Sonye Engineering, LLC

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1 Sonye Engineering, LLC Automotive Engineering Consultants 184 Stonetree Circle Rochester Hills, Michigan (248) Job No. SE State of Minnesota vs. Koua Fong Lee Engineering Report FrankSonye@SonyeEngineering.com A. INTRODUCTION This report was written at the request of and submitted to the Office of the Ramsey County Attorney. The subject incident was a crash that took place at approximately 4:40 PM on Saturday, June 10 th, 2006 in St. Paul, Minnesota and involved a 1996 Toyota Camry with Vehicle Identification Number: 4T1BF12K6TU The date of manufacture was January The power train consists of a 6 cylinder 3.0L gasoline engine (1MZ-FE) with an automatic transmission. The vehicle was equipped with cruise control and anti-lock brakes. The author was asked to become familiar with the subject vehicle in general and specifically with the electrical/electronic systems, the cruise control system, the throttle control system; the events leading up to the crash; and the crash scene. The author was also asked to review and comment on the engineering report by Mr. Richard F. Dusek dated , and the other incidents as described in affidavits to Mr. Lee s Petition for Post Conviction Relief. This report summarizes the author s review of the relevant materials and sets forth the opinions reached. B. DOCUMENTS EXAMINED The following documents have been examined by the author, and unless otherwise indicated were provided by the Office of the Ramsey County Attorney: vehicle inspection photos (identified as Donnelly Photos taken on ) 2. Aftermarket cruise control recall documents: i. Letter dated from Raymond Ford (Rostra) to Michael Brownlee (NHTSA) ii. Letter dated from Raymond Ford (Rostra) to Tom Garza (Toyota) iii. Letter dated from Raymond Ford (Rostra) to Preston Fox (Toyota) iv. Letter dated from Raymond Ford (Rostra) to Michael Brownlee (NHTSA) v. Letter dated from Jonathan White (NHTSA) to Raymond Ford (Rostra) 3. Collision Analysis and Reconstruction Report dated by Gregory Gravesen (SPPD) 4. Vehicle Inspection Protocol dated by Richard F. Dusek with Wade Bartlett comments 5. Vehicle Inspection Protocol (revised) dated by Richard F. Dusek 6. Petition for Post Conviction Relief dated and attached supplemental affidavits 7. Reconstruction Report dated by M. Rod Lundgren Aerial photos of collision scene 9. 4 Aerial photos of ramp aerial photos and diagrams of scene photos by SPPD ( thru ) photos taken by Gravesen/Churchich (Gravesen.ppt) Frank C. Sonye Page 1 of 21 June 14, 2010

2 photos by SPFD (P thru P ) 14. Vehicle Inspection Report not dated by Michael J. Churchich (City of St. Paul) Scene Photos taken by Ramsey County Medical Examiner (P thru P ) 16. Accident Report & keys dated by SPPD Officer Joseph Dick 17. St. Paul Police Incident Report dated Transcript of interview of Koua Lee dated Transcript of interview of Pang Houa Moua dated Supplemental police report dated Supplemental police report dated Supplemental SP Police reports (approx 26 reports plus other docs) 23. Letter dated from Mark Solheim to Brian Stofferahn (w/redacted text) 24. Letter dated from Mark Solheim to Brian Stofferahn (w/o redacted text) 25. Toyota Camry Technical Description Documents dated March, 2010 compiled by HMG, LLP 26. Protocol for Vehicle Inspection by SPPD 27. Letter dated from Bard Borkon to Phillip Carruthers re: inspection protocol 28. Trial transcript testimony of Koua Fong Lee, Pang Houa Moua, Nhia Koua Lee, and Nong Lee 29. Trial exhibits (15-20, 44-45, 59-63, 68-73, 75-76, 80-81) 30. Portions of Toyota Vehicle Service Documents (Technical Information System) for 1985, 1994, 1995, 1996, 1998, 2000, and 2003 Toyota Camry; 1996 Toyota Tacoma; 1996 Toyota Avalon 31. Vehicle Inspection Report by Richard F. Dusek dated Vehicle Inspection Report by James E. Walker, Jr. dated Supplement to Vehicle Inspection Report by Richard F. Dusek dated Draft Copy of Vehicle Inspection Report by Wade Bartlett 35. Affidavit of Koua Fong Lee dated Trial Transcript of Mike Churchich 37. Supplemental Police Reports dated , , , and C. VEHICLE INSPECTION A vehicle inspection was conducted over a two day period beginning on April 20, On April 20 th, the inspection began at 8:00AM and concluded at 7:00PM. On April 21 st the inspection resumed at 8:00AM and concluded at 4:00PM. The inspection was conducted at the St. Paul Police Department Impound Lot located at 830 Barge Channel Road, St. Paul, MN. The subject 1996 Toyota Camry is equipped with a 3.0L fuel-injected gasoline engine with a mechanical cable driven throttle valve. The vehicle has a stand-alone cruise control system. The vehicle does not contain an electronic throttle control system such as those used in later model vehicles. 