennedy (2013) observes that Allied pilots favored the paper drop tanks to the similar aluminum versions, because the paper was lighter and it denied the German war machine use of the discarded aluminum (p. 127). Kennedy (2013) states that pilots were so fond of the paper drop tanks that they continued to scrounge them until the end of the war in Europe (p. 127).

7 The P-51 Mustang 7 As would make sense, once the American AAF pilots discovered the Mustang, they quickly became admirers and asked for the deployment of P-51 s to their squadrons. However, the Mustang was not forthcoming. Kennedy (2013) notes that the P-51 Mustang s development and manufacture was stalled because of opposition among prominent USAAF and United States Air Force (USAF) generals. Kennedy (2013) explains that the generals were already committed to certain aircraft that had been tested in combat with relative success, and that the Mustang was an untried foreign idea that seemed and sounded ridiculous (p. 123). Kennedy (2013) also writes that the American Air Production Board, which was biased against the Mustang because it had been ordered by the RAF, was determined to slow down, if not totally stop, the production of all P-51's (p. 123). The bureaucratic dispute that affected the production of the Mustang, was not only a nuisance, it was a deadly complication. It did not matter who appealed to the US government to try to stimulate action. Even when Col. Don Blakeslee, a high profile American fighter pilot ace implored the Eighth Air Force for Mustangs, his commanding general initially opposed the idea (Hull, 2013, p. 58). According to Kennedy (2013) the complications became so intolerable that Winston Churchill pleaded with President Roosevelt in order to try to encourage American manufacturing of the Mustang (p. 122). Kennedy (2013) concludes that the push that made it possible for Mustangs to be deployed by U.S. forces finally came from within the USAAF for two reasons. Kennedy (2013) explains that the first reason was the Schweinfurt-Regensburg bombing raid disaster (In August 1943) that resulted in the high command realizing that full range fighter escorts were needed for the success of daylight bombing raids over Germany (p. 124). That and other bombing raids otherwise had such a high rate of attrition, which forced operations to almost cease, that even

8 The P-51 Mustang 8 members of the U.S. Congress were getting agitated (Kennedy, 2013, p. 124). In addition, Kennedy (2013) states that Operations Anvil and Overlord, the Allied invasions of France, could not be carried out unless the Luftwaffe was eliminated (p.124). In short, the Allies needed total air supremacy. Kennedy (2013) states that the second reason for the deployment of the Mustang by American forces was the remarkable amount of pressure exerted by a small cluster of men in the middle echelons of the USAAF (p. 125). Included among these were prominent flight leaders such as Commander Donald Blakeslee of the Eighth Air Force and Lieutenant General Jimmy Doolittle (p.125). Kennedy (2013) also writes that Tommy Hitchcock, the American air attaché in London, and the U.S. assistant secretary for air, Robert A Lovett, put their weight behind the P-51 (p.125). When the Mustang finally was accepted into the ranks of the AAF, it left a trail of wreckage in its path. Hermann Goering famously said, When I saw Mustangs over Berlin, I knew the jig was up" (Weider, 2011, p. 1). Nevertheless, the Allied air war effort took a severe beating in the early spring campaigns of 1944, with many of their most experienced and "best bomber and fighter pilots killed maimed or captured by a desperate German resistance (Kennedy, 2013, p.129). However, Kennedy (2013) states, the Luftwaffe fared far worse: to balance the extensive losses to American and British fighters, the Luftwaffe pulled many of the crews from the Eastern front (Russia), which gave the Soviets an advantage with air superiority for the first time ever, and the Luftwaffe also recalled most of the Mediterranean air groups in defense of the motherland (p. 129). Kennedy (2013) writes that even this influx of Axis pilots in Germany could not stem the tide of the Allied bombing campaign (p.130). In short, the