1. Exterior Visual Inspection A visual examination of the vehicle s exterior showed substantial impact damage across the entire front of the vehicle. There was impact damage to the left rear quarter panel between the axle and the rear bumper. There was also some minor damage to the right rear quarter panel between the axle and the rear bumper. The rear bumper cover had been separated from the vehicle. The right rear tail lamp and reflector assembly had been disassembled. This was not consistent with the scene photographs. The rear bulbs had been wrapped in clear bubble-wrap material. The hood and other loose parts that were stored with the vehicle were removed and set aside to provide better access to the engine compartment. Frank C. Sonye Page 2 of 21 June 14, 2010

3 2. Passenger Compartment There was intrusion into and damage to the passenger compartment caused by the crash. The driver and passenger front air-bags had deployed. The odometer indicated 177,893 miles. There was a significant amount of dust, dirt, and water damage to the interior of the vehicle resulting from its years of storage in the police secured storage lot. The uniform layer of dust/dirt on the instrument cluster, as shown in Photo #1, is typical of all surfaces in the vehicle interior. Photo #2 shows where water collection has supported a green growth in the driver s foot well. The Front of Dash, to which the brake and accelerator pedals are attached, had been moved rearward as a result of contact with the engine during the crash. 3. Passenger Compartment Accelerator Pedal The accelerator pedal operated smoothly when depressed and released. However, the cable that connected the accelerator pedal to the throttle linkage was binding and appeared to have limited movement. 4. Engine Compartment It was observed that nearly all components in the engine compartment, including the exterior of the throttle body, throttle linkages, and the cruise actuator had been subjected to significant weathering, including corrosion, and a heavy covering of dust and fibrous material. This was a result of the vehicle being stored for many years in the police secure storage lot with a damaged hood that left the engine compartment open to wind, rain, dust, snow, etc. The layer of dust/dirt and corrosion on various parts can be seen in many of the photographs. As a result of the crash, the front of the vehicle was pushed into the engine compartment. That intrusion into the engine compartment pushed the battery and its mounting tray into the cruise control actuator and throttle linkage. This damage moved the actuator from its design location, broke a plastic retainer, and bent the metal throttle linkage mechanism. See photos #3 and #4. In order to provide a better view of the cruise control actuator and throttle linkage mechanism, the air induction system and the battery were removed from the vehicle. The cruise actuator with its throttle linkage mechanism was unbolted and moved from its design location in order to provide a better visual inspection. See photo #5. 5. Engine Compartment Throttle Body The throttle plate moved smoothly when rotated independently of the throttle linkage cable. However, the cable did not move smoothly, exhibited some binding, and did not extend fully over its range of travel. This was caused by damage to the cruise control actuator assembly and is described in more detail in Section C-6 of this report. The throttle plate did not return to the fully closed position because of the restricted movement in the cable to the cruise control actuator. The amount that the throttle plate was held open is relatively small and would only cause the engine to run at a high idle speed. See photo #8. The dark arc at the bottom of the throttle plate shows the slight opening. The throttle return spring was in place and functional. See photo #6. There was, however, a significant amount of corrosion, dust, and dirt on the throttle body linkage. See photo #7. When Frank C. Sonye Page 3 of 21 June 14, 2010

4 the air induction system was removed, examination of the throttle body showed nothing out of the ordinary. There did not appear to be any obstructions; the bore was relatively clean. See photo #8. 6. Engine Compartment Cruise Control Actuator The cruise control actuator is a Toyota original equipment part. As a result, the Rostra cruise control recall was not relevant. The cruise actuator is labeled with the following information: Cruise Control Toyota V AISIN The cruise control actuator and its associated throttle linkage had been pushed from their design location and damaged in the crash. They were trapped and crushed between the battery, the radiator, and the engine. In addition, there was significant corrosion, and a heavy covering of dust and fibrous material. The electrical connector between the actuator and the vehicle wiring harness was also broken from its mounting tab. See photo #9. The corrosion, dust and water intrusion, and the damaged metal plate prevented proper operation of the throttle cables and linkage in three ways: The throttle cable was prevented from extending to its full length due to damage to the mounting bracket. This held the throttle plate open slightly and would have resulted only in a high idle speed. The cruise actuator linkage would begin to bind at approximately 25% of throttle opening. This prevented the throttle from opening further until sufficient force was applied to move past the binding. This binding was due to the damaged mounting bracket contacting the actuator linkage and did not exist before the crash. See photos #10 and #11. There was also substantial friction that prevented the pulleys from rotating smoothly around their axle pin. The friction was sufficient enough to prevent the throttle from returning to idle when the accelerator pedal was released. The friction was due to corrosion, dust intrusion, and a buildup of fibrous material and was not present before the crash. See photo #12. All three of the problems, mentioned above, were caused either by collision damage or the weathering affects of being stored for several years in an unprotected environment. None of the three problems would have caused the vehicle to accelerate to the high speed involved in this crash. 7. Engine Compartment Cruise Control Actuator Electrical Measurements The cruise control actuator was disconnected from the vehicle wiring harness. The connectors and pins appeared clean and free from corrosion. Electrical measurements were taken: Frank C. Sonye Page 4 of 21 June 14, 2010

5 Table 1 Cruise Control Actuator Electrical Measurements Pins Description Value (ohms) 1-3 Position resistor fixed ends Clutch relay (red lead on pin 5) Clutch relay (read lead on pin 4) Motor position fully CW Motor position fully CCW Motor position middle Motor position fully CW Motor position fully CCW Motor position middle 1324 Resistance between pins 1 and 2 was measured as the motor position was slowly rotated back and forth between its limits of travel. The measurement varied smoothly, without interruption, indicating proper function of the sensor contact. See photo #13. The electrical measurements indicated that the cruise control actuator circuits were performing correctly and were all in the range to be expected for a 14 year old vehicle with over 177,000 miles that had been stored for several years in an unprotected environment. 8. Passenger Compartment Cruise Control Switch The steering wheel mounted cruise control switch is a Toyota original equipment part. Electrical measurements were taken that documented the condition of both the Cruise Control Switch and its associated electrical wiring harness. Table 2 provides the results of these measurements. Table 2 Cruise Control Switch Electrical Measurements Pins Description Value (ohms) Main Switch Up Open Circuit Main Switch Depressed Resume/Accelerate - Depressed Set/Coast Depressed Cancel Depressed 422 The measurements indicate that the cruise control switches and the wiring that connects them to the ECU are operating as intended. 9. Passenger Compartment Brake Pedal Switches There are two redundant electrical brake pedal switches monitored by the Cruise Control ECU: The Normally Open (NO) switch has two functions. First, it turns on the brake lights. Secondly, it signals the Cruise Control ECU whenever the brake pedal is depressed, and The Normally Closed (NC) switch turns-off electrical power to the cruise actuator clutch when the brake pedal is pressed. Frank C. Sonye Page 5 of 21 June 14, 2010