9 The P-51 Mustang 9 Luftwaffe was being bled dry of all its experienced pilots and crews. There was no experienced reserve left. Kennedy (2013) concluded even though there was an ample supply of German planes in production, the effectiveness of the Luftwaffe was hampered by a severe shortage of aviation fuel, and above all, the loss of fighter pilots and crews. Newly trained recruits had so few flight hours, and had such a distinct lack of training, that Mustang pilots who chased their prey to the ground reported that many German planes were unable to avoid crashing into a pylon, tree, or high building (Kennedy, 2013, p.130). These same inexperienced pilots, and their competent comrades, "would come to regard the Mustang as the best Allied fighter of the war" (Hull, 2013, p. 58). "The RAF and AAF were able to inflict that damage only because other, more important things happened first" (Kennedy 2013, p. 136). Jablonski (1972) states that the development of the Mustang was the more important thing, because its influence warded off enemy planes while guarding AAF bombers all the way to and from their targets deep in the heart of the Third Reich (p. 48). Thanks to the superior performance of the radically innovative Mustang, the Eighth Air force was not compelled to adopt a flawed strategy that would have resulted in disaster for the USAAF. Instead, the Eighth Air Force implemented a plan that devastated the German economy and war machine. This Allied bombing campaign (Operation Pointblank) "resumed with vengeance" and the AAF started to execute their goal of "the progressive destruction and dislocation of the enemy's" capability to resist (Kennedy, 2013, p. 127). The breakthrough in 1944 was a consequence of the USAAF pounding the Germans with daylight raids, with

10 The P-51 Mustang 10 increasing amounts of fighter escorts to protect them from airborne threats. Michel (2003) states that early in 1944 Mustangs were just 10 percent of the escorts, but scored 30 percent of the kills. As an example of how the P-51 impacted air-to-air combat results, Michel (2003) observes that the 4th Group had about 75 kills in P-47s from March 1943 to February 1944 when they received P-51s. By mid-march 1944, the group had scored its 400th victory 350 in a month and a half in P-51s compared to the 75 in eleven months in the P 47 (p. 56). Jablonski suggests that the reason for this was the superior versatility, agility, and responsiveness of the P-51 Mustang when compared to the P-47 Thunderbolt (p. 99). The Mustang truly ruled the air during its stint as the predominant escort fighter deployed by the AAF. In hindsight, with the War in Europe hanging in the balance, the production of the Mustang was a touch and go process with no assured outcome. In 1940 the RAF, in need of a dominant fighter that could exploit the weaknesses that the Luftwaffe presented, stumbled upon a small California company that specialized in designing and manufacturing racing planes. That company, NAA, eventually designed an innovative and technologically superior fighter plane that would dominate the ETO until the end of World War II. Ironically, the mathematician who designed the Mustang, which ended up destroying most of the Luftwaffe, was a German immigrant. Both unfortunate and lucky coincidences pervaded the Mustang s career, with many of those coincidences contributing positively to the plane that many have called the best fighter of the war. The single greatest revision to the Mustang was the replacement of the Allison engine with the higher performing Rolls-Royce Merlin 61. However, bureaucracy and obstinacy on the part of American air marshals delayed the process of deployment to the American air groups in Britain, which limited the instantaneous effect of the Mustang. Deployment may not have been immediate, but once most air groups in the ETO were supplied with P-51s, the effect was

11 The P-51 Mustang 11 obvious. AAF bombers were able to penetrate deeper and with fewer losses into Germany while escort fighters crushed the vaunted Luftwaffe. The Mustang quickly became a favorite among AAF pilots because of its superior maneuverability, agility, speed, aerobatic performance, and responsiveness. One AAF pilot described it best: flying it [the Mustang] was a sensual pleasure (Jablonski, 1982, p. 98). To the Allied high command, the Mustang was a Godsend.

12 The P-51 Mustang 12 References Haggerty, A. (2010). The P-51 Mustang : A Case Study In Defense Acquisition. Defense AR Journal, 17(4), Hull, M. D. (2013). 'Patton In A P-51'. Aviation History, 23(5), Jablonski, E. (1972). Airwar: Wings of fire (Vol. IV). Garden City, NY: Doubleday & Company. Jablonski, E. (1982). America in the air war. Alexandria, VA: Time-Life Books. Kennedy, P. (2013). Engineers of victory. Ney York, NY: Random House. Ludwig, P. A. (2003). P-51 Mustang Development of the Long-Range Escort Fighter. Birmingham, United Kingdom: Classic Publications. Michel, M. L. (2008). The P-51 Mustang: The Most Important Aircraft In History. Air Power History, 55(4), 46. Rogers, F. (2011). Breaking in the Mustang. Aviation History, 21(4), 22. Sage Reinlie, L. (2013, January 27). World War II vet recalls P-51 missions. Northwest Florida Daily News (Fort Walton Beach, FL). Gadney, M. (2011). Long Range Luftwaffe Killers. World War II, 25(6), 66-67