6 Operation of the two brake pedal switches was observed by measuring the electrical resistance of the switch and its vehicle wiring harness. Both switches operated correctly. Operation of the Normally Open Switch was observed by measuring the resistance between pins 1 and 16 of the Cruise ECU wiring harness connector. The switch contact closed when the brake pedal was depressed approximately inches. The switch operated as intended. The following table shows the results of the measurements: Table 3 Normally Open Brake Switch Measurements Pins Description Value (ohms) 1-16 Brake Pedal Up Brake Pedal Depressed 0.3 Operation of the Normally Closed Switch was observed by measuring the resistance between pin 10 of Cruise ECU wiring harness connector and pin 5 of the under hood cruise actuator wiring harness connector. The switch contact opened when the brake pedal was depressed approximately inches. The switch operated as intended. The following table shows the results of the measurements: Table 4 Normally closed Brake Switch Measurements Pins Description Value (ohms) 10-5 Brake Pedal Up (3 readings) 2.4; 0.6; Brake Pedal Depressed Open Circuit 10. Passenger Compartment Cruise Electronic Control Unit The Electronic Control Unit (ECU) for the Cruise Control is located in the instrument panel near the passenger side A-pillar. Access was gained by removing the glove box assembly. The Cruise ECU is a Toyota original equipment part. It had a label with the following information: CRUISE CONTROL TOYOTA FUJITSU TEN LIMITED JAPAN {BAR CODE} * E* The Cruise ECU was disconnected from the vehicle wiring harness. The connectors and pins appeared clean and free from corrosion. There was no physical damage to the ECU, its connectors, or the vehicle wiring harness that would have prevented it from operating properly. No electrical testing of the ECU was performed because of the damaged condition of the vehicle. It was not necessary to perform further testing on this module because even a complete electrical failure of the ECU is not sufficient to cause the vehicle to accelerate while the brakes are being applied. Frank C. Sonye Page 6 of 21 June 14, 2010

7 11. Base Brake System The base-brake system of this vehicle does not require a functional ECU or even any electrical power to operate. The brake system contains two separate and redundant hydraulic circuits controlled by two pistons in the brake master cylinder. With a failure in either of these systems, braking will still be provided in two of the four wheels. The inspection of the vehicles base brake system was done under the direction of Mr. Wade Bartlett. In general, there appeared to be nothing remarkable about the vacuum boost system, the hydraulic system, the calipers, or friction material, given that the vehicle had been in a major frontal collision and had been stored unprotected for nearly four years. One pad on the right rear caliper may have had some debris between it and the backing plate which caused wearing to occur more rapidly at that end of the pad. While there were no obvious signs of brake overheating, substantial rusting of the rotors, which occurred over the long period that the vehicle was stored, made a definitive determination difficult. However, Mr. Mike Churchich inspected the vehicle approximately two days after the crash and reported finding no signs of brake overheating. Under a Wide Open Throttle (WOT) condition, the subject Camry s four wheel disk brake system would have been capable, at a minimum, of preventing vehicle from accelerating. If the brakes were fully and firmly applied the vehicle would have slowed substantially, not accelerated. 12. Cruise Control System There are only two ways that the throttle valve can be opened to provide engine power beyond an idle condition: the driver s foot on the accelerator pedal and engaging the cruise control system. There are several cruise control diagnostics that will detect problems in the ECU, the vehicle wiring, the switches and the actuator. If any of these diagnostics fail, the cruise control will not turn-on or will disengage if already turned-on. The Cruise Control System is designed to disengage under any of several conditions, including when the driver presses the brake pedal. Also, in the unlikely event of a complete electronic failure of the cruise control ECU, the vehicle is designed so that the brake pedal switch will turn-off electrical power to the cruise actuator clutch. This will completely disengage the cruise actuator motor from the throttle linkage. In order for the cruise control system to accelerate this vehicle while the driver was depressing the brake pedal, several system failures would have to take place simultaneously: 1. The cruise system would have to be turned-on without the driver pressing the On-Off button, and 2. The cruise control system would have to actively engage the throttle control without the driver pressing the set speed button, and 3. The cruise control system would have to fail turn-off when the brake pedal was depressed, and Frank C. Sonye Page 7 of 21 June 14, 2010

8 13. Fuses 4. The electrically operated clutch that connects the cruise control motor to the throttle linkage would have to engage even after the electrical power was turned-off by the brake pedal switch, and 5. There would have to be a failure of both sides of the brake hydraulic system, and 6. These failures would have to self-correct themselves before the vehicle was inspected by trained personnel. The electrical fuses in the engine and passenger compartments were removed one at a time and visually examined. All fuses were present and of the correct capacity as indicated by the owner s manual. All fuses tested were intact (not blown) The three Maxi Fuses behind the Instrument Panel cover in the passenger compartment could not be reached for examination without further disassembly. Given that all of the other fuses checked OK and there was no visible damage to the wiring harnesses in this area of the instrument panel, it was felt that the further disassembly would not provide any additional significant data. 14. Rear Exterior Lamps The only damage to the rear exterior lamp filaments occurred on the left side of the vehicle. The left turn signal bulb contains one filament. This filament was broken at one end and bent substantially out of its design position. See photo #16. The left Stop and Tail Lamp bulb contains two filaments. The Tail Lamp filament was broken at one end and bent substantially out of its design position. The Stop Lamp filament did not appear to be broken; however, it exhibited some stretching, distortion, and slight tangling which indicates the filament was hot when the impact occurred. See photo #17. The subject vehicle sustained two substantial impacts during the crash. The first was a frontal impact with a 1995 Oldsmobile Ciera. The second impact was to the left side of the vehicle between the rear wheel and the bumper. See photo #18. Because the Principal Direction of Force (PDOF) for the first impact was at the 12 o clock position, all of the rear lamp filaments were subjected to approximately the same forces. Since only the lamp filaments on the left side of the vehicle were damaged, it is more likely than not that the damage was due to the second impact, which occurred on the left side of the vehicle. The damage sustained by the left Brake Lamp filament does not indicate how long before the impact the brakes had been applied. However, the overall vehicle physical evidence is not consistent with the brakes being effectively applied for any length of time. There are two possible explanations: The brakes may have been applied very late in the scenario (just prior to impact) or The deceleration forces resulting from the first collision caused the brake pedal to move forward sufficiently to turn on the brake lights. Measurements showed that the brake Frank C. Sonye Page 8 of 21 June 14, 2010

9 lights would have turned on with inches of pedal travel. This amount of travel is not sufficient to develop any effective braking. D. COMMENTS ON R.F. DUSEK S REPORT AND ADDENDUM The following are comments regarding Mr. Dusek s report dated and his addendum dated : 1. On the 3 rd page of his report, Mr. Dusek states: I asked that the Accelerator Pedal be removed for further investigation of this apparent accelerator pedal assembly fault, but no removal or further detailed examination to determine the root cause was included in the inspection. It was not felt that further examination would provide any useful information relative to the operation of the throttle controls. This position is further supported by Mr. Dusek when he later states on the 7 th page, while discussing the pedal linkage not moving freely, The apparently faulty return spring on the Accelerator Pedal Assembly does not appear to be a contributing factor to this. 2. On the 4 th page of his report, Mr. Dusek states that one of the resistance readings taken during the examination of the cruise control actuator falls more than 10% outside of the range given to be specified in the Toyota Factory specifications. He does not address the significance of this comment in his report. This observation by Mr. Dusek is not indicative of any condition that would cause an unwanted acceleration in this vehicle. Mr. Dusek correctly observes that the 615 ohm measurement across pins 3 and 2 was outside of the specified range by over 10%. First, this may have been related to the fact that the throttle plate was not fully closed. Secondly, this measured value is only used to tell the Cruise Control ECU that the throttle was fully closed. If the Cruise Control ECU were to use this value, it would indicate that the throttle was slightly open when it was actually closed. Any action taken by the ECU, based on this value, would be to try to close the throttle further not open it. 3. On the 5 th page of his report, Mr. Dusek states: The results of these brake light switch measurements revealed that the brake light switch, after being depressed and released, did not recover to the initial reading for a number of seconds. He also states in Attachment H, Readings range from 0.6 to 16.5 slowly recovering to initial value... Should recover to initial value more quickly further detailed analysis desired. Again, Mr. Dusek did not address the significance of this comment in his report. The switches were working as intended and further analysis is not required. Two comments regarding his statement are in order: First, Mr. Dusek incorrectly identified this switch as the brake light switch when it was actually the cruise control switch. Depressing the brake pedal and opening this switch will turn off the cruise control. Secondly, the effect of slowly recovering to initial value means the cruise control cannot be re-engaged until this switch reading stabilizes. The effect is that the driver would have to wait Frank C. Sonye Page 9 of 21 June 14, 2010

10 two or three seconds before he could engage the cruise control after pressing and releasing the brake pedal., 4. On the 5 th page of his report, Mr. Dusek incorrectly states The left stop lamp bulb has both filaments broken. Only the tail lamp filament in the bulb was broken. The brake lamp filament was distorted but not broken as shown in photo #17, of this report. 5. On the 5 th page of his report, Mr. Dusek observes that the color of the plastic wiring haness connector body for the Cruise Control ECU is green instead of gray. The color of the connector is of no significance. This apparent anomaly is more likely than not due to a misprint in the cruise control documentation, since the mating connector on the ECU itself is also green. 6. In the Conclusions section on the 7 th page of his report, Mr. Dusek states that the pulleys and cables do not move freely and Instead, they stay stuck in the position they are placed in. As stated earlier in this report, substantial friction, due to corrosion, dust intrusion, and a buildup of fibrous material, prevented the pulleys from rotating smoothly. This condition resulted from exposure during the long-term storage of the vehicle since the crash. This is acknowledged by Mr. Dusek on the 8 th page where he states, There was too much accumulated grime to observe the associated return springs in any detail. This is shown in Photo # On the 8 th page of his report, while discussing the cruise control actuator and throttle linkage, Mr. Dusek states that Damage from the accident does not appear to be causing any of these faults. As stated in section C-6 of this report, the Cruise Control Actuator mounting bracket was bent in the crash. The deformed metal bracket contacted one of the pulley/cam linkages and prevented it from rotating over its entire design range. This is shown in Photo # Twice on the 8 th page of his report, Mr. Dusek states that additional analysis is required to reach further conclusions. Further analysis and data is not required. Regarding the Engine Throttle and Cruise Control System, even a complete failure of the Cruise Control ECU and the Engine Control ECU are not sufficient to cause the vehicle to accelerate when the brakes are applied. Regarding the Braking System, there is no evidence that the system was not working as designed; nor is there any evidence that the brakes over-heated. Mr. Dusek does not indicate what further conclusions could be reached or the significance of these conclusions. 9. Several times in his report, Mr. Dusek comments that the testing and measurements were not done according to Toyota s service manual. It was not always possible to perform the service manual procedures, exactly as specified, due to damage to the vehicle s structure, its drive train, and its electrical system. In most cases there are other procedures that will provide the same or equivalent results to the service manual procedure. The fact that some procedures were performed in a different manner does not necessarily render them invalid. The procedures used in the inspection of this vehicle were based on a sound Frank C. Sonye Page 10 of 21 June 14, 2010

11 understanding of how the vehicle operated under a wide variety of conditions and provided valid data on which an opinion could be based. 10. In his Supplement dated , Mr. Dusek disagrees with Mr. Churchich s statement that the throttle plate was held slightly open by a deformation in the firewall. Mr. Dusek s support for that statement is If this were an accurate and factual assessment and statement, the vehicle damage would have still held the throttle open and prevented it from closing completely during my inspection of May 20 th and 21 st, The throttle plate was not completely closed during our inspection. It was, in fact, being held open slightly. This is further discussed in section C-5 of this report and is shown in photo #8. It was not held open to any significant degree; and would only have caused a fast idle if the engine were running. This same observation is made by Mr. Walker and Mr. Bartlett in their reports. E. COMMENTS ON PETITIONER EXHIBITS 1 THRU 24 In general, anecdotal statements are not sufficient to establish a substantially similar event. Based only on the driver s statement there are many significant factors and conditions of the event that cannot be known. In these particular statements, some contain inconsistencies; some involve completely different vehicles; some are similar vehicles with different throttle systems, cruise control systems, or engines; and in some, driver error cannot be ruled out. For the purposes of this section, a surge in engine speed is defined as a sudden increase of a few hundred RPM followed by a return to the previous speed. Engine speed in an unwanted acceleration would increase several thousand RPM and would not return to the previous speed. 1. Exhibits 5, 11, and 18 are not unique events, in that they describe the same event also contained in other exhibits. 2. Exhibit 9 describes a surge not an unwanted acceleration, there was no mention of brake failure, and the vehicle was not substantially similar, in that it was 11 years older than the subject vehicle. 3. Exhibit 10 does not mention any attempt to apply the brakes and the vehicle was not substantially similar, in that it was 11 years older than the subject vehicle. 4. Exhibit 12 describes a surge not an unwanted acceleration, there was no mention of brake failure, and the vehicle was not substantially similar, in that it was Tacoma not a Camry. 5. Exhibit 15 describes an event where the brakes were able to stop the vehicle. 6. Exhibit 16 describes an event with a vehicle that was not substantially similar to the subject vehicle, in that it was 7 years newer than the subject vehicle; it did not have a Cruise Control ECU; and it contained an electronic throttle control. 7. There was no Petitioner Exhibit # Exhibit 19 describes an event with a vehicle that was not substantially similar to the subject vehicle, in that it was an Avalon not a Camry. The loss of power steering is not consistent with the engine running in neutral. Frank C. Sonye Page 11 of 21 June 14, 2010

12 9. Exhibit 22 describes an event with a vehicle that was not substantially similar to the subject vehicle, in that it was 4 years newer than the subject vehicle; it did not have the same Cruise Control ECU; and it contained a different cruise control actuator. 10. Exhibit 24 describes an event with a vehicle that was not substantially similar to the subject vehicle, in that it was 4 years newer than the subject vehicle; it did not have the same Cruise Control ECU; and it contained a different cruise control actuator. F. COMMENTS ON J. E. WALKER S REPORT I have read the report by Mr. J.E. Walker dated and have no substantive disagreement with his findings or opinions. G. OPINIONS Based on my education, training, and experience, it is my opinion, to a reasonable degree of engineering certainty, that: 1. There was nothing examined or measured during the inspection of April 20 th and 21 st of 2010 that was not available to be examined or measured immediately after the crash in June The brakes, when firmly applied, would have prevented the subject vehicle from accelerating to a speed of over 80 MPH. 3. It is not necessary to conduct further testing of the Cruise Control Actuator or the Cruise Control Electronic Control Unit, because a single point failure in either module is not sufficient to cause the throttle cable to be pulled to a wide open condition. 4. The binding and high friction exhibited by the throttle linkage was due to damage sustained in the crash and a build-up of corrosion, dust, dirt, and water intrusion that accumulated while the vehicle was being stored. 5. Based primarily on the evidence that there were no failures in the cruise control or braking system of the subject vehicle, the most likely cause of the unwanted acceleration experienced in this crash was the inadvertent application of the accelerator pedal by the driver. My opinions are base on the information made available to me at this time. If new information becomes available, I reserve the right to modify those opinions. Sincerely, Frank C. Sonye, Jr. Licensed Professional Engineer Michigan License # Frank C. Sonye Page 12 of 21 June 14, 2010